05785d3c (main)
and
26cd2ba1 (PR)
+10 -1
+10 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 10800,
"secondLine": "3h execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain (SD)",
"description": "All of the data (SD = state diffs) needed for proof construction is published onchain.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted standard upgrade because the central operator can censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay. The standard upgrade delay is 4d 3h."
"orderHint": 0,
"regular": {
"value": "4d 3h",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades go through a 4d 3h delay, but the central operator can still censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Enqueue via L1",
"description": "Users can submit transactions to an L1 queue, but can't force them. The sequencers cannot selectively skip transactions but can stop processing the queue entirely. In other words, if the sequencers censor or are down, they are so for everyone.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Replace proposer",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen. There is a decentralized Governance system that can attempt changing Proposers with an upgrade.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+6 -1
+6 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 0,
"secondLine": "No execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain (SD)",
"description": "All of the data (SD = state diffs) needed for proof construction is published onchain.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted standard upgrade because the central operator can censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay. The standard upgrade delay is 0s."
"orderHint": 0,
"warning": {
"value": "The central operator can censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Enqueue via L1",
"description": "Users can submit transactions to an L1 queue, but can't force them. The sequencers cannot selectively skip transactions but can stop processing the queue entirely. In other words, if the sequencers censor or are down, they are so for everyone.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.",
"executionDelay": 1800,
"challengeDelay": 1800,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.0",
"secondLine": "1h challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -3600
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on EigenDA. The sequencer is publishing data to EigenDA v2. Sequencer transaction data roots are not checked against the DACert Verifier onchain.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow 6 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. There are fewer than 5 Challengers external to the Operator among these. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 6,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/2 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.5
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -345600
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 4d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 345600,
"secondLine": "4d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632,
"secondLine": "12d 17h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632,
"secondLine": "12d 17h delay"
}
}
}+0 -68
+0 -68
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.0",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on Celestia. Sequencer tx roots are not checked against the Blobstream bridge data roots onchain, but L2 nodes can verify data availability by running a Celestia light client.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+0 -68
+0 -68
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
}
}
}+0 -68
+0 -68
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
}
}
}+12 -8
+12 -8
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 5/7 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.7142857142857143
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -259200
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 3d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 259200,
"secondLine": "3d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632,
"secondLine": "12d 17h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 5/7 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.7142857142857143
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -259200
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 4d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 345600
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST)",
"description": "STARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 3/5 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.6
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "1d",
"description": "Users have 1d to exit funds in case of an unwanted regular upgrade. There is a 8d delay before a regular upgrade is applied, and withdrawals can take up to 7d to be processed.",
"description": "Users have 1d to exit funds in case of an unwanted upgrade. There is a 8d delay before a upgrade is applied, and withdrawals can take up to 7d to be processed.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Force via L1",
"description": "Users can force the sequencer to include a trade or a withdrawal transaction by submitting a request through L1. If the sequencer censors or is down for 7d, users can use the exit hatch to withdraw their funds. Users are required to find a counterparty for the trade by out of system means.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Use escape hatch",
"description": "Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a Merkle proof of funds. Positions will be closed using the average price from the last batch state update.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -259200
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 3d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 259200,
"secondLine": "3d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632,
"secondLine": "12d 17h delay"
}
}
}+10 -6
+10 -6
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.0",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no exit window for users to exit in case of unwanted regular upgrades as they are initiated by the Security Council with instant upgrade power and without proper notice.",
"description": "There is no exit window for users to exit in case of unwanted upgrades as they are initiated by the Security Council with instant upgrade power and without proper notice.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+7 -3
+7 -3
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 0,
"secondLine": "No execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 3/5 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.6
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Even though there is a 3d Timelock for upgrades, there are no forced transactions and thus no way to exit during operator censorship or downtime.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since the Security Council can remove the delay on upgrades.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -1,
"regular": {
"value": "3d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can remove the delay on upgrades.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Even though there is a 3d Timelock for non-emergency upgrades, there are no forced transactions and thus no way to exit during operator censorship or downtime.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring. Although the functionality exists in the code, it is currently disabled.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published onchain. A custom data availability (DA) provider without attestations is used, but data unavailability can be challenged.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (SN)",
"description": "SNARKs are succinct zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness, but require trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 0,
"secondLine": "No execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain (SD)",
"description": "All of the data (SD = state diffs) needed for proof construction is published onchain.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Users have 10d to exit funds in case of an unwanted regular upgrade. There is a 1mo delay before a regular upgrade is applied, and withdrawal inclusion via the decentralized sequencer set is probabilistic and simulated to take up to 20d to be processed. Although core contracts are immutable, the onchain Governance system can designate a new 'canonical' rollup with a 1mo delay and has access to critical configuration permissions that can freeze or compromise the Rollup system, counting as an upgrade for the exit window."
"description": "Users have 10d to exit funds in case of an unwanted upgrade. There is a 1mo delay before an upgrade is applied, and withdrawal inclusion via the decentralized sequencer set is probabilistic and simulated to take up to 20d to be processed. Although core contracts are immutable, the onchain Governance system can designate a new 'canonical' rollup with a 1mo delay and has access to critical configuration permissions that can freeze or compromise the Rollup system, counting as an upgrade for the exit window."
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Decentralized Sequencer Set",
"sentiment": "good",
"description": "Users can permissionlessly become a sequencer by staking 200 K AZTEC to join the queue and wait to obtain committee-based block production rights. If the pseudo-randomly sampled committees censor proposals, anyone who bonds 332 M AZTEC will join the escape hatch candidate set. Every 2d 23h, a candidate is pseudo-randomly selected to propose and prove checkpoints fully autonomously. A candidate remains in the set until they are selected or leave voluntarily."
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self Propose",
"sentiment": "good",
"description": "Checkpoint proposals come from the open sequencer set, with the escape hatch providing a bonded fallback if the sampled committees are censoring or unavailable. Anyone with access to the required hardware can submit epoch root proofs which finalize the proven checkpoints."
}
}
}+3 -3
+3 -3
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.08",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on Celestia. Sequencer tx roots are not checked against the Blobstream bridge data roots onchain, but L2 nodes can verify data availability by running a Celestia light client.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on Celestia. Sequencer tx roots are not checked against the Blobstream bridge data roots onchain, but L2 nodes can verify data availability by running a Celestia light client.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.08",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+10 -6
+10 -6
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+12 -8
+12 -8
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow 5 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. There are fewer than 5 Challengers external to the Operator among these. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 5,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 2/3 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.6666666666666666
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632,
"secondLine": "12d 17h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow 5 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. There are fewer than 5 Challengers external to the Operator among these. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 5,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 2/3 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.6666666666666666
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 2d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 172800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632
}
}
}+10 -6
+10 -6
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow 10 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. At least 5 Challengers are external to the Operator. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 10,
"initialBond": "1.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 5/6 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 0.8333333333333334
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "7d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have only 7d to exit. \n \n If users post a tx after that time, they would only be able to self propose a state root 28d after the last state root was proposed and then wait for the 6d 8h challenge window, while the upgrade would be confirmed just after the 6d 8h challenge window and the 3d L1 timelock.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 604800,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "7d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have only 7d to exit.\n\n If users post a tx after that time, they would only be able to self propose a state root 28d after the last state root was proposed and then wait for the 6d 8h challenge window, while the upgrade would be confirmed just after the 6d 8h challenge window and the 3d L1 timelock.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 28d of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 2419200,
"secondLine": "28d delay"
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (1R, ZK)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Single round proofs (1R) prove the validity of a state proposal, only requiring a single transaction to resolve. A fault proof eliminates a state proposal by proving that any intermediate state transition in the proposal results in a different state root. For either, a ZK proof is used.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 86400,
"challengeDelay": 259200,
"initialBond": "0.5",
"secondLine": "4d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "The primary whitelisted proposer currently has no optimistic advantage (`vanguardAdvantage = 0`), so this privilege is disabled (not active). Anyone can leverage the source available zk prover to prove a fault or a conflicting valid proposal to win against the privileged proposer and/or supply a bond and make a counter proposal immediately.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.0",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST)",
"description": "STARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 2/4 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.5
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Force via L1",
"description": "Users can force the sequencer to include a transaction by submitting a request through L1. If the sequencer censors or is down for for more than 7d, users can use the exit hatch to withdraw their funds.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Use escape hatch",
"description": "Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a Merkle proof of funds.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+3 -3
+3 -3
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.08",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no exit window for users to exit in case of unwanted regular upgrades as they are initiated by the Security Council with instant upgrade power and without proper notice.",
"description": "There is no exit window for users to exit in case of unwanted upgrades as they are initiated by the Security Council with instant upgrade power and without proper notice.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There is no delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on the base chain, which ultimately gets published on Ethereum.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST)",
"description": "STARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/2 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.5
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Force via L1",
"description": "Users can force the sequencer to include a transaction by submitting a request through L1. If the sequencer censors or is down for for more than 7d, users can use the exit hatch to withdraw their funds.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Use escape hatch",
"description": "Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a Merkle proof of funds. NFTs will be minted on L1 to exit.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -259200
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 3d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 259200,
"secondLine": "3d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632,
"secondLine": "12d 17h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (1R, ZK)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Single round proofs (1R) only require a single transaction to resolve. ZK proofs are used to prove the correctness of the state transition. The system currently operates with at least 5 whitelisted challengers external to the team.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"initialBond": "0.01",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no exit window for users to exit in case of unwanted regular upgrades as they are initiated by the Security Council with instant upgrade power and without proper notice.",
"description": "There is no exit window for users to exit in case of unwanted upgrades as they are initiated by the Security Council with instant upgrade power and without proper notice.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on EigenDA. The sequencer is publishing data to EigenDA v2. Sequencer transaction data roots are checked against the DACert Verifier data roots, signed off by EigenDA operators.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+10 -6
+10 -6
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.08",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
}
}+10 -6
+10 -6
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 5d 14h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 483840,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "7d 14h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+10 -1
+10 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 10800,
"secondLine": "3h execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published onchain.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted standard upgrade because the central operator can censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay. The standard upgrade delay is 4d 3h."
