d2235ef7 (main)
and
c163a64b (PR)
+4 -5
+1 -1
[
{
"layer": {
"value": "EigenDA",
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "The data is posted to EigenDA which is a separate data availability layer developed by the Eigenlayer team. Only hashes of data are published on an onchain inbox.",
"description": "The data is posted to EigenDA which is a separate data availability layer developed by the Eigenlayer team. Only commitments to the data are published on an onchain inbox.",
"projectId": "eigenda"
},
"bridge": {
"value": "None",
"sentiment": "bad",
"description": "There is no bridge that can attest if the data has been made available.",
"orderHint": -2
},
"mode": {
"value": "Transaction data",
"secondLine": "Compressed"
}
}
]+2 -3
{
"architectureImage": "opstack-optimium-superchain-opfp",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "Data is posted to EigenDA",
"description": "Transactions roots are posted onchain and the full data is posted on EigenDA. The sequecencer is publishing data to EigenDA v2. Since the DACert Verifier is not used, availability of the data is not verified against EigenDA operators, meaning that the Sequencer can single-handedly publish unavailable commitments. If EigenDA becomes unavailable, the sequencer falls back to Ethereum.",
"description": "Transactions roots are posted onchain and the full data is posted on EigenDA. The sequencer is publishing data to EigenDA v2. Since the DACert Verifier is not used, availability of the data is not verified against EigenDA operators, meaning that the Sequencer can single-handedly publish unavailable commitments. If EigenDA becomes unavailable, the sequencer falls back to Ethereum.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be lost if",
"text": "the sequencer posts an unavailable transaction root.",
"isCritical": true
},
{
"category": "Funds can be lost if",
"text": "the data is not available on the external provider.",
"isCritical": true
}
],
"references": [
{
"title": "EigenDA Docs - Overview",
"url": "https://docs.eigenda.xyz/overview"
},
{
"title": "Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission"
},
{
"title": "BatchInbox - address",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x253887577420Cb7e7418cD4d50147743c8041b28#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xaa5b13609Fd0a48b3B20202B25494F58F3Ff89f4#code"
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular exits",
"description": "The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 30m. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 1h period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 30m to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xaa5b13609Fd0a48b3B20202B25494F58F3Ff89f4#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xaa5b13609Fd0a48b3B20202B25494F58F3Ff89f4#code"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain",
"url": "https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xaa5b13609Fd0a48b3B20202B25494F58F3Ff89f4#code"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized operator",
"description": "The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": []
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing EVM Equivalence",
"url": "https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306"
}
]
}
],
"stateValidation": {
"description": "Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by permissioned operators only. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.",
"categories": [
{
"title": "State root proposals",
"description": "Proposers submit state roots as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the `create` function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge period has passed and it is not countered.",
"references": [
{
"title": "OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game",
"url": "https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#fault-dispute-game"
}
]
},
{
"title": "Challenges",
"description": "Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state roots using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the `defend` or `attack` functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with [full concurrency](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a). Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 30m. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see [freeloader claims](https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#freeloader-claims)), if a clock gets inherited with less than 10m, it generally gets extended by 10m with the exception of 20m right before depth 30, and 2s right before the last depth. The maximum clock extension that a top level claim can get is therefore 12h. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers' stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step prover contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks ([Spearbit 5.1.3](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/develop/docs/security-reviews/2024_08_Fault-Proofs-No-MIPS_Spearbit.pdf)).",
"references": [
{
"title": "Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP",
"url": "https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a"
}
]
}
]
},
"warning": "Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots."
}
}+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1764933551,
"baseTimestamp": 1765550068,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}+2 -3
+1 -2
{
"architectureImage": "opstack-optimium-superchain-opfp",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "Data is posted to Celestia",
"description": "Transactions roots are posted onchain and the full data is posted on Celestia. Since the Blobstream bridge is not used, availability of the data is not verified against Celestia validators, meaning that the Sequencer can single-handedly publish unavailable roots. If Celestia becomes unavailable, the sequencer falls back to Ethereum.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be lost if",
"text": "the sequencer posts an unavailable transaction root.",
"isCritical": true
},
{
"category": "Funds can be lost if",
"text": "the data is not available on the external provider.",
"isCritical": true
}
],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing Blobstream: streaming modular DA to Ethereum",
"url": "https://blog.celestia.org/introducing-blobstream/"
},
{
"title": "Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission"
},
{
"title": "BatchInbox - address",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xd5df46c580fD2FBdaEE751dc535E14295C0336F3#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4#code"
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular exits",
"description": "The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4#code"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain",
"url": "https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4#code"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized operator",
"description": "The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": []
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing EVM Equivalence",
"url": "https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306"
}
]
}
],
"stateValidation": {
"description": "Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by permissioned operators only. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.",
"categories": [
{
"title": "State root proposals",
"description": "Proposers submit state roots as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the `create` function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge period has passed and it is not countered.",
"references": [
{
"title": "OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game",
"url": "https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#fault-dispute-game"
}
]
},
{
"title": "Challenges",
"description": "Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state roots using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the `defend` or `attack` functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with [full concurrency](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a). Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see [freeloader claims](https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#freeloader-claims)), if a clock gets inherited with less than 3h, it generally gets extended by 3h with the exception of 6h right before depth 30, and 1d right before the last depth. The maximum clock extension that a top level claim can get is therefore 10d. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers' stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step prover contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks ([Spearbit 5.1.3](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/develop/docs/security-reviews/2024_08_Fault-Proofs-No-MIPS_Spearbit.pdf)).",
"references": [
{
"title": "Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP",
"url": "https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a"
}
]
}
]
},
"warning": "Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots."
}
}+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1764933556,
"baseTimestamp": 1765550188,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}+2 -3
+1 -2
{
"architectureImage": "opstack-rollup-superchain-opfp",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "All data required for proofs is published on chain",
"description": "All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission"
},
{
"title": "BatchInbox - address",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x00f9BCEe08DCe4F0e7906c1f6cFb10c77802EEd0#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular exits",
"description": "The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain",
"url": "https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized operator",
"description": "The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": []
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing EVM Equivalence",
"url": "https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306"
}
]
}
],
"stateDerivation": {
"nodeSoftware": "The rollup node is composed of two software components: [op-node](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/tree/develop/op-node), implementing consensus related logic, and [op-geth](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/op-geth), implementing execution logic. The configuration file can be found [here](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/superchain-registry/blob/main/superchain/configs/mainnet/arena-z.toml).",
"compressionScheme": "Data batches are compressed using the [zlib](https://github.com/madler/zlib) algorithm with best compression level.",
"genesisState": "The genesis file can be found [here](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/superchain-registry/blob/main/superchain/extra/genesis/mainnet/arena-z.json.zst).",
"dataFormat": "The format specification of Sequencer's data batches can be found [here](https://optimism.io/blog/here-s-how-you-can-reproduce-op-mainnet-s-migration-to-bedrock)."
},
"stateValidation": {
"description": "Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by permissioned operators only. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.",
"categories": [
{
"title": "State root proposals",
"description": "Proposers submit state roots as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the `create` function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge period has passed and it is not countered.",
"references": [
{
"title": "OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game",
"url": "https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#fault-dispute-game"
}
]
},
{
"title": "Challenges",
"description": "Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state roots using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the `defend` or `attack` functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with [full concurrency](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a). Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see [freeloader claims](https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#freeloader-claims)), if a clock gets inherited with less than 3h, it generally gets extended by 3h with the exception of 6h right before depth 30, and 1d right before the last depth. The maximum clock extension that a top level claim can get is therefore 10d. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers' stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step prover contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks ([Spearbit 5.1.3](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/develop/docs/security-reviews/2024_08_Fault-Proofs-No-MIPS_Spearbit.pdf)).",
"references": [
{
"title": "Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP",
"url": "https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a"
}
]
}
]
},
"warning": "Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots."
}
}+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1764329634,
"baseTimestamp": 1765550264,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}+2 -3
+1 -2
{
"architectureImage": "opstack-rollup-superchain-opfp-permissionless",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "All data required for proofs is published on chain",
"description": "All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission"
},
{
"title": "BatchInbox - address",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xFf00000000000000000000000000000000008453#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular exits",
"description": "The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain",
"url": "https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized operator",
"description": "The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": []
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing EVM Equivalence",
"url": "https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306"
}
]
}
],
"stateDerivation": {
"nodeSoftware": "The rollup node is composed of two software components: [op-node](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/tree/develop/op-node), implementing consensus related logic, and [op-geth](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/op-geth), implementing execution logic. The configuration file can be found [here](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/superchain-registry/blob/main/superchain/configs/mainnet/base.toml).",
"compressionScheme": "Data batches are compressed using the [zlib](https://github.com/madler/zlib) algorithm with best compression level.",
"genesisState": "The genesis file can be found [here](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/base-org/node/refs/tags/v0.8.4/mainnet/genesis-l2.json).",
"dataFormat": "The format specification of Sequencer's data batches can be found [here](https://optimism.io/blog/here-s-how-you-can-reproduce-op-mainnet-s-migration-to-bedrock)."
},
"stateValidation": {
"description": "Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by anyone who has sufficient funds. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.",
"categories": [
{
"title": "State root proposals",
"description": "Proposers submit state roots as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the `create` function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.08 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge period has passed and it is not countered.",
"references": [
{
"title": "OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game",
"url": "https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#fault-dispute-game"
}
]
},
{
"title": "Challenges",
"description": "Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state roots using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 691.43 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the `defend` or `attack` functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with [full concurrency](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a). Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see [freeloader claims](https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#freeloader-claims)), if a clock gets inherited with less than 3h, it generally gets extended by 3h with the exception of 6h right before depth 30, and 1d right before the last depth. The maximum clock extension that a top level claim can get is therefore 10d. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers' stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step prover contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks ([Spearbit 5.1.3](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/develop/docs/security-reviews/2024_08_Fault-Proofs-No-MIPS_Spearbit.pdf)).",
"references": [
{
"title": "Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP",
"url": "https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a"
}
]
}
]
},
"stateValidationImage": "opfp",
"upgradesAndGovernance": "All contracts are upgradable by a `ProxyAdmin` contract which is controlled by a nested 2/2 `Base Governance Multisig` composed by the `Base Coordinator Multisig` and the OP Foundation. The `Base Coordinator Multisig` is a 2/2 controlled by the Base Security Council multisig and the Base team multisig. The Guardian role is assigned to the Security Council multisig, with a Safe Module that limits the Optimism Foundation to act through it to stop withdrawals in the whole Superchain or specific individual chains. Each pause automatically expires after 3 months if not extended or unpaused by the Security Council. The Security Council can remove the module if the Foundation becomes malicious. The single Sequencer actor can be modified by the `Base Multisig 1` via the SystemConfig contract. The Base Governance multisig can also recover dispute bonds in case of bugs that would distribute them incorrectly.",
"warning": "Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots."
"upgradesAndGovernance": "All contracts are upgradable by a `ProxyAdmin` contract which is controlled by a nested 2/2 `Base Governance Multisig` composed by the `Base Coordinator Multisig` and the OP Foundation. The `Base Coordinator Multisig` is a 2/2 controlled by the Base Security Council multisig and the Base team multisig. The Guardian role is assigned to the Security Council multisig, with a Safe Module that limits the Optimism Foundation to act through it to stop withdrawals in the whole Superchain or specific individual chains. Each pause automatically expires after 3 months if not extended or unpaused by the Security Council. The Security Council can remove the module if the Foundation becomes malicious. The single Sequencer actor can be modified by the `Base Multisig 1` via the SystemConfig contract. The Base Governance multisig can also recover dispute bonds in case of bugs that would distribute them incorrectly."
}+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1765358732,
"baseTimestamp": 1765550303,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}+2 -3
+1 -2
{
"architectureImage": "opstack-rollup-superchain-opfp-kailua",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "All data required for proofs is published on chain",
"description": "All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission"
},
{
"title": "BatchInbox - address",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x3A75346f81302aAc0333FB5DCDD407e12A6CfA83#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB250566074B3c0f1B109A531A83f3d9B1a579273#code"
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular exits",
"description": "The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 1d. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 1d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB250566074B3c0f1B109A531A83f3d9B1a579273#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB250566074B3c0f1B109A531A83f3d9B1a579273#code"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain",
"url": "https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB250566074B3c0f1B109A531A83f3d9B1a579273#code"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized operator",
"description": "The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": []
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing EVM Equivalence",
"url": "https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306"
}
]
}
],
"stateValidation": {
"categories": [
{
"title": "State root proposals",
"description": "Proposers submit state roots as children of any (possibly unresolved) previous state root proposal, by calling the `propose()` function in the KailuaTreasury. A parent state root can have multiple conflicting children, composing a tournament. Each proposer requires to lock a bond, currently set to 0.5 ETH, that can be slashed if any proposal made by them is proven incorrect via a fault proof or a conflicting validity proof. The bond can be withdrawn once the proposer has no more pending proposals that need to be resolved and was not eliminated.\n\nProposals consist of a state root and a reference to their parent and implicitly challenge any sibling proposals who have the same parent. A proposal asserts that the proposed state root constitutes a valid state transition from the parent's state root. To offer efficient zk fault proofs, each proposal must include 3600 intermediate state commitments, each spanning 6 L2 blocks. \n\nProposals target sequential tournament epochs of currently 3600 * 6 L2 blocks. A tournament with a resolved parent tournament, a single child- and no conflicting sibling proposals can be resolved after 3d. \n\nThe **Vanguard** is a privileged actor who can always make the first child proposal on a parent state root. They can, in the worst case, delay each tournament for up to 1mo by not making this first proposal. Sibling proposals made after the Vanguard's initial one or after the 1mo vanguardAdvantage in each tournament are permissionless.",
"references": [
{
"title": "'Sequencing' - Kailua Docs",
"url": "https://boundless-xyz.github.io/kailua/design.html#sequencing"
},
{
"title": "Vanguard - Kailua Docs",
"url": "https://boundless-xyz.github.io/kailua/parameters.html#vanguard-advantage"
}
]
},
{
"title": "Challenges",
"description": "\nAny conflicting sibling proposals within a tournament that are made within the 3d challenge period of a proposal they are challenging, delay resolving the tournament until sufficient ZK proofs are published to leave one single tournament survivor.\n\nIn the tree of proposed state roots, each parent node can have multiple children. These children are indirectly challenging each other in a tournament, which can only be resolved if but a single child survives. A state root can be resolved if it is **the only remaining proposal** due to any combination of the following elimination methods: \n1. the proposal's challenge period of 3d has ended before a conflicting proposal was made\n2. the proposal is proven correct with a full validity proof (invalidates all conflicting proposals)\n3. a conflicting sibling proposal is proven faulty\n\nProving any of the 3600 intermediate state commitments in a proposal faulty invalidates the entire proposal. Proving a proposal valid invalidates all conflicting siblings. Pruning of a tournament's children happens strictly chronologically, which guarantees that the first faulty proposal of a given proposer is always pruned first. When pruned, an invalid proposal leads to the elimination of its proposer, which invalidates all their subsequent proposals, slashes their bond, and disallows future proposals by the same address. A slashed bond is transferred to an address chosen by the prover who caused the slashing.\n\nA single remaining child in a tournament can be 'resolved' and will be finalized and usable for withdrawals after an execution delay of 1d (time for the Guardian to manually blacklist malicious state roots).",
"references": [
{
"url": "https://docs.boundless.network/developers/kailua/quick-start",
"title": "Disputes - Kailua Docs"
}
]
},
{
"title": "Validity proofs",
"description": "Validity proofs and fault proofs both must be accompanied by a ZK proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. These proofs are then verified on Ethereum by a smart contract.\n\nThe Kailua state validation system is primarily optimistically resolved, so no validity proofs are required in the happy case. But two different zk proofs on unresolved state roots are possible and permissionless: The proveValidity() function proves a state root proposal's full validity, automatically invalidating all conflicting sibling proposals. proveOutputFault() allows any actor to eliminate a state root proposal for which they can prove that any of the 3600 intermediate state transitions in the proposal are not correct. Both are zk proofs of validity, although one is used as an efficient fault proof to invalidate a single conflicting state transition.",
"references": [
{
"url": "https://risczero.com/blog/kailua-how-it-works",
"title": "Risc0 Kailua Docs"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/blob/main/contracts/version-management-design.md",
"title": "Verifier upgrade and deprecation - Kailua Docs"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "the validity proof cryptography is broken or implemented incorrectly."
},
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "no challenger checks the published state"
},
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "the proposer routes proof verification through a malicious or faulty verifier by specifying an unsafe route selector."
},
{
"category": "Funds can be frozen if",
"text": "a verifier needed for a given proof is paused by its permissioned owner."
}
]
}
]
},
"stateValidationImage": "kailua",
"warning": "Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots."
"stateValidationImage": "kailua"
}+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1764953632,
"baseTimestamp": 1765550347,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}+2 -3
+1 -2
{
"architectureImage": "opstack-rollup-superchain-opfp",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "All data required for proofs is published on chain",
"description": "All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission"
},
{
"title": "BatchInbox - address",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xfFF0000000000000000000000000000000000288#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B#code"
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular exits",
"description": "The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B#code"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain",
"url": "https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B#code"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized operator",
"description": "The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": []
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing EVM Equivalence",
"url": "https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306"
}
]
}
],
"stateValidation": {
"description": "Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by permissioned operators only. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.",
"categories": [
{
"title": "State root proposals",
"description": "Proposers submit state roots as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the `create` function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge period has passed and it is not countered.",
"references": [
{
"title": "OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game",
"url": "https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#fault-dispute-game"
}
]
},
{
"title": "Challenges",
"description": "Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state roots using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the `defend` or `attack` functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with [full concurrency](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a). Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see [freeloader claims](https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#freeloader-claims)), if a clock gets inherited with less than 3h, it generally gets extended by 3h with the exception of 6h right before depth 30, and 1d right before the last depth. The maximum clock extension that a top level claim can get is therefore 10d. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers' stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step prover contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks ([Spearbit 5.1.3](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/develop/docs/security-reviews/2024_08_Fault-Proofs-No-MIPS_Spearbit.pdf)).",
"references": [
{
"title": "Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP",
"url": "https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a"
}
]
}
]
},
"warning": "Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots."
