98b29f64 (main)
and
fb917dd4 (PR)
+18 -4
+1 -1
{
"architectureImage": "orbit-optimium",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "Data is not stored on chain",
"description": "Users transactions are not published onchain, but rather sent to external trusted parties, also known as committee members (DAC). Members of the DAC collectively produce a Data Availability Certificate (comprising BLS signatures from a quorum) guaranteeing that the data behind the new transaction batch will be available until the expiry period elapses (currently a minimum of two weeks). This signature is not verified by L1, however external Validators will skip the batch if BLS signature is not valid resulting. This will result in a fraud proof challenge if this batch is included in a consecutive state update. It is assumed that at least one honest DAC member that signed the batch will reveal tx data to the Validators if Sequencer decides to act maliciously and withhold the data. If the Sequencer cannot gather enough signatures from the DAC, it will \"fall back to rollup\" mode and by posting the full data directly to the L1 chain. The current DAC threshold is 2 out of 3.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be lost if",
"text": "the external data becomes unavailable.",
"isCritical": true
},
{
"category": "Users can be censored if",
"text": "the committee restricts their access to the external data."
}
],
"references": [
{
"title": "Inside AnyTrust - Arbitrum documentation",
"url": "https://developer.offchainlabs.com/inside-anytrust"
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular messaging",
"description": "The user initiates L2->L1 messages by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled, the message becomes available for processing on L1. The process of block finalization usually takes several days to complete.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Transaction lifecycle - Arbitrum documentation",
"url": "https://developer.offchainlabs.com/tx-lifecycle"
},
{
"title": "L2 to L1 Messages - Arbitrum documentation",
"url": "https://docs.arbitrum.io/how-arbitrum-works/deep-dives/l2-to-l1-messaging"
},
{
"title": "Mainnet for everyone - Arbitrum Blog",
"url": "https://offchain.medium.com/mainnet-for-everyone-27ce0f67c85e"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Autonomous exit",
"description": "Users can (eventually) exit the system by pushing the transaction on L1 and providing the corresponding state root. The only way to prevent such withdrawal is via an upgrade.",
"risks": [],
"references": []
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly. After a delay of 4d in which a Sequencer has failed to include a transaction that was directly posted to the smart contract, it can be forcefully included by anyone on the host chain, which finalizes its ordering.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "SequencerInbox.sol - source code, forceInclusion function",
"url": "https://arbiscan.io/address/0x3De02cf69192f4805edE47d7fA5efa614c5A6593#code"
"url": "https://arbiscan.io/address/0x7be08B013de2b23a6329De51C4994f841dcE1a10#code"
},
{
"title": "Sequencer Isn't Doing Its Job - Arbitrum documentation",
"url": "https://docs.arbitrum.io/how-arbitrum-works/sequencer#unhappyuncommon-case-sequencer-isnt-doing-its-job"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized sequencer",
"description": "While forcing transaction is open to anyone the system employs a privileged sequencer that has priority for submitting transaction batches and ordering transactions.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencer - Arbitrum documentation",
"url": "https://docs.arbitrum.io/how-arbitrum-works/inside-arbitrum-nitro#the-sequencer"
}
]
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "Arbitrum One uses Nitro technology that allows running fraud proofs by executing EVM code on top of WASM.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Inside Arbitrum Nitro",
"url": "https://developer.offchainlabs.com/inside-arbitrum-nitro/"
}
]
}
],
"sequencing": {
"name": "Delayed forced transactions",
"description": "To force transactions from the host chain, users must first enqueue \"delayed\" messages in the \"delayed\" inbox of the Bridge contract. Only authorized Inboxes are allowed to enqueue delayed messages, and the so-called Inbox contract is the one used as the entry point by calling the `sendMessage` or `sendMessageFromOrigin` functions. If the centralized sequencer doesn't process the request within some time bound, users can call the `forceInclusion` function on the SequencerInbox contract to include the message in the canonical chain. The time bound is hardcoded to be 4d.",
"references": [],
"risks": []
},
"stateValidation": {
"description": "Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by a set of whitelisted validators. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.",
"categories": [
{
"title": "State root proposals",
"description": "Whitelisted validators propose state roots as children of a previous state root. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. This structure forms a graph, and therefore, in the contracts, state roots are referred to as nodes. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.1 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be moved from one node to one of its children, either by calling `stakeOnExistingNode` or `stakeOnNewNode`. New nodes cannot be created faster than the minimum assertion period by the same validator, currently set to 15m. The oldest unconfirmed node can be confirmed if the challenge period has passed and there are no siblings, and rejected if the parent is not a confirmed node or if the challenge period has passed and no one is staked on it.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "none of the whitelisted verifiers checks the published state. Fraud proofs assume at least one honest and able validator.",
"isCritical": true
}
],
"references": [
{
"title": "How is fraud proven - Arbitrum documentation FAQ",
"url": "https://docs.arbitrum.io/get-started/arbitrum-introduction"
}
]
},
{
"title": "Challenges",
"description": "A challenge can be started between two siblings, i.e. two different state roots that share the same parent, by calling the `startChallenge` function. Validators cannot be in more than one challenge at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with [partial concurrency](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a). Since each challenge lasts 6d 8h, this implies that the protocol can be subject to [delay attacks](https://medium.com/offchainlabs/solutions-to-delay-attacks-on-rollups-434f9d05a07a), where a malicious actor can delay withdrawals as long as they are willing to pay the cost of losing their stakes. If the protocol is delayed attacked, the new stake requirement increases exponentially for each challenge period of delay. Challenges are played via a bisection game, where asserter and challenger play together to find the first instruction of disagreement. Such instruction is then executed onchain in the WASM OneStepProver contract to determine the winner, who then gets half of the stake of the loser. As said before, a state root is rejected only when no one left is staked on it. The protocol does not enforces valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claim and then provide incorrect midpoints.",
"references": [
{
"title": "Fraud Proof Wars: Arbitrum Classic",
"url": "https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a"
}
]
}
]
},
"stateValidationImage": "orbit",
"warning": "Fraud proof system is fully deployed but is not yet permissionless as it requires Validators to be whitelisted."
}+16 -2
{
"addresses": {
"arbitrum": [
{
"name": "ChallengeManager",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "arb1:0x3131627362AD79b3D831559E0AfC986BF60A6870",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"arb1:0x8D9e5bB33Da252739780e3df5F9E686fd11E0536"
],
"implementations": [
"arb1:0x079840Cc8959Ef60d414E5AFC6ED0493b8eAf514"
]
},
"chain": "arbitrum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1750157155,
"transactionHash": "0xd0a0751d8450543a294e38729482791348b8daba8017cdc92d3ada20f67a4e21",
"implementations": [
"arb1:0x079840Cc8959Ef60d414E5AFC6ED0493b8eAf514"
]
}
],
"description": "Contract that allows challenging state roots. Can be called through the RollupProxy by Validators or the UpgradeExecutor.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately EOA 1, SafeL2",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "SafeL2",
"delay": "no"
},
{
"id": "EOA-1",
"name": "EOA 1",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://arbiscan.io/address/arb1:0x3131627362AD79b3D831559E0AfC986BF60A6870#code"
},
{
"name": "SequencerInbox",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "arb1:0x38d41Ac2fbc3f13FcA7838F6638D8FbDb189e807",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"arb1:0x8D9e5bB33Da252739780e3df5F9E686fd11E0536"
],
"implementations": [
"arb1:0x3De02cf69192f4805edE47d7fA5efa614c5A6593"
"arb1:0x7be08B013de2b23a6329De51C4994f841dcE1a10"
]
},
"chain": "arbitrum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1750157155,
"transactionHash": "0xd0a0751d8450543a294e38729482791348b8daba8017cdc92d3ada20f67a4e21",
"implementations": [
"arb1:0x3De02cf69192f4805edE47d7fA5efa614c5A6593"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1767709919,
"transactionHash": "0x6ba75dc2936bc08617505e2a1abc4d117e98fc03707dbce6a598331ae6e21e7c",
"implementations": [
"arb1:0x7be08B013de2b23a6329De51C4994f841dcE1a10"
]
}
],
"description": "A sequencer (registered in this contract) can submit transaction batches or commitments here.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately EOA 1, SafeL2\n * **batchPosters**: EOA 3",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "SafeL2",
"delay": "no"
},
{
"id": "EOA-1",
"name": "EOA 1",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://arbiscan.io/address/arb1:0x38d41Ac2fbc3f13FcA7838F6638D8FbDb189e807#code"
},
{
"name": "Bridge",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "arb1:0xA9F4ee72439afC704db48dc049CbFb7E914aD300",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"arb1:0x8D9e5bB33Da252739780e3df5F9E686fd11E0536"
],
"implementations": [
"arb1:0x234e937F1a2926737b0084Fb7498772579497735"
]
},
"chain": "arbitrum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1750157155,
"transactionHash": "0xd0a0751d8450543a294e38729482791348b8daba8017cdc92d3ada20f67a4e21",
"implementations": [
"arb1:0x234e937F1a2926737b0084Fb7498772579497735"
]
}
],
"description": "Escrow contract for the project's gas token (can be different from ETH). Keeps a list of allowed Inboxes and Outboxes for canonical bridge messaging.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately EOA 1, SafeL2",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "SafeL2",
"delay": "no"
},
{
"id": "EOA-1",
"name": "EOA 1",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://arbiscan.io/address/arb1:0xA9F4ee72439afC704db48dc049CbFb7E914aD300#code"
},
{
"name": "RollupProxy",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "arb1:0xc930fd48846e956b308f28524dA2d5E14c832e33",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "Arbitrum proxy",