"orderHint": 0,
"regular": {
"value": "4d 3h",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades go through a 4d 3h delay, but the central operator can still censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Enqueue via L1",
"description": "Users can submit transactions to an L1 queue, but can't force them. The sequencers cannot selectively skip transactions but can stop processing the queue entirely. In other words, if the sequencers censor or are down, they are so for everyone.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Replace proposer",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen. There is a decentralized Governance system that can attempt changing Proposers with an upgrade.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.0",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published onchain. A custom data availability (DA) provider without attestations is used, but data unavailability can be challenged.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+0 -68
+0 -68
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (SN)",
"description": "SNARKs are succinct zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness, but require trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 0,
"secondLine": "No execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "1mo",
"description": "Users have 1mo to exit funds in case of an unwanted regular upgrade. There is a 1mo 15d delay before a regular upgrade is applied, and withdrawals can take up to 15d to be processed.",
"description": "Users have 1mo to exit funds in case of an unwanted upgrade. There is a 1mo 15d delay before a upgrade is applied, and withdrawals can take up to 15d to be processed.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 2592000
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Force via L1",
"description": "Users can force the sequencer to include a withdrawal transaction by submitting a request through L1 with a 0.01 ETH fee. If the sequencer is down for more than 15d, users can use the exit hatch to withdraw their funds. The sequencer can censor individual deposits, but in such case after 15d users can get their funds back.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1296000
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Use escape hatch",
"description": "Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a Merkle proof of funds.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+3 -3
+3 -3
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.08",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs only allow 2 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 5d 14h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 483840,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 2,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "5d 14h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 2/3 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.6666666666666666
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -345600
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 4d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 345600,
"secondLine": "4d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 6d 15h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 575476,
"secondLine": "6d 15h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs only allow 2 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 5d 14h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 483840,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 2,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "5d 14h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 2/3 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.6666666666666666
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -345600
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 4d 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 388800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 6d 15h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 575476
}
}
}+12 -8
+12 -8
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 1d challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 86400,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "1d challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on the base chain, which ultimately gets published on Ethereum.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 7d 8h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 636216,
"secondLine": "7d 8h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 1d challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 86400,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "1d challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 2d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 172800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 7d 8h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 636216
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST)",
"description": "STARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 4/7 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.5714285714285714
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade. Users can be explicitly censored from withdrawing (Blocklist on L1).",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade. Users can be explicitly censored from withdrawing (Blocklist on L1).",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -345600
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Force via L1",
"description": "Users can force the sequencer to include a transaction by submitting a request through L1. If the sequencer censors or is down for for more than 7d, users can use the exit hatch to withdraw their funds.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Use escape hatch",
"description": "Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a Merkle proof of funds.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+10 -6
+10 -6
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
}
}+3 -3
+3 -3
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.08",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on EigenDA. Sequencer transaction data roots are not checked against the ServiceManager DA bridge data roots onchain.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on EigenDA. Sequencer transaction data roots are not checked against the ServiceManager DA bridge data roots onchain.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+12 -8
+12 -8
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 2/3 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.6666666666666666
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -345600
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 4d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 345600,
"secondLine": "4d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632,
"secondLine": "12d 17h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 2/3 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.6666666666666666
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -345600
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 5d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 432000
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 5d 14h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 483840,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "5d 14h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 11d 23h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1033656,
"secondLine": "11d 23h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on Celestia. Sequencer tx roots are not checked against the Blobstream bridge data roots onchain, but L2 nodes can verify data availability by running a Celestia light client.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+12 -8
+12 -8
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs only allow 3 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 7d challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 3,
"initialBond": "0.0",
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 2/3 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.6666666666666666
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -345600
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 4d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 345600,
"secondLine": "4d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 13d 8h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1154616,
"secondLine": "13d 8h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs only allow 3 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 7d challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 3,
"initialBond": "0.0",
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 2/3 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.6666666666666666
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -345600
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 5d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 432000
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 13d 8h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1154616
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632,
"secondLine": "12d 17h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST)",
"description": "STARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/5 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.2
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Force via L1",
"description": "Users can force the sequencer to include a trade or a withdrawal transaction by submitting a request through L1. If the sequencer censors or is down for 7d, users can use the exit hatch to withdraw their funds. Users are required to find a counterparty for the trade by out of system means.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Use escape hatch",
"description": "Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a Merkle proof of funds. Positions will be closed using the average price from the last batch state update.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+12 -8
+12 -8
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs only allow 2 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 2,
"initialBond": "0.01",
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/2 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.5
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -345600
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 4d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 345600,
"secondLine": "4d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632,
"secondLine": "12d 17h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs only allow 2 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 2,
"initialBond": "0.01",
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/2 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.5
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -345600
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 5d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 432000
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632
}
}
}+12 -8
+12 -8
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 5d 14h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 483840,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "7d 14h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 5d 14h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 483840,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "7d 14h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 2d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 172800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+0 -68
+0 -68
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow 6 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. There are fewer than 5 Challengers external to the Operator among these. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 6,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/2 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.5
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -345600
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 4d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 345600,
"secondLine": "4d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632,
"secondLine": "12d 17h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow 6 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. There are fewer than 5 Challengers external to the Operator among these. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 6,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/2 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.5
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -3456000
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1mo 10d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 3456000,
"secondLine": "1mo 10d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632,
"secondLine": "12d 17h delay"
}
}
}+10 -6
+10 -6
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. 'Pessimistic' proofs only validate the bridge accounting.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on Celestia. Sequencer tx roots are not checked against the Blobstream bridge data roots onchain, but L2 nodes can verify data availability by running a Celestia light client.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+10 -6
+10 -6
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published on chain. Fraxtal uses a separate data availability module developed by the Frax Core Team, and data availability attestations are not published on chain.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on EigenDA. The sequencer is publishing data to EigenDA v2. Sequencer transaction data roots are not checked against the DACert Verifier onchain.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1.",
"sentiment": "good"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.0",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published onchain. A custom data availability (DA) provider without attestations is used, but data unavailability can be challenged.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 5d 14h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 483840,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "7d 14h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400000
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 2y 9mo delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400000,
"secondLine": "2y 9mo delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+12 -8
+12 -8
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow 15 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. There are fewer than 5 Challengers external to the Operator among these. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. There is a 5d 14h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 483840,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 15,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "5d 14h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 11d 23h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1033656,
"secondLine": "11d 23h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow 15 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. There are fewer than 5 Challengers external to the Operator among these. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. There is a 5d 14h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 483840,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 15,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "5d 14h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 2d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 172800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 11d 23h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1033656
}
}
}+3 -3
+3 -3
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.08",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs only allow 2 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 1mo 8d challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 3298896,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 2,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "1mo 8d challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 2/3 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.6666666666666666
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -345600
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 4d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 345600,
"secondLine": "4d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 1mo 14d of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 3848712,
"secondLine": "1mo 14d delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs only allow 2 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 1mo 8d challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 3298896,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 2,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "1mo 8d challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 2/3 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.6666666666666666
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -345600
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 4d 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 388800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 1mo 14d of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 3848712
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (!)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Because the data is not present on chain the security of fraud proofs is severely weakened.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published onchain.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Force via L1",
"description": "Users can force the sequencer to include a transaction by submitting a request through L1. If the sequencer censors or is down for , users can use the exit hatch to withdraw their funds.",
"sentiment": "good"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Use escape hatch",
"description": "Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a Merkle proof of funds.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published onchain. A custom data availability (DA) provider without attestations is used, but data unavailability can be challenged.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Ethereum contracts do not validate Gnosis Chain state transitions. Bridge messages are accepted after threshold signatures from dedicated bridge validators.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "PoS network",
"description": "Data is made available by an external proof of stake network of validators. Since there is no DA bridge, Ethereum cannot verify whether any data was made available on Gnosis Chain or whether incoming messages originate from state that was attested to by the PoS network.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Decentralized Sequencer Set",
"sentiment": "good",
"description": "Users can permissionlessly become a sequencer (validator) by staking a minimum of 1 GNO to join the queue and wait to obtain block production rights. There is no specific censorship resistance mechanism against selective censorship by parts of the active validator set nor a way to force transactions from Ethereum L1."