}
}+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1762517395,
"baseTimestamp": 1765550395,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}+326 -54
+3 -8
{
"badges": [
{
"id": "EVM",
"type": "VM",
"name": "EVM",
"description": "This project uses the Ethereum Virtual Machine to run its smart contracts and supports the Solidity programming language",
"action": {
"type": "scalingFilter",
"id": "vm",
"value": "EVM"
}
},
{
"id": "EigenDA",
"type": "DA",
"name": "EigenDA",
"description": "This project is posting its data to EigenDA",
"action": {
"type": "publicDaHighlight",
"slug": "eigenda"
}
},
{
"id": "OPStack",
"id": "OPSuccinct",
"type": "Stack",
"name": "Built on OP Stack",
"description": "The project is built on the OP Stack",
"action": {
"type": "scalingFilter",
"id": "stack",
"value": "OP Stack"
}
"name": "Built on the OP Succinct stack",
"description": "The project is built on the OP Succinct stack"
},
{
"id": "Superchain",
"type": "Infra",
"name": "Part of the Superchain",
"description": "The project is part of the Superchain, meaning it's included in the Superchain registry or uses the Superchain config",
"action": {
"type": "scalingFilter",
"id": "infrastructure",
"value": "Superchain"
}
},
{
"id": "MigratedFromL1",
"type": "Other",
"name": "Migrated from L1 to Ethereum L2",
"description": "This project has migrated from being a standalone L1 blockchain to an Ethereum L2",
"action": {
"type": "scalingFilter",
"id": "other",
"value": "Migrated from L1 to Ethereum L2"
}
}
],
"description": "Celo is an Ethereum Optimium based on the OP stack, scaling real-world solutions & leading a thriving new digital economy for all.",
"links": {
"websites": [
"https://celo.org/",
"https://forum.celo.org/"
],
"bridges": [
"https://superbridge.app/celo"
],
"documentation": [
"https://docs.celo.org/"
],
"explorers": [
"https://explorer.celo.org/mainnet/",
"https://celoscan.io",
"https://celo.blockscout.com/"
],
"repositories": [
"https://github.com/celo-org"
],
"socialMedia": [
"https://x.com/Celo",
"https://discord.com/invite/celo",
"https://blog.celo.org/"
],
"other": [
"https://growthepie.com/chains/celo"
]
}
}+7 -0
[
{
"title": "Jello hardfork activates OP Succinct Lite",
"url": "https://forum.celo.org/t/jello-hardfork-successfully-activates-on-mainnet-introducing-op-succinct-lite/12754",
"date": "2025-12-10T00:00:00.00Z",
"description": "Celo implements OP Succinct Lite, introducing ZK proofs for dispute resolution and DA verification.",
"type": "general"
},
{
"title": "Celo becomes an Ethereum L2",
"url": "https://blog.celo.org/celo-l2-is-now-live-a-note-from-our-founders-c585bd57b5fa",
"date": "2025-03-26T00:00:00.00Z",
"description": "Celo migrates from an L1 to an L2 architecture on Ethereum and EigenDA.",
"type": "general"
}
]+2 -7
{
"capability": "universal",
"daLayer": [
"EigenDA"
],
"hostChain": {
"id": "ethereum",
"slug": "ethereum",
"name": "Ethereum"
},
"infrastructure": "Superchain",
"layer": "layer2",
"proofSystem": {
"type": "Optimistic",
"name": "OPFP",
"challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
"zkCatalogId": "sp1",
"challengeProtocol": "Single-step"
},
"purposes": [
"Universal"
],
"reasonsForBeingOther": [
{
"label": "Closed proofs",
"shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
"description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
},
{
"label": "No DA bridge",
"shortDescription": "There is no data availability bridge",
"description": "Projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
}
],
"stacks": [
"OP Stack"
],
"stage": "Not applicable",
"type": "Other",
"vm": [
"EVM"
]
}+10 -9
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Although the OP stack fraud proof system is deployed, it assumes by default that data was made available. During a potential data withholding attack, it is impossible to prove a malicious state root.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"orderHint": 0,
"initialBond": "0.0",
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
"value": "Fraud proofs (1R, ZK)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Single round proofs (1R) only require a single transaction to resolve. ZK proofs are used to prove the correctness of the state transition.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"initialBond": "0.01",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no exit window for users to exit in case of unwanted regular upgrades as they are initiated by the Security Council with instant upgrade power and without proper notice.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on EigenDA. The sequencer is publishing data to EigenDA v2. Sequencer transaction data roots are not checked against the DACert Verifier onchain.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on EigenDA. The sequencer is publishing data to EigenDA v2. Sequencer transaction data roots are checked against the DACert Verifier data roots, signed off by EigenDA operators.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+5 -5
[
{
"layer": {
"value": "EigenDA",
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "The data is posted to EigenDA which is a separate data availability layer developed by the Eigenlayer team. Only hashes of data are published on an onchain inbox.",
"description": "The data is posted to EigenDA which is a separate data availability layer developed by the Eigenlayer team. Only commitments to the data are published on an onchain inbox.",
"projectId": "eigenda"
},
"bridge": {
"value": "None",
"sentiment": "bad",
"description": "There is no bridge that can attest if the data has been made available.",
"orderHint": -2
"value": "DACert Verifier",
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "EigenDA V2 certificates are verified by the proof system through the DACert Verifier contract, which validates certificates against operator signatures and stake thresholds.",
"projectId": "eigenda-v2"
},
"mode": {
"value": "Transaction data",
"secondLine": "Compressed"
}
}
]+19 -17
{
"architectureImage": "opstack-optimium-superchain-opfp",
"architectureImage": "celo",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "Data is posted to EigenDA",
"description": "Transactions roots are posted onchain and the full data is posted on EigenDA. The sequecencer is publishing data to EigenDA v2. Since the DACert Verifier is not used, availability of the data is not verified against EigenDA operators, meaning that the Sequencer can single-handedly publish unavailable commitments. If EigenDA becomes unavailable, the sequencer falls back to Ethereum.",
"description": "Transactions roots are posted onchain and the full data is posted on EigenDA. The sequencer is publishing data to EigenDA v2. The DACert Verifier is used to verify attestations from the EigenDA operator set that the data is indeed available. If EigenDA becomes unavailable, the sequencer falls back to Ethereum.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be lost if",
"text": "the sequencer posts an unavailable transaction root.",
"isCritical": true
},
{
"category": "Funds can be lost if",
"text": "the data is not available on the external provider.",
"isCritical": true
}
],
"references": [
{
"title": "EigenDA Docs - Overview",
"url": "https://docs.eigenda.xyz/overview"
},
{
"title": "Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission"
},
{
"title": "BatchInbox - address",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xff00000000000000000000000000000000042220#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x215A5fF85308A72A772F09B520dA71D3520e9aC7#code"
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular exits",
"description": "The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x215A5fF85308A72A772F09B520dA71D3520e9aC7#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x215A5fF85308A72A772F09B520dA71D3520e9aC7#code"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain",
"url": "https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x215A5fF85308A72A772F09B520dA71D3520e9aC7#code"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized operator",
"description": "The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": []
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing EVM Equivalence",
"url": "https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306"
}
]
}
],
"stateValidation": {
"description": "Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by permissioned operators only. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.",
"categories": [
{
"title": "State root proposals",
"description": "Proposers submit state roots as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the `create` function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge period has passed and it is not countered.",
"title": "Fraud proofs",
"description": "State roots are proposed by whitelisted proposers who create dispute games via the DisputeGameFactory by posting a bond of 0.01 ETH. Once created, the game enters a challenge period of 3d 12h during which whitelisted challengers can dispute the proposal by posting a bond of 0.01 ETH. If challenged, anyone can submit a ZK proof to prove the correct state within the proving period of 1d. After the challenge period passes without a successful challenge, or after a valid proof is submitted, anyone can resolve the game and finalize the state root.",
"references": [
{
"title": "OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game",
"url": "https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#fault-dispute-game"
"url": "https://succinctlabs.github.io/op-succinct/fault_proofs/fault_proof_architecture.html",
"title": "OP Succinct Lite architecture"
}
]
},
{
"title": "Challenges",
"description": "Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state roots using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the `defend` or `attack` functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with [full concurrency](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a). Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see [freeloader claims](https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#freeloader-claims)), if a clock gets inherited with less than 3h, it generally gets extended by 3h with the exception of 6h right before depth 30, and 1d right before the last depth. The maximum clock extension that a top level claim can get is therefore 10d. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers' stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step prover contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks ([Spearbit 5.1.3](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/develop/docs/security-reviews/2024_08_Fault-Proofs-No-MIPS_Spearbit.pdf)).",
"references": [
],
"risks": [
{
"title": "Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP",
"url": "https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a"
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "the validity proof cryptography is broken or implemented incorrectly."
},
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "the proposer routes proof verification through a malicious or faulty verifier."
},
{
"category": "Funds can be frozen if",
"text": "the permissioned proposer fails to publish state roots to the L1."
}
]
}
]
},
"warning": "Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots."
}
}+6 -1
{}
{
"explanation": "Celo is a ZK rollup that posts transaction data to EigenDA. For a transaction to be considered final, it has to be posted within a tx batch on L1 that links to a previous finalized batch. If the previous batch is missing, transaction finalization can be delayed up to 12h or until it gets published. The state root gets confirmed 7d after it has been posted.",
"warnings": {
"stateUpdates": "Please note, the state is not finalized until the finalization period passes."
}
}+1 -1
{
"id": "superchain",
"isPartOfSuperchain": false
"isPartOfSuperchain": true
}+190 -2
{
"ethereum": {
"roles": [
{
"id": "Challenger",
"name": "Challenger",
"description": "Allowed to challenge or delete state roots proposed by a Proposer.",
"accounts": [
{
"address": "eth:0x53E8EEAAE0731CCc888513695eC1Bd792ec975Ca",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "EOA 4",
"url": "#EOA-4,-EOA-5,-EOA-6,-EOA-7,-EOA-10-and-EOA-11"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x56966549e0953e8d6E17Fcd3278b003d81f58cA8",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "EOA 5",
"url": "#EOA-4,-EOA-5,-EOA-6,-EOA-7,-EOA-10-and-EOA-11"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x7247204E46B381149d99acF88b318713fE12c32f",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "EOA 6",
"url": "#EOA-4,-EOA-5,-EOA-6,-EOA-7,-EOA-10-and-EOA-11"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x77E831A0A6a680335BB54937E085fF625dfE3f6F",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "EOA 7",
"url": "#EOA-4,-EOA-5,-EOA-6,-EOA-7,-EOA-10-and-EOA-11"
},
{
"address": "eth:0xc6E6836CaCB6fF0a843050DB7F64bb2ab864C463",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "EOA 10",
"url": "#EOA-4,-EOA-5,-EOA-6,-EOA-7,-EOA-10-and-EOA-11"
},
{
"address": "eth:0xe4ce4999b1C4C60C384AC96f370F00796ae9eC78",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "EOA 11",
"url": "#EOA-4,-EOA-5,-EOA-6,-EOA-7,-EOA-10-and-EOA-11"
}
],
"chain": "ethereum",
"discoveryDrivenData": true
},
{
"id": "Guardian",
"name": "Guardian",
"description": "Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless).\n* OpFoundationUpgradeSafe has the role if the number of Optimism Security Council members falls below 8\n* Optimism EOA 1 has the role though restricted to the SuperchainConfig's `pause()` function",
"accounts": [
{
"address": "eth:0x847B5c174615B1B7fDF770882256e2D3E95b9D92",
"type": "Contract",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "OpFoundationUpgradeSafe",
"url": "#OpFoundationUpgradeSafe"
},
{
"address": "eth:0xc2819DC788505Aac350142A7A707BF9D03E3Bd03",
"type": "Contract",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "Optimism Security Council",
"url": "#Optimism Security Council"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x352f1defB49718e7Ea411687E850aA8d6299F7aC",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "Optimism EOA 1",
"url": "#Optimism-EOA-1"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x6E226fa22e5F19363d231D3FA048aaBa73CC1f47",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "EOA 2",
"url": "#EOA-2"
}
],
"chain": "ethereum",
"discoveryDrivenData": true
},
{
"id": "Proposer",
"name": "Proposer",
"description": "Allowed to post new state roots of the current layer to the host chain.",
"accounts": [
{
"address": "eth:0x0B7de3F505AD7Fc9b38207CD8E2Adc7a604BFe62",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "EOA 3",
"url": "#EOA-3-and-EOA-8"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x79D14553D6B3484F5612272B43c219A882415d33",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "EOA 8",
"url": "#EOA-3-and-EOA-8"
}
],
"chain": "ethereum",
"discoveryDrivenData": true
},
{
"id": "Sequencer",
"name": "Sequencer",
"description": "Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain.",
"accounts": [
{
"address": "eth:0x0cd08c7f7A96AA9635f761b49216B9eA74C5cA60",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "EOA 1",
"url": "#EOA-1"
}
],
"chain": "ethereum",
"discoveryDrivenData": true
}
],
"actors": [
{
"id": "CeloProxyAdminOwner",
"name": "CeloProxyAdminOwner",
"description": "A Multisig with 2/2 threshold. \n* Can upgrade **with no delay**\n * Celo native asset Token [via: ProxyAdmin]\n * L1CrossDomainMessenger [via: ProxyAdmin]\n * L1ERC721Bridge [via: ProxyAdmin]\n * OptimismMintableERC20Factory [via: ProxyAdmin]\n * SystemConfig [via: ProxyAdmin]\n * DelayedWETH [via: ProxyAdmin]\n * L1StandardBridge [via: ProxyAdmin]\n * AnchorStateRegistry [via: ProxyAdmin]\n * DelayedWETH [via: ProxyAdmin]\n * SuperchainConfigLocal [via: ProxyAdmin]\n * OptimismPortal2 [via: ProxyAdmin]\n * DisputeGameFactory [via: ProxyAdmin]\n* Can interact with AddressManager\n * set and change address mappings [via: ProxyAdmin]\n* Can interact with SystemConfig\n * it can update the preconfer address, the batch submitter (Sequencer) address and the gas configuration of the system \n* Can interact with DelayedWETH\n * can pull funds from the contract in case of emergency ",
"accounts": [
{
"address": "eth:0x4092A77bAF58fef0309452cEaCb09221e556E112",
"type": "Contract",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x4092…E112",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x4092A77bAF58fef0309452cEaCb09221e556E112"
}
],
"chain": "ethereum",
"references": [],
"participants": [
{
"address": "eth:0xC03172263409584f7860C25B6eB4985f0f6F4636",
"type": "Contract",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "Celo Multisig 1",
"url": "#Celo Multisig 1"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x9Eb44Da23433b5cAA1c87e35594D15FcEb08D34d",
"type": "Contract",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "Celo Multisig 2",
"url": "#Celo Multisig 2"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true
},
{
"id": "OpFoundationUpgradeSafe",
"name": "OpFoundationUpgradeSafe",
"description": "A Multisig with 5/7 threshold. \nMember of SuperchainProxyAdminOwner.\n* A Guardian LivenessModule if the number of Optimism Security Council members falls below 8 → Optimism Security Council → Optimism Guardian Multisig",
"accounts": [
{
"address": "eth:0x847B5c174615B1B7fDF770882256e2D3E95b9D92",
"type": "Contract",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x847B…9D92",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x847B5c174615B1B7fDF770882256e2D3E95b9D92"
}
],
"chain": "ethereum",
"references": [],
"participants": [
{
"address": "eth:0x42d27eEA1AD6e22Af6284F609847CB3Cd56B9c64",
"type": "Contract",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "GnosisSafe",
"url": "#GnosisSafe"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x3041BA32f451F5850c147805F5521AC206421623",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x3041…1623",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x3041BA32f451F5850c147805F5521AC206421623"
},
{
"address": "eth:0xE7dEA1306D9F829bA469d1904c50903b46ebd02e",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0xE7dE…d02e",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xE7dEA1306D9F829bA469d1904c50903b46ebd02e"
},
{
"address": "eth:0xBF93D4d727F7Ba1F753E1124C3e532dCb04Ea2c8",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0xBF93…a2c8",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xBF93D4d727F7Ba1F753E1124C3e532dCb04Ea2c8"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x4D014f3c5F33Aa9Cd1Dc29ce29618d07Ae666d15",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x4D01…6d15",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x4D014f3c5F33Aa9Cd1Dc29ce29618d07Ae666d15"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x69acfE2096Dfb8d5A041eF37693553c48d9BFd02",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x69ac…Fd02",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x69acfE2096Dfb8d5A041eF37693553c48d9BFd02"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x9bbFB9919062C29a5eE15aCD93c9D7c3b14d31aa",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x9bbF…31aa",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x9bbFB9919062C29a5eE15aCD93c9D7c3b14d31aa"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true
},
{
"id": "SuperchainConfig",
"name": "SuperchainConfig",
"accounts": [
{
"address": "eth:0x95703e0982140D16f8ebA6d158FccEde42f04a4C",
"type": "Contract",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x9570…4a4C",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x95703e0982140D16f8ebA6d158FccEde42f04a4C"
}
],
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Used to manage global configuration values for multiple OP Chains within a single Superchain network. The SuperchainConfig contract manages individual pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3 months if left untouched.\n* Can interact with SuperchainConfigLocal\n * act as an override that pauses the SuperchainConfigLocal ",
"discoveryDrivenData": true
},
{
"id": "Optimism Security Council",
"name": "Optimism Security Council",
"description": "A Multisig with 10/13 threshold. It uses the following modules: LivenessModule (used to remove members inactive for 3mo 8d while making sure that the threshold remains above 75%. If the number of members falls below 8, the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe takes ownership of the multisig).\nMember of Optimism Guardian Multisig, SuperchainProxyAdminOwner.\n* A Guardian Optimism Guardian Multisig",
"accounts": [
{
"address": "eth:0xc2819DC788505Aac350142A7A707BF9D03E3Bd03",
"type": "Contract",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0xc281…Bd03",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xc2819DC788505Aac350142A7A707BF9D03E3Bd03"
}
],
"chain": "ethereum",
"references": [],
"participants": [
{
"address": "eth:0x07dC0893cAfbF810e3E72505041f2865726Fd073",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x07dC…d073",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x07dC0893cAfbF810e3E72505041f2865726Fd073"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x652BC529E171847E2fFddCeA13567643C84ccB5f",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x652B…cB5f",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x652BC529E171847E2fFddCeA13567643C84ccB5f"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x1822b35B09f5ce1C78ecbC06AC0A4e17885b925e",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x1822…925e",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x1822b35B09f5ce1C78ecbC06AC0A4e17885b925e"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x4A7322258c9E690e4CB8Cea6e5251443E956e61E",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x4A73…e61E",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x4A7322258c9E690e4CB8Cea6e5251443E956e61E"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x3A53B4B081Eb7Cb00C46497b16Ea22e65E4Faa94",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x3A53…aa94",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x3A53B4B081Eb7Cb00C46497b16Ea22e65E4Faa94"
},
{
"address": "eth:0xEF9A98511939eEe6Ec69af62082E3F2ff606877c",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0xEF9A…877c",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xEF9A98511939eEe6Ec69af62082E3F2ff606877c"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x6323ef2b80030f3fBc508bFc321Fc71fDB95c865",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x6323…c865",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x6323ef2b80030f3fBc508bFc321Fc71fDB95c865"
},
{
"address": "eth:0xd5b735b676A043a53946C3b6F6BE28c1ECE6aC90",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0xd5b7…aC90",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xd5b735b676A043a53946C3b6F6BE28c1ECE6aC90"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x7ed8d9Af9eaA194D1A75C67c1475579E42289E39",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x7ed8…9E39",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7ed8d9Af9eaA194D1A75C67c1475579E42289E39"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x0aA384EB2fedD2741277A0f72909A0d7275575D7",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x0aA3…75D7",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x0aA384EB2fedD2741277A0f72909A0d7275575D7"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x0a8742365a7EB0A3698293ac54357B5Ac04cefE6",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x0a87…efE6",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x0a8742365a7EB0A3698293ac54357B5Ac04cefE6"
},
{
"address": "eth:0xbfA046B0bc5cEa1596be62B8b3f79f9f41f1E0d9",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0xbfA0…E0d9",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xbfA046B0bc5cEa1596be62B8b3f79f9f41f1E0d9"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x92827223f6b397CE9F208eE352bacA710765cACb",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x9282…cACb",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x92827223f6b397CE9F208eE352bacA710765cACb"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true
},
{
"id": "SuperchainProxyAdminOwner",
"name": "SuperchainProxyAdminOwner",
"description": "A Multisig with 2/2 threshold. \n* Can upgrade **with no delay**\n * SuperchainConfig [via: SuperchainProxyAdmin]\n* Can interact with AddressManager\n * set and change address mappings [via: SuperchainProxyAdmin]",
"accounts": [
{
"address": "eth:0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A",
"type": "Contract",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x5a0A…3d2A",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x5a0Aae59D09fccBdDb6C6CcEB07B7279367C3d2A"
}
],
"chain": "ethereum",
"references": [],
"participants": [
{
"address": "eth:0x847B5c174615B1B7fDF770882256e2D3E95b9D92",
"type": "Contract",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "OpFoundationUpgradeSafe",
"url": "#OpFoundationUpgradeSafe"
},
{
"address": "eth:0xc2819DC788505Aac350142A7A707BF9D03E3Bd03",
"type": "Contract",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "Optimism Security Council",
"url": "#Optimism Security Council"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true
},
{
"id": "LivenessGuard",
"name": "LivenessGuard",
"accounts": [
{
"address": "eth:0x24424336F04440b1c28685a38303aC33C9D14a25",
"type": "Contract",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x2442…4a25",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x24424336F04440b1c28685a38303aC33C9D14a25"
}
],
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Modular contract to be used together with the LivenessModule. Tracks liveness / activity of Safe owners.\n* Can interact with LivenessModule\n * can remove members of Optimism Security Council inactive for 3mo 8d ",