"admins": [
"arb1:0xcD3D1CFE5e0cDa77D0a2D1ac1c0268C77115f89D"
],
"implementations": [
"arb1:0xF9725312bd91CcfA3aD797e78A8A10b6d692FCd6",
"arb1:0xF916Bfe431B7A7AaE083273F5b862e00a15d60F4"
]
},
"chain": "arbitrum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1750157155,
"transactionHash": "0xd0a0751d8450543a294e38729482791348b8daba8017cdc92d3ada20f67a4e21",
"implementations": [
"arb1:0xF9725312bd91CcfA3aD797e78A8A10b6d692FCd6",
"arb1:0xF916Bfe431B7A7AaE083273F5b862e00a15d60F4"
]
}
],
"description": "Central contract for the project's configuration like its execution logic hash (`wasmModuleRoot`) and addresses of the other system contracts. Entry point for Proposers creating new Rollup Nodes (state commitments) and Challengers submitting fraud proofs (In the Orbit stack, these two roles are both held by the Validators).\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: UpgradeExecutor; ultimately EOA 1, SafeL2\n * **owner**: UpgradeExecutor; ultimately EOA 1, SafeL2\n * **validators**: EOA 2",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "SafeL2",
"delay": "no"
},
{
"id": "EOA-1",
"name": "EOA 1",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://arbiscan.io/address/arb1:0xc930fd48846e956b308f28524dA2d5E14c832e33#code"
},
{
"name": "UpgradeExecutor",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "arb1:0xcD3D1CFE5e0cDa77D0a2D1ac1c0268C77115f89D",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"arb1:0x8D9e5bB33Da252739780e3df5F9E686fd11E0536"
],
"implementations": [
"arb1:0x12B1389Fbf261E781bdc3094d28636Abfb03C5b3"
]
},
"chain": "arbitrum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1750157155,
"transactionHash": "0xd0a0751d8450543a294e38729482791348b8daba8017cdc92d3ada20f67a4e21",
"implementations": [
"arb1:0x12B1389Fbf261E781bdc3094d28636Abfb03C5b3"
]
}
],
"description": "Central contract defining the access control permissions for upgrading the system contract implementations.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately EOA 1, SafeL2\n * **executors**: EOA 1, SafeL2",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "SafeL2",
"delay": "no"
},
{
"id": "EOA-1",
"name": "EOA 1",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://arbiscan.io/address/arb1:0xcD3D1CFE5e0cDa77D0a2D1ac1c0268C77115f89D#code"
},
{
"name": "Outbox",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "arb1:0x39919941b42DAb335d9924Ef56dF7b9813b2D6d9",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"arb1:0x8D9e5bB33Da252739780e3df5F9E686fd11E0536"
],
"implementations": [
"arb1:0xCf66F830c4e5E1904B599ED61249601901E55D89"
]
},
"chain": "arbitrum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1750157155,
"transactionHash": "0xd0a0751d8450543a294e38729482791348b8daba8017cdc92d3ada20f67a4e21",
"implementations": [
"arb1:0xCf66F830c4e5E1904B599ED61249601901E55D89"
]
}
],
"description": "Facilitates L2 to L1 contract calls: Messages initiated from L2 (for example withdrawal messages) eventually resolve in execution on L1.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately EOA 1, SafeL2",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "SafeL2",
"delay": "no"
},
{
"id": "EOA-1",
"name": "EOA 1",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://arbiscan.io/address/arb1:0x39919941b42DAb335d9924Ef56dF7b9813b2D6d9#code"
},
{
"name": "Inbox",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "arb1:0x446626827f14F89B38D5bA1ab152B484cd7912fD",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"arb1:0x8D9e5bB33Da252739780e3df5F9E686fd11E0536"
],
"implementations": [
"arb1:0x0f728dd0217E26120A304B3Fa554C3Ba2b2aF535"
"arb1:0xD87f160f8c414d834cBDd9477c3D8c3ad1802255"
]
},
"chain": "arbitrum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1750157155,
"transactionHash": "0xd0a0751d8450543a294e38729482791348b8daba8017cdc92d3ada20f67a4e21",
"implementations": [
"arb1:0x0f728dd0217E26120A304B3Fa554C3Ba2b2aF535"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1767709919,
"transactionHash": "0x6ba75dc2936bc08617505e2a1abc4d117e98fc03707dbce6a598331ae6e21e7c",
"implementations": [
"arb1:0xD87f160f8c414d834cBDd9477c3D8c3ad1802255"
]
}
],
"description": "Facilitates sending L1 to L2 messages like depositing ETH, but does not escrow funds.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately EOA 1, SafeL2",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "SafeL2",
"delay": "no"
},
{
"id": "EOA-1",
"name": "EOA 1",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://arbiscan.io/address/arb1:0x446626827f14F89B38D5bA1ab152B484cd7912fD#code"
},
{
"name": "OneStepProverMemory",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "arb1:0x09fDA6447fA7758EA9245ac78Ca3c9ba68CBfd3d",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "arbitrum",
"description": "One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://arbiscan.io/address/arb1:0x09fDA6447fA7758EA9245ac78Ca3c9ba68CBfd3d#code"
},
{
"name": "OneStepProverHostIo",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "arb1:0x3930AD9a21dA38E63d52B43b0c530CB0AACcB389",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "arbitrum",
"description": "One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://arbiscan.io/address/arb1:0x3930AD9a21dA38E63d52B43b0c530CB0AACcB389#code"
},
{
"name": "ProxyAdmin",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "arb1:0x8D9e5bB33Da252739780e3df5F9E686fd11E0536",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "arbitrum",
"description": "* Roles:\n * **owner**: UpgradeExecutor",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://arbiscan.io/address/arb1:0x8D9e5bB33Da252739780e3df5F9E686fd11E0536#code"
},
{
"name": "ValidatorUtils",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "arb1:0xa0d6E6b1B950aCC748B45F3419FeAd4b52f7389A",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "arbitrum",
"description": "This contract implements view only utilities for validators.\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://arbiscan.io/address/arb1:0xa0d6E6b1B950aCC748B45F3419FeAd4b52f7389A#code"
},
{
"name": "OneStepProofEntry",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "arb1:0xA6D1cE7210353E431CE79f41BcFA9Ea3Ae507b98",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "arbitrum",
"description": "One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://arbiscan.io/address/arb1:0xA6D1cE7210353E431CE79f41BcFA9Ea3Ae507b98#code"
},
{
"name": "RollupEventInbox",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "arb1:0xAc9348017885a132F1A0614B508F632A56B90ec4",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"arb1:0x8D9e5bB33Da252739780e3df5F9E686fd11E0536"
],
"implementations": [
"arb1:0x3e9A459089758E760bEA267aBB9485EE5b47a909"
]
},
"chain": "arbitrum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1750157155,
"transactionHash": "0xd0a0751d8450543a294e38729482791348b8daba8017cdc92d3ada20f67a4e21",
"implementations": [
"arb1:0x3e9A459089758E760bEA267aBB9485EE5b47a909"
]
}
],
"description": "Helper contract sending configuration data over the bridge during the systems initialization.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately EOA 1, SafeL2",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "SafeL2",
"delay": "no"
},
{
"id": "EOA-1",
"name": "EOA 1",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://arbiscan.io/address/arb1:0xAc9348017885a132F1A0614B508F632A56B90ec4#code"
},
{
"name": "OneStepProverMath",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "arb1:0xD3dE403eADdf791104918E9C9336B434AE7DDA01",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "arbitrum",
"description": "One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://arbiscan.io/address/arb1:0xD3dE403eADdf791104918E9C9336B434AE7DDA01#code"
},
{
"name": "OneStepProver0",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "arb1:0xF5f5bc097ca8f4bE96D8CdE86c96Bd2d81fd2585",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "arbitrum",
"description": "One of the modular contracts used for the last step of a fraud proof, which is simulated inside a WASM virtual machine.\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://arbiscan.io/address/arb1:0xF5f5bc097ca8f4bE96D8CdE86c96Bd2d81fd2585#code"
}
]
},
"escrows": [
{
"address": "0xA9F4ee72439afC704db48dc049CbFb7E914aD300",
"sinceTimestamp": 1750157155,
"tokens": [
"ETH"
],
"contract": {
"isVerified": true,
"address": "arb1:0xA9F4ee72439afC704db48dc049CbFb7E914aD300",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"arb1:0x8D9e5bB33Da252739780e3df5F9E686fd11E0536"
],
"implementations": [
"arb1:0x234e937F1a2926737b0084Fb7498772579497735"
]
},
"chain": "arbitrum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1750157155,
"transactionHash": "0xd0a0751d8450543a294e38729482791348b8daba8017cdc92d3ada20f67a4e21",
"implementations": [
"arb1:0x234e937F1a2926737b0084Fb7498772579497735"
]
}
],
"description": "Contract managing Inboxes and Outboxes. It escrows ETH sent to L2.",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "ProxyAdmin",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"url": "https://arbiscan.io/address/0xA9F4ee72439afC704db48dc049CbFb7E914aD300#code"
},
"chain": "arbitrum",
"includeInTotal": false,
"chainId": 42161
},
{
"address": "0x0b6b5aFEe8602A4d88dC26Fc2E85b2d1236156F6",
"sinceTimestamp": 1745356800,
"tokens": "*",
"chain": "arbitrum",
"chainId": 42161
}
],
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades.",
"isCritical": true
}
]
}+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1761914121,
"baseTimestamp": 1767802188,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}+3 -3
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "1.3",
"initialBond": "1.6",
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632,
"secondLine": "12d 17h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
{
"architectureImage": "orbit-optimium",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "Data is not stored on chain",
"description": "Users transactions are not published onchain, but rather sent to external trusted parties, also known as committee members (DAC). Members of the DAC collectively produce a Data Availability Certificate (comprising BLS signatures from a quorum) guaranteeing that the data behind the new transaction batch will be available until the expiry period elapses (currently a minimum of two weeks). This signature is not verified by L1, however external Validators will skip the batch if BLS signature is not valid resulting. This will result in a fraud proof challenge if this batch is included in a consecutive state update. It is assumed that at least one honest DAC member that signed the batch will reveal tx data to the Validators if Sequencer decides to act maliciously and withhold the data. If the Sequencer cannot gather enough signatures from the DAC, it will \"fall back to rollup\" mode and by posting the full data directly to the L1 chain. The current DAC threshold is 1 out of 1.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be lost if",
"text": "the external data becomes unavailable.",
"isCritical": true
},
{
"category": "Users can be censored if",
"text": "the committee restricts their access to the external data."