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "The Gnosis Chain bridge is not validated by its PoS validator set. Withdrawals through the xDAI bridge require 4/7 validator signatures, while AMB and Omnibridge withdrawals require 4/7 validator signatures. The bridge validators can freeze bridge transactions and/or steal bridge-locked and minted assets. Transactions on Gnosis Chain itself cannot be forced from Ethereum. If the chain has a liveness failure due to blanket censorship or operator walkaway the only recourse are new validators joining the open validator set.",
"sentiment": "bad"
}
}
}+7 -3
+7 -3
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 0,
"secondLine": "No execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/2 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.5
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Even though there is a 3d Timelock for upgrades, there are no forced transactions and thus no way to exit during operator censorship or downtime.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since the Security Council can remove the delay on upgrades.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -1,
"regular": {
"value": "3d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can remove the delay on upgrades.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Even though there is a 3d Timelock for non-emergency upgrades, there are no forced transactions and thus no way to exit during operator censorship or downtime.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring. Although the functionality exists in the code, it is currently disabled.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+10 -5
+10 -5
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST)",
"description": "STARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 0,
"secondLine": "No execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain (SD)",
"description": "All of the data (SD = state diffs) needed for proof construction is published onchain.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "7d",
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Standard upgrades are initiated on L1 and go through a 8d delay. In case users are censored, the Security Council minority can be alerted to enforce censorship resistance by submitting a new state root. This process is assumed to take 1d.",
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "7d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L1 and go through a 8d delay. In case users are censored, the Security Council minority can be alerted to enforce censorship resistance by submitting a new state root. This process is assumed to take 1d, leaving users 7d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Log via L1",
"description": "Users can submit transactions to an L1 map, but can't force them. When users “complain” that their transaction is stuck on L1 and not picked up by the sequencer, the Security Council minority can bypass the sequencer by posting a state root that includes it.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Security Council minority",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposer can update state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen. The Security Council minority can be alerted to enforce censorship resistance because they are a permissioned Operator.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": null
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
}
}+10 -1
+10 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 10800,
"secondLine": "3h execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published onchain.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted standard upgrade because the central operator can censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay. The standard upgrade delay is 4d 3h."
"orderHint": 0,
"regular": {
"value": "4d 3h",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades go through a 4d 3h delay, but the central operator can still censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring. The Operator actively uses a TransactionFilterer contract, which requires accounts that enqueue or force transactions from L1 to be whitelisted.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Replace proposer",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen. There is a decentralized Governance system that can attempt changing Proposers with an upgrade.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+3 -3
+3 -3
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.08",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on Celestia. Sequencer tx roots are not checked against the Blobstream bridge data roots onchain, but L2 nodes can verify data availability by running a Celestia light client.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on Celestia. Sequencer tx roots are not checked against the Blobstream bridge data roots onchain, but L2 nodes can verify data availability by running a Celestia light client.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.0",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -302400
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. 'Pessimistic' proofs only validate the bridge accounting.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published onchain.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring. Although the functionality exists in the code, it is currently disabled.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+10 -6
+10 -6
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (SN)",
"description": "SNARKs are succinct zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness, but require trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "7d",
"description": "Users have 7d to exit funds in case of an unwanted regular upgrade. There is a 7d delay before a regular upgrade is applied, and withdrawals can take up to 0s to be processed.",
"description": "Users have 7d to exit funds in case of an unwanted upgrade. There is a 7d delay before a upgrade is applied, and withdrawals can take up to 0s to be processed.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 604800
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Force via L1",
"description": "Users can force the sequencer to include a transaction by submitting a request through L1. If the sequencer censors or is down for , users can use the exit hatch to withdraw their funds.",
"sentiment": "good"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "If the Proposer fails, users can leverage the source available prover to submit proofs to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good"
}
}
}+10 -6
+10 -6
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
}
}+10 -6
+10 -6
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "1.9",
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632,
"secondLine": "12d 17h delay"
}
}
}+0 -68
+0 -68
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
}
}
}+12 -8
+12 -8
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published onchain.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -200
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is ultimately NOT published on Ethereum.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -200
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on Celestia. Sequencer tx roots are not checked against the Blobstream bridge data roots onchain, but L2 nodes can verify data availability by running a Celestia light client.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST)",
"description": "STARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 5/7 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.7142857142857143
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "14d",
"description": "Users have 14d to exit funds in case of an unwanted regular upgrade. There is a 14d delay before a regular upgrade is applied, and withdrawals can take up to 0s to be processed.",
"description": "Users have 14d to exit funds in case of an unwanted upgrade. There is a 14d delay before a upgrade is applied, and withdrawals can take up to 0s to be processed.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 1209600
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Use escape hatch",
"description": "Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a Merkle proof of funds. NFTs will be minted on L1 to exit.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published onchain.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+12 -8
+12 -8
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.8",
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632,
"secondLine": "12d 17h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.8",
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 2d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 172800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.08",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no exit window for users to exit in case of unwanted regular upgrades as they are initiated by the Security Council with instant upgrade power and without proper notice.",
"description": "There is no exit window for users to exit in case of unwanted upgrades as they are initiated by the Security Council with instant upgrade power and without proper notice.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+3 -3
+3 -3
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 0,
"secondLine": "No execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 7d delay on this operation. Proposing new blocks requires creating ZK proofs.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "If the Proposer fails, users can leverage the source available prover to submit proofs to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good"
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (SN)",
"description": "SNARKs are succinct zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness, but require trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 0,
"secondLine": "No execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Self custodied",
"description": "All data required for payments and withdrawals is self custodied by users.",
"sentiment": "good"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. Proposing new blocks requires creating ZK proofs.",
"sentiment": "good"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "If the Proposer fails, users can leverage the source available prover to submit proofs to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (SN)",
"description": "SNARKs are succinct zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness, but require trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 0,
"secondLine": "No execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Self custodied",
"description": "All data required for payments and withdrawals is self custodied by users.",
"sentiment": "good"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 7d delay on this operation. Proposing new blocks requires creating ZK proofs.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "If the Proposer fails, users can leverage the source available prover to submit proofs to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good"
}
}
}+0 -64
+0 -64
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.08",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
}
}
}+10 -6
+10 -6
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "TEE attestations",
"description": "State roots are accepted when attested by a permissioned TEE through the TEEVerifierProxy. There is no challenge mechanism and no validity proofs can be submitted.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Enqueue via L1",
"description": "Users can submit transactions to an L1 queue, but can't force them. The sequencers cannot selectively skip transactions but can stop processing the queue entirely. In other words, if the sequencers censor or are down, they are so for everyone.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 259200,
"secondLine": "3d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -259200
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on Celestia. Sequencer tx roots are not checked against the Blobstream bridge data roots onchain, but L2 nodes can verify data availability by running a Celestia light client.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+7 -3
+7 -3
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 0,
"secondLine": "No execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Even though there is a 3d Timelock for upgrades, forced transactions are disabled.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since the Security Council can remove the delay on upgrades.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -1,
"regular": {
"value": "3d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can remove the delay on upgrades.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Even though there is a 3d Timelock for non-emergency upgrades, forced transactions are disabled.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow 9 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. At least 5 Challengers are external to the Operator. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 9,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no exit window for users to exit in case of unwanted regular upgrades of the L1 as they are initiated by the Security Council with instant upgrade power and without proper notice. Upgrades initiated by actors other than the Security Council (e.g. KYC providers) on Layer 2 guarantee at least a 7d exit window to the user.",
"description": "There is no exit window for users to exit in case of unwanted upgrades of the L1 as they are initiated by the Security Council with instant upgrade power and without proper notice. Upgrades initiated by actors other than the Security Council (e.g. KYC providers) on Layer 2 guarantee at least a 7d exit window to the user.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632,
"secondLine": "12d 17h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT, ZK)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. ZK proofs are used to adjudicate the correctness of the last step. The challenge protocol can fail under certain conditions. The current system doesn't use posted L2 txs batches on L1 as inputs to prove a fault (for the zkEVM prover path), meaning that DA is not always enforced.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
}
}+12 -8
+12 -8
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 1d challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 86400,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "1d challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 7d 8h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 636216,
"secondLine": "7d 8h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 1d challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 86400,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "1d challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 2d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 172800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 7d 8h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 636216
}
}
}+10 -1
+10 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 10800,
"secondLine": "3h execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain (SD)",
"description": "All of the data (SD = state diffs) needed for proof construction is published onchain.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted standard upgrade because the central operator can censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay. The standard upgrade delay is 4d 3h."
