{
"badges": [
{
"id": "EVM",
"type": "VM",
"name": "EVM",
"description": "This project uses the Ethereum Virtual Machine to run its smart contracts and supports the Solidity programming language",
"action": {
"type": "scalingFilter",
"id": "vm",
"value": "EVM"
}
},
{
"id": "EthereumBlobs",
"id": "EthereumCalldata",
"type": "DA",
"name": "Ethereum with blobs",
"description": "This project is posting its data to Ethereum as blobs",
"name": "Ethereum with calldata",
"description": "This project is posting its data to Ethereum as calldata",
"action": {
"type": "publicDaHighlight",
"slug": "ethereum"
}
},
{
"id": "ZKStack",
"type": "Stack",
"name": "Built on the ZK Stack",
"description": "The project is built on the ZK Stack",
"action": {
"type": "scalingFilter",
"id": "stack",
"value": "ZK Stack"
}
},
{
"id": "ElasticChain",
"type": "Infra",
"name": "Part of the Elastic Chain",
"description": "The project is part of the Elastic Chain, meaning it's based on the ZK stack and uses the shared contracts",
"action": {
"type": "scalingFilter",
"id": "infrastructure",
"value": "Elastic Chain"
}
},
{
"id": "Caldera",
"type": "RaaS",
"name": "Caldera",
"description": "This project was deployed via the rollup-as-a-service provider Caldera",
"action": {
"type": "scalingFilter",
"id": "raas",
"value": "Caldera"
}
}
],
"description": "Space and Time (SxT) is a decentralized data warehouse that aims to provide a zk 'Proof of SQL' to bring offchain data to smart contracts onchain. Built on ZK Stack, the SxT chain will serve as a settlement layer and payment hub for data queries.",
"links": {
"websites": [
"https://spaceandtime.io"
],
"bridges": [
"https://app.spaceandtime.ai"
],
"documentation": [
"https://docs.spaceandtime.io"
],
"explorers": [
"https://spaceandtime.calderaexplorer.xyz"
],
"repositories": [
"https://github.com/spaceandtimelabs"
],
"socialMedia": [
"https://x.com/SpaceandTimeDB",
"https://discord.com/invite/spaceandtimeDB",
"https://linkedin.com/company/space-and-time-db/",
"https://youtube.com/channel/UCXJyE7ahmqCH11aO7L76PBA",
"https://t.me/spaceandtimedb",
"https://instagram.com/spaceandtimedb/",
"https://spaceandtime.io/blog"
]
}
}
{
"missing": {
"nextStage": "Stage 1",
"requirements": [
"Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.",
"Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
],
"principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council should be the only way (other than bugs) for a rollup to indefinitely block an L2→L1 message (e.g. a withdrawal) or push an invalid L2→L1 message (e.g. an invalid withdrawal) with a <7d exit window."
},
"stage": "Stage 0",
"stage1PrincipleDescription": "While the Security Council is properly set up and is able to recover from a misbehaving operator, the majority is required, meaning that a compromised quorum-blocking minority can prevent users from exiting. Recovery actions are not straightforward and require complex protocol upgrades.",
"summary": [
{
"stage": "Stage 0",
"requirements": [
{
"satisfied": true,
"description": "A complete and functional proof system is deployed."
},
{
"satisfied": true,
"description": "The project calls itself a rollup."
},
{
"satisfied": true,
"description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
},
{
"satisfied": true,
"description": "Inputs for the state transition function are posted to Ethereum L1."
},
{
"satisfied": true,
"description": "A source-available node exists that can recreate the state from Ethereum L1 data. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code. [View code](https://github.com/matter-labs/zksync-era)"
}
]
},
{
"stage": "Stage 1",
"requirements": [
{
"satisfied": false,
"description": "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators."
},
{
"satisfied": false,
"description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
},
{
"satisfied": true,
"description": "The Security Council is properly set up."
}
],
"principle": {
"satisfied": false,
"description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council should be the only way (other than bugs) for a rollup to indefinitely block an L2→L1 message (e.g. a withdrawal) or push an invalid L2→L1 message (e.g. an invalid withdrawal) with a <7d exit window."