}
],
"references": [
{
"title": "Inside AnyTrust - Arbitrum documentation",
"url": "https://developer.offchainlabs.com/inside-anytrust"
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular messaging",
"description": "The user initiates L2->L1 messages by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled, the message becomes available for processing on L1. The process of block finalization usually takes several days to complete.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Transaction lifecycle - Arbitrum documentation",
"url": "https://developer.offchainlabs.com/tx-lifecycle"
},
{
"title": "L2 to L1 Messages - Arbitrum documentation",
"url": "https://docs.arbitrum.io/how-arbitrum-works/deep-dives/l2-to-l1-messaging"
},
{
"title": "Mainnet for everyone - Arbitrum Blog",
"url": "https://offchain.medium.com/mainnet-for-everyone-27ce0f67c85e"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Autonomous exit",
"description": "Users can (eventually) exit the system by pushing the transaction on L1 and providing the corresponding state root. The only way to prevent such withdrawal is via an upgrade.",
"risks": [],
"references": []
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly. After a delay of 1d in which a Sequencer has failed to include a transaction that was directly posted to the smart contract, it can be forcefully included by anyone on the host chain, which finalizes its ordering.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "SequencerInbox.sol - source code, forceInclusion function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xfdB1487798E3104AC23c885f9BC94B98102Ff0BD#code"
},
{
"title": "Sequencer Isn't Doing Its Job - Arbitrum documentation",
"url": "https://docs.arbitrum.io/how-arbitrum-works/sequencer#unhappyuncommon-case-sequencer-isnt-doing-its-job"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized sequencer",
"description": "While forcing transaction is open to anyone the system employs a privileged sequencer that has priority for submitting transaction batches and ordering transactions.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencer - Arbitrum documentation",
"url": "https://docs.arbitrum.io/how-arbitrum-works/inside-arbitrum-nitro#the-sequencer"
}
]
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "Arbitrum One uses Nitro technology that allows running fraud proofs by executing EVM code on top of WASM.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Inside Arbitrum Nitro",
"url": "https://developer.offchainlabs.com/inside-arbitrum-nitro/"
}
]
}
],
"sequencing": {
"name": "Delayed forced transactions",
"description": "To force transactions from the host chain, users must first enqueue \"delayed\" messages in the \"delayed\" inbox of the Bridge contract. Only authorized Inboxes are allowed to enqueue delayed messages, and the so-called Inbox contract is the one used as the entry point by calling the `sendMessage` or `sendMessageFromOrigin` functions. If the centralized sequencer doesn't process the request within some time bound, users can call the `forceInclusion` function on the SequencerInbox contract to include the message in the canonical chain. The time bound is hardcoded to be 1d.",
"references": [],
"risks": []
},
"stateValidation": {
"description": "Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by a set of whitelisted validators. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.",
"categories": [
{
"title": "State root proposals",
"description": "Whitelisted validators propose state roots as children of a previous state root. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. This structure forms a graph, and therefore, in the contracts, state roots are referred to as nodes. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 1.3 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be moved from one node to one of its children, either by calling `stakeOnExistingNode` or `stakeOnNewNode`. New nodes cannot be created faster than the minimum assertion period by the same validator, currently set to 15m. The oldest unconfirmed node can be confirmed if the challenge period has passed and there are no siblings, and rejected if the parent is not a confirmed node or if the challenge period has passed and no one is staked on it.",
"description": "Whitelisted validators propose state roots as children of a previous state root. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. This structure forms a graph, and therefore, in the contracts, state roots are referred to as nodes. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 1.6 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be moved from one node to one of its children, either by calling `stakeOnExistingNode` or `stakeOnNewNode`. New nodes cannot be created faster than the minimum assertion period by the same validator, currently set to 15m. The oldest unconfirmed node can be confirmed if the challenge period has passed and there are no siblings, and rejected if the parent is not a confirmed node or if the challenge period has passed and no one is staked on it.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "none of the whitelisted verifiers checks the published state. Fraud proofs assume at least one honest and able validator.",
"isCritical": true
}
],
"references": [
{
"title": "How is fraud proven - Arbitrum documentation FAQ",
"url": "https://docs.arbitrum.io/get-started/arbitrum-introduction"
}
]
},
{
"title": "Challenges",
"description": "A challenge can be started between two siblings, i.e. two different state roots that share the same parent, by calling the `startChallenge` function. Validators cannot be in more than one challenge at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with [partial concurrency](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a). Since each challenge lasts 6d 8h, this implies that the protocol can be subject to [delay attacks](https://medium.com/offchainlabs/solutions-to-delay-attacks-on-rollups-434f9d05a07a), where a malicious actor can delay withdrawals as long as they are willing to pay the cost of losing their stakes. If the protocol is delayed attacked, the new stake requirement increases exponentially for each challenge period of delay. Challenges are played via a bisection game, where asserter and challenger play together to find the first instruction of disagreement. Such instruction is then executed onchain in the WASM OneStepProver contract to determine the winner, who then gets half of the stake of the loser. As said before, a state root is rejected only when no one left is staked on it. The protocol does not enforces valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claim and then provide incorrect midpoints.",
"references": [
{
"title": "Fraud Proof Wars: Arbitrum Classic",
"url": "https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a"
}
]
}
]
},
"stateValidationImage": "orbit",
"warning": "Fraud proof system is fully deployed but is not yet permissionless as it requires Validators to be whitelisted."
}+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1767696129,
"baseTimestamp": 1767802692,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}+18 -81
+0 -8
{
"architectureImage": "opstack-optimium-opfp-opsuccinct",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "Data is posted to EigenDA",
"description": "Transactions roots are posted onchain and the full data is posted on EigenDA. Since the ServiceManager bridge is not used, availability of the data is not verified against EigenDA operators, meaning that the Sequencer can single-handedly publish unavailable commitments. Mantle uses Hokulea, a Rust implementation that provides EigenDA blob derivation for OP stack chains.",
"references": [
{
"url": "https://docs.eigenda.xyz/overview",
"title": "EigenDA Docs - Overview"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/Layr-Labs/hokulea",
"title": "Hokulea - EigenDA blob derivation library"
},
{
"title": "Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be lost if",
"text": "the sequencer posts an unavailable transaction root.",
"isCritical": true
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular messaging",
"description": "The user initiates L2->L1 messages by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled, the message becomes available for processing on L1. ZK proofs are required to settle blocks.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be frozen if",
"text": "the centralized validator goes down. Users cannot produce blocks themselves and exiting the system requires new block production.",
"isCritical": true
}
],
"references": [
{
"title": "OptimismPortal.sol - source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xe1399f54ba2597b4EaDA9E3450c34D393fb131A7#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal.sol - source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xe1399f54ba2597b4EaDA9E3450c34D393fb131A7#code"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain",
"url": "https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xe1399f54ba2597b4EaDA9E3450c34D393fb131A7#code"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized operator",
"description": "The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": []
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing EVM Equivalence",
"url": "https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306"
}
]
}
],
"stateValidation": {
"categories": [
{
"title": "Validity proofs",
"description": "Each update to the system state must be accompanied by a ZK proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. These proofs are then verified on Ethereum by a smart contract.\n Through the SuccinctL2OutputOracle, the system also allows to switch to an optimistic mode, in which no proofs are required and a challenger can challenge the proposed output state root within the finalization period.",
"references": [
{
"url": "https://succinctlabs.github.io/op-succinct/architecture.html",
"title": "Op-Succinct architecture"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "in non-optimistic mode, the validity proof cryptography is broken or implemented incorrectly."
},
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "optimistic mode is enabled and no challenger checks the published state."
},
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "the proposer routes proof verification through a malicious or faulty verifier by specifying an unsafe route id."
},
{
"category": "Funds can be frozen if",
"text": "the permissioned proposer fails to publish state roots to the L1."
},
{
"category": "Funds can be frozen if",
"text": "in non-optimistic mode, the SP1VerifierGateway is unable to route proof verification to a valid verifier."
}
]
}
]
},
"stateValidationImage": "opsuccinct"
}+0 -40
{
"ethereum": {
"roles": [
{
"id": "Guardian",
"name": "Guardian",
"description": "Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless).",
"accounts": [
{
"address": "eth:0x2F44BD2a54aC3fB20cd7783cF94334069641daC9",
"type": "Contract",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "MantleEngineeringMultisig",
"url": "#MantleEngineeringMultisig"
}
],
"chain": "ethereum",
"discoveryDrivenData": true
},
{
"id": "Proposer",
"name": "Proposer",
"description": "Allowed to post new state roots of the current layer to the host chain.",
"accounts": [
{
"address": "eth:0x6667961f5e9C98A76a48767522150889703Ed77D",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "EOA 2",
"url": "#EOA-2"
}
],
"chain": "ethereum",
"discoveryDrivenData": true
},
{
"id": "Sequencer",
"name": "Sequencer",
"description": "Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain.",
"accounts": [
{
"address": "eth:0x2f40D796917ffB642bD2e2bdD2C762A5e40fd749",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "EOA 1",
"url": "#EOA-1"
}
],
"chain": "ethereum",
"discoveryDrivenData": true
}
],
"actors": [
{
"id": "MantleSecurityMultisig",
"name": "MantleSecurityMultisig",
"description": "A Multisig with 6/13 threshold. \n* Can upgrade **with no delay**\n * OPSuccinctL2OutputOracle [via: ProxyAdmin]\n * SystemConfig [via: ProxyAdmin]\n * L1CrossDomainMessenger [via: ProxyAdmin]\n * L1StandardBridge [via: ProxyAdmin]\n * OptimismPortal [via: ProxyAdmin]\n* Can upgrade **with 1d delay**\n * L1MantleToken [via: TimelockController with 1d delay → MantleTokenProxyAdmin]\n* Can interact with OPSuccinctL2OutputOracle\n * can toggle between the optimistic mode and not optimistic (ZK) mode \n* Can interact with SystemConfig\n * it can update the preconfer address, the batch submitter (Sequencer) address and the gas configuration of the system \n* Can interact with TimelockController\n * cancel queued transactions \n * execute transactions that are ready \n * manage all access control roles **with 1d delay or with no delay** [via: TimelockController with 1d delay - or - acting directly]\n * propose transactions \n* Can interact with AddressManager\n * set and change address mappings [via: ProxyAdmin]",
"accounts": [
{
"address": "eth:0x4e59e778a0fb77fBb305637435C62FaeD9aED40f",
"type": "Contract",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x4e59…D40f",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x4e59e778a0fb77fBb305637435C62FaeD9aED40f"
}
],
"chain": "ethereum",
"references": [],
"participants": [
{
"address": "eth:0xf73546Da2F971bD0Ed1b3c5F9C01092180Db5089",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0xf735…5089",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xf73546Da2F971bD0Ed1b3c5F9C01092180Db5089"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x61Af7a48B0EeA8481E5A055A35f829d0e8505fE3",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x61Af…5fE3",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x61Af7a48B0EeA8481E5A055A35f829d0e8505fE3"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x50dCf0B40E593301aA75DcB54f36f379607595CE",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x50dC…95CE",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x50dCf0B40E593301aA75DcB54f36f379607595CE"
},
{
"address": "eth:0xA3C8f55BE8aF7402d5192b343E8BfE4BB9795C2F",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0xA3C8…5C2F",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xA3C8f55BE8aF7402d5192b343E8BfE4BB9795C2F"
},
{