"orderHint": 0,
"regular": {
"value": "4d 3h",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades go through a 4d 3h delay, but the central operator can still censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Enqueue via L1",
"description": "Users can submit transactions to an L1 queue, but can't force them. The sequencers cannot selectively skip transactions but can stop processing the queue entirely. In other words, if the sequencers censor or are down, they are so for everyone.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Replace proposer",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen. There is a decentralized Governance system that can attempt changing Proposers with an upgrade.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 5d 14h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 483840,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "7d 14h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST)",
"description": "STARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Force via L1",
"description": "Users can force the sequencer to include a transaction by submitting a request through L1. If the sequencer censors or is down for , users can use the exit hatch to withdraw their funds.",
"sentiment": "good"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Use escape hatch",
"description": "Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a Merkle proof of funds.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+10 -1
+10 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 10800,
"secondLine": "3h execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on Avail. Transaction data is checked against the Vector bridge data roots, signed off by Avail validators.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted standard upgrade because the central operator can censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay. The standard upgrade delay is 4d 3h."
"orderHint": 0,
"regular": {
"value": "4d 3h",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades go through a 4d 3h delay, but the central operator can still censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Enqueue via L1",
"description": "Users can submit transactions to an L1 queue, but can't force them. The sequencers cannot selectively skip transactions but can stop processing the queue entirely. In other words, if the sequencers censor or are down, they are so for everyone.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Replace proposer",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen. There is a decentralized Governance system that can attempt changing Proposers with an upgrade.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (SN)",
"description": "SNARKs are succinct zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness, but require trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 0,
"secondLine": "No execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain (SD)",
"description": "All of the data (SD = state diffs) needed for proof construction is published onchain.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -1209600
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Force via L1",
"description": "Users can force the sequencer to include a transaction by submitting a request through L1. If the sequencer censors or is down for for more than 14d, users can use the exit hatch to withdraw their funds.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1209600
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on Celestia. Sequencer tx roots are not checked against the Blobstream bridge data roots onchain, but L2 nodes can verify data availability by running a Celestia light client.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -432000
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (SN)",
"description": "SNARKs are succinct zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness, but require trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 0,
"secondLine": "No execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1. Unlike most ZK rollups, transaction data is posted instead of state diffs.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring. Eventually (after 6 months of no finalized blocks) the Operator role becomes public, theoretically allowing anyone to post data.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen. Eventually (after 6 months of no finalized blocks) the Operator role becomes public, theoretically allowing anyone to propose state with valid proofs.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.0",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (SN)",
"description": "SNARKs are succinct zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness, but require trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 0,
"secondLine": "No execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -1296000
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Force via L1",
"description": "Users can force the sequencer to include a withdrawal transaction by submitting a request through L1 with a 0.02 ETH fee. If the sequencer is down for more than 15d, users can use the exit hatch to withdraw their funds. The sequencer can censor individual deposits, but in such case after 15d users can get their funds back.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1296000
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Use escape hatch",
"description": "Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a Merkle proof of funds.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. 'Pessimistic' proofs only validate the bridge accounting.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published onchain.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring. Although the functionality exists in the code, it is currently disabled.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+0 -68
+0 -68
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.0",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on Celestia. Sequencer tx roots are not checked against the Blobstream bridge data roots onchain, but L2 nodes can verify data availability by running a Celestia light client.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 259200,
"secondLine": "3d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -259200
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on Celestia. Sequencer tx roots are not checked against the Blobstream bridge data roots onchain, but L2 nodes can verify data availability by running a Celestia light client.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -43200
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (1R, ZK)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Single round proofs (1R) prove the validity of a state proposal, only requiring a single transaction to resolve. A fault proof eliminates a state proposal by proving that any intermediate state transition in the proposal results in a different state root. For either, a ZK proof is used. Since the node source is not available, challengers cannot watch the chain independently.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"initialBond": "0.00001",
"orderHint": null,
"secondLine": "10d 12h challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on EigenDA. The sequencer is publishing data to EigenDA v2. Sequencer transaction data roots are not checked against the DACert Verifier onchain.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.0",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no exit window for users to exit in case of unwanted regular upgrades as they are initiated by the Security Council with instant upgrade power and without proper notice.",
"description": "There is no exit window for users to exit in case of unwanted upgrades as they are initiated by the Security Council with instant upgrade power and without proper notice.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.Anyone can submit challenge requests. However, permissioned actors are needed to create the challenge and to delete successfully disputed state roots. Additionally, the current permissioned actors (GameCreator and Security Council minority) can collude and finalize malicious state roots.",
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring. The single address acting as a sequencer on L1 is not trustlessly linkable to the claim of multiple decentralized sequencers being used.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Security Council minority",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposer can update state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen. The Security Council minority can be alerted to enforce censorship resistance because they own the proposer registry, controlling the active whitelisted proposer.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+0 -68
+0 -68
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.0",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.0",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no exit window for users to exit in case of unwanted regular upgrades as they are initiated by the Security Council with instant upgrade power and without proper notice.",
"description": "There is no exit window for users to exit in case of unwanted upgrades as they are initiated by the Security Council with instant upgrade power and without proper notice.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+12 -8
+12 -8
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on the base chain, which ultimately gets published on Ethereum.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632,
"secondLine": "12d 17h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 2d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 172800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632
}
}
}+10 -6
+10 -6
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (1R, ZK)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Single round proofs (1R) only require a single transaction to resolve. ZK proofs are used to prove the correctness of the state transition. The system currently operates with at least 5 whitelisted challengers external to the team.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 172800,
"initialBond": "1.0",
"secondLine": "2d challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Force via L1",
"description": "Users can force the sequencer to include a transaction by submitting a request through L1. If the sequencer censors or is down for 7d, new L1 batches must include at least 1 transaction from the queue.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 7d of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers. This requires using the source-available prover to submit a zk proof of validity for the proposal.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 604800
}
}
}+12 -8
+12 -8
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 30m challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 1800,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "2d challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 28d of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 2419200,
"secondLine": "28d delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 30m challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 1800,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "2d challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 2d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 172800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 28d of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 2419200
}
}
}+0 -68
+0 -68
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST)",
"description": "STARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 2/5 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.4
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "1d",
"description": "Users have 1d to exit funds in case of an unwanted regular upgrade. There is a 8d delay before a regular upgrade is applied, and withdrawals can take up to 7d to be processed.",
"description": "Users have 1d to exit funds in case of an unwanted upgrade. There is a 8d delay before a upgrade is applied, and withdrawals can take up to 7d to be processed.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Force via L1",
"description": "Users can force the sequencer to include a transaction by submitting a request through L1. If the sequencer censors or is down for for more than 7d, users can use the exit hatch to withdraw their funds.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Use escape hatch",
"description": "Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a Merkle proof of funds. NFTs will be minted on L1 to exit.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.0",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on Celestia. Sequencer tx roots are not checked against the Blobstream bridge data roots onchain, but L2 nodes can verify data availability by running a Celestia light client.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+10 -6
+10 -6
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow 10 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. At least 5 Challengers are external to the Operator. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 10,
"initialBond": "1.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 5/6 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 0.8333333333333334
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "7d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have only 7d to exit. \n \n If users post a tx after that time, they would only be able to self propose a state root 28d after the last state root was proposed and then wait for the 6d 8h challenge window, while the upgrade would be confirmed just after the 6d 8h challenge window and the 3d L1 timelock.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 604800,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "7d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have only 7d to exit.\n\n If users post a tx after that time, they would only be able to self propose a state root 28d after the last state root was proposed and then wait for the 6d 8h challenge window, while the upgrade would be confirmed just after the 6d 8h challenge window and the 3d L1 timelock.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 28d of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 2419200,
"secondLine": "28d delay"
}
}
}+0 -68
+0 -68
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
}
}
}+0 -68
+0 -68
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "1.2",
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632,
"secondLine": "12d 17h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Exits only",
"description": "Exits from the network are subject to a period when they can be challenged. The internal network state is left unchecked.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published onchain.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Force via L1",
"description": "Users can force the sequencer to include a transaction by submitting a request through L1. If the sequencer censors or is down for , users can use the exit hatch to withdraw their funds.",
"sentiment": "good"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Use escape hatch",
"description": "Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a Merkle proof of funds. The details are unknown.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.08",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
}
}+3 -3
+3 -3
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.08",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 1mo 3d challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 1036800,
"challengeDelay": 2903040,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "1mo 15d challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 1mo 3d challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 1036800,
"challengeDelay": 2903040,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "1mo 15d challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 129600
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.08",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no exit window for users to exit in case of unwanted regular upgrades as they are initiated by the Security Council with instant upgrade power and without proper notice.",