"discoveryDrivenData": true
},
{
"id": "SP1VerifierGatewayMultisig",
"name": "SP1VerifierGatewayMultisig",
"description": "A Multisig with 2/3 threshold. \n* Can interact with SP1VerifierGateway\n * affect the liveness and safety of the gateway - can transfer ownership, add and freeze verifier routes ",
"accounts": [
{
"address": "eth:0xCafEf00d348Adbd57c37d1B77e0619C6244C6878",
"type": "Contract",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0xCafE…6878",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xCafEf00d348Adbd57c37d1B77e0619C6244C6878"
}
],
"chain": "ethereum",
"references": [],
"participants": [
{
"address": "eth:0xBaB2c2aF5b91695e65955DA60d63aD1b2aE81126",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0xBaB2…1126",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xBaB2c2aF5b91695e65955DA60d63aD1b2aE81126"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x72Ff26D9517324eEFA89A48B75c5df41132c4f54",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x72Ff…4f54",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x72Ff26D9517324eEFA89A48B75c5df41132c4f54"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x9395e83720bf2D8ac6435f9c520b48E289Cb8885",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x9395…8885",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x9395e83720bf2D8ac6435f9c520b48E289Cb8885"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true
},
{
"id": "Optimism Guardian Multisig",
"name": "Optimism Guardian Multisig",
"description": "A Multisig with 1/1 threshold. It uses the following modules: DeputyPauseModule (Allows 0x352f1defB49718e7Ea411687E850aA8d6299F7aC, called the deputy pauser, to act on behalf of the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe if set as its Safe module).",
"accounts": [
{
"address": "eth:0x09f7150D8c019BeF34450d6920f6B3608ceFdAf2",
"type": "Contract",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x09f7…dAf2",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x09f7150D8c019BeF34450d6920f6B3608ceFdAf2"
}
],
"chain": "ethereum",
"references": [],
"participants": [
{
"address": "eth:0xc2819DC788505Aac350142A7A707BF9D03E3Bd03",
"type": "Contract",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "Optimism Security Council",
"url": "#Optimism Security Council"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true
},
{
"id": "GnosisSafe",
"name": "GnosisSafe",
"description": "A Multisig with 2/2 threshold. \nMember of OpFoundationUpgradeSafe.\n",
"accounts": [
{
"address": "eth:0x42d27eEA1AD6e22Af6284F609847CB3Cd56B9c64",
"type": "Contract",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x42d2…9c64",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x42d27eEA1AD6e22Af6284F609847CB3Cd56B9c64"
}
],
"chain": "ethereum",
"references": [],
"participants": [
{
"address": "eth:0xb23794fd6BA1CEAd01Cf54D772b8341F2F0197A5",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0xb237…97A5",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xb23794fd6BA1CEAd01Cf54D772b8341F2F0197A5"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x4665374939642965EfD8357D4568D2A77f677429",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x4665…7429",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x4665374939642965EfD8357D4568D2A77f677429"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true
},
{
"id": "Celo Multisig 2",
"name": "Celo Multisig 2",
"description": "A Multisig with 6/8 threshold. \nMember of CeloProxyAdminOwner.\n",
"accounts": [
{
"address": "eth:0x9Eb44Da23433b5cAA1c87e35594D15FcEb08D34d",
"type": "Contract",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x9Eb4…D34d",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x9Eb44Da23433b5cAA1c87e35594D15FcEb08D34d"
}
],
"chain": "ethereum",
"references": [],
"participants": [
{
"address": "eth:0x0Bd06B2b192BD9eC316f2880A0c296D9Bc3225e0",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x0Bd0…25e0",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x0Bd06B2b192BD9eC316f2880A0c296D9Bc3225e0"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x21e595451bDD69a85cf946f37f5A6A356C3F875D",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x21e5…875D",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x21e595451bDD69a85cf946f37f5A6A356C3F875D"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x09c0B069100F5d880a596605b94Cc9493D96e797",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x09c0…e797",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x09c0B069100F5d880a596605b94Cc9493D96e797"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x326b764CEb4FE11e70af538D3CB997Bb2e16659d",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x326b…659d",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x326b764CEb4FE11e70af538D3CB997Bb2e16659d"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x48139512241D32047760E7481eBf0b6BF3390f8F",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x4813…0f8F",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x48139512241D32047760E7481eBf0b6BF3390f8F"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x4D89adf3a4a71b25FB1a6D702Cf059CF5BebD02d",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x4D89…D02d",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x4D89adf3a4a71b25FB1a6D702Cf059CF5BebD02d"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x8b4b85f78F799F8364198FFEd2266d3cb3EA0daE",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x8b4b…0daE",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x8b4b85f78F799F8364198FFEd2266d3cb3EA0daE"
},
{
"address": "eth:0xE0024dCadff414fCb0AAfBB475e92Ccc367E1A84",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0xE002…1A84",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xE0024dCadff414fCb0AAfBB475e92Ccc367E1A84"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true
},
{
"id": "Celo Multisig 1",
"name": "Celo Multisig 1",
"description": "A Multisig with 6/8 threshold. \nMember of CeloProxyAdminOwner.\n",
"accounts": [
{
"address": "eth:0xC03172263409584f7860C25B6eB4985f0f6F4636",
"type": "Contract",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0xC031…4636",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xC03172263409584f7860C25B6eB4985f0f6F4636"
}
],
"chain": "ethereum",
"references": [],
"participants": [
{
"address": "eth:0xB963047c5D875b7FE777339B1E6B61ac4df1f3e2",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0xB963…f3e2",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB963047c5D875b7FE777339B1E6B61ac4df1f3e2"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x6FDb3eA186981aA32DD8e7B782d95733Ca3c13A1",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x6FDb…13A1",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x6FDb3eA186981aA32DD8e7B782d95733Ca3c13A1"
},
{
"address": "eth:0xd0cE4D055d04bDA69b20815A3F796019bB68c6Db",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0xd0cE…c6Db",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xd0cE4D055d04bDA69b20815A3F796019bB68c6Db"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x148dfaC5dF51Ab1D7b02a3B53f1e2Da1F0A6B5Ca",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x148d…B5Ca",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x148dfaC5dF51Ab1D7b02a3B53f1e2Da1F0A6B5Ca"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x5f70938aA8d2fd91EE3959998E5DdaACFb6Ffb85",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x5f70…fb85",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x5f70938aA8d2fd91EE3959998E5DdaACFb6Ffb85"
},
{
"address": "eth:0xD1C635987B6Aa287361d08C6461491Fa9df087f2",
"type": "Contract",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "Safe",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xD1C635987B6Aa287361d08C6461491Fa9df087f2"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x2BE5E223E368E8c0f404a1f3Eb4eB09f99C8FaD8",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x2BE5…FaD8",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x2BE5E223E368E8c0f404a1f3Eb4eB09f99C8FaD8"
},
{
"address": "eth:0xc3E966E79eF1aA4751221F55fB8A36589C24C0cA",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0xc3E9…C0cA",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xc3E966E79eF1aA4751221F55fB8A36589C24C0cA"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true
},
{
"id": "EOA-1",
"name": "EOA 1",
"accounts": [
{
"address": "eth:0x0cd08c7f7A96AA9635f761b49216B9eA74C5cA60",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x0cd0…cA60",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x0cd08c7f7A96AA9635f761b49216B9eA74C5cA60"
}
],
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "* A Sequencer - acting directly",
"discoveryDrivenData": true
},
{
"id": "Optimism-EOA-1",
"name": "Optimism EOA 1",
"accounts": [
{
"address": "eth:0x352f1defB49718e7Ea411687E850aA8d6299F7aC",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x352f…F7aC",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x352f1defB49718e7Ea411687E850aA8d6299F7aC"
}
],
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "* A Guardian DeputyPauseModule though restricted to the SuperchainConfig's `pause()` function → Optimism Guardian Multisig",
"discoveryDrivenData": true
},
{
"id": "EOA-2",
"name": "EOA 2",
"accounts": [
{
"address": "eth:0x6E226fa22e5F19363d231D3FA048aaBa73CC1f47",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x6E22…1f47",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x6E226fa22e5F19363d231D3FA048aaBa73CC1f47"
}
],
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "* A Guardian - acting directly",
"discoveryDrivenData": true
},
{
"id": "EOA-3",
"name": "EOA 3",
"id": "EOA-3-and-EOA-8",
"name": "EOA 3 and EOA 8",
"accounts": [
{
"address": "eth:0x0B7de3F505AD7Fc9b38207CD8E2Adc7a604BFe62",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x0B7d…Fe62",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x0B7de3F505AD7Fc9b38207CD8E2Adc7a604BFe62"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x79D14553D6B3484F5612272B43c219A882415d33",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x79D1…5d33",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x79D14553D6B3484F5612272B43c219A882415d33"
}
],
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "* A Proposer - acting directly",
"discoveryDrivenData": true
},
{
"id": "EOA-4,-EOA-5,-EOA-6,-EOA-7,-EOA-10-and-EOA-11",
"name": "EOA 4, EOA 5, EOA 6, EOA 7, EOA 10 and EOA 11",
"accounts": [
{
"address": "eth:0x53E8EEAAE0731CCc888513695eC1Bd792ec975Ca",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x53E8…75Ca",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x53E8EEAAE0731CCc888513695eC1Bd792ec975Ca"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x56966549e0953e8d6E17Fcd3278b003d81f58cA8",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x5696…8cA8",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x56966549e0953e8d6E17Fcd3278b003d81f58cA8"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x7247204E46B381149d99acF88b318713fE12c32f",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x7247…c32f",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7247204E46B381149d99acF88b318713fE12c32f"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x77E831A0A6a680335BB54937E085fF625dfE3f6F",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x77E8…3f6F",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x77E831A0A6a680335BB54937E085fF625dfE3f6F"
},
{
"address": "eth:0xc6E6836CaCB6fF0a843050DB7F64bb2ab864C463",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0xc6E6…C463",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xc6E6836CaCB6fF0a843050DB7F64bb2ab864C463"
},
{
"address": "eth:0xe4ce4999b1C4C60C384AC96f370F00796ae9eC78",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0xe4ce…eC78",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xe4ce4999b1C4C60C384AC96f370F00796ae9eC78"
}
],
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "* A Challenger - acting directly",
"discoveryDrivenData": true
},
{
"id": "EOA-9",
"name": "EOA 9",
"accounts": [
{
"address": "eth:0xbcA67eE5188efc419c42C91156EcC888b20664f3",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0xbcA6…64f3",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xbcA67eE5188efc419c42C91156EcC888b20664f3"
}
],
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "* Can interact with DelayedWETH\n * can pull funds from the contract in case of emergency ",
"discoveryDrivenData": true
}
]
}
}+82 -3
{
"addresses": {
"ethereum": [
{
"name": "SystemConfig",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x89E31965D844a309231B1f17759Ccaf1b7c09861",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x783A434532Ee94667979213af1711505E8bFE374"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x9c61C5a8FF9408B83ac92571278550097A9d2BB5"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1741879595,
"transactionHash": "0x5852f5888f0563ac1d7e3bf2b566e63fa981394e24b9753a41416a2ba6bdbfbc",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x7b5a84F818B6fC3F079EE87c214F369062188D2A"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1751883851,
"transactionHash": "0x14663947fe932e8ad6d57fe9aa61910d8d2e5fc37ac5e16e4345c3f8e2f7b2d2",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x911EA44d22EB903515378625dA3a0E09D2E1B074"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1751884031,
"transactionHash": "0xa9816c6dcbbe126e3b5c56f26ecfeebcb2dc03ab78535a7d5ed2bcdeea7ccf39",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x9c61C5a8FF9408B83ac92571278550097A9d2BB5"
]
}
],
"description": "Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner\n * **batcherHash**: EOA 1\n * **owner**: CeloProxyAdminOwner",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "CeloProxyAdminOwner",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x89E31965D844a309231B1f17759Ccaf1b7c09861#code"
},
{
"name": "OptimismPortal2",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0xc5c5D157928BDBD2ACf6d0777626b6C75a9EAEDC",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x783A434532Ee94667979213af1711505E8bFE374"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x215A5fF85308A72A772F09B520dA71D3520e9aC7"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1741879583,
"transactionHash": "0x7411775e32485632423395def2883f19e3a11c66c88c57f08d9975a927e2b166",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x6322C2f2D6a4305Fc033754d486A5A067Ee5F9b1"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1741879583,
"transactionHash": "0x381b707419ae79c88d6fa34ec819396c80ba54f489d47d10ff85c4285b64e447",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x3Da872782f9fB696fD72Af2ec9313a56bDA6f06d"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1751883851,
"transactionHash": "0x14663947fe932e8ad6d57fe9aa61910d8d2e5fc37ac5e16e4345c3f8e2f7b2d2",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xBeD463769920dAc19a7E2aDf47B6C6Bb6480bD97"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1751884031,
"transactionHash": "0xa9816c6dcbbe126e3b5c56f26ecfeebcb2dc03ab78535a7d5ed2bcdeea7ccf39",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x215A5fF85308A72A772F09B520dA71D3520e9aC7"
]
}
],
"description": "The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the PermissionedDisputeGame.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner",
"description": "The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the 42.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "CeloProxyAdminOwner",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0xc5c5D157928BDBD2ACf6d0777626b6C75a9EAEDC#code"
},
{
"name": "DisputeGameFactory",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0xFbAC162162f4009Bb007C6DeBC36B1dAC10aF683",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x783A434532Ee94667979213af1711505E8bFE374"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x4bbA758F006Ef09402eF31724203F316ab74e4a0"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1741879595,
"transactionHash": "0xb42846aca12a846645e69e61c48c9b8de7078117c710ff124b04c18f735fbc5e",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xe8b013bEE7Bd603e2f0B4825638559d645A4C4CB"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1751883851,
"transactionHash": "0x14663947fe932e8ad6d57fe9aa61910d8d2e5fc37ac5e16e4345c3f8e2f7b2d2",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x4bbA758F006Ef09402eF31724203F316ab74e4a0"
]
}
],
"description": "The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "CeloProxyAdminOwner",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0xFbAC162162f4009Bb007C6DeBC36B1dAC10aF683#code"
},
{
"name": "SuperchainConfigLocal",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0xa440975E5A6BB19Bc3Bee901d909BB24b0f43D33",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x783A434532Ee94667979213af1711505E8bFE374"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x693cFD911523ccaE1a14AdE2501ae4a0A463b446"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1741879559,
"transactionHash": "0x427e785add84f7429e78dc82c39e2b3b6e2c3e224f8abd6f4b67795f16e45357",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x693cFD911523ccaE1a14AdE2501ae4a0A463b446"
]
}
],
"description": "A local contract acting as source of truth for the paused status and the guardian role for the local chain.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner\n * **guardian**: EOA 2\n * **superchainConfig**: SuperchainConfig if the (global) SuperchainConfig is paused",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "CeloProxyAdminOwner",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0xa440975E5A6BB19Bc3Bee901d909BB24b0f43D33#code"
},
{
"name": "L1CrossDomainMessenger",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x1AC1181fc4e4F877963680587AEAa2C90D7EbB95",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "resolved delegate proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x783A434532Ee94667979213af1711505E8bFE374"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x807124F75FF2120b2f26D7e6f9e39C03ee9DE212"
],
"immutable": false
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1741879595,
"transactionHash": "0x142804c112b7513d03962454fab1f12292cf4b4833ca1701f5122a7212476c77",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xDE47b113E4157ed15fA46c5572562aC11146c5eA"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1751883851,
"transactionHash": "0x14663947fe932e8ad6d57fe9aa61910d8d2e5fc37ac5e16e4345c3f8e2f7b2d2",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x3d5a67747dE7E09b0d71F5d782c8b45f6307B9Fd"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1751884031,
"transactionHash": "0xa9816c6dcbbe126e3b5c56f26ecfeebcb2dc03ab78535a7d5ed2bcdeea7ccf39",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x807124F75FF2120b2f26D7e6f9e39C03ee9DE212"
]
}
],
"description": "Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "CeloProxyAdminOwner",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x1AC1181fc4e4F877963680587AEAa2C90D7EbB95#code"
},
{
"name": "L1ERC721Bridge",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x3C519816C5BdC0a0199147594F83feD4F5847f13",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x783A434532Ee94667979213af1711505E8bFE374"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x7aE1d3BD877a4C5CA257404ce26BE93A02C98013"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1741879595,
"transactionHash": "0x088ae685dbdd16320c9d3f99e7feea6c823156f69ab0da7dc48ce6c38498c55e",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xad5D111e961A5E451C8172034115bcc0551b6551"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1751883851,
"transactionHash": "0x14663947fe932e8ad6d57fe9aa61910d8d2e5fc37ac5e16e4345c3f8e2f7b2d2",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x276d3730f219f7ec22274f7263180b8452B46d47"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1751884031,
"transactionHash": "0xa9816c6dcbbe126e3b5c56f26ecfeebcb2dc03ab78535a7d5ed2bcdeea7ccf39",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x7aE1d3BD877a4C5CA257404ce26BE93A02C98013"
]
}
],
"description": "Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "CeloProxyAdminOwner",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x3C519816C5BdC0a0199147594F83feD4F5847f13#code"
},
{
"name": "L1StandardBridge",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x9C4955b92F34148dbcfDCD82e9c9eCe5CF2badfe",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x783A434532Ee94667979213af1711505E8bFE374"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x28841965B26d41304905A836Da5C0921DA7dBB84"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [],
"description": "The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "CeloProxyAdminOwner",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x9C4955b92F34148dbcfDCD82e9c9eCe5CF2badfe#code"
},
{
"name": "LivenessModule",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x0454092516c9A4d636d3CAfA1e82161376C8a748",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "used to remove members inactive for 3mo 8d while making sure that the threshold remains above 75%. If the number of members falls below 8, the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe takes ownership of the multisig\n* Roles:\n * **fallbackOwner**: OpFoundationUpgradeSafe if the number of Optimism Security Council members falls below 8\n * **livenessGuard**: LivenessGuard",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x0454092516c9A4d636d3CAfA1e82161376C8a748#code"
},
{
"name": "SP1Verifier",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x0459d576A6223fEeA177Fb3DF53C9c77BF84C459",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Verifier contract for SP1 proofs (v5.0.0).\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x0459d576A6223fEeA177Fb3DF53C9c77BF84C459#code"
},
{
"name": "Celo native asset Token",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x057898f3C43F129a17517B9056D23851F124b19f",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x783A434532Ee94667979213af1711505E8bFE374"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x64fE3f9201E6534D2d744c7C57D134E709131a6e"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1741879583,
"transactionHash": "0xe145ca9f0fea9f384f7abad906b81717a0d407de37718cb9036678937c44d9f0",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x64fE3f9201E6534D2d744c7C57D134E709131a6e"
]
}
],
"description": "* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "CeloProxyAdminOwner",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x057898f3C43F129a17517B9056D23851F124b19f#code"
},
{
"name": "OPSuccinctFaultDisputeGame",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x113f434f82FF82678AE7f69Ea122791FE1F6b73e",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Logic of the dispute game. When a state root is proposed, a dispute game contract is deployed. Challengers can use such contracts to challenge the proposed state root.\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x113f434f82FF82678AE7f69Ea122791FE1F6b73e#code"
},
{
"name": "PreimageOracle",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x1fb8cdFc6831fc866Ed9C51aF8817Da5c287aDD3",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game.\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x1fb8cdFc6831fc866Ed9C51aF8817Da5c287aDD3#code"
},
{
"name": "PermissionedDisputeGame",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x25c2e07A24a74F9FA54f7CA5ddAfedB2264a5d02",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x25c2e07A24a74F9FA54f7CA5ddAfedB2264a5d02#code"
},
{
"name": "SP1VerifierGateway",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x3B6041173B80E77f038f3F2C0f9744f04837185e",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "This contract is the router for zk proof verification. It stores the mapping between identifiers and the address of onchain verifier contracts, routing each identifier to the corresponding verifier contract.\n* Roles:\n * **owner**: SP1VerifierGatewayMultisig",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x3B6041173B80E77f038f3F2C0f9744f04837185e#code"
},
{
"name": "SuperchainProxyAdmin",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x543bA4AADBAb8f9025686Bd03993043599c6fB04",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "* Roles:\n * **owner**: SuperchainProxyAdminOwner",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x543bA4AADBAb8f9025686Bd03993043599c6fB04#code"
},
{
"name": "OptimismMintableERC20Factory",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x6f0E4f1EB98A52EfaCF7BE11d48B9d9d6510A906",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x783A434532Ee94667979213af1711505E8bFE374"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x5493f4677A186f64805fe7317D6993ba4863988F"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1741879595,
"transactionHash": "0x0297053983c066511596ec9542fd1d217b46039efc3d729f4e4468ecfff47b6b",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x0B3004b843dA84FE5D4C46AeB5E80F826e5CD69A"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1751883851,
"transactionHash": "0x14663947fe932e8ad6d57fe9aa61910d8d2e5fc37ac5e16e4345c3f8e2f7b2d2",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x5493f4677A186f64805fe7317D6993ba4863988F"
]
}
],
"description": "A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "CeloProxyAdminOwner",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x6f0E4f1EB98A52EfaCF7BE11d48B9d9d6510A906#code"
},
{
"name": "DeputyPauseModule",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x76fC2F971FB355D0453cF9F64d3F9E4f640E1754",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Allows 0x352f1defB49718e7Ea411687E850aA8d6299F7aC, called the deputy pauser, to act on behalf of the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe if set as its Safe module.\n* Roles:\n * **deputy**: Optimism EOA 1 though restricted to the SuperchainConfig's `pause()` function",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x76fC2F971FB355D0453cF9F64d3F9E4f640E1754#code"