}
},
{
"stage": "Stage 2",
"requirements": [
{
"satisfied": false,
"description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs provide less than 30d to exit."
}
]
}
]
"stage": "NotApplicable"
}
scalingDa+2-2
[
{
"layer": {
"value": "Ethereum",
"secondLine": "Blobs or Calldata",
"secondLine": "Calldata",
"sentiment": "good",
"description": "The data is posted to Ethereum as calldata or blobs.",
"description": "The data is posted to Ethereum as calldata.",
"projectId": "ethereum"
},
"bridge": {
"value": "Enshrined",
"sentiment": "good",
"description": "The validating bridge has access to all the data, as it is posted onchain.",
"projectId": "ethereum"
},
"mode": {
"value": "State diffs",
"secondLine": "Compressed"
}
}
]
scalingTechnology+3-9
{
"architectureImage": "zkstack-rollup",
"architectureImage": "zkstack-validium",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "All data required for proofs is published on chain",
"description": "All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.",
"name": "All data required for proofs is published onchain",
"description": "All the data that is used to construct the system state is published onchain in the form of cheap calldata. This ensures that it will always be available when needed.",
"risks": [],
"references": []
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular messaging",
"description": "The user initiates L2->L1 messages by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled, the message becomes available for processing on L1. ZK proofs are required to settle blocks.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Withdrawing funds - ZKsync documentation",
"url": "https://docs.zksync.io/zksync-protocol/rollup/bridging-assets"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages from L1, including all forced withdrawals and deposits. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": []
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction via L1",
"description": "If a user is censored by the L2 Sequencer, they can try to force their transaction via an L1 queue. Right now there is no mechanism that forces L2 Sequencer to include transactions from the queue in an L2 block. The operator can implement a TransactionFilterer that censors forced transactions.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "Users can be censored if",
"text": "the operator refuses to include their transactions."
},
{
"category": "Users can be censored if",
"text": "the operator implements a TransactionFilterer, which is possible without delay."
}
],
"references": [
{
"title": "L1 - L2 interoperability - Developer's documentation",
"url": "https://docs.zksync.io/zksync-protocol/era-vm/contracts/handling-l1-l2-ops"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized operator",
"description": "The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": []
},
"stateDerivation": {
"nodeSoftware": "The node software is open-source, and its source code can be found [here](https://github.com/matter-labs/zksync-era).\n The main node software does not rely on Layer 1 (L1) to reconstruct the state, but you can use [this tool](https://github.com/eqlabs/zksync-state-reconstruct) for that purpose. Currently, there is no straightforward method to inject the state into the main node, but ZKsync is actively working on a solution for this.",
"compressionScheme": "Bytecodes undergo compression before deployment on Layer 1 (L1). You can find additional information on this process [here](https://github.com/matter-labs/zksync-era/blob/main/docs/src/guides/advanced/11_compression.md).",
"genesisState": "There have been neither genesis states nor regenesis.",
"dataFormat": "Details on data format can be found [here](https://github.com/matter-labs/zksync-era/blob/main/docs/src/guides/advanced/09_pubdata.md)."
},
"stateValidation": {
"description": "Each update to the system state must be accompanied by a ZK proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. These proofs are then verified on Ethereum by a smart contract.",
"categories": [
{
"title": "Prover Architecture",
"description": "ZKsync Era proof system Boojum can be found [here](https://github.com/matter-labs/era-boojum/tree/main) and contains essential tools like the Prover, the Verifier, and other backend components. The specs of the system can be found [here](https://github.com/matter-labs/zksync-era/tree/main/prover)."
},
{
"title": "ZK Circuits",
"description": "ZKsync Era circuits are built from Boojum and are designed to replicate the behavior of the EVM. The source code can be found [here](https://github.com/matter-labs/era-zkevm_circuits/tree/main). The circuits are checked against tests that can be found [here](https://github.com/matter-labs/era-zkevm_test_harness/tree/main).",
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be lost if",
"text": "the proof system is implemented incorrectly."