"description": "There is no exit window for users to exit in case of unwanted upgrades as they are initiated by the Security Council with instant upgrade power and without proper notice.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.0",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on Celestia. Sequencer tx roots are not checked against the Blobstream bridge data roots onchain, but L2 nodes can verify data availability by running a Celestia light client.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST)",
"description": "STARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 0,
"secondLine": "No execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Encrypted data is posted on Ethereum as blobs, and a privacy council of 3 members holds the decryption keys. Users are not able to independetly reconstruct the L2 state without relying on the council members.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 518400,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "6d challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -172800
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 2d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 172800,
"secondLine": "2d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 8h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1068216,
"secondLine": "12d 8h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. 'Pessimistic' proofs only validate the bridge accounting.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published onchain.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring. Although the functionality exists in the code, it is currently disabled.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on Celestia. Sequencer tx roots are not checked against the Blobstream bridge data roots onchain, but L2 nodes can verify data availability by running a Celestia light client.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 5d 14h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 483840,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "7d 14h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.08",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.0",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+12 -8
+12 -8
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow 10 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. At least 5 Challengers are external to the Operator. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 10,
"initialBond": "1.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 5/6 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 0.8333333333333334
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "7d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have only 7d to exit. \n \n If users post a tx after that time, they would only be able to self propose a state root 28d after the last state root was proposed and then wait for the 6d 8h challenge window, while the upgrade would be confirmed just after the 6d 8h challenge window and the 3d L1 timelock.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 604800,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "7d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have only 7d to exit.\n\n If users post a tx after that time, they would only be able to self propose a state root 28d after the last state root was proposed and then wait for the 6d 8h challenge window, while the upgrade would be confirmed just after the 6d 8h challenge window and the 3d L1 timelock.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 28d of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 2419200,
"secondLine": "28d delay"
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 30m challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 1800,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "30m challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/2 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.5
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 6d 9h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 551616,
"secondLine": "6d 9h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 30m challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 1800,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "30m challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/2 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.5
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 2d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 172800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 1mo 4d of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 2970816
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 5d 14h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 483840,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "7d 14h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+10 -6
+10 -6
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "PoS network",
"description": "Data is guaranteed to be available by an external proof of stake network of validators. On Ethereum, DA is attested via signed block headers.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Enqueue via L1",
"description": "Users can submit transactions to an L1 queue, but can't force them. The sequencers cannot selectively skip transactions but can stop processing the queue entirely. In other words, if the sequencers censor or are down, they are so for everyone. In Polygon PoS, the sequencers network corresponds to the PoS validators network, which is composed of 103 members.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "The PoS network is composed of 103 validators. Blocks are included in the chain only if signed by 2/3+1 of the network stake. It's currently not possible to join the set if the validator cap is reached. The current validator cap is set to 105. In the event of a failure in reaching consensus, withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. 'Pessimistic' proofs only validate the bridge accounting.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published onchain.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring. Although the functionality exists in the code, it is currently disabled.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.0",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+12 -8
+12 -8
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow 14 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. There are fewer than 5 Challengers external to the Operator among these. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. There is a 5d 14h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 483840,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 14,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "5d 14h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400000
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 2y 9mo delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400000,
"secondLine": "2y 9mo delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 11d 23h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1033656,
"secondLine": "11d 23h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow 14 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. There are fewer than 5 Challengers external to the Operator among these. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. There is a 5d 14h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 483840,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 14,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "5d 14h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400000
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 2y 9mo delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86486400
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 11d 23h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1033656
}
}
}+12 -8
+12 -8
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow 14 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. There are fewer than 5 Challengers external to the Operator among these. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. There is a 5d 14h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 483840,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 14,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "5d 14h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 11d 23h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1033656,
"secondLine": "11d 23h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow 14 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. There are fewer than 5 Challengers external to the Operator among these. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. There is a 5d 14h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 483840,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 14,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "5d 14h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 2d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 172800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 11d 23h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1033656
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 5d 14h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 483840,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "7d 14h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on Celestia. Sequencer tx roots are not checked against the Blobstream bridge data roots onchain, but L2 nodes can verify data availability by running a Celestia light client.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+12 -8
+12 -8
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632,
"secondLine": "12d 17h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 2d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 172800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow 6 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. There are fewer than 5 Challengers external to the Operator among these. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 6,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/2 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.5
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632,
"secondLine": "12d 17h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST)",
"description": "STARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 2/2 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Force via L1",
"description": "Users can force the sequencer to include a transaction by submitting a request through L1. If the sequencer censors or is down for for more than 7d, users can use the exit hatch to withdraw their funds.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Use escape hatch",
"description": "Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a Merkle proof of funds. NFTs will be minted on L1 to exit.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published onchain. A custom data availability (DA) provider without attestations is used, but data unavailability can be challenged.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/2 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.5
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632,
"secondLine": "12d 17h delay"
}
}
}+0 -68
+0 -68
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on Celestia. Sequencer tx roots are not checked against the Blobstream bridge data roots onchain, but L2 nodes can verify data availability by running a Celestia light client.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published on chain.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+12 -8
+12 -8
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs only allow 3 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 3,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 2/3 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.6666666666666666
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632,
"secondLine": "12d 17h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs only allow 3 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 3,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 2/3 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.6666666666666666
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 2d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 172800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 0,
"secondLine": "No execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 7d delay on this operation. Proposing new blocks requires creating ZK proofs.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "If the Proposer fails, users can leverage the source available prover to submit proofs to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.0",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on Celestia. Sequencer tx roots are not checked against the Blobstream bridge data roots onchain, but L2 nodes can verify data availability by running a Celestia light client.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.0",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 8/11 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.7272727272727273
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Enqueue via L1",
"description": "Users can submit transactions to an L1 queue, but can't force them. The sequencers cannot selectively skip transactions but can stop processing the queue entirely. In other words, if the sequencers censor or are down, they are so for everyone.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.0",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published onchain.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+7 -3
+7 -3
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 0,
"secondLine": "No execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 2/3 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.6666666666666666
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Even though there is a 3d Timelock for upgrades, there are no forced transactions and thus no way to exit during operator censorship or downtime.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since the Security Council can remove the delay on upgrades.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -1,
"regular": {
"value": "3d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can remove the delay on upgrades.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Even though there is a 3d Timelock for non-emergency upgrades, there are no forced transactions and thus no way to exit during operator censorship or downtime.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring. Although the functionality exists in the code, it is currently disabled.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+10 -6
+10 -6
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
}
}+0 -68
+0 -68
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.0",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.0",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no exit window for users to exit in case of unwanted regular upgrades as they are initiated by the Security Council with instant upgrade power and without proper notice.",
"description": "There is no exit window for users to exit in case of unwanted upgrades as they are initiated by the Security Council with instant upgrade power and without proper notice.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (1R, ZK)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Single round proofs (1R) prove the validity of a state proposal, only requiring a single transaction to resolve. A fault proof eliminates a state proposal by proving that any intermediate state transition in the proposal results in a different state root. For either, a ZK proof is used.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 28800,
"challengeDelay": 64800,
"initialBond": "0.01",
"secondLine": "1d 2h challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -28800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on EigenDA. The sequencer is publishing data to EigenDA v2. Sequencer transaction data roots are not checked against the DACert Verifier onchain.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+10 -1
+10 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 10800,
"secondLine": "3h execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on Avail. Transaction data is checked against the Vector bridge data roots, signed off by Avail validators.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted standard upgrade because the central operator can censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay. The standard upgrade delay is 4d 3h."