},
{
"name": "ProxyAdmin",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x783A434532Ee94667979213af1711505E8bFE374",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "* Roles:\n * **owner**: CeloProxyAdminOwner",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x783A434532Ee94667979213af1711505E8bFE374#code"
},
{
"name": "DelayedWETH",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x9c314E8057025F2982aa4B3923Abd741A8e8DE91",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x783A434532Ee94667979213af1711505E8bFE374"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x1e121E21E1A11Ae47C0EFE8A7E13ae3eb4923796"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1741879595,
"transactionHash": "0x265553a76e8c52912e8a4511e9ab4ae344736ebd5f26f3ec97986307c37f28ed",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xDFBB69681F217aB3221E94AFCA4fEa51f5c6a779"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1751883851,
"transactionHash": "0x14663947fe932e8ad6d57fe9aa61910d8d2e5fc37ac5e16e4345c3f8e2f7b2d2",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x1e121E21E1A11Ae47C0EFE8A7E13ae3eb4923796"
]
}
],
"description": "Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner\n * **owner**: EOA 3",
"description": "Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner\n * **owner**: EOA 9",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "CeloProxyAdminOwner",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x9c314E8057025F2982aa4B3923Abd741A8e8DE91#code"
},
{
"name": "AnchorStateRegistry",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x9F18D91949731E766f294A14027bBFE8F28328CC",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x783A434532Ee94667979213af1711505E8bFE374"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x7b465370BB7A333f99edd19599EB7Fb1c2D3F8D2"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1751883851,
"transactionHash": "0x14663947fe932e8ad6d57fe9aa61910d8d2e5fc37ac5e16e4345c3f8e2f7b2d2",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x7b465370BB7A333f99edd19599EB7Fb1c2D3F8D2"
]
}
],
"description": "Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "CeloProxyAdminOwner",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x9F18D91949731E766f294A14027bBFE8F28328CC#code"
},
{
"name": "DelayedWETH",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0xa316D42E8Fd98D2Ec364b8bF853d2623E768f95a",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x783A434532Ee94667979213af1711505E8bFE374"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x1e121E21E1A11Ae47C0EFE8A7E13ae3eb4923796"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1741879595,
"transactionHash": "0x3fba113c724de4de010b1dd0a044c8d0970effb4a12a9e4eb5450199cd8f0749",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xDFBB69681F217aB3221E94AFCA4fEa51f5c6a779"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1751883851,
"transactionHash": "0x14663947fe932e8ad6d57fe9aa61910d8d2e5fc37ac5e16e4345c3f8e2f7b2d2",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x1e121E21E1A11Ae47C0EFE8A7E13ae3eb4923796"
]
}
],
"description": "Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately CeloProxyAdminOwner\n * **owner**: CeloProxyAdminOwner",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "CeloProxyAdminOwner",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0xa316D42E8Fd98D2Ec364b8bF853d2623E768f95a#code"
},
{
"name": "MIPS",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0xaA59A0777648BC75cd10364083e878c1cCd6112a",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0xaA59A0777648BC75cd10364083e878c1cCd6112a#code"
},
{
"name": "FaultDisputeGame",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0xcc744008aD3306a716fED303b0A6eA5b5d0690a5",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Logic of the dispute game. When a state root is proposed, a dispute game contract is deployed. Challengers can use such contracts to challenge the proposed state root.\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0xcc744008aD3306a716fED303b0A6eA5b5d0690a5#code"
},
{
"name": "AccessManager",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0xF59a19c5578291cB7fd22618D16281aDf76f2816",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Contract managing access control for proposers and challengers in OPSuccinct.\n* Roles:\n * **challengers**: EOA 10, EOA 11, EOA 4, EOA 5, EOA 6, EOA 7\n * **proposers**: EOA 3, EOA 8",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0xF59a19c5578291cB7fd22618D16281aDf76f2816#code"
}
]
},
"escrows": [
{
"address": "0xc5c5D157928BDBD2ACf6d0777626b6C75a9EAEDC",
"sinceTimestamp": 1741879559,
"tokens": [
"ETH"
],
"contract": {
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0xc5c5D157928BDBD2ACf6d0777626b6C75a9EAEDC",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x783A434532Ee94667979213af1711505E8bFE374"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x215A5fF85308A72A772F09B520dA71D3520e9aC7"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1741879583,
"transactionHash": "0x7411775e32485632423395def2883f19e3a11c66c88c57f08d9975a927e2b166",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x6322C2f2D6a4305Fc033754d486A5A067Ee5F9b1"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1741879583,
"transactionHash": "0x381b707419ae79c88d6fa34ec819396c80ba54f489d47d10ff85c4285b64e447",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x3Da872782f9fB696fD72Af2ec9313a56bDA6f06d"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1751883851,
"transactionHash": "0x14663947fe932e8ad6d57fe9aa61910d8d2e5fc37ac5e16e4345c3f8e2f7b2d2",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xBeD463769920dAc19a7E2aDf47B6C6Bb6480bD97"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1751884031,
"transactionHash": "0xa9816c6dcbbe126e3b5c56f26ecfeebcb2dc03ab78535a7d5ed2bcdeea7ccf39",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x215A5fF85308A72A772F09B520dA71D3520e9aC7"
]
}
],
"description": "Main entry point for users depositing ETH.",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "ProxyAdmin",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xc5c5D157928BDBD2ACf6d0777626b6C75a9EAEDC#code"
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"includeInTotal": true,
"chainId": 1
},
{
"address": "0x9C4955b92F34148dbcfDCD82e9c9eCe5CF2badfe",
"sinceTimestamp": 1741879559,
"tokens": "*",
"contract": {
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x9C4955b92F34148dbcfDCD82e9c9eCe5CF2badfe",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x783A434532Ee94667979213af1711505E8bFE374"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x28841965B26d41304905A836Da5C0921DA7dBB84"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [],
"description": "Main entry point for users depositing ERC20 token that do not require custom gateway.",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "ProxyAdmin",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x9C4955b92F34148dbcfDCD82e9c9eCe5CF2badfe#code"
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"includeInTotal": true,
"chainId": 1
}
],
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades.",
"isCritical": true
}
],
"zkProgramHashes": []
"zkProgramHashes": [
{
"title": "Aggregation program of OP Succinct FDP",
"description": "Aggregates proofs of correct execution for several consecutive block ranges of OP L2 client in fault dispute proof mode.",
"proverSystemProject": "sp1",
"programUrl": "https://github.com/celo-org/op-succinct/tree/celo/v1.0.1/programs/aggregation",
"verificationStatus": "successful",
"verificationSteps": "\n Prepare:\n \n 1. Install cargo make: `cargo install --debug --locked cargo-make`\n 2. Install sp1 toolchain: `curl -L https://sp1up.succinct.xyz/ | bash`, then `sp1up`\n 3. Install docker [https://docs.docker.com/get-started/get-docker/](https://docs.docker.com/get-started/get-docker/)\n \n Verify:\n \n 1. Checkout the correct branch in [celo-org/op-succinct](https://github.com/celo-org/op-succinct) repo: `git checkout celo/v1.0.1 ` . Commit hash should be `4408f080e40526eaf2e327ac651e106842478523 `.\n 2. Make sure docker is running by running `docker ps `\n 3. From the `op-succinct` dir: `cargo run --bin config --release --features eigenda` to build the SP1 programs for EigenDA features and generate and print verification key hashes.\n ",
"hash": "0x0075c7ec424df1386508596dc886e528c733a5f2c7728e7a81ad7676495ff31c"
},
{
"title": "Range program of OP Succinct FDP",
"description": "Proves correct state transition function within an OP L2 client over a range of consecutive L2 blocks in fault dispute proof mode.",
"programUrl": "https://github.com/celo-org/op-succinct/tree/celo/v1.0.1/programs/range/eigenda",
"proverSystemProject": "sp1",
"verificationStatus": "successful",
"verificationSteps": "\nPrepare:\n\n1. Install cargo make: `cargo install --debug --locked cargo-make`\n2. Install sp1 toolchain: `curl -L https://sp1up.succinct.xyz/ | bash`, then `sp1up`\n3. Install docker [https://docs.docker.com/get-started/get-docker/](https://docs.docker.com/get-started/get-docker/)\n\nVerify:\n\n1. Checkout the correct branch in [celo-org/op-succinct](https://github.com/celo-org/op-succinct) repo: `git checkout celo/v1.0.1 ` . Commit hash should be `4408f080e40526eaf2e327ac651e106842478523 `.\n2. Make sure docker is running by running `docker ps `\n3. From the `op-succinct` dir: `cargo run --bin config --release --features eigenda` to build the SP1 programs for EigenDA features and generate and print verification key hashes.\n ",
"hash": "0x223fe2ba07be84da6afb2e3c1ed5c76b182aed383ad45aee40970cd30bcf9a83"
}
]
}+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1764322969,
"baseTimestamp": 1765550224,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}+2 -3
+1 -2
{
"architectureImage": "opstack-rollup-superchain-opfp",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "Data required to compute fraud proof is published offchain without onchain attestations",
"description": "The project relies on DA challenges for data availability. If a DA challenger finds that the data behind a tx data commitment is not available,\n they can submit a challenge which requires locking a bond within 12h. A challenge can be resolved by publishing the preimage data within an additional 12h.\n In such a case, a portion of the challenger bond is burned, with the exact amount estimated as the cost incurred by the resolver to publish the full data,\n meaning that the resolver and challenger will approximately lose the same amount of funds. The system is not secure if the malicious sequencer is able to outspend the altruistic challengers. If instead, after a challenge, the preimage data is not published, the chain reorgs to the last fully derivable state. This mechanism fully depends on the derivation rule of the L2 node and can only be verified in its source code, which [can be reviewed here](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/releases/tag/v1.9.4).",
"references": [
{
"title": "OP Plasma specification",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/experimental/alt-da.md"
},
{
"title": "Universal Plasma and DA Challenges - Ethresear.ch",
"url": "https://ethresear.ch/t/universal-plasma-and-da-challenges/18629"
},
{
"title": "Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission"
},
{
"title": "BatchInbox - address",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xfF00000000000000000000000000000000001d88#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B#code"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "the sequencer is malicious and is able to economically outspend the altruistic challengers."
},
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "there is no challenger willing to challenge unavailable data commitments."
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular exits",
"description": "The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B#code"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain",
"url": "https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B#code"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized operator",
"description": "The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": []
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing EVM Equivalence",
"url": "https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306"
}
]
}
],
"stateValidation": {
"description": "Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by permissioned operators only. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.",
"categories": [
{
"title": "State root proposals",
"description": "Proposers submit state roots as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the `create` function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge period has passed and it is not countered.",
"references": [
{
"title": "OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game",
"url": "https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#fault-dispute-game"
}
]
},
{
"title": "Challenges",
"description": "Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state roots using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the `defend` or `attack` functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with [full concurrency](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a). Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see [freeloader claims](https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#freeloader-claims)), if a clock gets inherited with less than 3h, it generally gets extended by 3h with the exception of 6h right before depth 30, and 1d right before the last depth. The maximum clock extension that a top level claim can get is therefore 10d. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers' stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step prover contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks ([Spearbit 5.1.3](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/develop/docs/security-reviews/2024_08_Fault-Proofs-No-MIPS_Spearbit.pdf)).",
"references": [
{
"title": "Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP",
"url": "https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a"
}
]
}
]
},
"warning": "Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots."
}
}+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1764757255,
"baseTimestamp": 1765550447,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}+1 -1
+1 -1
[
{
"layer": {
"value": "EigenDA",
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "The data is posted to EigenDA which is a separate data availability layer developed by the Eigenlayer team. Only hashes of data are published on an onchain inbox.",
"description": "The data is posted to EigenDA which is a separate data availability layer developed by the Eigenlayer team. Only commitments to the data are published on an onchain inbox.",
"projectId": "eigenda"
},
"bridge": {
"value": "None",
"sentiment": "bad",
"description": "There is no bridge that can attest if the data has been made available.",
"orderHint": -2
},
"mode": {
"value": "Transaction data",
"secondLine": "Compressed"
}
}
]+0 -5
+0 -5
{
"finality": 600,
"pruningWindow": 1209600,
"risks": {
"economicSecurity": {
"value": {
"value": "No slashing",
"sentiment": "bad",
"description": "Node operators are required to stake a minimum of 32 ETH (first quorum) or 1 EIGEN (second quorum) to become members of the DA network. Although slashing is enabled at EigenLayer protocol level, individual AVSs like EigenDA need to activate it by migrating to Operators Sets and defining slashing conditions. Currently, there is no slashing condition in place for misbehaving nodes. The EIGEN token social forking protocol for intersubjective attributable faults is under active development."
},
"adjustSecurityRisk": false
},
"fraudDetection": {
"value": "None",
"sentiment": "bad",
"description": "There is no fraud detection mechanism in place. A data withholding attack can only be detected by nodes downloading the full data from the DA layer."
}
},
"sovereignProjectsTrackingConfig": [
{
"projectId": "mantle-testnet",
"name": "Mantle-testnet",
"daTrackingConfig": [
{
"type": "eigen-da",
"sinceTimestamp": 0,
"customerId": "0xc16267ecb2297f8a98fce214686e80697da91198"
}
]
},
{
"projectId": "matter-labs-wonderfi",
"name": "Matter Labs - WonderFi",
"daTrackingConfig": [
{
"type": "eigen-da",
"sinceTimestamp": 0,
"customerId": "0xdaf4b26d608d58f53ab6f0758a12de01296ce5bf"
}
]
},
{
"projectId": "altlayer",
"name": "AltLayer",
"daTrackingConfig": [
{
"type": "eigen-da",
"sinceTimestamp": 0,
"customerId": "0x4fdbd273b8d2c1c429a7e3078063c49528aa8264"
}
]
},
{
"projectId": "altlayer-2",
"name": "AltLayer-2",
"daTrackingConfig": [
{
"type": "eigen-da",
"sinceTimestamp": 0,
"customerId": "0x1359fbd4b9bc9441a90436719426157526742c9a"
}
]
},
{
"projectId": "altlayer-cyber",
"name": "Altlayer Cyber",
"daTrackingConfig": [
{
"type": "eigen-da",
"sinceTimestamp": 0,
"customerId": "35.167.254.127"
}
]
},
{
"projectId": "conduit",
"name": "Conduit",
"daTrackingConfig": [
{
"type": "eigen-da",
"sinceTimestamp": 0,
"customerId": "0x8dc6f0bd2ce3c40d633f5541e21e7574598f7c75"
}
]
},
{
"projectId": "layer-n",
"name": "Layer N",
"daTrackingConfig": [
{
"type": "eigen-da",
"sinceTimestamp": 0,
"customerId": "0xd697219f32129f4544a554be015386fac9445507"
}
]
},
{
"projectId": "treasure",
"name": "Treasure",
"daTrackingConfig": [
{
"type": "eigen-da",
"sinceTimestamp": 0,
"customerId": "0x96561d11f55f99f7cda780b77e524195bde1dcde"
}
]
},
{
"projectId": "openledger",
"name": "OpenLedger",
"daTrackingConfig": [
{
"type": "eigen-da",
"sinceTimestamp": 1752044400,
"customerId": "0xe16fabeb99a6c098e4d7b4d442df0c827d5a6d26"
}
]
},
{
"projectId": "alchemy-production",
"name": "Alchemy Production",
"daTrackingConfig": [
{
"type": "eigen-da",
"sinceTimestamp": 1753833600,
"customerId": "0x3ba8c28a0209dea4d0502031f83d09a17a389fb0"
}
]
},
{
"projectId": "powerloom",
"name": "Powerloom",
"daTrackingConfig": [
{
"type": "eigen-da",
"sinceTimestamp": 1754438400,
"customerId": "0x00efb491755397ab8727ab45c4aef5fdcd3ecef8"
}
]
},
{
"projectId": "soon-base",
"name": "SOON - Base",
"daTrackingConfig": [
{
"type": "eigen-da",
"sinceTimestamp": 1748934000,
"customerId": "0xa11b7dea1592011c0055c62efb9566a845493003"
}
]
},
{
"projectId": "polymer",
"name": "Polymer",
"daTrackingConfig": [
{
"type": "eigen-da",
"sinceTimestamp": 1731974400,
"customerId": "0xf33f8cfea5857ebf248520cf6bc33640680ff83b"
}
]
},
{
"projectId": "crestal",
"name": "Crestal",
"daTrackingConfig": [
{
"type": "eigen-da",
"sinceTimestamp": 1728399600,
"customerId": "0x2659d4555e482ec4131a493def0770a922c75de3"
}
]
},
{
"projectId": "megaeth",
"name": "MegaETH",
"daTrackingConfig": [
{
"type": "eigen-da",
"sinceTimestamp": 1722405600,
"customerId": "0xcd1161b78f01da838ce0d42ec750891ec8708f1d"
}
]
},
{
"projectId": "conduit-2",
"name": "Conduit",
"daTrackingConfig": [
{
"type": "eigen-da",
"sinceTimestamp": 1719266400,
"customerId": "34.145.120.220"
}
]
},
{
"projectId": "conduit-3",
"name": "Conduit",
"daTrackingConfig": [
{
"type": "eigen-da",
"sinceTimestamp": 1719262800,
"customerId": "34.168.104.248"
}
]
}
],
"systemCategory": "public",
"technology": {
"description": "\n\n ## Architecture\n\n \n\n EigenDA is composed by three types of off-chain entities: node operators, a disperser and a retriever.\n - EigenDA **operators** are node operators running the EigenDA node software and are registered to the EigenDA AVS in EigenLayer.\n - The **disperser** is the entity responsible for collecting the blobs from the sequencer, erasure coding them and generating the encoded blob's KZG commitments for each chunk. Although the disperser could be rollup-operated, it is currently a centralised entity operated by Eigen Labs.\n - Lastly, the **retriever** client is responsible for querying the EigenDA operators to retrieve blob chunks, verifying their integrity and reconstructing the original blob. \n \n ### Operators Registration \n Operators register with the EigenDAServiceManager via the registerOperatorToAVS() function, enabling them to participate in the data availability network. They are responsible for holding and serving blobs data, and earn rewards for their participation in the network.\n\n \n\n ### Operators Stake Update \n \n EigenDA operators' stake for quorum verification is fetched from the EigenDA StakeRegistry contract. To keep the stake in sync with changes in share balances in the EigenLayer DelegationManager (e.g., due to tokens delegated/undelegated to operators), the permissionless updateOperators() function on the RegistryCoordinator contract needs to be called periodically. This function updates the operators' quorum weight in the StakeRegistry contract based on the operators' shares in the EigenLayer DelegationManager contract.\n \n\n ### Operators Blob Storage and Retrieval \n\n The process of storing a blob on EigenDA works as follows. A sequencer submits blobs to the EigenDA Disperser, which erasure codes the blobs into chunks and generates KZG commitments and proofs for each chunk, certifying the correctness of the data. The disperser then sends the chunks, KZG commitments, and KZG proofs to the operators.\n Multiple operators are responsible for storing chunks of the encoded data blobs and their associated KZG commitment and proof.\n Once the chunks, KZG commitments, and KZG proofs are sent to the operators, each of them generates a signature certifying that they have stored the data. These signatures are then sent to the Disperser which aggregates them and submits them to Ethereum by sending a transaction to the EigenDAServiceManager (the DA bridge).\n \n \n\n ## Data Availability Certificates\n\n EigenDA uses different certificate formats depending on the version, each with corresponding verifier contracts:\n\n ### Certificate Types\n - **V1 Certificates**: Used in EigenDA V1, verified through the EigenDAServiceManager contract via the confirmBatch() function. These certificates contain batch headers with KZG commitments and BLS aggregated signatures from operators.\n \n - **V2/V3 Certificates**: Used in EigenDA V2, which introduces significant architectural changes. The sequencer acts as the relayer and does not post batches to the service manager. Instead, certificates are verified through dedicated DACert Verifier contracts that correspond to different certificate versions.\n\n ### EigenDA V2 Changes\n In EigenDA V2, the architecture has evolved to improve efficiency:\n - **Sequencer as Relayer**: The sequencer now acts as the relayer, eliminating the need to post batches to the service manager\n - **Direct Certificate Verification**: Certificates are verified directly through version-specific DACert Verifier contracts\n - **Improved Throughput**: The new architecture supports higher throughput by removing bottlenecks in the batch confirmation process\n\n ### Certificate Verification Process\n 1. **Certificate Construction**: The EigenDA client constructs certificates from BlobStatusReply data received from the disperser\n 2. **Version Detection**: The certificate version is determined from the commitment structure\n 3. **Verifier Selection**: The appropriate DACert Verifier contract is selected based on the certificate version\n 4. **Onchain Verification**: The verifier contract's checkDACert function validates the certificate against operator signatures and stake thresholds\n\n ## L2 Data Availability\n The verification process differs between EigenDA versions:\n\n **EigenDA V1**: The Disperser collects operators' signatures and submits them to the EigenDAServiceManager contract via the confirmBatch() function. This submission includes a call to the BLSRegistry contract to verify signatures and check whether the required quorum of operators' stake has been achieved.\n\n **EigenDA V2**: Certificate verification is handled by dedicated DACert Verifier contracts. Each certificate version corresponds to a specific verifier that validates the certificate format and cryptographic proofs without requiring batch submissions to a central service manager.\n\n Threshold BLS signatures are not used. Instead, the threshold check is performed on the signers' total stake fetched by the StakeRegistry, and the stake threshold percentage to reach is provided in the batch header input data.\n\n The EigenDARollupUtils.sol library's verifyBlob() function can then be used by L2s to verify that a data blob is included within a confirmed batch in the EigenDAServiceManager (V1) or through the appropriate DACert Verifier contract (V2/V3). \n This function is not used by the EigenDAServiceManager contract itself, but rather by L2 systems to prove inclusion of the blob and that their trust assumptions (i.e., batch confirmation threshold) were as expected.\n ",
"references": [
{
"title": "EigenDA - Documentation",
"url": "https://docs.eigenda.xyz/overview"
},
{
"title": "EigenDA Integration Spec - Lifecycle Phases",
"url": "https://layr-labs.github.io/eigenda/integration/spec/5-lifecycle-phases.html#secure-dispersal"
},
{
"title": "EigenDA Disperser - Source Code",
"url": "https://github.com/Layr-Labs/eigenda/blob/2ed86a0c1dd730b56c8235031c19e08a9837bde8/disperser/batcher/batcher.go"
},
{
"title": "EigenDA Rollup Utils - Source Code",
"url": "https://github.com/Layr-Labs/eigenda-utils/blob/c4cbc9ec078aeca3e4a04bd278e2fb136bf3e6de/src/libraries/EigenDARollupUtils.sol"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"category": "Users can be censored if",
"text": "the disperser does not distribute data to EigenDA operators."