"address": "eth:0xdC3644e172813ADbF6D130262e2416975Ac48Af3",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0xdC36…8Af3",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xdC3644e172813ADbF6D130262e2416975Ac48Af3"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x4A42577Bf6e51127c490F3639F5c8B90Ec53f5B1",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x4A42…f5B1",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x4A42577Bf6e51127c490F3639F5c8B90Ec53f5B1"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x4b6CFecA60f8BDF8AbCEE10f033f17cb2a928498",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x4b6C…8498",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x4b6CFecA60f8BDF8AbCEE10f033f17cb2a928498"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x3Dc5FcB0Ad5835C6059112e51A75b57DBA668eB8",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x3Dc5…8eB8",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x3Dc5FcB0Ad5835C6059112e51A75b57DBA668eB8"
},
{
"address": "eth:0xf5b16239f88B54894e03e0293d3d7FDdEb9f9070",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0xf5b1…9070",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xf5b16239f88B54894e03e0293d3d7FDdEb9f9070"
},
{
"address": "eth:0xe75D7324d6BC4E70A200c5E268160332F43b2d2B",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0xe75D…2d2B",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xe75D7324d6BC4E70A200c5E268160332F43b2d2B"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x3000BE80ad204D327990eB403654aCd1Eaa8eCeb",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x3000…eCeb",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x3000BE80ad204D327990eB403654aCd1Eaa8eCeb"
},
{
"address": "eth:0xc4143711aA5bd6d37F1b0A690120AA5859e32A93",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0xc414…2A93",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xc4143711aA5bd6d37F1b0A690120AA5859e32A93"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x915dc866e2e5E64f912A5ac1D40E3be4597F172a",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x915d…172a",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x915dc866e2e5E64f912A5ac1D40E3be4597F172a"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true
},
{
"id": "MantleEngineeringMultisig",
"name": "MantleEngineeringMultisig",
"description": "A Multisig with 3/7 threshold. \n* A Guardian - acting directly",
"accounts": [
{
"address": "eth:0x2F44BD2a54aC3fB20cd7783cF94334069641daC9",
"type": "Contract",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x2F44…daC9",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x2F44BD2a54aC3fB20cd7783cF94334069641daC9"
}
],
"chain": "ethereum",
"references": [],
"participants": [
{
"address": "eth:0xC37642355c18ec9c3b3268AAC67e33516aa115eb",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0xC376…15eb",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xC37642355c18ec9c3b3268AAC67e33516aa115eb"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x207E804758e28F2b3fD6E4219671B327100b82f8",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x207E…82f8",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x207E804758e28F2b3fD6E4219671B327100b82f8"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x5a021DC06A9630bb56099b8aEdfaDC2dEa7eB317",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x5a02…B317",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x5a021DC06A9630bb56099b8aEdfaDC2dEa7eB317"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x00da2F87c56C3a19BD863613995705095F55b524",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x00da…b524",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x00da2F87c56C3a19BD863613995705095F55b524"
},
{
"address": "eth:0xbE73dea9c8DcDdB6b03F7e5797b85982065fe34e",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0xbE73…e34e",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xbE73dea9c8DcDdB6b03F7e5797b85982065fe34e"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x3Dc5FcB0Ad5835C6059112e51A75b57DBA668eB8",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x3Dc5…8eB8",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x3Dc5FcB0Ad5835C6059112e51A75b57DBA668eB8"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x915dc866e2e5E64f912A5ac1D40E3be4597F172a",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x915d…172a",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x915dc866e2e5E64f912A5ac1D40E3be4597F172a"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true
},
{
"id": "SP1VerifierGatewayMultisig",
"name": "SP1VerifierGatewayMultisig",
"description": "A Multisig with 2/3 threshold. \n* Can interact with SP1VerifierGateway\n * affect the liveness and safety of the gateway - can transfer ownership, add and freeze verifier routes ",
"accounts": [
{
"address": "eth:0xCafEf00d348Adbd57c37d1B77e0619C6244C6878",
"type": "Contract",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0xCafE…6878",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xCafEf00d348Adbd57c37d1B77e0619C6244C6878"
}
],
"chain": "ethereum",
"references": [],
"participants": [
{
"address": "eth:0xBaB2c2aF5b91695e65955DA60d63aD1b2aE81126",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0xBaB2…1126",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xBaB2c2aF5b91695e65955DA60d63aD1b2aE81126"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x72Ff26D9517324eEFA89A48B75c5df41132c4f54",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x72Ff…4f54",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x72Ff26D9517324eEFA89A48B75c5df41132c4f54"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x9395e83720bf2D8ac6435f9c520b48E289Cb8885",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x9395…8885",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x9395e83720bf2D8ac6435f9c520b48E289Cb8885"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true
},
{
"id": "EOA-1",
"name": "EOA 1",
"accounts": [
{
"address": "eth:0x2f40D796917ffB642bD2e2bdD2C762A5e40fd749",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x2f40…d749",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x2f40D796917ffB642bD2e2bdD2C762A5e40fd749"
}
],
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "* A Sequencer - acting directly",
"discoveryDrivenData": true
},
{
"id": "EOA-2",
"name": "EOA 2",
"accounts": [
{
"address": "eth:0x6667961f5e9C98A76a48767522150889703Ed77D",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x6667…d77D",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x6667961f5e9C98A76a48767522150889703Ed77D"
}
],
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "* A Proposer - acting directly",
"discoveryDrivenData": true
}
]
}
}+17 -32
{
"addresses": {
"ethereum": [
{
"name": "SystemConfig",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x427Ea0710FA5252057F0D88274f7aeb308386cAf",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0xca35F8338054739D138884685e08b39EE2217794"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x6Dbb7D9C5dC60844B8CF442ddC6Be081c060B2E3"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1710467267,
"transactionHash": "0x667a55493b70812eedb69586be570fa87bb305ff046ebd1419cdc71163f770ac",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x6Dbb7D9C5dC60844B8CF442ddC6Be081c060B2E3"
]
}
],
"description": "Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately MantleSecurityMultisig\n * **batcherHash**: EOA 1\n * **owner**: MantleSecurityMultisig",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "MantleSecurityMultisig",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x427Ea0710FA5252057F0D88274f7aeb308386cAf#code"
},
{
"name": "OptimismPortal",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0xc54cb22944F2bE476E02dECfCD7e3E7d3e15A8Fb",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0xca35F8338054739D138884685e08b39EE2217794"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0xe1399f54ba2597b4EaDA9E3450c34D393fb131A7"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1710490775,
"transactionHash": "0xa5fff128e999954c7dfe8e3360d0844e439425124922e85cd32fdcf2e3582247",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xe1399f54ba2597b4EaDA9E3450c34D393fb131A7"
]
}
],
"description": "The main entry point to deposit funds from host chain to this chain. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately MantleSecurityMultisig\n * **guardian**: MantleEngineeringMultisig",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "MantleSecurityMultisig",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0xc54cb22944F2bE476E02dECfCD7e3E7d3e15A8Fb#code"
},
{
"name": "L1CrossDomainMessenger",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x676A795fe6E43C17c668de16730c3F690FEB7120",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "resolved delegate proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0xca35F8338054739D138884685e08b39EE2217794"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0xb8DE82551fA4BA3bE4B3d9097763EDBeED541308"
],
"immutable": false
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1687958039,
"transactionHash": "0x3ef2116cdd9366a646b6625affcf0cbe96bb3c59c3ffc629432d3f79ff1f886c",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x4692363048d0F32a2dE7816860D48fff0c61B24B"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1710467267,
"transactionHash": "0x667a55493b70812eedb69586be570fa87bb305ff046ebd1419cdc71163f770ac",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1710490775,
"transactionHash": "0xa5fff128e999954c7dfe8e3360d0844e439425124922e85cd32fdcf2e3582247",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xb8DE82551fA4BA3bE4B3d9097763EDBeED541308"
]
}
],
"description": "Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately MantleSecurityMultisig",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "MantleSecurityMultisig",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x676A795fe6E43C17c668de16730c3F690FEB7120#code"
},
{
"name": "L1StandardBridge",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x95fC37A27a2f68e3A647CDc081F0A89bb47c3012",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0xca35F8338054739D138884685e08b39EE2217794"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0xb4133552BA49dFb60DA6eb5cA0102d0f94ce071f"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [],
"description": "The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately MantleSecurityMultisig",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "MantleSecurityMultisig",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x95fC37A27a2f68e3A647CDc081F0A89bb47c3012#code"
},
{
"name": "SP1Verifier",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x0459d576A6223fEeA177Fb3DF53C9c77BF84C459",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Verifier contract for SP1 proofs (v5.0.0).\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x0459d576A6223fEeA177Fb3DF53C9c77BF84C459#code"
},
{
"name": "MantleTokenProxyAdmin",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x0cac2B1a172ac24012621101634DD5ABD6399ADd",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "* Roles:\n * **owner**: TimelockController",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x0cac2B1a172ac24012621101634DD5ABD6399ADd#code"
},
{
"name": "OPSuccinctL2OutputOracle",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x31d543e7BE1dA6eFDc2206Ef7822879045B9f481",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0xca35F8338054739D138884685e08b39EE2217794"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x4059509fFb703B048D1e9Ce3118F90E759076f50"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1710490775,
"transactionHash": "0xa5fff128e999954c7dfe8e3360d0844e439425124922e85cd32fdcf2e3582247",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xD1230865641561653406906Fb08873F011c19080"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1758005207,
"transactionHash": "0xf9fc68effd8cbd421d25e87a357757fe6710c6c9c0d9c5270d2af5a37f675259",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x4059509fFb703B048D1e9Ce3118F90E759076f50"
]
}
],
"description": "Contains a list of proposed state roots which Proposers assert to be a result of block execution. The SuccinctL2OutputOracle modifies the L2OutputOracle to support whenNotOptimistic mode, in which a validity proof can be passed as input argument to the proposeL2Output function.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately MantleSecurityMultisig\n * **initialProposer**: EOA 2\n * **owner**: MantleSecurityMultisig",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "MantleSecurityMultisig",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x31d543e7BE1dA6eFDc2206Ef7822879045B9f481#code"
},
{
"name": "SP1VerifierGateway",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x397A5f7f3dBd538f23DE225B51f532c34448dA9B",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "This contract is the router for zk proof verification. It stores the mapping between identifiers and the address of onchain verifier contracts, routing each identifier to the corresponding verifier contract.\n* Roles:\n * **owner**: SP1VerifierGatewayMultisig",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x397A5f7f3dBd538f23DE225B51f532c34448dA9B#code"
},
{
"name": "L1MantleToken",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x3c3a81e81dc49A522A592e7622A7E711c06bf354",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x0cac2B1a172ac24012621101634DD5ABD6399ADd"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0xCd368c1d80120b0Dd92447c87eB570154f8e685c"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1687241795,
"transactionHash": "0x8f7867724cfba4b9b1b19ca140711809b40dda9ae245caf7bcff9473a5a7e45e",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xCd368c1d80120b0Dd92447c87eB570154f8e685c"
]
}
],
"description": "MNT token contract: Mantle uses Mantle (MNT) as the designated gas token, allowing users pay for gas in MNT.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: MantleTokenProxyAdmin; ultimately MantleSecurityMultisig",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "MantleSecurityMultisig",
"delay": "1d"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x3c3a81e81dc49A522A592e7622A7E711c06bf354#code"
},
{
"name": "SP1Verifier",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x50ACFBEdecf4cbe350E1a86fC6f03a821772f1e5",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Verifier contract for SP1 proofs (v5.0.0).\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x50ACFBEdecf4cbe350E1a86fC6f03a821772f1e5#code"
},
{
"name": "TimelockController",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x65331ff6F8B0fc2612F2a0deBD9d04Fce60a447F",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 1d.\n* Roles:\n * **canceller**: MantleSecurityMultisig\n * **defaultAdmin**: MantleSecurityMultisig, TimelockController; ultimately MantleSecurityMultisig\n * **executor**: MantleSecurityMultisig\n * **proposer**: MantleSecurityMultisig",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x65331ff6F8B0fc2612F2a0deBD9d04Fce60a447F#code"