"orderHint": 0,
"regular": {
"value": "4d 3h",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades go through a 4d 3h delay, but the central operator can still censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring. The Operator actively uses a TransactionFilterer contract, which requires accounts that enqueue or force transactions from L1 OR their targets on L2, to be whitelisted.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Replace proposer",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen. There is a decentralized Governance system that can attempt changing Proposers with an upgrade.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST)",
"description": "STARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 2/4 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.5
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Force via L1",
"description": "Users can force the sequencer to include a transaction by submitting a request through L1. If the sequencer censors or is down for for more than 7d, users can use the exit hatch to withdraw their funds.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Use escape hatch",
"description": "Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a Merkle proof of funds. NFTs will be minted on L1 to exit.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+0 -68
+0 -68
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
}
}
}+3 -3
+3 -3
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.08",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on Celestia. Sequencer tx roots are not checked against the Blobstream bridge data roots onchain, but L2 nodes can verify data availability by running a Celestia light client.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on Celestia. Sequencer tx roots are not checked against the Blobstream bridge data roots onchain, but L2 nodes can verify data availability by running a Celestia light client.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+10 -5
+10 -5
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST)",
"description": "STARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 0,
"secondLine": "No execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain (SD)",
"description": "All of the data (SD = state diffs) needed for proof construction is published onchain.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "7d",
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Standard upgrades are initiated on L1 and go through a 8d delay. In case users are censored, the Security Council minority can be alerted to enforce censorship resistance by submitting a new state root. This process is assumed to take 1d.",
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "7d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L1 and go through a 8d delay. In case users are censored, the Security Council minority can be alerted to enforce censorship resistance by submitting a new state root. This process is assumed to take 1d, leaving users 7d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Log via L1",
"description": "Users can submit transactions to an L1 map, but can't force them. When users “complain” that their transaction is stuck on L1 and not picked up by the sequencer, the Security Council minority can bypass the sequencer by posting a state root that includes it.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Security Council minority",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposer can update state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen. The Security Council minority can be alerted to enforce censorship resistance because they are a permissioned Operator.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.0",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+12 -8
+12 -8
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 5d 14h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 483840,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "7d 14h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 5d 14h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 483840,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "7d 14h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 2d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 172800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.0",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.0",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no exit window for users to exit in case of unwanted regular upgrades as they are initiated by the Security Council with instant upgrade power and without proper notice.",
"description": "There is no exit window for users to exit in case of unwanted upgrades as they are initiated by the Security Council with instant upgrade power and without proper notice.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow 6 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. There are fewer than 5 Challengers external to the Operator among these. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 6,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -345600
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 4d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 345600,
"secondLine": "4d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632,
"secondLine": "12d 17h delay"
}
}
}+10 -1
+10 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 10800,
"secondLine": "3h execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on Avail. Transaction data is checked against the Vector bridge data roots, signed off by Avail validators.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted standard upgrade because the central operator can censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay. The standard upgrade delay is 4d 3h."
"orderHint": 0,
"regular": {
"value": "4d 3h",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades go through a 4d 3h delay, but the central operator can still censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Enqueue via L1",
"description": "Users can submit transactions to an L1 queue, but can't force them. The sequencers cannot selectively skip transactions but can stop processing the queue entirely. In other words, if the sequencers censor or are down, they are so for everyone.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Replace proposer",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen. There is a decentralized Governance system that can attempt changing Proposers with an upgrade.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 7d challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -345600
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 4d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 345600,
"secondLine": "4d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 1mo 5d of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 3024000,
"secondLine": "1mo 5d delay"
}
}
}+3 -3
+3 -3
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.08",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on the base chain, which ultimately gets published on Ethereum.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+10 -6
+10 -6
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (SN)",
"description": "SNARKs are succinct zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness, but require trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -1209600
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Force via L1",
"description": "Users can force the sequencer to include a transaction by submitting a request through L1. If the sequencer censors or is down for for more than 14d, users can use the exit hatch to withdraw their funds.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1209600
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Use escape hatch",
"description": "Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a zero knowledge proof of funds.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+7 -3
+7 -3
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 0,
"secondLine": "No execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Even though there is a 3d Timelock for upgrades, there are no forced transactions and thus no way to exit during operator censorship or downtime.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since the Security Council can remove the delay on upgrades.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -1,
"regular": {
"value": "3d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can remove the delay on upgrades.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Even though there is a 3d Timelock for non-emergency upgrades, there are no forced transactions and thus no way to exit during operator censorship or downtime.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring. Although the functionality exists in the code, it is currently disabled.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+0 -68
+0 -68
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
}
}
}+10 -1
+10 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 10800,
"secondLine": "3h execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published onchain.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted standard upgrade because the central operator can censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay. The standard upgrade delay is 4d 3h."
"orderHint": 0,
"regular": {
"value": "4d 3h",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades go through a 4d 3h delay, but the central operator can still censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Enqueue via L1",
"description": "Users can submit transactions to an L1 queue, but can't force them. The sequencers cannot selectively skip transactions but can stop processing the queue entirely. In other words, if the sequencers censor or are down, they are so for everyone.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Replace proposer",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen. There is a decentralized Governance system that can attempt changing Proposers with an upgrade.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.08",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no exit window for users to exit in case of unwanted regular upgrades as they are initiated by the Security Council with instant upgrade power and without proper notice.",
"description": "There is no exit window for users to exit in case of unwanted upgrades as they are initiated by the Security Council with instant upgrade power and without proper notice.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.08",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
}
}+10 -6
+10 -6
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
}
}+12 -8
+12 -8
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow 15 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. There are fewer than 5 Challengers external to the Operator among these. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. There is a 1h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 3600,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 15,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "1h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 6d 9h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 553416,
"secondLine": "6d 9h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow 15 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. There are fewer than 5 Challengers external to the Operator among these. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. There is a 1h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 3600,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 15,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "1h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 2d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 172800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 6d 9h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 553416
}
}
}+7 -3
+7 -3
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 0,
"secondLine": "No execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/2 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.5
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Even though there is a 3d Timelock for upgrades, there are no forced transactions and thus no way to exit during operator censorship or downtime.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since the Security Council can remove the delay on upgrades.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -1,
"regular": {
"value": "3d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can remove the delay on upgrades.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Even though there is a 3d Timelock for non-emergency upgrades, there are no forced transactions and thus no way to exit during operator censorship or downtime.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring. Although the functionality exists in the code, it is currently disabled.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+7 -3
+7 -3
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 0,
"secondLine": "No execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/2 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.5
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Even though there is a 3d Timelock for upgrades, there are no forced transactions and thus no way to exit during operator censorship or downtime.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since the Security Council can remove the delay on upgrades.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -1,
"regular": {
"value": "3d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can remove the delay on upgrades.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Even though there is a 3d Timelock for non-emergency upgrades, there are no forced transactions and thus no way to exit during operator censorship or downtime.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring. Although the functionality exists in the code, it is currently disabled.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+10 -1
+10 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 10800,
"secondLine": "3h execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published onchain.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted standard upgrade because the central operator can censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay. The standard upgrade delay is 4d 3h."