}
]
},
"throughput": [
{
"size": 15728640,
"frequency": 1,
"sinceTimestamp": 1719187200
},
{
"size": "NO_CAP",
"frequency": 1,
"sinceTimestamp": 1753833600
}
],
"type": "DA Service",
"usedWithoutBridgeIn": [
{
"id": "aevo",
"name": "Aevo",
"slug": "aevo"
},
{
"id": "celo",
"name": "Celo",
"slug": "celo"
},
{
"id": "fuel",
"name": "Fuel Ignition",
"slug": "fuel"
},
{
"id": "mantle",
"name": "Mantle",
"slug": "mantle"
},
{
"id": "soon",
"name": "Soon Alpha Mainnet",
"slug": "soon"
}
],
"validators": {
"type": "static",
"count": 113
}
}+7 -1
+7 -1
{
"daLayer": "eigenda",
"name": "DACert Verifier (EigenDA V2)",
"relayerType": {
"value": "SelfRelay",
"sentiment": "good",
"description": "In EigenDA V2 secure integrations, the rollup batcher includes the DA certificate on L1, no separate third-party relayer is required."
},
"risks": {
"committeeSecurity": {
"value": "Permissioned",
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "The committee requires an honest minority (less than 1/3) of members (or the network stake) to prevent the DA bridge from accepting an unavailable data commitment.\n There are 113 operators currently registered in the committee, but entry or exit of members is partially controlled by a centralized entity.",
"orderHint": 1
},
"upgradeability": {
"value": "No delay",
"sentiment": "bad",
"description": "There is no delay in the upgradeability of the bridge. Users have no time to exit the system before the bridge implementation update is completed."
},
"relayerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"sentiment": "good",
"description": "Anyone can relay data availability commitments to the DA bridge. In case of current relayer failure, users can collect attestations from committee members and propose new data availability commitments to the DA bridge."
}
},
"technology": {
"description": "\n## EigenDA V2 Architecture\n\nEigenDA V2 introduces a more efficient architecture where the L2 sequencer acts as the relayer, eliminating the need for separate permissioned relayers:\n\n### Key Improvements\n- **Sequencer as Relayer**: The sequencer acts as the relayer, eliminating the need for separate permissioned relayers\n- **Direct Certificate Verification**: Multiple DACert Verifier contracts handle different certificate versions (V2, V3). These contracts read operator/state metadata via EigenDA and EigenLayer core contracts (incl. ServiceManager components) and verify signatures and stake thresholds.\n- **Version-Specific Verification**: Each certificate version has a corresponding verifier contract that validates the specific certificate format and cryptographic proofs\n\n### Certificate Types and Verifiers\nEigenDA V2 supports multiple certificate formats:\n\n- **V2 Certificates**: Contain blob inclusion info, batch headers, and non-signer stakes with signatures. Verified through EigenDACertVerifierV2 contracts.\n- **V3 Certificates**: Similar structure to V2 but with reordered fields for optimization. Verified through EigenDACertVerifierV3 contracts.\n\n### Verification Process\n1. **Certificate Construction**: The EigenDA client constructs certificates from BlobStatusReply data received from the disperser\n2. **Version Detection**: The certificate version is determined from the commitment structure \n3. **Verifier Selection**: The appropriate DACert Verifier contract is selected based on the certificate version using the EigenDACertVerifierRouter\n4. **Onchain Verification**: The verifier contract's checkDACert function validates the certificate against operator signatures and stake thresholds\n\n### Secure Dispersal Flow\nBased on the [EigenDA Integration Spec](https://layr-labs.github.io/eigenda/integration/spec/5-lifecycle-phases.html#secure-dispersal):\n\n1. EigenDA Client converts raw payload bytes into a blob\n2. Client fetches the appropriate EigenDACertVerifier contract address using the router\n3. Client submits blob request to disperser and polls for BlobStatusReply\n4. Once confirmation thresholds are met, client constructs the DACert from the reply\n5. Client calls the verifier's checkDACert function for onchain verification\n6. Based on verification status, client either returns the certificate or initiates failover\n\n### Router-Based Verifier Selection\nEigenDA V2 uses the EigenDACertVerifierRouter to dynamically select the appropriate verifier contract:\n- The router maps certificate versions to their corresponding verifier contracts\n- This allows for seamless upgrades and support for multiple certificate formats\n- The client queries the router using the latest block number to get the verifier for the reference block\n\nThis architecture provides improved throughput and eliminates single points of failure while maintaining the same security guarantees as V1.\n ",
"references": [
{
"title": "EigenDA Integration Spec - Lifecycle Phases",
"url": "https://layr-labs.github.io/eigenda/integration/spec/5-lifecycle-phases.html#secure-dispersal"
},
{
"title": "EigenDA - Documentation",
"url": "https://docs.eigenda.xyz/overview"
},
{
"title": "EigenDA Disperser - Source Code",
"url": "https://github.com/Layr-Labs/eigenda/blob/2ed86a0c1dd730b56c8235031c19e08a9837bde8/disperser/batcher/batcher.go"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be lost if",
"text": "the sequencer posts an invalid certificate and EigenDA operators do not make the data available for verification."
},
{
"category": "Funds can be frozen if",
"text": "the EigenDACertVerifierRouter fails to provide correct verifier contract addresses."
}
]
},
"usedIn": [],
"usedIn": [
{
"id": "celo",
"name": "Celo",
"slug": "celo"
}
],
"validationType": {
"value": "BLS Signature",
"description": "EigenDA V2 certificates require onchain BLS signatures verification through dedicated DACert Verifier contracts. Each certificate version corresponds to a specific verifier that validates the certificate format and proofs."
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
[
{
"layer": {
"value": "EigenDA",
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "The data is posted to EigenDA which is a separate data availability layer developed by the Eigenlayer team. Only hashes of data are published on an onchain inbox.",
"description": "The data is posted to EigenDA which is a separate data availability layer developed by the Eigenlayer team. Only commitments to the data are published on an onchain inbox.",
"projectId": "eigenda"
},
"bridge": {
"value": "None",
"sentiment": "bad",
"description": "There is no bridge that can attest if the data has been made available.",
"orderHint": -2
},
"mode": {
"value": "Transaction data",
"secondLine": "Compressed"
}
}
]+2 -3
+1 -2
{
"architectureImage": "opstack-rollup-superchain-opfp",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "Data required to compute fraud proof is published offchain without onchain attestations",
"description": "The project relies on DA challenges for data availability. If a DA challenger finds that the data behind a tx data commitment is not available,\n they can submit a challenge which requires locking a bond within 12h. A challenge can be resolved by publishing the preimage data within an additional 12h.\n In such a case, a portion of the challenger bond is burned, with the exact amount estimated as the cost incurred by the resolver to publish the full data,\n meaning that the resolver and challenger will approximately lose the same amount of funds. The system is not secure if the malicious sequencer is able to outspend the altruistic challengers. If instead, after a challenge, the preimage data is not published, the chain reorgs to the last fully derivable state. This mechanism fully depends on the derivation rule of the L2 node and can only be verified in its source code, which [can be reviewed here](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/releases/tag/v1.7.7).",
"references": [
{
"title": "OP Plasma specification",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/experimental/alt-da.md"
},
{
"title": "Universal Plasma and DA Challenges - Ethresear.ch",
"url": "https://ethresear.ch/t/universal-plasma-and-da-challenges/18629"
},
{
"title": "Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission"
},
{
"title": "BatchInbox - address",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xfF00000000000000000000000000000084BB84Bb#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B#code"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "the sequencer is malicious and is able to economically outspend the altruistic challengers."
},
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "there is no challenger willing to challenge unavailable data commitments."
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular exits",
"description": "The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B#code"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain",
"url": "https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B#code"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized operator",
"description": "The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": []
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing EVM Equivalence",
"url": "https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306"
}
]
}
],
"stateValidation": {
"description": "Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by permissioned operators only. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.",
"categories": [
{
"title": "State root proposals",
"description": "Proposers submit state roots as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the `create` function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge period has passed and it is not countered.",
"references": [
{
"title": "OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game",
"url": "https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#fault-dispute-game"
}
]
},
{
"title": "Challenges",
"description": "Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state roots using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the `defend` or `attack` functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with [full concurrency](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a). Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see [freeloader claims](https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#freeloader-claims)), if a clock gets inherited with less than 3h, it generally gets extended by 3h with the exception of 6h right before depth 30, and 1d right before the last depth. The maximum clock extension that a top level claim can get is therefore 10d. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers' stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step prover contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks ([Spearbit 5.1.3](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/develop/docs/security-reviews/2024_08_Fault-Proofs-No-MIPS_Spearbit.pdf)).",
"references": [
{
"title": "Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP",
"url": "https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a"
}
]
}
]
},
"warning": "Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots."
}
}+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1764757484,
"baseTimestamp": 1765550486,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}+2 -3
+1 -2
{
"architectureImage": "opstack-rollup-superchain-opfp",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "All data required for proofs is published on chain",
"description": "All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission"
},
{
"title": "BatchInbox - address",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x0004cb44C80b6Fbf8ceb1d80AF688C9f7C0b2aB5#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x18A7868ECe35A45aC9138108E5b6e021aD1038d1#code"
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular exits",
"description": "The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 3d 12h period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x18A7868ECe35A45aC9138108E5b6e021aD1038d1#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x18A7868ECe35A45aC9138108E5b6e021aD1038d1#code"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain",
"url": "https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x18A7868ECe35A45aC9138108E5b6e021aD1038d1#code"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized operator",
"description": "The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": []
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing EVM Equivalence",
"url": "https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306"
}
]
}
],
"stateDerivation": {
"nodeSoftware": "The rollup node is composed of two software components: [op-node](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/tree/develop/op-node), implementing consensus related logic, and [op-geth](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/op-geth), implementing execution logic. The configuration file can be found [here](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/superchain-registry/blob/main/superchain/configs/mainnet/hashkeychain.toml).",
"compressionScheme": "Data batches are compressed using the [zlib](https://github.com/madler/zlib) algorithm with best compression level.",
"genesisState": "The genesis file can be found [here](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/superchain-registry/blob/main/superchain/extra/genesis/mainnet/hashkeychain.json.zst).",
"dataFormat": "The format specification of Sequencer's data batches can be found [here](https://optimism.io/blog/here-s-how-you-can-reproduce-op-mainnet-s-migration-to-bedrock)."
},
"stateValidation": {
"description": "Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by permissioned operators only. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.",
"categories": [
{
"title": "State root proposals",
"description": "Proposers submit state roots as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the `create` function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge period has passed and it is not countered.",
"references": [
{
"title": "OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game",
"url": "https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#fault-dispute-game"
}
]
},
{
"title": "Challenges",
"description": "Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state roots using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the `defend` or `attack` functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with [full concurrency](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a). Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see [freeloader claims](https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#freeloader-claims)), if a clock gets inherited with less than 3h, it generally gets extended by 3h with the exception of 6h right before depth 30, and 1d right before the last depth. The maximum clock extension that a top level claim can get is therefore 10d. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers' stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step prover contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks ([Spearbit 5.1.3](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/develop/docs/security-reviews/2024_08_Fault-Proofs-No-MIPS_Spearbit.pdf)).",
"references": [
{
"title": "Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP",
"url": "https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a"
}
]
}
]
},
"warning": "Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots."
}
}+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1756721254,
"baseTimestamp": 1765550542,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}+2 -3
+1 -2
{
"architectureImage": "opstack-rollup-superchain-opfp-permissionless",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "All data required for proofs is published on chain",
"description": "All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission"
},
{
"title": "BatchInbox - address",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x005969bf0EcbF6eDB6C47E5e94693b1C3651Be97#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular exits",
"description": "The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain",
"url": "https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized operator",
"description": "The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": []
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing EVM Equivalence",
"url": "https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306"
}
]
}
],
"stateDerivation": {
"nodeSoftware": "The rollup node is composed of two software components: [op-node](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/tree/develop/op-node), implementing consensus related logic, and [op-geth](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/op-geth), implementing execution logic. The configuration file can be found [here](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/superchain-registry/blob/main/superchain/configs/mainnet/ink.toml).",
"compressionScheme": "Data batches are compressed using the [zlib](https://github.com/madler/zlib) algorithm with best compression level.",
"genesisState": "The genesis file can be found [here](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/superchain-registry/blob/main/superchain/extra/genesis/mainnet/ink.json.zst).",
"dataFormat": "The format specification of Sequencer's data batches can be found [here](https://optimism.io/blog/here-s-how-you-can-reproduce-op-mainnet-s-migration-to-bedrock)."
},
"stateValidation": {
"description": "Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by anyone who has sufficient funds. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.",
"categories": [
{
"title": "State root proposals",
"description": "Proposers submit state roots as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the `create` function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.08 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge period has passed and it is not countered.",
"references": [
{
"title": "OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game",
"url": "https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#fault-dispute-game"
}
]
},
{
"title": "Challenges",
"description": "Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state roots using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 691.43 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the `defend` or `attack` functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with [full concurrency](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a). Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see [freeloader claims](https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#freeloader-claims)), if a clock gets inherited with less than 3h, it generally gets extended by 3h with the exception of 6h right before depth 30, and 1d right before the last depth. The maximum clock extension that a top level claim can get is therefore 10d. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers' stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step prover contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks ([Spearbit 5.1.3](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/develop/docs/security-reviews/2024_08_Fault-Proofs-No-MIPS_Spearbit.pdf)).",
"references": [
{
"title": "Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP",
"url": "https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a"
}
]
}
]
},
"stateValidationImage": "opfp",
"warning": "Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots."
"stateValidationImage": "opfp"
}+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1765360693,
"baseTimestamp": 1765550577,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}+2 -3
+1 -2
{
"architectureImage": "opstack-rollup-superchain-opfp",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "All data required for proofs is published on chain",
"description": "All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission"
},
{
"title": "BatchInbox - address",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xFf00000000000000000000000000000000001135#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B#code"
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular exits",
"description": "The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B#code"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain",
"url": "https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B#code"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized operator",
"description": "The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": []
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing EVM Equivalence",
"url": "https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306"
}
]
}
],
"stateValidation": {
"description": "Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by permissioned operators only. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.",
"categories": [
{
"title": "State root proposals",
"description": "Proposers submit state roots as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the `create` function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge period has passed and it is not countered.",
"references": [
{
"title": "OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game",
"url": "https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#fault-dispute-game"
}
]
},
{
"title": "Challenges",
"description": "Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state roots using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the `defend` or `attack` functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with [full concurrency](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a). Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see [freeloader claims](https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#freeloader-claims)), if a clock gets inherited with less than 3h, it generally gets extended by 3h with the exception of 6h right before depth 32, and 1d right before the last depth. The maximum clock extension that a top level claim can get is therefore 10d. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers' stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step prover contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks ([Spearbit 5.1.3](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/develop/docs/security-reviews/2024_08_Fault-Proofs-No-MIPS_Spearbit.pdf)).",
"references": [
{
"title": "Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP",
"url": "https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a"
}
]
}
]
},
"warning": "Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots."
}
}+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1764329775,
"baseTimestamp": 1765550612,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}+2 -3
+1 -2
{
"architectureImage": "opstack-optimium-superchain-opfp",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "Data is posted to Celestia",
"description": "Transactions roots are posted onchain and the full data is posted on Celestia. Since the Blobstream bridge is not used, availability of the data is not verified against Celestia validators, meaning that the Sequencer can single-handedly publish unavailable roots. If Celestia becomes unavailable, the sequencer falls back to Ethereum.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be lost if",
"text": "the sequencer posts an unavailable transaction root.",
"isCritical": true
},
{
"category": "Funds can be lost if",
"text": "the data is not available on the external provider.",
"isCritical": true
}
],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing Blobstream: streaming modular DA to Ethereum",
"url": "https://blog.celestia.org/introducing-blobstream/"
},
{
"title": "Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission"
},
{
"title": "BatchInbox - address",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x5f7f7f6DB967F0ef10BdA0678964DBA185d16c50#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4#code"
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular exits",
"description": "The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4#code"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain",
"url": "https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4#code"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized operator",
"description": "The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": []
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing EVM Equivalence",
"url": "https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306"
}
]
}
],
"stateValidation": {
"description": "Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by permissioned operators only. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.",
"categories": [
{
"title": "State root proposals",
"description": "Proposers submit state roots as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the `create` function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge period has passed and it is not countered.",
"references": [
{
"title": "OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game",
"url": "https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#fault-dispute-game"
}
]
},
{
"title": "Challenges",
"description": "Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state roots using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the `defend` or `attack` functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with [full concurrency](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a). Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see [freeloader claims](https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#freeloader-claims)), if a clock gets inherited with less than 3h, it generally gets extended by 3h with the exception of 6h right before depth 30, and 1d right before the last depth. The maximum clock extension that a top level claim can get is therefore 10d. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers' stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step prover contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks ([Spearbit 5.1.3](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/develop/docs/security-reviews/2024_08_Fault-Proofs-No-MIPS_Spearbit.pdf)).",
"references": [
{
"title": "Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP",
"url": "https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a"
}
]
}
]
},
"warning": "Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots."