},
{
"name": "ProxyAdmin",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0xca35F8338054739D138884685e08b39EE2217794",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "* Roles:\n * **owner**: MantleSecurityMultisig",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0xca35F8338054739D138884685e08b39EE2217794#code"
}
]
},
"escrows": [
{
"address": "0xc54cb22944F2bE476E02dECfCD7e3E7d3e15A8Fb",
"sinceTimestamp": 1710439967,
"tokens": [
"ETH",
"MNT"
],
"contract": {
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0xc54cb22944F2bE476E02dECfCD7e3E7d3e15A8Fb",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0xca35F8338054739D138884685e08b39EE2217794"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0xe1399f54ba2597b4EaDA9E3450c34D393fb131A7"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1710490775,
"transactionHash": "0xa5fff128e999954c7dfe8e3360d0844e439425124922e85cd32fdcf2e3582247",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xe1399f54ba2597b4EaDA9E3450c34D393fb131A7"
]
}
],
"description": "Main entry point for users depositing ETH, MNT.",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "ProxyAdmin",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xc54cb22944F2bE476E02dECfCD7e3E7d3e15A8Fb#code"
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"includeInTotal": true,
"chainId": 1
},
{
"address": "0x95fC37A27a2f68e3A647CDc081F0A89bb47c3012",
"sinceTimestamp": 1687954103,
"tokens": "*",
"excludedTokens": [
"SolvBTC",
"SolvBTC.BBN",
"FBTC"
],
"contract": {
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x95fC37A27a2f68e3A647CDc081F0A89bb47c3012",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0xca35F8338054739D138884685e08b39EE2217794"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0xb4133552BA49dFb60DA6eb5cA0102d0f94ce071f"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [],
"description": "Main entry point for users depositing ERC20 token that do not require custom gateway.",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "ProxyAdmin",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x95fC37A27a2f68e3A647CDc081F0A89bb47c3012#code"
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"includeInTotal": true,
"chainId": 1
}
],
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades.",
"isCritical": true
}
],
"zkProgramHashes": [
{
"title": "Aggregation program of OP Succinct",
"description": "Aggregates proofs of correct execution for several consecutive block ranges of OP L2 client.",
"proverSystemProject": "sp1",
"verificationStatus": "notVerified",
"hash": "0x00bca7947ba758bd6f539f480c6d983cca4bd4387a411a41a71fb953d5df3de7"
"hash": "0x006110a295396036ad8df48c333e2b99b11624799138fbc18e10181551e29eb1"
},
{
"title": "Range program of OP Succinct",
"description": "Proves correct state transition function within an OP L2 client over a range of consecutive L2 blocks.",
"proverSystemProject": "sp1",
"verificationStatus": "notVerified",
"hash": "0x2d0dcc4f4a5e59b80239c28a3fb68ab63b8eaf6f132239e95f927da9046f4256"
"hash": "0x5d15e85151cc8f4b68d2721f675b0b8665a7a2752fa34ff935d5adbc3c8acab8"
}
]
}+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1760971761,
"baseTimestamp": 1767784170,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}+3 -3
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.8",
"initialBond": "0.9",
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632,
"secondLine": "12d 17h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
{
"architectureImage": "orbit-optimium",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "Data is not stored on chain",
"description": "Users transactions are not published onchain, but rather sent to external trusted parties, also known as committee members (DAC). Members of the DAC collectively produce a Data Availability Certificate (comprising BLS signatures from a quorum) guaranteeing that the data behind the new transaction batch will be available until the expiry period elapses (currently a minimum of two weeks). This signature is not verified by L1, however external Validators will skip the batch if BLS signature is not valid resulting. This will result in a fraud proof challenge if this batch is included in a consecutive state update. It is assumed that at least one honest DAC member that signed the batch will reveal tx data to the Validators if Sequencer decides to act maliciously and withhold the data. If the Sequencer cannot gather enough signatures from the DAC, it will \"fall back to rollup\" mode and by posting the full data directly to the L1 chain. The current DAC threshold is 1 out of 1.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be lost if",
"text": "the external data becomes unavailable.",
"isCritical": true
},
{
"category": "Users can be censored if",
"text": "the committee restricts their access to the external data."
}
],
"references": [
{
"title": "Inside AnyTrust - Arbitrum documentation",
"url": "https://developer.offchainlabs.com/inside-anytrust"
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular messaging",
"description": "The user initiates L2->L1 messages by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled, the message becomes available for processing on L1. The process of block finalization usually takes several days to complete.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Transaction lifecycle - Arbitrum documentation",
"url": "https://developer.offchainlabs.com/tx-lifecycle"
},
{
"title": "L2 to L1 Messages - Arbitrum documentation",
"url": "https://docs.arbitrum.io/how-arbitrum-works/deep-dives/l2-to-l1-messaging"
},
{
"title": "Mainnet for everyone - Arbitrum Blog",
"url": "https://offchain.medium.com/mainnet-for-everyone-27ce0f67c85e"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Autonomous exit",
"description": "Users can (eventually) exit the system by pushing the transaction on L1 and providing the corresponding state root. The only way to prevent such withdrawal is via an upgrade.",
"risks": [],
"references": []
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly. After a delay of 1d in which a Sequencer has failed to include a transaction that was directly posted to the smart contract, it can be forcefully included by anyone on the host chain, which finalizes its ordering.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "SequencerInbox.sol - source code, forceInclusion function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x6B292d1d4D38653b4F1D6De41c6be198371C5af1#code"
},
{
"title": "Sequencer Isn't Doing Its Job - Arbitrum documentation",
"url": "https://docs.arbitrum.io/how-arbitrum-works/sequencer#unhappyuncommon-case-sequencer-isnt-doing-its-job"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized sequencer",
"description": "While forcing transaction is open to anyone the system employs a privileged sequencer that has priority for submitting transaction batches and ordering transactions.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencer - Arbitrum documentation",
"url": "https://docs.arbitrum.io/how-arbitrum-works/inside-arbitrum-nitro#the-sequencer"
}
]
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "Arbitrum One uses Nitro technology that allows running fraud proofs by executing EVM code on top of WASM.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Inside Arbitrum Nitro",
"url": "https://developer.offchainlabs.com/inside-arbitrum-nitro/"
}
]
}
],
"sequencing": {
"name": "Delayed forced transactions",
"description": "To force transactions from the host chain, users must first enqueue \"delayed\" messages in the \"delayed\" inbox of the Bridge contract. Only authorized Inboxes are allowed to enqueue delayed messages, and the so-called Inbox contract is the one used as the entry point by calling the `sendMessage` or `sendMessageFromOrigin` functions. If the centralized sequencer doesn't process the request within some time bound, users can call the `forceInclusion` function on the SequencerInbox contract to include the message in the canonical chain. The time bound is hardcoded to be 1d.",
"references": [],
"risks": []
},
"stateValidation": {
"description": "Updates to the system state can be proposed and challenged by a set of whitelisted validators. If a state root passes the challenge period, it is optimistically considered correct and made actionable for withdrawals.",
"categories": [
{
"title": "State root proposals",
"description": "Whitelisted validators propose state roots as children of a previous state root. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. This structure forms a graph, and therefore, in the contracts, state roots are referred to as nodes. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.8 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be moved from one node to one of its children, either by calling `stakeOnExistingNode` or `stakeOnNewNode`. New nodes cannot be created faster than the minimum assertion period by the same validator, currently set to 15m. The oldest unconfirmed node can be confirmed if the challenge period has passed and there are no siblings, and rejected if the parent is not a confirmed node or if the challenge period has passed and no one is staked on it.",
"description": "Whitelisted validators propose state roots as children of a previous state root. A state root can have multiple conflicting children. This structure forms a graph, and therefore, in the contracts, state roots are referred to as nodes. Each proposal requires a stake, currently set to 0.9 ETH, that can be slashed if the proposal is proven incorrect via a fraud proof. Stakes can be moved from one node to one of its children, either by calling `stakeOnExistingNode` or `stakeOnNewNode`. New nodes cannot be created faster than the minimum assertion period by the same validator, currently set to 15m. The oldest unconfirmed node can be confirmed if the challenge period has passed and there are no siblings, and rejected if the parent is not a confirmed node or if the challenge period has passed and no one is staked on it.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "none of the whitelisted verifiers checks the published state. Fraud proofs assume at least one honest and able validator.",
"isCritical": true
}
],
"references": [
{
"title": "How is fraud proven - Arbitrum documentation FAQ",
"url": "https://docs.arbitrum.io/get-started/arbitrum-introduction"
}
]
},
{
"title": "Challenges",
"description": "A challenge can be started between two siblings, i.e. two different state roots that share the same parent, by calling the `startChallenge` function. Validators cannot be in more than one challenge at the same time, meaning that the protocol operates with [partial concurrency](https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a). Since each challenge lasts 6d 8h, this implies that the protocol can be subject to [delay attacks](https://medium.com/offchainlabs/solutions-to-delay-attacks-on-rollups-434f9d05a07a), where a malicious actor can delay withdrawals as long as they are willing to pay the cost of losing their stakes. If the protocol is delayed attacked, the new stake requirement increases exponentially for each challenge period of delay. Challenges are played via a bisection game, where asserter and challenger play together to find the first instruction of disagreement. Such instruction is then executed onchain in the WASM OneStepProver contract to determine the winner, who then gets half of the stake of the loser. As said before, a state root is rejected only when no one left is staked on it. The protocol does not enforces valid bisections, meaning that actors can propose correct initial claim and then provide incorrect midpoints.",
"references": [
{
"title": "Fraud Proof Wars: Arbitrum Classic",
"url": "https://medium.com/l2beat/fraud-proof-wars-b0cb4d0f452a"
}
]
}
]
},
"stateValidationImage": "orbit",
"warning": "Fraud proof system is fully deployed but is not yet permissionless as it requires Validators to be whitelisted."
}+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1767628410,
"baseTimestamp": 1767802709,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}+0 -8
+0 -8
{
"architectureImage": "opstack-rollup-superchain-opfp-opsuccinct",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "All data required for proofs is published on chain",
"description": "All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission"
},
{
"title": "BatchInbox - address",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x5A2a0698355D06cd5c4e3872D2Bc6B9f6a89d39B#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x5B172BBfa0140285A02374EC1f5B9f25ef415514#code"
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular messaging",
"description": "The user initiates L2->L1 messages by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled, the message becomes available for processing on L1. ZK proofs are required to settle blocks.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be frozen if",
"text": "the centralized validator goes down. Users cannot produce blocks themselves and exiting the system requires new block production.",
"isCritical": true
}
],
"references": [
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x5B172BBfa0140285A02374EC1f5B9f25ef415514#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x5B172BBfa0140285A02374EC1f5B9f25ef415514#code"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain",
"url": "https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x5B172BBfa0140285A02374EC1f5B9f25ef415514#code"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized operator",
"description": "The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": []
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing EVM Equivalence",
"url": "https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306"
}
]
}
],
"stateValidation": {
"categories": [
{
"title": "Validity proofs",
"description": "Each update to the system state must be accompanied by a ZK proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. These proofs are then verified on Ethereum by a smart contract.\n Through the SuccinctL2OutputOracle, the system also allows to switch to an optimistic mode, in which no proofs are required and a challenger can challenge the proposed output state root within the finalization period.",
"references": [
{
"url": "https://succinctlabs.github.io/op-succinct/architecture.html",
"title": "Op-Succinct architecture"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "in non-optimistic mode, the validity proof cryptography is broken or implemented incorrectly."