"orderHint": 0,
"regular": {
"value": "4d 3h",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades go through a 4d 3h delay, but the central operator can still censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Enqueue via L1",
"description": "Users can submit transactions to an L1 queue, but can't force them. The sequencers cannot selectively skip transactions but can stop processing the queue entirely. In other words, if the sequencers censor or are down, they are so for everyone.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Replace proposer",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen. There is a decentralized Governance system that can attempt changing Proposers with an upgrade.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.0",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+12 -8
+12 -8
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs only allow 2 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 2,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 3/5 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.6
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632,
"secondLine": "12d 17h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs only allow 2 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 2,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 3/5 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.6
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 2d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 172800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow 10 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. There are fewer than 5 Challengers external to the Operator among these. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. There is a 5d 14h challenge period.",
"challengeDelay": 483840,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 10,
"initialBond": "0.1",
"secondLine": "5d 14h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 11d 23h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1033656,
"secondLine": "11d 23h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. 'Pessimistic' proofs only validate the bridge accounting.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+10 -6
+10 -6
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Under Review",
"description": "This risk is currently under review.",
"sentiment": "UnderReview"
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published onchain. A custom data availability (DA) provider without attestations is used, but data unavailability can be challenged.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+0 -68
+0 -68
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "3600.0",
"secondLine": "8d 8h challenge + execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "10d",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 864000,
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "",
"description": "No information available.",
"sentiment": "neutral"
}
}
}+10 -1
+10 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 10800,
"secondLine": "3h execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain (SD)",
"description": "All of the data (SD = state diffs) needed for proof construction is published onchain.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted standard upgrade because the central operator can censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay. The standard upgrade delay is 4d 3h."
"orderHint": 0,
"regular": {
"value": "4d 3h",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades go through a 4d 3h delay, but the central operator can still censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Enqueue via L1",
"description": "Users can submit transactions to an L1 queue, but can't force them. The sequencers cannot selectively skip transactions but can stop processing the queue entirely. In other words, if the sequencers censor or are down, they are so for everyone.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Replace proposer",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen. There is a decentralized Governance system that can attempt changing Proposers with an upgrade.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 14400,
"secondLine": "4h execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring. The L2 code has been modified to allow the sequencer to explicitly censor selected L1->L2 transactions.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Use escape hatch",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": null,
"description": "Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a Merkle proof of funds after 1mo with no new state proposals have passed. The escape of ETH and ERC-20 balances is permissionless while the escape of DeFi contract balances is trusted."
}
}
}+10 -1
+10 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 10800,
"secondLine": "3h execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published onchain.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted standard upgrade because the central operator can censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay. The standard upgrade delay is 4d 3h."
"orderHint": 0,
"regular": {
"value": "4d 3h",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades go through a 4d 3h delay, but the central operator can still censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Enqueue via L1",
"description": "Users can submit transactions to an L1 queue, but can't force them. The sequencers cannot selectively skip transactions but can stop processing the queue entirely. In other words, if the sequencers censor or are down, they are so for everyone.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Replace proposer",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen. There is a decentralized Governance system that can attempt changing Proposers with an upgrade.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+12 -8
+8 -4
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (SN)",
"description": "SNARKs are succinct zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness, but require trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 3/5 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.6
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Even though there is a 1d Timelock for upgrades, forced transactions are disabled. Even if they were to be enabled, user withdrawals can be censored up to 15d.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -1209600,
"orderHint": -1296000,
"regular": {
"value": "1d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The ZkFair Owner can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Even though there is a 1d Timelock for non-emergency upgrades, forced transactions are disabled. Even if they were to be enabled, user withdrawals can be censored up to 15d.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring. Although the functionality exists in the code, it is currently disabled.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "If the Proposer fails, users can leverage the source available prover to submit proofs to the L1 bridge. There is a 5d delay for proving and a 5d delay for finalizing state proven in this way. These delays can only be lowered except during the emergency state.",
"sentiment": "good"
}
}
}+4 -4
{
"addresses": {
"ethereum": [
{
"name": "ZKFairValidium",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x1CbC08bf0D48b18F9f97796c61352b192d1850A5",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0xb57b9101dEc7dC1635B576fFf71F2f522C970EF3"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x668965757127549f8755D2eEd10494B06420213b"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"references": [
{
"title": "State injections - stateRoot and exitRoot are part of the validity proof input.",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x668965757127549f8755D2eEd10494B06420213b#code#F8#L809"
}
],
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1702879355,
"transactionHash": "0xf231cd4ea460fef7127452f1f2e380080338d99b581b1fbdb69c02b3eb43c396",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x668965757127549f8755D2eEd10494B06420213b"
]
}
],
"description": "The main contract of the Polygon CDK Validium. It defines the rules of the system including core system parameters, permissioned actors as well as emergency procedures. The emergency state can be activated either by the ZkFair Owner, by proving a soundness error or by presenting a sequenced batch that has not been aggregated before a 7d timeout. This contract receives transaction roots, L2 state roots as well as ZK proofs. It also holds the address of ZKFairValidiumDAC.",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "ZKFairAdmin",
"delay": "None"
}
],
"upgradeConsiderations": "Even though there is a 1d Timelock for upgrades, forced transactions are disabled. Even if they were to be enabled, user withdrawals can be censored up to 15d.",
"upgradeConsiderations": "Even though there is a 1d Timelock for non-emergency upgrades, forced transactions are disabled. Even if they were to be enabled, user withdrawals can be censored up to 15d.",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x1CbC08bf0D48b18F9f97796c61352b192d1850A5#code"
},
{
"name": "Bridge",
"isVerified": false,
"address": "eth:0xb10f60B4Ea978CA02aFBAC57fa84907e8439766e",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "The current escrow contract for user funds.",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xb10f60B4Ea978CA02aFBAC57fa84907e8439766e#code"
},
{
"name": "OldBridge",
"isVerified": false,
"address": "eth:0x9cb4706e20A18E59a48ffa7616d700A3891e1861",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0xb57b9101dEc7dC1635B576fFf71F2f522C970EF3"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x58371687dc997A7A11154bBcA72aEb15e4Db8F46"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1702879283,
"transactionHash": "0x22ef364422913d82a57f2fb0b440655ced0178c3549491490edff4663389f511",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xEb80283EBc508CF6AaC5E054118954a2BD7fA006"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1743053459,
"transactionHash": "0xca7c847dde27f60d98b07ef29ba9e0a677f28dddd980bb20c52f660c0071e768",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x58371687dc997A7A11154bBcA72aEb15e4Db8F46"
]
}
],
"description": "Deprecated! Was the escrow contract for user funds. It is mirrored on the L2 side and can be used to transfer ERC20 assets. To transfer funds a user initiated transaction on both sides is required.",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "ZKFairAdmin",
"delay": "None"
}
],
"upgradeConsiderations": "Even though there is a 1d Timelock for upgrades, forced transactions are disabled. Even if they were to be enabled, user withdrawals can be censored up to 15d.",
"upgradeConsiderations": "Even though there is a 1d Timelock for non-emergency upgrades, forced transactions are disabled. Even if they were to be enabled, user withdrawals can be censored up to 15d.",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x9cb4706e20A18E59a48ffa7616d700A3891e1861#code"
},
{