}
}+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1764933699,
"baseTimestamp": 1765550648,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}+23 -3
+1 -1
[
{
"layer": {
"value": "EigenDA",
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "The data is posted to EigenDA which is a separate data availability layer developed by the Eigenlayer team. Only hashes of data are published on an onchain inbox.",
"description": "The data is posted to EigenDA which is a separate data availability layer developed by the Eigenlayer team. Only commitments to the data are published on an onchain inbox.",
"projectId": "eigenda"
},
"bridge": {
"value": "None",
"sentiment": "bad",
"description": "There is no bridge that can attest if the data has been made available.",
"orderHint": -2
},
"mode": {
"value": "Transaction data",
"secondLine": "Compressed"
}
}
]+22 -2
{
"architectureImage": "opstack-optimium-opfp-opsuccinct",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "Data is posted to EigenDA",
"description": "Transactions roots are posted onchain and the full data is posted on EigenDA. Since the ServiceManager bridge is not used, availability of the data is not verified against EigenDA operators, meaning that the Sequencer can single-handedly publish unavailable commitments. Mantle uses Hokulea, a Rust implementation that provides EigenDA blob derivation for OP stack chains.",
"references": [
{
"url": "https://docs.eigenda.xyz/overview",
"title": "EigenDA Docs - Overview"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/Layr-Labs/hokulea",
"title": "Hokulea - EigenDA blob derivation library"
},
{
"title": "Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be lost if",
"text": "the sequencer posts an unavailable transaction root.",
"isCritical": true
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular messaging",
"description": "The user initiates L2->L1 messages by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled, the message becomes available for processing on L1. ZK proofs are required to settle blocks.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be frozen if",
"text": "the centralized validator goes down. Users cannot produce blocks themselves and exiting the system requires new block production.",
"isCritical": true
}
],
"references": [
{
"title": "OptimismPortal.sol - source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xe1399f54ba2597b4EaDA9E3450c34D393fb131A7#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal.sol - source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xe1399f54ba2597b4EaDA9E3450c34D393fb131A7#code"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain",
"url": "https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xe1399f54ba2597b4EaDA9E3450c34D393fb131A7#code"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized operator",
"description": "The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": []
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing EVM Equivalence",
"url": "https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306"
}
]
}
],
"stateValidation": {
"categories": [
{
"title": "Validity proofs",
"description": "Each update to the system state must be accompanied by a ZK proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. These proofs are then verified on Ethereum by a smart contract.\n Through the SuccinctL2OutputOracle, the system also allows to switch to an optimistic mode, in which no proofs are required and a challenger can challenge the proposed output state root within the finalization period.",
"references": [
{
"url": "https://succinctlabs.github.io/op-succinct/architecture.html",
"title": "Op-Succinct architecture"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "in non-optimistic mode, the validity proof cryptography is broken or implemented incorrectly."
},
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "optimistic mode is enabled and no challenger checks the published state."
},
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "the proposer routes proof verification through a malicious or faulty verifier by specifying an unsafe route id."
},
{
"category": "Funds can be frozen if",
"text": "the permissioned proposer fails to publish state roots to the L1."
},
{
"category": "Funds can be frozen if",
"text": "in non-optimistic mode, the SP1VerifierGateway is unable to route proof verification to a valid verifier."
}
]
}
]
},
"stateValidationImage": "opsuccinct",
"warning": "Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots."
"stateValidationImage": "opsuccinct"
}+2 -3
+1 -2
{
"architectureImage": "opstack-rollup-superchain-opfp",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "All data required for proofs is published on chain",
"description": "All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission"
},
{
"title": "BatchInbox - address",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xc83f7D9F2D4A76E81145849381ABA02602373723#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular exits",
"description": "The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain",
"url": "https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized operator",
"description": "The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": []
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing EVM Equivalence",
"url": "https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306"
}
]
}
],
"stateDerivation": {
"nodeSoftware": "The rollup node is composed of two software components: [op-node](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/tree/develop/op-node), implementing consensus related logic, and [op-geth](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/op-geth), implementing execution logic. The configuration file can be found [here](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/superchain-registry/blob/main/superchain/configs/mainnet/metal.toml).",
"compressionScheme": "Data batches are compressed using the [zlib](https://github.com/madler/zlib) algorithm with best compression level.",
"genesisState": "The genesis file can be found [here](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/superchain-registry/blob/main/superchain/extra/genesis/mainnet/metal.json.zst).",
"dataFormat": "The format specification of Sequencer's data batches can be found [here](https://optimism.io/blog/here-s-how-you-can-reproduce-op-mainnet-s-migration-to-bedrock)."
},
"stateValidation": {
"description": "Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by permissioned operators only. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.",
"categories": [
{
"title": "State root proposals",
"description": "Proposers submit state roots as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the `create` function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge period has passed and it is not countered.",
"references": [
{
"title": "OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game",
"url": "https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#fault-dispute-game"
}
]
},
{
"title": "Challenges",
"description": "Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state roots using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the `defend` or `attack` functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with [full concurrency](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a). Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see [freeloader claims](https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#freeloader-claims)), if a clock gets inherited with less than 3h, it generally gets extended by 3h with the exception of 6h right before depth 30, and 1d right before the last depth. The maximum clock extension that a top level claim can get is therefore 10d. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers' stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step prover contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks ([Spearbit 5.1.3](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/develop/docs/security-reviews/2024_08_Fault-Proofs-No-MIPS_Spearbit.pdf)).",
"references": [
{
"title": "Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP",
"url": "https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a"
}
]
}
]
},
"warning": "Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots."
}
}+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1764933717,
"baseTimestamp": 1765550685,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}+1 -2
+1 -2
{
"architectureImage": "opstack-rollup-superchain-opfp",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "All data required for proofs is published on chain",
"description": "All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission"
},
{
"title": "BatchInbox - address",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x4e31448a098393727b786e25B54E59DcA1b77FE1#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4#code"
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular exits",
"description": "The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4#code"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain",
"url": "https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4#code"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized operator",
"description": "The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": []
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing EVM Equivalence",
"url": "https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306"
}
]
}
],
"stateDerivation": {
"nodeSoftware": "The rollup node is composed of two software components: [op-node](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/tree/develop/op-node), implementing consensus related logic, and [op-geth](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/op-geth), implementing execution logic. The configuration file can be found [here](https://api.conduit.xyz/file/v1/optimism/rollup/mint-mainnet-0).",
"compressionScheme": "Data batches are compressed using the [zlib](https://github.com/madler/zlib) algorithm with best compression level.",
"genesisState": "The genesis file can be found [here](https://api.conduit.xyz/file/v1/optimism/genesis/mint-mainnet-0).",
"dataFormat": "The format specification of Sequencer's data batches can be found [here](https://optimism.io/blog/here-s-how-you-can-reproduce-op-mainnet-s-migration-to-bedrock)."
},
"stateValidation": {
"description": "Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by permissioned operators only. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.",
"categories": [
{
"title": "State root proposals",
"description": "Proposers submit state roots as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the `create` function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge period has passed and it is not countered.",
"references": [
{
"title": "OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game",
"url": "https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#fault-dispute-game"
}
]
},
{
"title": "Challenges",
"description": "Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state roots using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the `defend` or `attack` functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with [full concurrency](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a). Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see [freeloader claims](https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#freeloader-claims)), if a clock gets inherited with less than 3h, it generally gets extended by 3h with the exception of 6h right before depth 30, and 1d right before the last depth. The maximum clock extension that a top level claim can get is therefore 10d. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers' stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step prover contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks ([Spearbit 5.1.3](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/develop/docs/security-reviews/2024_08_Fault-Proofs-No-MIPS_Spearbit.pdf)).",
"references": [
{
"title": "Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP",
"url": "https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a"
}
]
}
]
},
"warning": "Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots."
}
}+2 -3
+1 -2
{
"architectureImage": "opstack-rollup-superchain-opfp",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "All data required for proofs is published on chain",
"description": "All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission"
},
{
"title": "BatchInbox - address",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x24E59d9d3Bd73ccC28Dc54062AF7EF7bFF58Bd67#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular exits",
"description": "The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain",
"url": "https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized operator",
"description": "The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": []
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing EVM Equivalence",
"url": "https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306"
}
]
}
],
"stateDerivation": {
"nodeSoftware": "The rollup node is composed of two software components: [op-node](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/tree/develop/op-node), implementing consensus related logic, and [op-geth](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/op-geth), implementing execution logic. The configuration file can be found [here](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/superchain-registry/blob/main/superchain/configs/mainnet/mode.toml).",
"compressionScheme": "Data batches are compressed using the [zlib](https://github.com/madler/zlib) algorithm with best compression level.",
"genesisState": "The genesis file can be found [here](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/superchain-registry/blob/main/superchain/extra/genesis/mainnet/mode.json.zst).",
"dataFormat": "The format specification of Sequencer's data batches can be found [here](https://optimism.io/blog/here-s-how-you-can-reproduce-op-mainnet-s-migration-to-bedrock)."
},
"stateValidation": {
"description": "Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by permissioned operators only. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.",
"categories": [
{
"title": "State root proposals",
"description": "Proposers submit state roots as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the `create` function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge period has passed and it is not countered.",
"references": [
{
"title": "OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game",
"url": "https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#fault-dispute-game"
}
]
},
{
"title": "Challenges",
"description": "Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state roots using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the `defend` or `attack` functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with [full concurrency](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a). Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see [freeloader claims](https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#freeloader-claims)), if a clock gets inherited with less than 3h, it generally gets extended by 3h with the exception of 6h right before depth 30, and 1d right before the last depth. The maximum clock extension that a top level claim can get is therefore 10d. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers' stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step prover contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks ([Spearbit 5.1.3](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/develop/docs/security-reviews/2024_08_Fault-Proofs-No-MIPS_Spearbit.pdf)).",
"references": [
{
"title": "Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP",
"url": "https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a"
}
]
}
]
},
"warning": "Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots."
}
}+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1764933738,
"baseTimestamp": 1765550723,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}+2 -3
+1 -2
{
"architectureImage": "opstack-rollup-superchain-opfp-permissionless",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "All data required for proofs is published on chain",
"description": "All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission"
},
{
"title": "BatchInbox - address",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xFF00000000000000000000000000000000000010#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular exits",
"description": "The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain",
"url": "https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized operator",
"description": "The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": []
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing EVM Equivalence",
"url": "https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306"
}
]
}
],
"stateDerivation": {
"nodeSoftware": "The rollup node is composed of two software components: [op-node](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/tree/develop/op-node), implementing consensus related logic, and [op-geth](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/op-geth), implementing execution logic. The configuration file can be found [here](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/superchain-registry/blob/main/superchain/configs/mainnet/op.toml).",
"compressionScheme": "Data batches are compressed using the [zlib](https://github.com/madler/zlib) algorithm with best compression level.",
"genesisState": "Since OP Mainnet has migrated from the OVM to Bedrock, a node must be synced using a data directory that can be found [here](https://docs.optimism.io/builders/node-operators/management/snapshots). To reproduce the migration itself, see this [guide](https://optimism.io/blog/here-s-how-you-can-reproduce-op-mainnet-s-migration-to-bedrock).",
"dataFormat": "The format specification of Sequencer's data batches can be found [here](https://optimism.io/blog/here-s-how-you-can-reproduce-op-mainnet-s-migration-to-bedrock)."
},
"stateValidation": {
"description": "Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by anyone who has sufficient funds. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.",
"categories": [
{
"title": "State root proposals",
"description": "Proposers submit state roots as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the `create` function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.08 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge period has passed and it is not countered.",
"references": [
{
"title": "OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game",
"url": "https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#fault-dispute-game"
}
]
},
{
"title": "Challenges",
"description": "Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state roots using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 691.43 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the `defend` or `attack` functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with [full concurrency](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a). Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see [freeloader claims](https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#freeloader-claims)), if a clock gets inherited with less than 3h, it generally gets extended by 3h with the exception of 6h right before depth 30, and 1d right before the last depth. The maximum clock extension that a top level claim can get is therefore 10d. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers' stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step prover contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks ([Spearbit 5.1.3](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/develop/docs/security-reviews/2024_08_Fault-Proofs-No-MIPS_Spearbit.pdf)).",
"references": [
{
"title": "Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP",
"url": "https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a"
}
]
}
]
},
"stateValidationImage": "opfp",
"upgradesAndGovernance": "All contracts are upgradable by the `SuperchainProxyAdmin` which is controlled by a 2/2 multisig composed by the Optimism Foundation and a Security Council. The Guardian role is assigned to the Security Council multisig, with a Safe Module that limits the Optimism Foundation to act through it to stop withdrawals in the whole Superchain or specific individual chains. Each pause automatically expires after 3 months if not extended or unpaused by the Security Council. The Security Council can remove the module if the Foundation becomes malicious. The single Sequencer actor can be modified by the `OpFoundationOperationsSafe` via the `SystemConfig` contract. The SuperchainProxyAdminOwner can recover dispute bonds in case of bugs that would distribute them incorrectly. \n\nAt the moment, for regular upgrades, the DAO signals its intent by voting on upgrade proposals, but has no direct control over the upgrade process.",
"warning": "Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots."
"upgradesAndGovernance": "All contracts are upgradable by the `SuperchainProxyAdmin` which is controlled by a 2/2 multisig composed by the Optimism Foundation and a Security Council. The Guardian role is assigned to the Security Council multisig, with a Safe Module that limits the Optimism Foundation to act through it to stop withdrawals in the whole Superchain or specific individual chains. Each pause automatically expires after 3 months if not extended or unpaused by the Security Council. The Security Council can remove the module if the Foundation becomes malicious. The single Sequencer actor can be modified by the `OpFoundationOperationsSafe` via the `SystemConfig` contract. The SuperchainProxyAdminOwner can recover dispute bonds in case of bugs that would distribute them incorrectly. \n\nAt the moment, for regular upgrades, the DAO signals its intent by voting on upgrade proposals, but has no direct control over the upgrade process."
}+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1765362353,
"baseTimestamp": 1765550762,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}+2 -3
+1 -2
{
"architectureImage": "opstack-optimium-superchain-opfp",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "Data is posted to Celestia",
"description": "Transactions roots are posted onchain and the full data is posted on Celestia. Since the Blobstream bridge is not used, availability of the data is not verified against Celestia validators, meaning that the Sequencer can single-handedly publish unavailable roots. If Celestia becomes unavailable, the sequencer falls back to Ethereum.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be lost if",
"text": "the sequencer posts an unavailable transaction root.",
"isCritical": true
},
{
"category": "Funds can be lost if",
"text": "the data is not available on the external provider.",
"isCritical": true
}
],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing Blobstream: streaming modular DA to Ethereum",
"url": "https://blog.celestia.org/introducing-blobstream/"
},
{
"title": "Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission"
},
{
"title": "BatchInbox - address",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x08aA34cC843CeEBcC88A627F18430294aA9780be#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4#code"
}
]
}
],
"detailedDescription": "While ETH deposited to Orderly is using an OP Stack canonical bridge, the multichain USDC escrows are sending / receiving their deposit / withdrawal messages through the external LayerZero v1 AMB.",
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular exits",
"description": "The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4#code"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain",
"url": "https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4#code"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized operator",
"description": "The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": []
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing EVM Equivalence",
"url": "https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306"
}
]
}
],
"stateValidation": {
"description": "Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by permissioned operators only. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.",
"categories": [
{
"title": "State root proposals",
"description": "Proposers submit state roots as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the `create` function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge period has passed and it is not countered.",
"references": [
{
"title": "OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game",
"url": "https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#fault-dispute-game"
}
]
},
{
"title": "Challenges",
"description": "Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state roots using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the `defend` or `attack` functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with [full concurrency](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a). Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see [freeloader claims](https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#freeloader-claims)), if a clock gets inherited with less than 3h, it generally gets extended by 3h with the exception of 6h right before depth 30, and 1d right before the last depth. The maximum clock extension that a top level claim can get is therefore 10d. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers' stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step prover contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks ([Spearbit 5.1.3](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/develop/docs/security-reviews/2024_08_Fault-Proofs-No-MIPS_Spearbit.pdf)).",
"references": [
{
"title": "Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP",
"url": "https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a"
}
]
}
]
},
"warning": "Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots."
}
}+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1764933743,
"baseTimestamp": 1765550831,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}+23 -3
+22 -2
{
"architectureImage": "opstack-rollup-superchain-opfp-opsuccinct",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "All data required for proofs is published on chain",
"description": "All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission"
},
{
"title": "BatchInbox - address",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x5A2a0698355D06cd5c4e3872D2Bc6B9f6a89d39B#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x5B172BBfa0140285A02374EC1f5B9f25ef415514#code"
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular messaging",
"description": "The user initiates L2->L1 messages by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled, the message becomes available for processing on L1. ZK proofs are required to settle blocks.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be frozen if",
"text": "the centralized validator goes down. Users cannot produce blocks themselves and exiting the system requires new block production.",
"isCritical": true
}
],
"references": [
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x5B172BBfa0140285A02374EC1f5B9f25ef415514#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x5B172BBfa0140285A02374EC1f5B9f25ef415514#code"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain",
"url": "https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x5B172BBfa0140285A02374EC1f5B9f25ef415514#code"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized operator",
"description": "The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": []
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing EVM Equivalence",
"url": "https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306"
}
]
}
],
"stateValidation": {
"categories": [
{
"title": "Validity proofs",
"description": "Each update to the system state must be accompanied by a ZK proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. These proofs are then verified on Ethereum by a smart contract.\n Through the SuccinctL2OutputOracle, the system also allows to switch to an optimistic mode, in which no proofs are required and a challenger can challenge the proposed output state root within the finalization period.",
"references": [
{
"url": "https://succinctlabs.github.io/op-succinct/architecture.html",
"title": "Op-Succinct architecture"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "in non-optimistic mode, the validity proof cryptography is broken or implemented incorrectly."
},
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "optimistic mode is enabled and no challenger checks the published state."
},
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "the proposer routes proof verification through a malicious or faulty verifier by specifying an unsafe route id."
},
{
"category": "Funds can be frozen if",
"text": "the permissioned proposer fails to publish state roots to the L1."
},
{
"category": "Funds can be frozen if",
"text": "in non-optimistic mode, the SP1VerifierGateway is unable to route proof verification to a valid verifier."
}
]
}
]
},
"stateValidationImage": "opsuccinct",
"warning": "Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots."
"stateValidationImage": "opsuccinct"
}+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1764933798,
"baseTimestamp": 1765550868,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}+2 -3
+1 -2
{
"architectureImage": "opstack-rollup-superchain-opfp",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "All data required for proofs is published on chain",
"description": "All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission"
},
{
"title": "BatchInbox - address",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x0bd57e83B5E0f9eCD84d559bB58e1EcFEEdD2565#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4#code"
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular exits",
"description": "The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4#code"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain",
"url": "https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4#code"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized operator",
"description": "The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": []
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing EVM Equivalence",
"url": "https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306"
}
]
}
],
"stateDerivation": {
"nodeSoftware": "The rollup node is composed of two software components: [op-node](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/tree/develop/op-node), implementing consensus related logic, and [op-geth](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/op-geth), implementing execution logic. The configuration file can be found [here](https://api.conduit.xyz/file/v1/optimism/rollup/polynomial-mainnet-0).",
"compressionScheme": "Data batches are compressed using the [zlib](https://github.com/madler/zlib) algorithm with best compression level.",
"genesisState": "The genesis file can be found [here](https://api.conduit.xyz/file/v1/optimism/genesis/polynomial-mainnet-0).",
"dataFormat": "The format specification of Sequencer's data batches can be found [here](https://optimism.io/blog/here-s-how-you-can-reproduce-op-mainnet-s-migration-to-bedrock)."