},
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "optimistic mode is enabled and no challenger checks the published state."
},
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "the proposer routes proof verification through a malicious or faulty verifier by specifying an unsafe route id."
},
{
"category": "Funds can be frozen if",
"text": "the permissioned proposer fails to publish state roots to the L1."
},
{
"category": "Funds can be frozen if",
"text": "in non-optimistic mode, the SP1VerifierGateway is unable to route proof verification to a valid verifier."
}
]
}
]
},
"stateValidationImage": "opsuccinct"
}+2 -2
+1 -1
{
"addresses": {
"ethereum": [
{
"name": "OptimismPortal2",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x0bd48f6B86a26D3a217d0Fa6FfE2B491B956A7a2",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x3B73Fa8d82f511A3caE17B5a26E4E1a2d5E2f2A4"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1730748347,
"transactionHash": "0x1623e586faeda506c832de15a948fd9c9d34da18c0ed5bbfc095dc1c0621f936",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1744485539,
"transactionHash": "0x7e5e478cafbe30293645e6972a477f77dcfdc006c4cf1dd248a94e6386d04159",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x2D7e764a0D9919e16983a46595CfA81fc34fa7Cd"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1745543531,
"transactionHash": "0xc74c5e0dddfa9e2d0fd5d902fb7b1aa4cc28ba034ebed7bf3a0aa3a8b8d21b20",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1753380731,
"transactionHash": "0x1f1f283ad793a901a94e11241d46b87cd264b2e276a690b9554148ba56c57959",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xEFEd7F38BB9BE74bBa583a1A5B7D0fe7C9D5787a"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1759437959,
"transactionHash": "0xc98240172fa3950ec9c62f32cc09d0eb0ed21684b02f1b2677357674cda64ca5",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x381E729FF983FA4BCEd820e7b922d79bF653B999"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1764106535,
"transactionHash": "0x7c9e6b65258838fb38bc0bf584cb0c0802bc0dfbbe877a8639880e2ed88b3aa6",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202"
]
}
],
"description": "The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the FaultDisputeGame.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately UnichainProxyAdminOwner",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x0bd48f6B86a26D3a217d0Fa6FfE2B491B956A7a2#code"
},
{
"name": "DisputeGameFactory",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x2F12d621a16e2d3285929C9996f478508951dFe4",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x3B73Fa8d82f511A3caE17B5a26E4E1a2d5E2f2A4"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x74Fac1D45B98bae058F8F566201c9A81B85C7D50"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1730748467,
"transactionHash": "0x742808a336fb214d362e781aae88a3f818ba00a363900e7ca1915f0996b2060a",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xc641A33cab81C559F2bd4b21EA34C290E2440C2B"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1744485539,
"transactionHash": "0x7e5e478cafbe30293645e6972a477f77dcfdc006c4cf1dd248a94e6386d04159",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x4bbA758F006Ef09402eF31724203F316ab74e4a0"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1753380731,
"transactionHash": "0x1f1f283ad793a901a94e11241d46b87cd264b2e276a690b9554148ba56c57959",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x33D1e8571a85a538ed3D5A4d88f46C112383439D"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1759437959,
"transactionHash": "0xc98240172fa3950ec9c62f32cc09d0eb0ed21684b02f1b2677357674cda64ca5",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x33D1e8571a85a538ed3D5A4d88f46C112383439D"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1764106535,
"transactionHash": "0x7c9e6b65258838fb38bc0bf584cb0c0802bc0dfbbe877a8639880e2ed88b3aa6",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x74Fac1D45B98bae058F8F566201c9A81B85C7D50"
]
}
],
"description": "The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately UnichainProxyAdminOwner",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x2F12d621a16e2d3285929C9996f478508951dFe4#code"
},
{
"name": "SystemConfig",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0xc407398d063f942feBbcC6F80a156b47F3f1BDA6",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x3B73Fa8d82f511A3caE17B5a26E4E1a2d5E2f2A4"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1730748359,
"transactionHash": "0xb9a9cca69cc08ba53aeb94e99695bbaec8c54a6431b258d2bca5d73a51663df9",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xF56D96B2535B932656d3c04Ebf51baBff241D886"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1742397851,
"transactionHash": "0x191505a1bff29cc42fe5a1eb1888170c5241d552d7028d26ec3e54980980cf16",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1742397851,
"transactionHash": "0x191505a1bff29cc42fe5a1eb1888170c5241d552d7028d26ec3e54980980cf16",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xAB9d6cB7A427c0765163A7f45BB91cAfe5f2D375"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1744485539,
"transactionHash": "0x7e5e478cafbe30293645e6972a477f77dcfdc006c4cf1dd248a94e6386d04159",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x760C48C62A85045A6B69f07F4a9f22868659CbCc"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1745543531,
"transactionHash": "0xc74c5e0dddfa9e2d0fd5d902fb7b1aa4cc28ba034ebed7bf3a0aa3a8b8d21b20",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x340f923E5c7cbB2171146f64169EC9d5a9FfE647"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1753380731,
"transactionHash": "0x1f1f283ad793a901a94e11241d46b87cd264b2e276a690b9554148ba56c57959",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xFaA660bf783CBAa55e1B7F3475C20Db74a53b9Fa"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1759437959,
"transactionHash": "0xc98240172fa3950ec9c62f32cc09d0eb0ed21684b02f1b2677357674cda64ca5",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x2bFE4A5Bd5A41e9d848d843ebCDFa15954e9A557"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1764106535,
"transactionHash": "0x7c9e6b65258838fb38bc0bf584cb0c0802bc0dfbbe877a8639880e2ed88b3aa6",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED"
]
}
],
"description": "Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately UnichainProxyAdminOwner\n * **batcherHash**: EOA 1\n * **owner**: Unichain Multisig 2",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0xc407398d063f942feBbcC6F80a156b47F3f1BDA6#code"
},
{
"name": "SuperchainConfig",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x95703e0982140D16f8ebA6d158FccEde42f04a4C",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x543bA4AADBAb8f9025686Bd03993043599c6fB04"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1705954799,
"transactionHash": "0x8ba0e42b89cde22310b644ed30fd44e4a348619a165a54c908e7dc341e9bbd0c",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x53c165169401764778F780a69701385eb0FF19B7"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1718044163,
"transactionHash": "0xe361c0d4ae3aebc94b3f281ee372fbb1cbdb0c33ca8b1b35e7f3b009b2fcbdb0",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1718044163,
"transactionHash": "0xe361c0d4ae3aebc94b3f281ee372fbb1cbdb0c33ca8b1b35e7f3b009b2fcbdb0",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x53c165169401764778F780a69701385eb0FF19B7"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1743612623,
"transactionHash": "0x5f3530e593bbac37c61dc5b7755b6a40c06c20c1a3a1b13fca5b7d00cde65c29",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x4da82a327773965b8d4D85Fa3dB8249b387458E7"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1753379243,
"transactionHash": "0x46acdce174c8d83ebe2f208d8c76c867e75617483d64c3e407f69ae2f9868716",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xCe28685EB204186b557133766eCA00334EB441E4"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1764092795,
"transactionHash": "0xf556934cb4de1ab40a4cfba17856cd601cbc8b875b96a9ccd8ee32bcd363abf5",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957"
]
}
],
"description": "Used to manage global configuration values for multiple OP Chains within a single Superchain network. The SuperchainConfig contract manages individual pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3 months if left untouched.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: SuperchainProxyAdmin; ultimately SuperchainProxyAdminOwner\n * **guardian**: Optimism Guardian Multisig; ultimately OpFoundationUpgradeSafe, Optimism EOA 1, Optimism Security Council",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "SuperchainProxyAdminOwner",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x95703e0982140D16f8ebA6d158FccEde42f04a4C#code"
},
{
"name": "L1StandardBridge",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x81014F44b0a345033bB2b3B21C7a1A308B35fEeA",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x3B73Fa8d82f511A3caE17B5a26E4E1a2d5E2f2A4"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [],
"description": "The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately UnichainProxyAdminOwner",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x81014F44b0a345033bB2b3B21C7a1A308B35fEeA#code"
},
{
"name": "L1CrossDomainMessenger",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x9A3D64E386C18Cb1d6d5179a9596A4B5736e98A6",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "resolved delegate proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x3B73Fa8d82f511A3caE17B5a26E4E1a2d5E2f2A4"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0"
],
"immutable": false
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1730748455,
"transactionHash": "0x9efd53c7ecef0094ea6cd3a05d346daaee4a6c71c0dc69758bcdbac26b9ca9ef",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xD3494713A5cfaD3F5359379DfA074E2Ac8C6Fd65"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1744485539,
"transactionHash": "0x7e5e478cafbe30293645e6972a477f77dcfdc006c4cf1dd248a94e6386d04159",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x3eA6084748ED1b2A9B5D4426181F1ad8C93F6231"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1745543531,
"transactionHash": "0xc74c5e0dddfa9e2d0fd5d902fb7b1aa4cc28ba034ebed7bf3a0aa3a8b8d21b20",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x5D5a095665886119693F0B41d8DFeE78da033e8B"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1753380731,
"transactionHash": "0x1f1f283ad793a901a94e11241d46b87cd264b2e276a690b9554148ba56c57959",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xD26bB3aaAa4cB5638A8581A4c4b1d937D8E05c54"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1759437959,
"transactionHash": "0xc98240172fa3950ec9c62f32cc09d0eb0ed21684b02f1b2677357674cda64ca5",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x22D12E0FAebD62d429514A65EBAe32dd316c12D6"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1764106535,
"transactionHash": "0x7c9e6b65258838fb38bc0bf584cb0c0802bc0dfbbe877a8639880e2ed88b3aa6",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0"
]
}
],
"description": "Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately UnichainProxyAdminOwner",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x9A3D64E386C18Cb1d6d5179a9596A4B5736e98A6#code"
},
{
"name": "L1ERC721Bridge",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0xD04D0D87E0bd4D2E50286760a3EF323FeA6849Cf",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x3B73Fa8d82f511A3caE17B5a26E4E1a2d5E2f2A4"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1730748407,
"transactionHash": "0xb432a9b2f5b368a884c3a0d0708bf6949d38d8102b35bba9fa4d21c12865e601",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xAE2AF01232a6c4a4d3012C5eC5b1b35059caF10d"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1744485539,
"transactionHash": "0x7e5e478cafbe30293645e6972a477f77dcfdc006c4cf1dd248a94e6386d04159",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x276d3730f219f7ec22274f7263180b8452B46d47"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1745543531,
"transactionHash": "0xc74c5e0dddfa9e2d0fd5d902fb7b1aa4cc28ba034ebed7bf3a0aa3a8b8d21b20",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x7aE1d3BD877a4C5CA257404ce26BE93A02C98013"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1753380731,
"transactionHash": "0x1f1f283ad793a901a94e11241d46b87cd264b2e276a690b9554148ba56c57959",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x25d6CeDEB277Ad7ebEe71226eD7877768E0B7A2F"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1759437959,
"transactionHash": "0xc98240172fa3950ec9c62f32cc09d0eb0ed21684b02f1b2677357674cda64ca5",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x7f1d12fB2911EB095278085f721e644C1f675696"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1764106535,
"transactionHash": "0x7c9e6b65258838fb38bc0bf584cb0c0802bc0dfbbe877a8639880e2ed88b3aa6",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9"
]
}
],
"description": "Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately UnichainProxyAdminOwner",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0xD04D0D87E0bd4D2E50286760a3EF323FeA6849Cf#code"
},
{