"name": "GlobalExitRoot",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x72abD6416Ea2d99ad30C86B90e7409Dc2d1ba40b",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0xb57b9101dEc7dC1635B576fFf71F2f522C970EF3"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0xC4CD3D0b31904969a397A98AcE8bDF2A94ba8615"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1702879331,
"transactionHash": "0x4e28f8a72e2c30b692920184f37ffd953bfdcc89b907a1284fbb986aad9bc686",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xC4CD3D0b31904969a397A98AcE8bDF2A94ba8615"
]
}
],
"description": "Synchronizes deposit and withdraw merkle trees across L1 and L2. The global root from this contract is injected into the L2 contract.",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "ZKFairAdmin",
"delay": "None"
}
],
"upgradeConsiderations": "Even though there is a 1d Timelock for upgrades, forced transactions are disabled. Even if they were to be enabled, user withdrawals can be censored up to 15d.",
"upgradeConsiderations": "Even though there is a 1d Timelock for non-emergency upgrades, forced transactions are disabled. Even if they were to be enabled, user withdrawals can be censored up to 15d.",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x72abD6416Ea2d99ad30C86B90e7409Dc2d1ba40b#code"
},
{
"name": "FflonkVerifier",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x769E285d2120472c3400A09684B82A842012F46d",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "An autogenerated contract that verifies ZK proofs in the ZKFairValidium system.",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x769E285d2120472c3400A09684B82A842012F46d#code"
},
{
"name": "ZKFairValidiumDAC",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x997CfB0838544f68E59f877EDc905001456F125b",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0xb57b9101dEc7dC1635B576fFf71F2f522C970EF3"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x63150fA72c1c9fF8Fe4438f8355927D3415b0FDc"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1702879319,
"transactionHash": "0xc32e3c87473e1564ad91461787c42867d6793e330617ca806ea1357c40fc4cba",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x63150fA72c1c9fF8Fe4438f8355927D3415b0FDc"
]
}
],
"description": "Committee attesting that data for a given dataRoot has been published. The DAC Owner can update the member set at any time.",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "ZKFairAdmin",
"delay": "None"
}
],
"upgradeConsiderations": "Even though there is a 1d Timelock for upgrades, forced transactions are disabled. Even if they were to be enabled, user withdrawals can be censored up to 15d.",
"upgradeConsiderations": "Even though there is a 1d Timelock for non-emergency upgrades, forced transactions are disabled. Even if they were to be enabled, user withdrawals can be censored up to 15d.",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x997CfB0838544f68E59f877EDc905001456F125b#code"
},
{
"name": "Timelock",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x52882c7564fAca480549145fAc4d0b09eD0D9c17",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Contract upgrades have to go through a 1d timelock unless the Emergency State is activated. It is controlled by the TimelockExecutor.",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x52882c7564fAca480549145fAc4d0b09eD0D9c17#code"
}
]
},
"escrows": [
{
"address": "0xb10f60B4Ea978CA02aFBAC57fa84907e8439766e",
"sinceTimestamp": 1744292087,
"tokens": "*",
"contract": {
"isVerified": false,
"address": "eth:0xb10f60B4Ea978CA02aFBAC57fa84907e8439766e",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xb10f60B4Ea978CA02aFBAC57fa84907e8439766e#code"
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"includeInTotal": true,
"chainId": 1
},
{
"address": "0x9cb4706e20A18E59a48ffa7616d700A3891e1861",
"sinceTimestamp": 1702879283,
"tokens": "*",
"contract": {
"isVerified": false,
"address": "eth:0x9cb4706e20A18E59a48ffa7616d700A3891e1861",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0xb57b9101dEc7dC1635B576fFf71F2f522C970EF3"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x58371687dc997A7A11154bBcA72aEb15e4Db8F46"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1702879283,
"transactionHash": "0x22ef364422913d82a57f2fb0b440655ced0178c3549491490edff4663389f511",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xEb80283EBc508CF6AaC5E054118954a2BD7fA006"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1743053459,
"transactionHash": "0xca7c847dde27f60d98b07ef29ba9e0a677f28dddd980bb20c52f660c0071e768",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x58371687dc997A7A11154bBcA72aEb15e4Db8F46"
]
}
],
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x9cb4706e20A18E59a48ffa7616d700A3891e1861#code"
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"includeInTotal": true,
"untilTimestamp": 1744292087,
"chainId": 1
}
],
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is a 1d delay on code upgrades."
},
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "the source code of unverified contracts contains malicious code.",
"isCritical": true
}
]
}+3 -3
+3 -3
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (SN)",
"description": "SNARKs are succinct zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness, but require trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 0,
"secondLine": "No execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1. Unlike most ZK rollups, transaction data is posted instead of state diffs.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring. Eventually (after 6 months of no finalized blocks) the Operator role becomes public, theoretically allowing anyone to post data.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen. Eventually (after 6 months of no finalized blocks) the Operator role becomes public, theoretically allowing anyone to propose state with valid proofs.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published onchain.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Enqueue via L2",
"description": "Users can submit transactions to an L2 queue, but can't force them. The sequencers cannot selectively skip transactions but can stop processing the queue entirely. In other words, if the sequencers censor or are down, they are so for everyone.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs",
"description": "Zero knowledge cryptography is used to ensure state correctness. Proofs are first verified on Linea and finally on Ethereum.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is ultimately NOT published on Ethereum.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (SN)",
"description": "SNARKs are succinct zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness, but require trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 0,
"secondLine": "No execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "5d",
"description": "Users have 5d to exit funds in case of an unwanted regular upgrade. There is a 8d delay before a regular upgrade is applied, and withdrawals can take up to 3d to be processed.",
"description": "Users have 5d to exit funds in case of an unwanted upgrade. There is a 8d delay before a upgrade is applied, and withdrawals can take up to 3d to be processed.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 432000
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Force via L1",
"description": "Users can force the sequencer to include a transaction by submitting a request through L1. If the sequencer censors or is down for for more than 3d, users can use the exit hatch to withdraw their funds.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 259200
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Use escape hatch",
"description": "Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a zero knowledge proof of funds.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+9 -5
+9 -5
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (SN)",
"description": "SNARKs are succinct zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness, but require trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 0,
"secondLine": "No execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "7d",
"description": "Users have 7d to exit funds in case of an unwanted upgrade. There is a 21d delay before an upgrade is applied, and withdrawals can take up to 14d to be processed.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -1209600,
"regular": {
"value": "7d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "The Security Council can upgrade with no delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
"value": "Users have 7d to exit funds in case of an unwanted non-emergency upgrade. There is a 21d delay before a non-emergency upgrade is applied, and withdrawals can take up to 14d to be processed.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Force via L1",
"description": "Users can force the sequencer to include a transaction by submitting a request through L1. If the sequencer censors or is down for for more than 14d, users can use the exit hatch to withdraw their funds.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1209600
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Use escape hatch",
"description": "Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a zero knowledge proof of funds.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+10 -1
+10 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 10800,
"secondLine": "3h execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain (SD)",
"description": "All of the data (SD = state diffs) needed for proof construction is published onchain.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted standard upgrade because the central operator can censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay. The standard upgrade delay is 4d 3h."
"orderHint": 0,
"regular": {
"value": "4d 3h",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades go through a 4d 3h delay, but the central operator can still censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay.",
"sentiment": "warning"
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Enqueue via L1",
"description": "Users can submit transactions to an L1 queue, but can't force them. The sequencers cannot selectively skip transactions but can stop processing the queue entirely. In other words, if the sequencers censor or are down, they are so for everyone.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Replace proposer",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen. There is a decentralized Governance system that can attempt changing Proposers with an upgrade.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. Only one entity is currently allowed to propose and submit challenges, as only permissioned games are currently allowed.",
"executionDelay": 302400,
"challengeDelay": 302400,
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": "0.0",
"secondLine": "7d challenge + execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no exit window for users to exit in case of unwanted regular upgrades as they are initiated by the Security Council with instant upgrade power and without proper notice.",
"description": "There is no exit window for users to exit in case of unwanted upgrades as they are initiated by the Security Council with instant upgrade power and without proper notice.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}