},
"stateValidation": {
"description": "Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by permissioned operators only. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.",
"categories": [
{
"title": "State root proposals",
"description": "Proposers submit state roots as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the `create` function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge period has passed and it is not countered.",
"references": [
{
"title": "OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game",
"url": "https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#fault-dispute-game"
}
]
},
{
"title": "Challenges",
"description": "Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state roots using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the `defend` or `attack` functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with [full concurrency](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a). Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see [freeloader claims](https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#freeloader-claims)), if a clock gets inherited with less than 3h, it generally gets extended by 3h with the exception of 6h right before depth 30, and 1d right before the last depth. The maximum clock extension that a top level claim can get is therefore 10d. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers' stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step prover contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks ([Spearbit 5.1.3](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/develop/docs/security-reviews/2024_08_Fault-Proofs-No-MIPS_Spearbit.pdf)).",
"references": [
{
"title": "Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP",
"url": "https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a"
}
]
}
]
},
"warning": "Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots."
}
}+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1764933823,
"baseTimestamp": 1765550938,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1743765215,
"baseTimestamp": 1765550969,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}+2 -3
+1 -2
{
"architectureImage": "opstack-rollup-superchain-opfp",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "All data required for proofs is published on chain",
"description": "All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission"
},
{
"title": "BatchInbox - address",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x003E40D3125591bD722aB1bB880c78e4D74d0977#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B#code"
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular exits",
"description": "The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B#code"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain",
"url": "https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B#code"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized operator",
"description": "The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": []
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing EVM Equivalence",
"url": "https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306"
}
]
}
],
"stateValidation": {
"description": "Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by permissioned operators only. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.",
"categories": [
{
"title": "State root proposals",
"description": "Proposers submit state roots as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the `create` function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge period has passed and it is not countered.",
"references": [
{
"title": "OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game",
"url": "https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#fault-dispute-game"
}
]
},
{
"title": "Challenges",
"description": "Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state roots using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the `defend` or `attack` functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with [full concurrency](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a). Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see [freeloader claims](https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#freeloader-claims)), if a clock gets inherited with less than 3h, it generally gets extended by 3h with the exception of 6h right before depth 30, and 1d right before the last depth. The maximum clock extension that a top level claim can get is therefore 10d. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers' stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step prover contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks ([Spearbit 5.1.3](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/develop/docs/security-reviews/2024_08_Fault-Proofs-No-MIPS_Spearbit.pdf)).",
"references": [
{
"title": "Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP",
"url": "https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a"
}
]
}
]
},
"warning": "Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots."
}
}+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1764324033,
"baseTimestamp": 1765551022,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}+2 -3
+1 -2
{
"architectureImage": "opstack-rollup-superchain-opfp",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "All data required for proofs is published on chain",
"description": "All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission"
},
{
"title": "BatchInbox - address",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xfF00000000000000000000000000000000000360#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B#code"
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular exits",
"description": "The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B#code"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain",
"url": "https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B#code"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized operator",
"description": "The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": []
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing EVM Equivalence",
"url": "https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306"
}
]
}
],
"stateDerivation": {
"nodeSoftware": "The rollup node is composed of two software components: [op-node](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/tree/develop/op-node), implementing consensus related logic, and [op-geth](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/op-geth), implementing execution logic. The configuration file can be found [here](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/superchain-registry/blob/main/superchain/configs/mainnet/shape.toml).",
"compressionScheme": "Data batches are compressed using the [zlib](https://github.com/madler/zlib) algorithm with best compression level.",
"genesisState": "The genesis file can be found [here](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/superchain-registry/blob/main/superchain/extra/genesis/mainnet/shape.json.zst).",
"dataFormat": "The format specification of Sequencer's data batches can be found [here](https://optimism.io/blog/here-s-how-you-can-reproduce-op-mainnet-s-migration-to-bedrock)."
},
"stateValidation": {
"description": "Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by permissioned operators only. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.",
"categories": [
{
"title": "State root proposals",
"description": "Proposers submit state roots as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the `create` function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge period has passed and it is not countered.",
"references": [
{
"title": "OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game",
"url": "https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#fault-dispute-game"
}
]
},
{
"title": "Challenges",
"description": "Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state roots using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the `defend` or `attack` functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with [full concurrency](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a). Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see [freeloader claims](https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#freeloader-claims)), if a clock gets inherited with less than 3h, it generally gets extended by 3h with the exception of 6h right before depth 30, and 1d right before the last depth. The maximum clock extension that a top level claim can get is therefore 10d. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers' stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step prover contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks ([Spearbit 5.1.3](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/develop/docs/security-reviews/2024_08_Fault-Proofs-No-MIPS_Spearbit.pdf)).",
"references": [
{
"title": "Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP",
"url": "https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a"
}
]
}
]
},
"warning": "Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots."
}
}+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1764324463,
"baseTimestamp": 1765551057,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}+2 -3
+1 -2
{
"architectureImage": "opstack-optimium-superchain-opfp",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "Data is not stored on chain",
"description": "The transaction data is not recorded on the Ethereum main chain.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be lost if",
"text": "the external data becomes unavailable.",
"isCritical": true
}
],
"references": [
{
"title": "Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission"
},
{
"title": "BatchInbox - address",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x00a7a8fDb9A61f85DD8F926f4e1723927a18c9F3#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x2D7e764a0D9919e16983a46595CfA81fc34fa7Cd#code"
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular exits",
"description": "The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x2D7e764a0D9919e16983a46595CfA81fc34fa7Cd#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x2D7e764a0D9919e16983a46595CfA81fc34fa7Cd#code"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain",
"url": "https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x2D7e764a0D9919e16983a46595CfA81fc34fa7Cd#code"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized operator",
"description": "The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.",
"risks": [],
"references": []
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing EVM Equivalence",
"url": "https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306"
}
]
}
],
"stateValidation": {
"description": "Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by permissioned operators only. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.",
"categories": [
{
"title": "State root proposals",
"description": "Proposers submit state roots as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the `create` function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge period has passed and it is not countered.",
"references": [
{
"title": "OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game",
"url": "https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#fault-dispute-game"
}
]
},
{
"title": "Challenges",
"description": "Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state roots using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the `defend` or `attack` functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with [full concurrency](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a). Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see [freeloader claims](https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#freeloader-claims)), if a clock gets inherited with less than 3h, it generally gets extended by 3h with the exception of 6h right before depth 30, and 1d right before the last depth. The maximum clock extension that a top level claim can get is therefore 10d. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers' stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step prover contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks ([Spearbit 5.1.3](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/develop/docs/security-reviews/2024_08_Fault-Proofs-No-MIPS_Spearbit.pdf)).",
"references": [
{
"title": "Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP",
"url": "https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a"
}
]
}
]
},
"warning": "Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots."
}
}+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1759407917,
"baseTimestamp": 1765551112,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}+2 -3
+1 -2
{
"architectureImage": "opstack-rollup-superchain-opfp",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "All data required for proofs is published on chain",
"description": "All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission"
},
{
"title": "BatchInbox - address",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xFeC57BD3729a5F930d4Ee8ac5992Fdc8988426e4#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4#code"
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular exits",
"description": "The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4#code"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain",
"url": "https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4#code"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized operator",
"description": "The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": []
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing EVM Equivalence",
"url": "https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306"
}
]
}
],
"stateDerivation": {
"nodeSoftware": "The rollup node is composed of two software components: [op-node](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/tree/develop/op-node), implementing consensus related logic, and [op-geth](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/op-geth), implementing execution logic. The configuration file can be found [here](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/superchain-registry/blob/main/superchain/configs/mainnet/snax.toml).",
"compressionScheme": "Data batches are compressed using the [zlib](https://github.com/madler/zlib) algorithm with best compression level.",
"genesisState": "The genesis file can be found [here](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/superchain-registry/blob/main/superchain/extra/genesis/mainnet/snax.json.zst).",
"dataFormat": "The format specification of Sequencer's data batches can be found [here](https://optimism.io/blog/here-s-how-you-can-reproduce-op-mainnet-s-migration-to-bedrock)."
},
"stateValidation": {
"description": "Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by permissioned operators only. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.",
"categories": [
{
"title": "State root proposals",
"description": "Proposers submit state roots as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the `create` function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge period has passed and it is not countered.",
"references": [
{
"title": "OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game",
"url": "https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#fault-dispute-game"
}
]
},
{
"title": "Challenges",
"description": "Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state roots using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the `defend` or `attack` functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with [full concurrency](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a). Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see [freeloader claims](https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#freeloader-claims)), if a clock gets inherited with less than 3h, it generally gets extended by 3h with the exception of 6h right before depth 30, and 1d right before the last depth. The maximum clock extension that a top level claim can get is therefore 10d. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers' stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step prover contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks ([Spearbit 5.1.3](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/develop/docs/security-reviews/2024_08_Fault-Proofs-No-MIPS_Spearbit.pdf)).",
"references": [
{
"title": "Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP",
"url": "https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a"
}
]
}
]
},
"warning": "Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots."
}
}+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1764933876,
"baseTimestamp": 1765551151,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}+2 -3
+1 -2
{
"architectureImage": "opstack-rollup-superchain-opfp",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "All data required for proofs is published on chain",
"description": "All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission"
},
{
"title": "BatchInbox - address",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x008dC74CecC9dedA8595B2Fe210cE5979F0BfA8e#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular exits",
"description": "The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain",
"url": "https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized operator",
"description": "The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": []
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing EVM Equivalence",
"url": "https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306"
}
]
}
],
"stateDerivation": {
"nodeSoftware": "The rollup node is composed of two software components: [op-node](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/tree/develop/op-node), implementing consensus related logic, and [op-geth](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/op-geth), implementing execution logic. The configuration file can be found [here](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/superchain-registry/blob/main/superchain/configs/mainnet/soneium.toml).",
"compressionScheme": "Data batches are compressed using the [zlib](https://github.com/madler/zlib) algorithm with best compression level.",
"genesisState": "The genesis file can be found [here](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/superchain-registry/blob/main/superchain/extra/genesis/mainnet/soneium.json.zst).",
"dataFormat": "The format specification of Sequencer's data batches can be found [here](https://optimism.io/blog/here-s-how-you-can-reproduce-op-mainnet-s-migration-to-bedrock)."
},
"stateValidation": {
"description": "Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by permissioned operators only. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.",
"categories": [
{
"title": "State root proposals",
"description": "Proposers submit state roots as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the `create` function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge period has passed and it is not countered.",
"references": [
{
"title": "OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game",
"url": "https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#fault-dispute-game"
}
]
},
{
"title": "Challenges",
"description": "Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state roots using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the `defend` or `attack` functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with [full concurrency](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a). Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see [freeloader claims](https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#freeloader-claims)), if a clock gets inherited with less than 3h, it generally gets extended by 3h with the exception of 6h right before depth 30, and 1d right before the last depth. The maximum clock extension that a top level claim can get is therefore 10d. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers' stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step prover contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks ([Spearbit 5.1.3](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/develop/docs/security-reviews/2024_08_Fault-Proofs-No-MIPS_Spearbit.pdf)).",
"references": [
{
"title": "Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP",
"url": "https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a"
}
]
}
]
},
"stateValidationImage": "opfp",
"warning": "Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots."
"stateValidationImage": "opfp"
}+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1764933869,
"baseTimestamp": 1765551186,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}+2 -2
+1 -1
[
{
"layer": {
"value": "EigenDA",
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "The data is posted to EigenDA which is a separate data availability layer developed by the Eigenlayer team. Only hashes of data are published on an onchain inbox.",
"description": "The data is posted to EigenDA which is a separate data availability layer developed by the Eigenlayer team. Only commitments to the data are published on an onchain inbox.",
"projectId": "eigenda"
},
"bridge": {
"value": "None",
"sentiment": "bad",
"description": "There is no bridge that can attest if the data has been made available.",
"orderHint": -2
},
"mode": {
"value": "Transaction data",
"secondLine": "Compressed"
}
}
]+1 -1
{
"architectureImage": "opstack-optimium-superchain",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "Data is posted to EigenDA",
"description": "Transactions roots are posted onchain and the full data is posted on EigenDA. The sequecencer is publishing data to EigenDA v2. Since the DACert Verifier is not used, availability of the data is not verified against EigenDA operators, meaning that the Sequencer can single-handedly publish unavailable commitments. If EigenDA becomes unavailable, the sequencer falls back to Ethereum.",
"description": "Transactions roots are posted onchain and the full data is posted on EigenDA. The sequencer is publishing data to EigenDA v2. Since the DACert Verifier is not used, availability of the data is not verified against EigenDA operators, meaning that the Sequencer can single-handedly publish unavailable commitments. If EigenDA becomes unavailable, the sequencer falls back to Ethereum.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be lost if",
"text": "the sequencer posts an unavailable transaction root.",
"isCritical": true
},
{
"category": "Funds can be lost if",
"text": "the data is not available on the external provider.",
"isCritical": true
}
],
"references": [
{
"title": "EigenDA Docs - Overview",
"url": "https://docs.eigenda.xyz/overview"
},
{
"title": "Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission"
},
{
"title": "BatchInbox - address",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xfF000000000000000000000000000000000000FF#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x24331B68bea70c2b086BC883EEEA551BAF80C2BA#code"
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular messaging",
"description": "The user initiates L2->L1 messages by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled, the message becomes available for processing on L1. The process of block finalization takes a challenge period of 1d to complete.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be frozen if",
"text": "the centralized validator goes down. Users cannot produce blocks themselves and exiting the system requires new block production.",
"isCritical": true
}
],
"references": [
{
"title": "OptimismPortal.sol - source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x24331B68bea70c2b086BC883EEEA551BAF80C2BA#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal.sol - source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x24331B68bea70c2b086BC883EEEA551BAF80C2BA#code"
},
{
"title": "L2OutputOracle.sol - source code, PROPOSER check",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x240d0038d87b5A27e4Fb7FB0c27F9b45D89b2C4F#code"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain",
"url": "https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x24331B68bea70c2b086BC883EEEA551BAF80C2BA#code"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized operator",
"description": "The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": [
{
"title": "L2OutputOracle.sol - source code, CHALLENGER address",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x240d0038d87b5A27e4Fb7FB0c27F9b45D89b2C4F#code"
},
{
"title": "L2OutputOracle.sol - source code, PROPOSER address",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x240d0038d87b5A27e4Fb7FB0c27F9b45D89b2C4F#code"
}
]
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "Solana Virtual Machine is supported",
"description": "OP stack chains are usually pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. But Soon implements the rust-based Solana virtual machine (SVM) which uses parallel processing.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Soon Docs - Decoupled SVM",
"url": "https://docs.soo.network/introduction/decoupled-svm"
}
]
}
],
"stateValidation": {
"categories": [
{
"title": "No state validation",
"description": "OP Stack projects can use the OP fault proof system, already being deployed on some. This project though is not using fault proofs yet and is relying on the honesty of the permissioned Proposer and Challengers to ensure state correctness. The smart contract system permits invalid state roots.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "an invalid state root is submitted to the system.",
"isCritical": true
}
],
"references": [
{
"title": "L2OutputOracle.sol - source code, deleteL2Outputs function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x240d0038d87b5A27e4Fb7FB0c27F9b45D89b2C4F#code"
}
]
}
]
},
"warning": "Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots."
}+4 -0
+4 -0
{
"creator": "Succinct",
"projectsForTvs": [
{
"projectId": "forknet",
"sinceTimestamp": 1753882500
},
{
"projectId": "katana",
"sinceTimestamp": 1751328000
},
{
"projectId": "blobstream",
"sinceTimestamp": 1717608107
},
{
"projectId": "vector",
"sinceTimestamp": 1720128227
},
{
"projectId": "sophon",
"sinceTimestamp": 1745341091
},
{
"projectId": "lens",
"sinceTimestamp": 1745359200
},
{
"projectId": "plumenetwork",
"sinceTimestamp": 1746735060
},
{
"projectId": "galxegravity",
"sinceTimestamp": 1745880540
},
{
"projectId": "rari",
"sinceTimestamp": 1734562800
},
{
"projectId": "winr",
"sinceTimestamp": 1747088280
},
{
"projectId": "molten",
"sinceTimestamp": 1731480840
},
{
"projectId": "taiko",
"sinceTimestamp": 1730452800
},
{
"projectId": "lumia",
"sinceTimestamp": 1753882500
},
{
"projectId": "polygonzkevm",
"sinceTimestamp": 1753882500
},
{
"projectId": "xlayer",
"sinceTimestamp": 1753882500
},
{
"projectId": "silicon",
"sinceTimestamp": 1753882500
},
{
"projectId": "facet",
"sinceTimestamp": 1751407200
},
{
"projectId": "ternoa",
"sinceTimestamp": 1753882500
},
{
"projectId": "wirex",
"sinceTimestamp": 1753882500
},
{
"projectId": "penchain",
"sinceTimestamp": 1753882500
},
{
"projectId": "phala",
"sinceTimestamp": 1736290800
},
{
"projectId": "mantle",
"sinceTimestamp": 1757973600
},
{
"projectId": "zircuit",
"sinceTimestamp": 1756072800
},
{
"projectId": "omni",
"sinceTimestamp": 1748856160
},
{
"projectId": "gpt",
"sinceTimestamp": 1753882500
},
{
"projectId": "astarzkevm",
"sinceTimestamp": 1753882500
},
{
"projectId": "witness",
"sinceTimestamp": 1753882500
},
{
"projectId": "kroma",
"sinceTimestamp": 1739228400
},
{
"projectId": "haust",
"sinceTimestamp": 1756808195
},
{
"projectId": "celo",
"sinceTimestamp": 1765324800
}
],
"proofSystemInfo": "\n ## Description\n\n SP1 is a RISC-V zkVM using the [Plonky3](https://github.com/Plonky3/Plonky3) stack. The zkVM execution is proven recursively and is wrapped into a SNARK for final verification. It provides tools to generate onchain Groth16 or Plonk verifiers. SP1 targets [100 bits of security](https://docs.succinct.xyz/docs/sp1/security/security-model#conjectures-for-fris-security).\n\n ## Proof system\n\n SP1 proves execution of a RISC-V VM using several ZK circuits connected by lookup arguments, as implemented in Plonky3. VM execution trace is split into several chunks that could be proven in parallel with a STARK proving system. The parallelized proofs are recursively checked by the next layer of STARK circuits. The correctness of the final STARK proof is verified with the final wrap SNARK program, the wrap SNARK proof is verified onchain.\n\n ### zkVM component\n\n Verifies execution of a RISC-V program in a zkVM. Uses [Plonky3](https://github.com/Plonky3/Plonky3) STARK toolkit with AIR arithmetization and FRI-based polynomial commitment scheme within the [BabyBear field](https://docs.succinct.xyz/docs/sp1/security/security-model#hash-functions-and-the-random-oracle-model).\n\n ### Recursion circuits\n\n SP1 provides tools for recursive proof generation by [verifying proofs in a zkVM](https://docs.succinct.xyz/docs/sp1/writing-programs/proof-aggregation#verifying-proofs-inside-the-zkvm). This uses the same toolkit as top-level proof system, but proves the correct verification of all proofs generated on the previous step.\n\n ### Final wrap\n\n SP1 supports Plonk (with KZG polynomial commitments) or Groth16 final SNARK wrap of the STARK proof for performant onchain proof verification ([link](https://docs.succinct.xyz/docs/sp1/generating-proofs/proof-types#compressed)). The [gnark](https://github.com/Consensys/gnark) implementation of these proof systems over BN254 curve is used. For Plonk, Aztec Ignition trusted setup ceremony is used, for Groth16 Succinct run internal circuit-dependent phase 2 trusted setup, see [below](#trusted-setups) for more details.\n ",
"techStack": {
"zkVM": [
{
"id": "Plonky3",
"type": "STARK",
"name": "Plonky3",
"description": "Toolkit that implements a set of primitives for STARK-based zkVMs developed by Polygon Zero team."