"name": "LivenessModule",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x0454092516c9A4d636d3CAfA1e82161376C8a748",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "used to remove members inactive for 3mo 8d while making sure that the threshold remains above 75%. If the number of members falls below 8, the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe takes ownership of the multisig\n* Roles:\n * **fallbackOwner**: OpFoundationUpgradeSafe if the number of Optimism Security Council members falls below 8\n * **livenessGuard**: LivenessGuard",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x0454092516c9A4d636d3CAfA1e82161376C8a748#code"
},
{
"name": "ETHLockbox",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x08bA0023eD60C7Bd040716dD13C45fA0062df5C5",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x3B73Fa8d82f511A3caE17B5a26E4E1a2d5E2f2A4"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x784d2F03593A42A6E4676A012762F18775ecbBe6"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1753380731,
"transactionHash": "0x1f1f283ad793a901a94e11241d46b87cd264b2e276a690b9554148ba56c57959",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x784d2F03593A42A6E4676A012762F18775ecbBe6"
]
}
],
"description": "A simple escrow contract storing ETH for the canonical bridge.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately UnichainProxyAdminOwner",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x08bA0023eD60C7Bd040716dD13C45fA0062df5C5#code"
},
{
"name": "DelayedWETH",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x0bdbEc6bd35571F97f96f3ed21822a4f2e071A3c",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x3B73Fa8d82f511A3caE17B5a26E4E1a2d5E2f2A4"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x33Dadc2d1aA9BB613A7AE6B28425eA00D44c6998"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1759437959,
"transactionHash": "0xc98240172fa3950ec9c62f32cc09d0eb0ed21684b02f1b2677357674cda64ca5",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x33Dadc2d1aA9BB613A7AE6B28425eA00D44c6998"
]
}
],
"description": "Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately UnichainProxyAdminOwner",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x0bdbEc6bd35571F97f96f3ed21822a4f2e071A3c#code"
},
{
"name": "Escrow",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x1196F688C585D3E5C895Ef8954FFB0dCDAfc566A",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Simple escrow that accepts tokens and allows to configure permissioned addresses that can access the tokens.\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x1196F688C585D3E5C895Ef8954FFB0dCDAfc566A#code"
},
{
"name": "PreimageOracle",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x1fb8cdFc6831fc866Ed9C51aF8817Da5c287aDD3",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game.\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x1fb8cdFc6831fc866Ed9C51aF8817Da5c287aDD3#code"
},
{
"name": "AnchorStateRegistry",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x27Cf508E4E3Aa8d30b3226aC3b5Ea0e8bcaCAFF9",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x3B73Fa8d82f511A3caE17B5a26E4E1a2d5E2f2A4"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0xeb69cC681E8D4a557b30DFFBAd85aFfD47a2CF2E"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1753380731,
"transactionHash": "0x1f1f283ad793a901a94e11241d46b87cd264b2e276a690b9554148ba56c57959",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xeb69cC681E8D4a557b30DFFBAd85aFfD47a2CF2E"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1759437959,
"transactionHash": "0xc98240172fa3950ec9c62f32cc09d0eb0ed21684b02f1b2677357674cda64ca5",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xeb69cC681E8D4a557b30DFFBAd85aFfD47a2CF2E"
]
}
],
"description": "Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the FaultDisputeGame.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately UnichainProxyAdminOwner",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x27Cf508E4E3Aa8d30b3226aC3b5Ea0e8bcaCAFF9#code"
},
{
"name": "ProxyAdmin",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x3B73Fa8d82f511A3caE17B5a26E4E1a2d5E2f2A4",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "* Roles:\n * **owner**: UnichainProxyAdminOwner",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x3B73Fa8d82f511A3caE17B5a26E4E1a2d5E2f2A4#code"
},
{
"name": "LivenessModule",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x4B4F1aF8d43C8c140D2355Fea663fC9f762067C2",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "used to remove members inactive for 2mo 10d while making sure that the threshold remains above 60%. If the number of members falls below 1, the 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 takes ownership of the multisig\n* Roles:\n * **livenessGuard**: LivenessGuard",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x4B4F1aF8d43C8c140D2355Fea663fC9f762067C2#code"
},
{
"name": "SuperchainProxyAdmin",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x543bA4AADBAb8f9025686Bd03993043599c6fB04",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "* Roles:\n * **owner**: SuperchainProxyAdminOwner",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x543bA4AADBAb8f9025686Bd03993043599c6fB04#code"
},
{
"name": "MIPS",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x6463dEE3828677F6270d83d45408044fc5eDB908",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x6463dEE3828677F6270d83d45408044fc5eDB908#code"
},
{
"name": "FaultDisputeGame",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x6D0462850F7B87403660CC9f4F89346483108512",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Logic of the dispute game. When a state root is proposed, a dispute game contract is deployed. Challengers can use such contracts to challenge the proposed state root.\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x6D0462850F7B87403660CC9f4F89346483108512#code"
},
{
"name": "L1ERC20TokenBridge",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x755610f5Be536Ad7afBAa7c10F3E938Ea3aa1877",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x3e40D73EB977Dc6a537aF587D48316feE66E9C8c"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x6078232C54d956c901620fa4590e0F7E37c2B82f"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1739519603,
"transactionHash": "0x09f1292f517ff6453a28592ca3def9cfcc55d8738877af3b9830f0c457009c02",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x6078232C54d956c901620fa4590e0F7E37c2B82f"
]
}
],
"description": "Lido custom escrow for wstETH tokens that uses the canonical bridge for messaging but is governed externally.\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x755610f5Be536Ad7afBAa7c10F3E938Ea3aa1877#code"
},
{
"name": "DeputyPauseModule",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x76fC2F971FB355D0453cF9F64d3F9E4f640E1754",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Allows 0x352f1defB49718e7Ea411687E850aA8d6299F7aC, called the deputy pauser, to act on behalf of the OpFoundationUpgradeSafe if set as its Safe module.\n* Roles:\n * **deputy**: Optimism EOA 1 though restricted to the SuperchainConfig's `pause()` function",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x76fC2F971FB355D0453cF9F64d3F9E4f640E1754#code"
},
{
"name": "OptimismMintableERC20Factory",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0xA2B597EaeAcb6F627e088cbEaD319e934ED5edad",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x3B73Fa8d82f511A3caE17B5a26E4E1a2d5E2f2A4"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1730748419,
"transactionHash": "0x14bd9cb3f3d081f9b569dfeccac4821a21e4fe65b0c1a1b1b80f0369cca63695",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xE01efbeb1089D1d1dB9c6c8b135C934C0734c846"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1744485539,
"transactionHash": "0x7e5e478cafbe30293645e6972a477f77dcfdc006c4cf1dd248a94e6386d04159",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x5493f4677A186f64805fe7317D6993ba4863988F"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1764106535,
"transactionHash": "0x7c9e6b65258838fb38bc0bf584cb0c0802bc0dfbbe877a8639880e2ed88b3aa6",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB"
]
}
],
"description": "A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately UnichainProxyAdminOwner",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0xA2B597EaeAcb6F627e088cbEaD319e934ED5edad#code"
},
{
"name": "DelayedWETH",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0xe62B0279f6A466C5E1676f3ea955086300Bcd0Ac",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x3B73Fa8d82f511A3caE17B5a26E4E1a2d5E2f2A4"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x33Dadc2d1aA9BB613A7AE6B28425eA00D44c6998"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1759437959,
"transactionHash": "0xc98240172fa3950ec9c62f32cc09d0eb0ed21684b02f1b2677357674cda64ca5",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x33Dadc2d1aA9BB613A7AE6B28425eA00D44c6998"
]
}
],
"description": "Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately UnichainProxyAdminOwner",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0xe62B0279f6A466C5E1676f3ea955086300Bcd0Ac#code"
},
{
"name": "PermissionedDisputeGame",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0xFc38CE38042f7eA61001DE8815ef8825E277fe02",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0xFc38CE38042f7eA61001DE8815ef8825E277fe02#code"
}
],
"unichain": [
{
"name": "DeployerWhitelist",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000002",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
],
"implementations": [
"unichain:0xc0d3c0d3C0d3c0D3c0d3C0D3c0d3C0d3c0D30002"
]
},
"chain": "unichain",
"pastUpgrades": [],
"description": "Legacy contract that was originally used to act as a whitelist of addresses allowed to the Optimism network. Fully unused and deprecated since the Bedrock upgrade.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"id": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"name": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://uniscan.xyz/address/unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000002#code"
},
{
"name": "L2CrossDomainMessenger",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000007",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
],
"implementations": [
"unichain:0xC0d3c0d3c0D3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D3c0d3c0d30007"
]
},
"chain": "unichain",
"pastUpgrades": [],
"description": "The L2CrossDomainMessenger (L2xDM) contract sends messages from L2 to L1, and relays messages from L1 onto L2 with a system tx. In the event that a message sent from L2 to L1 is rejected for exceeding the L1 gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"id": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"name": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://uniscan.xyz/address/unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000007#code"
},
{
"name": "GasPriceOracle",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "unichain:0x420000000000000000000000000000000000000F",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
],
"implementations": [
"unichain:0x4f1db3c6AbD250ba86E0928471A8F7DB3AFd88F1"
]
},
"chain": "unichain",
"references": [
{
"title": "Source Code",
"url": "https://unichain.blockscout.com/address/0x4f1db3c6AbD250ba86E0928471A8F7DB3AFd88F1"
}
],
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1746806401,
"transactionHash": "0xb6560306ccb0e772b132a8a6dd78244c0d7ac270c80baba40f95006184926c30",
"implementations": [
"unichain:0x93e57A196454CB919193fa9946f14943cf733845"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1764691201,
"transactionHash": "0xc7c01d75d0b6950fcd30b448cba848e9841ab9ebb6b46eed9ecde4ba05ad0fd9",
"implementations": [
"unichain:0x4f1db3c6AbD250ba86E0928471A8F7DB3AFd88F1"
]
}
],
"description": "* Roles:\n * **admin**: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"id": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"name": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://uniscan.xyz/address/unichain:0x420000000000000000000000000000000000000F#code"
},
{
"name": "L2StandardBridge",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000010",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
],
"implementations": [
"unichain:0xC0d3c0d3c0D3c0d3C0D3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D30010"
]
},
"chain": "unichain",
"pastUpgrades": [],
"description": "The L2StandardBridge contract is the main entry point to deposit or withdraw ERC20 tokens from L2 to L1. This contract can store any token.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"id": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"name": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://uniscan.xyz/address/unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000010#code"
},
{
"name": "SequencerFeeVault",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000011",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
],
"implementations": [
"unichain:0xC0D3C0d3c0d3c0d3C0D3c0d3C0D3c0d3c0D30011"
]
},
"chain": "unichain",
"pastUpgrades": [],
"description": "Collects the sequencer fees, which are withdrawable to the FeesCollector on L1.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"id": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"name": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://uniscan.xyz/address/unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000011#code"
},
{
"name": "OptimismMintableERC20Factory",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000012",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