}
]
},
{
"title": "Verification Keys Generation",
"description": "SNARK verification keys can be generated and checked against the Ethereum verifier contract using [this tool](https://github.com/matter-labs/zksync-era/tree/main/prover/crates/bin/vk_setup_data_generator_server_fri). The system requires a trusted setup."
}
],
"proofVerification": {
"shortDescription": "ZKsync Era is a ZK-EVM rollup on Ethereum.",
"aggregation": true,
"requiredTools": [
{
"name": "Custom tool",
"version": "v14.2.0",
"link": "https://github.com/matter-labs/zksync-era/tree/prover-v14.2.0/prover/vk_setup_data_generator_server_fri"
}
],
"verifiers": [
{
"name": "ZKsyncEraVerifier",
"description": "ZKsync Era utilizes [Boojum](https://github.com/matter-labs/zksync-crypto/tree/main/crates/boojum) as the main proving stack for their system. Boojum is an implementation of the [Redshift](https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1400.pdf) protocol. The protocol makes use of recursive proof aggregation. The final Redshift proof is wrapped in a SNARK (Plonk + KZG) proof.",
"verified": "no",
"contractAddress": "0x06aa7a7B07108F7C5539645e32DD5c21cBF9EB66",
"chainId": 1,
"subVerifiers": [
{
"name": "Final wrap",
"proofSystem": "Plonk SNARK",
"mainArithmetization": "Plonkish",
"mainPCS": "KZG",
"trustedSetup": "Aztec ceremony",
"link": "https://github.com/matter-labs/zksync-protocol/blob/main/crates/circuit_definitions/src/circuit_definitions/aux_layer/wrapper.rs"
},
{
"name": "Aggregation circuit",
"proofSystem": "Redshift",
"mainArithmetization": "Plonkish",
"mainPCS": "LPC",
"trustedSetup": "None",
"link": "https://github.com/matter-labs/zksync-protocol/blob/7dfcc81eccc3984793646a5a47e4cd68757955a2/crates/circuit_definitions/src/circuit_definitions/recursion_layer/mod.rs#L45"
},
{
"name": "Main circuit",
"proofSystem": "Redshift",
"mainArithmetization": "Plonkish",
"mainPCS": "LPC",
"trustedSetup": "None",
"link": "https://github.com/matter-labs/zksync-protocol/tree/main/crates/zkevm_circuits"
}
]
}
]
}
},
"upgradesAndGovernance": "\nThere are two main paths for contract upgrades in the shared ZK stack ecosystem - standard and emergency - both converging on the shared upgrade management contract ProtocolUpgradeHandler.\nThe standard path involves a governance proposal and voting through the DAO, multiple timelock delays and finally approval by the Guardians or 6 SecurityCouncil participants.\nThe emergency path allows for contract upgrades without any delay by the EmergencyUpgradeBoard, which acts as a 3/3 Multisig between SecurityCouncil, Guardians and the FoundationMultisig.\n## Standard path\n### On ZKsync Era\nDelegates can start new proposals by reaching a threshold of 21M ZK tokens on the ZKsync Era Rollup's ZkProtocolGovernor contract.\nThis launches a 3d 'voting delay' after which the 7d voting period starts. During these first two periods, the proposal can be canceled by the proposer or if it falls below the proposing threshold.\nA proposal is only successful if it reaches both quorum (630M ZK tokens) and simple majority. When it reaches quorum, a remaining voting period of 3d is guaranteed by a potential late quorum vote extension.\nIn the successful case, it can be queued in the 0s timelock which forwards it via the Gateway to Ethereum as an L2->L1 log.\n### On Ethereum\nAfter the execution of the proposal-containing batch (3h delay), the proposal is now picked up by the ProtocolUpgradeHandler and enters the 3d 'legal veto period'.\nThis serves as a window in which a veto could be coordinated offchain, to be then enforced by non-approval of Guardians and SecurityCouncil. A threshold of 2 Guardians can extend the veto period to 7d.\nAfter this a proposal enters a *waiting* state of 1mo, from which it can be immediately approved (cancelling the delay) by 6 participants of the SecurityCouncil.\nFor the unlikely case that the Security Council does not approve here, the Guardians can instead approve the proposal, or nobody. In the two latter cases, the waiting period is enforced in full.