},
{
"id": "RISCV",
"type": "ISA",
"name": "RISC-V",
"description": "Free and open-source universal 32-bit ISA used across a variety of hardware and software."
},
{
"id": "BabyBear",
"type": "Field",
"name": "Baby Bear",
"description": "Prime field of order p = 15 * 2**27 + 1."
}
],
"finalWrap": [
{
"id": "Gnark",
"type": "Plonk",
"name": "Gnark",
"description": "Consensys implementation of Plonk proving system written in Go."
},
{
"id": "Gnark",
"type": "Groth16",
"name": "Gnark",
"description": "Consensys implementation of Groth16 proving system written in Go."
},
{
"id": "BN254",
"type": "curve",
"name": "BN254",
"description": "BN254, aka BN256, aka alt_bn128 pairing-friendly 254-bit prime field Weierstrass elliptic curve."
}
]
},
"trustedSetups": [
{
"proofSystem": {
"id": "Gnark",
"type": "Plonk",
"name": "Gnark",
"description": "Consensys implementation of Plonk proving system written in Go."
},
"id": "AztecIgnition",
"name": "Aztec Ignition",
"risk": "green",
"shortDescription": "Aztec Ignition is a trusted setup ceremony that was run by Aztec for KZG commitment over BN254 curve in 2019. It included 176 participants and was publicly open for participation.",
"longDescription": " \n Aztec Ignition is a trusted setup ceremony for KZG commitments over BN254 curve that was run by Aztec for KZG commitment over BN254 curve in 2019. \n It included 176 participants and was publicly open for participation.\n \n - Github repo to download and verify the ceremony artifacts: [https://github.com/AztecProtocol/ignition-verification](https://github.com/AztecProtocol/ignition-verification).\n - Github repo with instructions for ceremony participants: [https://github.com/AztecProtocol/Setup](https://github.com/AztecProtocol/Setup).\n - Ceremony announcement with a call to participate: [https://aztec.network/blog/announcing-ignition](https://aztec.network/blog/announcing-ignition).\n "
},
{
"proofSystem": {
"id": "Gnark",
"type": "Groth16",
"name": "Gnark",
"description": "Consensys implementation of Groth16 proving system written in Go."
},
"id": "SP1Groth16",
"name": "SP1 Groth16 circuit-specific setup",
"risk": "red",
"shortDescription": "Succinct's internally run trusted setup for SP1 Groth16 final wrap circuits. Ceremony was run among 7 contributors to the SP1 project without public calls to participate.",
"longDescription": "\n Ceremony was run among 7 contributors to the SP1 project without public calls to participate. It generated setup parameters for Groth16 wrapper of SP1 zkVM.\n\n - Ceremony info on Succinct docs page: [https://docs.succinct.xyz/docs/sp1/security/security-model#options](https://docs.succinct.xyz/docs/sp1/security/security-model#options).\n - Ceremony instructions and verification instructions: [https://github.com/succinctlabs/semaphore-gnark-11/tree/main](https://github.com/succinctlabs/semaphore-gnark-11/tree/main).\n - Link to transcript and other artifacts (Note: will immediately start downloading .tar.gz file): [https://sp1-circuits.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/v4.0.0-rc.3-trusted-setup.tar.gz](https://sp1-circuits.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/v4.0.0-rc.3-trusted-setup.tar.gz).\n "
}
],
"verifierHashes": [
{
"hash": "0xd4e8ecd2357dd882209800acd6abb443d231cf287d77ba62b732ce937c8b56e7",
"proofSystem": {
"id": "Gnark",
"type": "Plonk",
"name": "Gnark",
"description": "Consensys implementation of Plonk proving system written in Go."
},
"knownDeployments": [
{
"address": "0x0459d576A6223fEeA177Fb3DF53C9c77BF84C459",
"chain": "ethereum"
},
{
"address": "0xFF5Adab685362DC4C33536a65aF5873738D1216B",
"chain": "ethereum"
}
],
"verificationStatus": "notVerified"
},
{
"hash": "0x1b34fe11a637737f0c75c88241669dcf9ca3c03713659265b8241f398a2d286d",
"proofSystem": {
"id": "Gnark",
"type": "Plonk",
"name": "Gnark",
"description": "Consensys implementation of Plonk proving system written in Go."
},
"knownDeployments": [
{
"address": "0xE00a3cBFC45241b33c0A44C78e26168CBc55EC63",
"chain": "ethereum"
}
],
"verificationStatus": "successful",
"verificationSteps": "\n - Check out [sp1 repo](https://github.com/succinctlabs/sp1) at commit `76c28bf986ba102127788ce081c21fa09cf93b18`.\n - Set an environment variable by calling `export SP1_ALLOW_DEPRECATED_HOOKS=true`. It is needed for the correct execution of circuit building.\n - Make sure that you have [go lang installed](https://go.dev/doc/install).\n - From `crates/prover` call `make build-circuits`. Note that the execution could take a while.\n ",
"attesters": [
{
"id": "l2beat",
"name": "L2BEAT",
"link": "https://l2beat.com"
}
]
},
{
"hash": "0xa4594c59bbc142f3b81c3ecb7f50a7c34bc9af7c4c444b5d48b795427e285913",
"proofSystem": {
"id": "Gnark",
"type": "Groth16",
"name": "Gnark",
"description": "Consensys implementation of Groth16 proving system written in Go."
},
"knownDeployments": [
{
"address": "0x50ACFBEdecf4cbe350E1a86fC6f03a821772f1e5",
"chain": "ethereum"
},
{
"address": "0x50ACFBEdecf4cbe350E1a86fC6f03a821772f1e5",
"chain": "arbitrum"
},
{
"address": "0xa5E60dbBAc6A65B654E5A14A5E357da3Fcf139dd",
"chain": "gnosis"
}
],
"verificationStatus": "notVerified"
}
]
}+2 -3
+1 -2
{
"architectureImage": "opstack-rollup-superchain-opfp",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "All data required for proofs is published on chain",
"description": "All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission"
},
{
"title": "BatchInbox - address",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xA12Cf34001e553dc254D131105364351f5174d75#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4#code"
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular exits",
"description": "The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4#code"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain",
"url": "https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4#code"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized operator",
"description": "The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": []
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing EVM Equivalence",
"url": "https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306"
}
]
}
],
"stateValidation": {
"description": "Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by permissioned operators only. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.",
"categories": [
{
"title": "State root proposals",
"description": "Proposers submit state roots as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the `create` function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge period has passed and it is not countered.",
"references": [
{
"title": "OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game",
"url": "https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#fault-dispute-game"
}
]
},
{
"title": "Challenges",
"description": "Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state roots using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the `defend` or `attack` functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with [full concurrency](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a). Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see [freeloader claims](https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#freeloader-claims)), if a clock gets inherited with less than 3h, it generally gets extended by 3h with the exception of 6h right before depth 30, and 1d right before the last depth. The maximum clock extension that a top level claim can get is therefore 10d. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers' stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step prover contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks ([Spearbit 5.1.3](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/develop/docs/security-reviews/2024_08_Fault-Proofs-No-MIPS_Spearbit.pdf)).",
"references": [
{
"title": "Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP",
"url": "https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a"
}
]
}
]
},
"warning": "Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots."
}
}+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1764933892,
"baseTimestamp": 1765551224,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}+2 -3
+1 -2
{
"architectureImage": "opstack-rollup-superchain-opfp",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "All data required for proofs is published on chain",
"description": "All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission"
},
{
"title": "BatchInbox - address",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x8612014a343089F1ddBACfD42baf4Afbf9133593#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4#code"
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular exits",
"description": "The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4#code"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain",
"url": "https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4#code"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized operator",
"description": "The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": []
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing EVM Equivalence",
"url": "https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306"
}
]
}
],
"stateDerivation": {
"nodeSoftware": "The rollup node is composed of two software components: [op-node](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/tree/develop/op-node), implementing consensus related logic, and [op-geth](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/op-geth), implementing execution logic. The configuration file can be found [here](https://api.conduit.xyz/file/v1/optimism/rollup/superseed-mainnet-0).",
"compressionScheme": "Data batches are compressed using the [zlib](https://github.com/madler/zlib) algorithm with best compression level.",
"genesisState": "The genesis file can be found [here](https://api.conduit.xyz/file/v1/optimism/genesis/superseed-mainnet-0).",
"dataFormat": "The format specification of Sequencer's data batches can be found [here](https://optimism.io/blog/here-s-how-you-can-reproduce-op-mainnet-s-migration-to-bedrock)."
},
"stateValidation": {
"description": "Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by permissioned operators only. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.",
"categories": [
{
"title": "State root proposals",
"description": "Proposers submit state roots as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the `create` function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge period has passed and it is not countered.",
"references": [
{
"title": "OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game",
"url": "https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#fault-dispute-game"
}
]
},
{
"title": "Challenges",
"description": "Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state roots using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the `defend` or `attack` functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with [full concurrency](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a). Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see [freeloader claims](https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#freeloader-claims)), if a clock gets inherited with less than 3h, it generally gets extended by 3h with the exception of 6h right before depth 30, and 1d right before the last depth. The maximum clock extension that a top level claim can get is therefore 10d. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers' stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step prover contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks ([Spearbit 5.1.3](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/develop/docs/security-reviews/2024_08_Fault-Proofs-No-MIPS_Spearbit.pdf)).",
"references": [
{
"title": "Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP",
"url": "https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a"
}
]
}
]
},
"warning": "Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots."
}
}+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1764933911,
"baseTimestamp": 1765551260,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}+2 -3
+1 -2
{
"architectureImage": "opstack-rollup-superchain-opfp",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "All data required for proofs is published on chain",
"description": "All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission"
},
{
"title": "BatchInbox - address",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x005dE5857e38dFD703a1725c0900E9C6f24cbdE0#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular exits",
"description": "The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain",
"url": "https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized operator",
"description": "The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": []
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing EVM Equivalence",
"url": "https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306"
}
]
}
],
"stateDerivation": {
"nodeSoftware": "The rollup node is composed of two software components: [op-node](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/tree/develop/op-node), implementing consensus related logic, and [op-geth](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/op-geth), implementing execution logic. The configuration file can be found [here](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/superchain-registry/blob/main/superchain/configs/mainnet/swell.toml).",
"compressionScheme": "Data batches are compressed using the [zlib](https://github.com/madler/zlib) algorithm with best compression level.",
"genesisState": "The genesis file can be found [here](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/superchain-registry/blob/main/superchain/extra/genesis/mainnet/swell.json.zst).",
"dataFormat": "The format specification of Sequencer's data batches can be found [here](https://optimism.io/blog/here-s-how-you-can-reproduce-op-mainnet-s-migration-to-bedrock)."
},
"stateValidation": {
"description": "Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by permissioned operators only. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.",
"categories": [
{
"title": "State root proposals",
"description": "Proposers submit state roots as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the `create` function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge period has passed and it is not countered.",
"references": [
{
"title": "OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game",
"url": "https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#fault-dispute-game"
}
]
},
{
"title": "Challenges",
"description": "Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state roots using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the `defend` or `attack` functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with [full concurrency](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a). Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see [freeloader claims](https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#freeloader-claims)), if a clock gets inherited with less than 3h, it generally gets extended by 3h with the exception of 6h right before depth 30, and 1d right before the last depth. The maximum clock extension that a top level claim can get is therefore 10d. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers' stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step prover contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks ([Spearbit 5.1.3](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/develop/docs/security-reviews/2024_08_Fault-Proofs-No-MIPS_Spearbit.pdf)).",
"references": [
{
"title": "Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP",
"url": "https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a"
}
]
}
]
},
"warning": "Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots."
}
}+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1764324829,
"baseTimestamp": 1765551289,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}+2 -3
+1 -2
{
"architectureImage": "opstack-rollup-superchain-opfp-permissionless",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "All data required for proofs is published on chain",
"description": "All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission"
},
{
"title": "BatchInbox - address",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xFf00000000000000000000000000000000000130#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular exits",
"description": "The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain",
"url": "https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized operator",
"description": "The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": []
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing EVM Equivalence",
"url": "https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306"
}
]
}
],
"stateDerivation": {
"nodeSoftware": "The rollup node is composed of two software components: [op-node](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/tree/develop/op-node), implementing consensus related logic, and [op-geth](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/op-geth), implementing execution logic. The configuration file can be found [here](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/superchain-registry/blob/main/superchain/configs/mainnet/unichain.toml).",
"compressionScheme": "Data batches are compressed using the [zlib](https://github.com/madler/zlib) algorithm with best compression level.",
"genesisState": "The genesis file can be found [here](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/superchain-registry/blob/main/superchain/extra/genesis/mainnet/unichain.json.zst).",
"dataFormat": "The format specification of Sequencer's data batches can be found [here](https://optimism.io/blog/here-s-how-you-can-reproduce-op-mainnet-s-migration-to-bedrock)."
},
"stateValidation": {
"description": "Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by anyone who has sufficient funds. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.",
"categories": [
{
"title": "State root proposals",
"description": "Proposers submit state roots as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the `create` function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.08 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge period has passed and it is not countered.",
"references": [
{
"title": "OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game",
"url": "https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#fault-dispute-game"
}
]
},
{
"title": "Challenges",
"description": "Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state roots using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 691.43 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the `defend` or `attack` functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with [full concurrency](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a). Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see [freeloader claims](https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#freeloader-claims)), if a clock gets inherited with less than 3h, it generally gets extended by 3h with the exception of 6h right before depth 30, and 1d right before the last depth. The maximum clock extension that a top level claim can get is therefore 10d. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers' stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step prover contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks ([Spearbit 5.1.3](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/develop/docs/security-reviews/2024_08_Fault-Proofs-No-MIPS_Spearbit.pdf)).",
"references": [
{
"title": "Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP",
"url": "https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a"
}
]
}
]
},
"stateValidationImage": "opfp",
"warning": "Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots."
"stateValidationImage": "opfp"
}+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1765362369,
"baseTimestamp": 1765551322,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}+2 -3
+1 -2
{
"architectureImage": "opstack-rollup-superchain-opfp",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "All data required for proofs is published on chain",
"description": "All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission"
},
{
"title": "BatchInbox - address",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xff00000000000000000000000000000000000480#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x381E729FF983FA4BCEd820e7b922d79bF653B999#code"
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular exits",
"description": "The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x381E729FF983FA4BCEd820e7b922d79bF653B999#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x381E729FF983FA4BCEd820e7b922d79bF653B999#code"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain",
"url": "https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x381E729FF983FA4BCEd820e7b922d79bF653B999#code"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized operator",
"description": "The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": []
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing EVM Equivalence",
"url": "https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306"
}
]
}
],
"stateDerivation": {
"nodeSoftware": "The rollup node is composed of two software components: [op-node](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/tree/develop/op-node), implementing consensus related logic, and [op-geth](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/op-geth), implementing execution logic. The configuration file can be found [here](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/superchain-registry/blob/main/superchain/configs/mainnet/worldchain.toml).",
"compressionScheme": "Data batches are compressed using the [zlib](https://github.com/madler/zlib) algorithm with best compression level.",
"genesisState": "The genesis file can be found [here](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/superchain-registry/blob/main/superchain/extra/genesis/mainnet/worldchain.json.zst).",
"dataFormat": "The format specification of Sequencer's data batches can be found [here](https://optimism.io/blog/here-s-how-you-can-reproduce-op-mainnet-s-migration-to-bedrock)."
},
"stateValidation": {
"description": "Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by permissioned operators only. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.",
"categories": [
{
"title": "State root proposals",
"description": "Proposers submit state roots as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the `create` function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge period has passed and it is not countered.",
"references": [
{
"title": "OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game",
"url": "https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#fault-dispute-game"
}
]
},
{
"title": "Challenges",
"description": "Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state roots using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the `defend` or `attack` functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with [full concurrency](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a). Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see [freeloader claims](https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#freeloader-claims)), if a clock gets inherited with less than 3h, it generally gets extended by 3h with the exception of 6h right before depth 30, and 1d right before the last depth. The maximum clock extension that a top level claim can get is therefore 10d. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers' stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step prover contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks ([Spearbit 5.1.3](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/develop/docs/security-reviews/2024_08_Fault-Proofs-No-MIPS_Spearbit.pdf)).",
"references": [
{
"title": "Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP",
"url": "https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a"
}
]
}
]
},
"warning": "Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots."
}
}+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1764325163,
"baseTimestamp": 1765551356,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}+2 -3
+1 -2
{
"architectureImage": "opstack-rollup-superchain-opfp",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "All data required for proofs is published on chain",
"description": "All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission"
},
{
"title": "BatchInbox - address",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x6F54Ca6F6EdE96662024Ffd61BFd18f3f4e34DFf#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular exits",
"description": "The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 3d 12h. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 7d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d 12h to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain",
"url": "https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202#code"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized operator",
"description": "The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": []
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing EVM Equivalence",
"url": "https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306"
}
]
}
],
"stateDerivation": {
"nodeSoftware": "The rollup node is composed of two software components: [op-node](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/tree/develop/op-node), implementing consensus related logic, and [op-geth](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/op-geth), implementing execution logic. The configuration file can be found [here](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/superchain-registry/blob/main/superchain/configs/mainnet/zora.toml).",
"compressionScheme": "Data batches are compressed using the [zlib](https://github.com/madler/zlib) algorithm with best compression level.",
"genesisState": "The genesis file can be found [here](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/superchain-registry/tree/main/superchain/extra/genesis/mainnet).",
"dataFormat": "The format specification of Sequencer's data batches can be found [here](https://optimism.io/blog/here-s-how-you-can-reproduce-op-mainnet-s-migration-to-bedrock)."
},
"stateValidation": {
"description": "Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by permissioned operators only. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.",
"categories": [
{
"title": "State root proposals",
"description": "Proposers submit state roots as children of the latest confirmed state root (called anchor state), by calling the `create` function in the DisputeGameFactory. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.0 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be withdrawn only after the proposal has been confirmed. A state root gets confirmed if the challenge period has passed and it is not countered.",
"references": [
{
"title": "OP stack specification: Fault Dispute Game",
"url": "https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#fault-dispute-game"
}
]
},
{
"title": "Challenges",
"description": "Challenges are opened to disprove invalid state roots using bisection games. Each bisection move requires a stake that increases expontentially with the depth of the bisection, with a factor of 1.09493. The maximum depth is 73, and reaching it therefore requires a cumulative stake of 0.00 ETH from depth 0. Actors can participate in any challenge by calling the `defend` or `attack` functions, depending whether they agree or disagree with the latest claim and want to move the bisection game forward. Actors that disagree with the top-level claim are called challengers, and actors that agree are called defenders. Each actor might be involved in multiple (sub-)challenges at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with [full concurrency](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a). Challengers and defenders alternate in the bisection game, and they pass each other a clock that starts with 3d 12h. If a clock expires, the claim is considered defeated if it was countered, or it gets confirmed if uncountered. Since honest parties can inherit clocks from malicious parties that play both as challengers and defenders (see [freeloader claims](https://specs.optimism.io/fault-proof/stage-one/fault-dispute-game.html#freeloader-claims)), if a clock gets inherited with less than 3h, it generally gets extended by 3h with the exception of 6h right before depth 30, and 1d right before the last depth. The maximum clock extension that a top level claim can get is therefore 10d. Since unconfirmed state roots are independent of one another, users can decide to exit with a subsequent confirmed state root if the previous one is delayed. Winners get the entire losers' stake, meaning that sybils can potentially play against each other at no cost. The final instruction found via the bisection game is then executed onchain in the MIPS one step prover contract who determines the winner. The protocol does not enforce valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claims and then provide incorrect midpoints. The protocol can be subject to resource exhaustion attacks ([Spearbit 5.1.3](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/develop/docs/security-reviews/2024_08_Fault-Proofs-No-MIPS_Spearbit.pdf)).",
"references": [
{
"title": "Fraud Proof Wars: OPFP",
"url": "https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a"
}
]
}
]
},
"warning": "Fraud proof system is currently under development. Users need to trust the block proposer to submit correct L1 state roots."
}
}+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1764325395,
"baseTimestamp": 1765551413,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}