],
"implementations": [
"unichain:0xc0D3c0d3C0d3c0d3c0D3c0d3c0D3c0D3c0D30012"
]
},
"chain": "unichain",
"pastUpgrades": [],
"description": "Factory contract to create bridge compliant ERC20 IOU token representations of bridged L1 ERC20 tokens.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"id": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"name": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://uniscan.xyz/address/unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000012#code"
},
{
"name": "L1BlockNumber",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000013",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
],
"implementations": [
"unichain:0xC0D3C0d3C0D3c0D3C0d3c0D3C0d3c0d3C0d30013"
]
},
"chain": "unichain",
"pastUpgrades": [],
"description": "Simple contract that returns the latest L1 block number.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"id": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"name": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://uniscan.xyz/address/unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000013#code"
},
{
"name": "L2ERC721Bridge",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000014",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
],
"implementations": [
"unichain:0xC0D3c0d3c0d3c0d3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D3c0d30014"
]
},
"chain": "unichain",
"pastUpgrades": [],
"description": "The L2ERC721Bridge contract is the main entry point to deposit or withdraw ERC721 tokens from L2 to L1. This contract can store any token.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"id": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"name": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://uniscan.xyz/address/unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000014#code"
},
{
"name": "L1Block",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000015",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
],
"implementations": [
"unichain:0x3Ba4007f5C922FBb33C454B41ea7a1f11E83df2C"
]
},
"chain": "unichain",
"references": [
{
"title": "Source Code",
"url": "https://unichain.blockscout.com/address/0x3Ba4007f5C922FBb33C454B41ea7a1f11E83df2C"
}
],
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1746806401,
"transactionHash": "0xe992e00998b34075506d2726a274db07a62af6cdd9d527bfda9128114603cfbd",
"implementations": [
"unichain:0xFf256497D61dcd71a9e9Ff43967C13fdE1F72D12"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1764691201,
"transactionHash": "0xcd60191626fa3124e7031235c52f0adf6be545ebbd7cf55641bd9dabcbedaf6a",
"implementations": [
"unichain:0x3Ba4007f5C922FBb33C454B41ea7a1f11E83df2C"
]
}
],
"description": "* Roles:\n * **admin**: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"id": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"name": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://uniscan.xyz/address/unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000015#code"
},
{
"name": "L2ToL1MessagePasser",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000016",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
],
"implementations": [
"unichain:0xC0D3C0d3C0d3c0d3C0d3C0D3c0D3c0d3c0D30016"
]
},
"chain": "unichain",
"pastUpgrades": [],
"description": "Contract used internally by the L2CrossDomainMessenger to send messages to L1, including withdrawals. It can also be used directly as a low-level interface.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"id": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"name": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://uniscan.xyz/address/unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000016#code"
},
{
"name": "OptimismMintableERC721Factory",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000017",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
],
"implementations": [
"unichain:0xc0d3C0d3C0d3C0d3C0d3c0d3C0D3C0d3C0D30017"
]
},
"chain": "unichain",
"pastUpgrades": [],
"description": "Factory contract to create bridge compliant ERC721 IOU token representations of bridged L1 ERC721 tokens.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"id": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"name": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://uniscan.xyz/address/unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000017#code"
},
{
"name": "L2ProxyAdmin",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
],
"implementations": [
"unichain:0xC0d3C0D3c0d3C0d3c0d3c0D3C0D3C0d3C0D30018"
]
},
"chain": "unichain",
"pastUpgrades": [],
"description": "Administration contract for other contract proxies.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias\n * **owner**: UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"id": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"name": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://uniscan.xyz/address/unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018#code"
},
{
"name": "BaseFeeVault",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000019",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
],
"implementations": [
"unichain:0xC0d3c0D3c0d3C0D3C0D3C0d3c0D3C0D3c0d30019"
]
},
"chain": "unichain",
"pastUpgrades": [],
"description": "Collects EIP-1559 base fees, which are withdrawable to the FeesCollector on L1.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"id": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"name": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://uniscan.xyz/address/unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000019#code"
},
{
"name": "L1FeeVault",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "unichain:0x420000000000000000000000000000000000001A",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
],
"implementations": [
"unichain:0xc0D3c0D3C0d3c0d3c0d3C0d3c0d3C0d3C0D3001A"
]
},
"chain": "unichain",
"pastUpgrades": [],
"description": "Collects the L1 portion of the L2 transaction fees, which are withdrawable to the FeesCollector on L1.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"id": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"name": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://uniscan.xyz/address/unichain:0x420000000000000000000000000000000000001A#code"
},
{
"name": "SchemaRegistry",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000020",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
],
"implementations": [
"unichain:0xc0d3c0d3c0d3C0d3c0d3C0D3C0D3c0d3C0D30020"
]
},
"chain": "unichain",
"pastUpgrades": [],
"description": "Contracts to register schemas for the Ethereum Attestation Service (EAS).\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"id": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"name": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://uniscan.xyz/address/unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000020#code"
},
{
"name": "EAS",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000021",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
],
"implementations": [
"unichain:0xC0D3c0D3C0d3c0D3c0D3C0D3c0D3c0d3c0d30021"
]
},
"chain": "unichain",
"pastUpgrades": [],
"description": "Contract containing the main logic for the Ethereum Attestation Service (EAS).\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: L2ProxyAdmin; ultimately UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"id": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"name": "UnichainProxyAdminOwner_L2Alias",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://uniscan.xyz/address/unichain:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000021#code"
},
{
"name": "FeeSplitter",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "unichain:0x4300c0D3c0d3c0d3c0d3c0d3C0D3c0d3c0d30001",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "unichain",
"description": "",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://uniscan.xyz/address/unichain:0x4300c0D3c0d3c0d3c0d3c0d3C0D3c0d3c0d30001#code"
},
{
"name": "L1Splitter",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "unichain:0x4300C0D3C0D3C0D3C0d3C0d3c0d3C0d3C0d30002",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "unichain",
"description": "Automatically collects ETH on L2 and periodically bridges it back to Ethereum Layer 1 to a specified recipient address (0xa3d596EAfaB6B13Ab18D40FaE1A962700C84ADEa).\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://uniscan.xyz/address/unichain:0x4300C0D3C0D3C0D3C0d3C0d3c0d3C0d3C0d30002#code"
},
{
"name": "L1Splitter",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "unichain:0x4300c0d3c0d3c0D3c0d3C0D3c0d3C0D3C0D30003",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "unichain",
"description": "Automatically collects ETH on L2 and periodically bridges it back to Ethereum Layer 1 to a specified recipient address (0x2F60A5184c63ca94f82a27100643DbAbe4F3f7Fd).\n",
"description": "Automatically collects ETH on L2 and periodically bridges it back to Ethereum Layer 1 to a specified recipient address (0x7078c4537C04c2b2E52ddBa06074dBdACF23cA15).\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://uniscan.xyz/address/unichain:0x4300c0d3c0d3c0D3c0d3C0D3c0d3C0D3C0D30003#code"
},
{
"name": "NetFeeSplitter",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "unichain:0x4300c0D3c0D3c0D3c0D3c0D3C0D3c0d3c0D30004",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "unichain",
"description": "",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://uniscan.xyz/address/unichain:0x4300c0D3c0D3c0D3c0D3c0D3C0D3c0d3c0D30004#code"
}
]
},
"escrows": [
{
"address": "0x08bA0023eD60C7Bd040716dD13C45fA0062df5C5",
"sinceTimestamp": 1753380731,
"tokens": [
"ETH"
],
"contract": {
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x08bA0023eD60C7Bd040716dD13C45fA0062df5C5",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x3B73Fa8d82f511A3caE17B5a26E4E1a2d5E2f2A4"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x784d2F03593A42A6E4676A012762F18775ecbBe6"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1753380731,
"transactionHash": "0x1f1f283ad793a901a94e11241d46b87cd264b2e276a690b9554148ba56c57959",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x784d2F03593A42A6E4676A012762F18775ecbBe6"
]
}
],
"description": "Main escrow for users depositing ETH.",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "ProxyAdmin",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x08bA0023eD60C7Bd040716dD13C45fA0062df5C5#code"
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"includeInTotal": true,
"chainId": 1
},
{
"address": "0x81014F44b0a345033bB2b3B21C7a1A308B35fEeA",
"sinceTimestamp": 1730748227,
"tokens": "*",
"excludedTokens": [
"USDC"
],
"contract": {
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x81014F44b0a345033bB2b3B21C7a1A308B35fEeA",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x3B73Fa8d82f511A3caE17B5a26E4E1a2d5E2f2A4"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [],
"description": "Main entry point for users depositing ERC20 token that do not require custom gateway.",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "ProxyAdmin",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x81014F44b0a345033bB2b3B21C7a1A308B35fEeA#code"
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"includeInTotal": true,
"chainId": 1
},
{
"address": "0x755610f5Be536Ad7afBAa7c10F3E938Ea3aa1877",
"sinceTimestamp": 1739519603,
"tokens": [
"wstETH"
],
"contract": {
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x755610f5Be536Ad7afBAa7c10F3E938Ea3aa1877",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x3e40D73EB977Dc6a537aF587D48316feE66E9C8c"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x6078232C54d956c901620fa4590e0F7E37c2B82f"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1739519603,
"transactionHash": "0x09f1292f517ff6453a28592ca3def9cfcc55d8738877af3b9830f0c457009c02",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x6078232C54d956c901620fa4590e0F7E37c2B82f"
]
}
],
"description": "wstETH Vault for custom wstETH Gateway. Fully controlled by Lido governance.",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x755610f5Be536Ad7afBAa7c10F3E938Ea3aa1877#code"
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"includeInTotal": true,
"source": "external",
"bridgedUsing": {
"bridges": [
{
"name": "Custom escrow"
}
]
},
"chainId": 1
},
{
"address": "0x1196F688C585D3E5C895Ef8954FFB0dCDAfc566A",
"sinceTimestamp": 1745940647,
"tokens": [
"USDS",
"sUSDS"
],
"contract": {
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x1196F688C585D3E5C895Ef8954FFB0dCDAfc566A",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Maker/Sky-controlled vault for USDS and sUSDS bridged with canonical messaging.",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x1196F688C585D3E5C895Ef8954FFB0dCDAfc566A#code"
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"includeInTotal": true,
"source": "external",
"bridgedUsing": {
"bridges": [
{
"name": "Custom escrow"
}
]
},
"chainId": 1
}
],
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. Both regular and emergency upgrades must be approved by both the Security Council and the Foundation. There is no delay on regular upgrades."
}
],
"zkProgramHashes": []
}+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1766048397,
"baseTimestamp": 1767802030,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}