\nA proposal cannot be actively cancelled in the ProtocolUpgradeHandler, but will expire if not approved within the waiting period. An approved proposal now enters the *pendingExecution* state for a final delay of 1d and can then be executed.\n### Other governance tracks\nThere are two other tracks of Governance also starting with DAO Delegate proposals the ZKsync Era rollup: 1) Token Program Proposals that add new minters, allocations or upgrade the ZK token and\n2) Governance Advisory Proposals that e.g. change the ZK Credo or other offchain Governance Procedures without onchain targets.\nThe protocol for these two other tracks is similar to the first part of the standard path described above (albeit having different quorum and timelock values), and not passing over to the Ethereum L1.\nFurther customizations are that the ZkFoundationMultisig can propose to the ZkTokenGovernor without a threshold and that the Guardians' L2 alias can cancel proposals in the ZkTokenGovernor and the ZkGovOpsGovernor.\n## Emergency path\nSecurityCouncil (9/12), Guardians (5/8) and ZkFoundationMultisig (3/5) form a de-facto 3/3 Multisig\nby pushing an immediate upgrade proposal through the EmergencyUpgradeBoard, which circumvents all delays and executes immediately via the ProtocolUpgradeHandler.\n## Upgrade Delays\nThe cumulative duration of the upgrade paths from the moment of a voted 'successful' proposal is 4d 3h or 8d 3h (depending on Guardians extending the LegalVetoPeriod) for Standard, 0 for Emergency and 1mo 4d for the path in which the SecurityCouncil is not approving the proposal.\n## Freezing\nThe SecurityCouncil can freeze (pause withdrawals and settlement) all chains connected to the current ChainTypeManager.\nEither for a softFreeze of 12h or a hardFreeze of 7d.\nAfter a softFreeze and / or a hardFreeze, a proposal from the EmergencyUpgradeBoard has to be passed before subsequent freezes are possible.\nOnly the SecurityCouncil can unfreeze an active freeze.\n## ZK cluster Admin and Chain Admin\nApart from the paths that can upgrade all shared implementations, the ZK stack governance system defines other roles that can modify the system:\nA single *ZK cluster Admin* role who governs parameters in the shared contracts and a *Chain Admin* role (defined in each chain-specific diamond contract) for managing parameters of each individual ZK chain that builds on the stack.\nThese chain-specific actions include critical operations like setting a transaction filterer that can censor L1 -> L2 messages, changing the DA mode, migrating the chain to a different settlement layer and standard operations like setting fee parameters and adding / removing Validators in the ValidatorTimelock.\nFor rollups, data availability on Ethereum is validated by a RollupL1DAValidator contract (or a RelayedSLDAValidator on the Gateway). Each rollup can become a permanent rollup (through their Chain Admin) which disallows DA changes to non-whitelisted sources or settlement layers in the future.\nThe source of truth for rollup-compliant DA validator contracts is the RollupDAManager contract, which is administered via the ProtocolUpgradeHandler.\nZKsync Era's Chain Admin differs from the others as it also has the above *ZK cluster Admin* role in the shared ZK stack contracts.",
"upgradesAndGovernanceImage": "zkstack"
}
livenessInfo+1-1
{
"explanation": "Space and Time is a ZK rollup that posts state diffs to the L1. Transactions within a state diff can be considered final when proven on L1 using a ZK proof, except that an operator can revert them if not executed yet. Currently, there is at least a 3h delay between state diffs verification and the execution of the corresponding state actions."
"explanation": "Space and Time is a Validium that posts commitments to the L1. Transactions within a state diff can be considered final when proven on L1 using a ZK proof, except that an operator can revert them if not executed yet. Currently, there is at least a 3h delay between state diffs verification and the execution of the corresponding state actions."
}