Diff between 5b38ed41 (main) and d32f2971 (PR)

• aevo +80 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "EigenDA"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "layer": "layer2",
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "Exchange"
      ],
      "raas": "Conduit",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "No proofs",
          "shortDescription": "The proof system isn't fully functional",
          "description": "Projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "No DA bridge",
          "shortDescription": "There is no data availability bridge",
          "description": "Projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "OP Stack"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +79 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "warning",
        "text": "There is no available node software that can reconstruct L2 state transitions from available DA, so this system cannot be independently verified."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.",
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "No source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state from the DA layer."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• alephzero +84 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "layer": "layer2",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "Arbitrum Classic",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "Privacy"
      ],
      "raas": "Gelato",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Small DAC",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +83 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• alienx +84 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "layer": "layer2",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "Arbitrum Classic",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "Gaming",
        "AI",
        "NFT"
      ],
      "raas": "Caldera",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Small DAC",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +83 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• ancient +80 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "Celestia"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "layer": "layer2",
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "Gaming"
      ],
      "raas": "Conduit",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "No proofs",
          "shortDescription": "The proof system isn't fully functional",
          "description": "Projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "No DA bridge",
          "shortDescription": "There is no data availability bridge",
          "description": "Projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "OP Stack"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +79 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.",
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• apechain +79 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "Espresso",
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "arbitrum",
        "slug": "arbitrum",
        "name": "Arbitrum One"
      },
      "layer": "layer3",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "Arbitrum Classic",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal"
      ],
      "raas": "Caldera",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Small DAC",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +78 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• appchain +84 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "Espresso",
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "layer": "layer2",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "Arbitrum Classic",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal"
      ],
      "raas": "Caldera",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Small DAC",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +83 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• automata +63 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "Alt-DA"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "layer": "layer2",
      "purposes": [
        "Universal"
      ],
      "raas": "AltLayer",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "No proofs",
          "shortDescription": "The proof system isn't fully functional",
          "description": "Projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "No DA bridge",
          "shortDescription": "There is no data availability bridge",
          "description": "Projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "OP Stack"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +62 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.",
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The proof system is still under development."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• b3 +63 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "Celestia"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "base",
        "slug": "base",
        "name": "Base Chain"
      },
      "layer": "layer3",
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "Gaming"
      ],
      "raas": "Caldera",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "No proofs",
          "shortDescription": "The proof system isn't fully functional",
          "description": "Projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "No DA bridge",
          "shortDescription": "There is no data availability bridge",
          "description": "Projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "OP Stack"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +62 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "warning",
        "text": "There is no available node software that can reconstruct L2 state transitions from available DA, so this system cannot be independently verified."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.",
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The proof system is still under development."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "No source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state from the DA layer."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• blessnet +84 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "arbitrum",
        "slug": "arbitrum",
        "name": "Arbitrum One"
      },
      "layer": "layer3",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "Arbitrum Classic",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "Interoperability"
      ],
      "raas": "Caldera",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Small DAC",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +83 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• capx +84 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "layer": "layer2",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "Arbitrum Classic",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal"
      ],
      "raas": "Caldera",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Small DAC",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +83 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• celo +5 -9 Viewed

  • scalingStage +5 -9 Viewed

    {
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.",
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The DA verifier is upgradeable with less than 7d independent exit window."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "DA is attested by a committee or external DA layer, not solely by the sequencer."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code. [View code](https://github.com/celo-org/op-geth)"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The Security Council is properly set up [(List of members)](https://docs.celo.org/home/protocol/security-council)."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A secure DA verifier is integrated on L1 that checks DA attestations onchain, enabling challengers to retrieve data and construct proofs."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The DA verifier is upgradeable with less than 7d independent exit window."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The DA layer meets minimum decentralization: a DAC with ≥5 external members under an honest-minority assumption, or an external DA chain with an attestation verifier."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The proof system does not meet the minimum trusted setup requirements defined in the L2BEAT [trusted setup assessment framework](https://forum.l2beat.com/t/the-trusted-setups-framework-for-zk-catalog/381).",
              "upcoming": true
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Prover source code is published. [View code](https://github.com/succinctlabs/sp1)",
              "upcoming": true
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Onchain verifiers' smart contracts (including the DA verifier) can be independently regenerated from the verifier source code.",
              "upcoming": true
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Not all program sources are public or not all program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The DA verifier (and related contracts) is upgradeable with less than 30d independent exit window."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The DA mechanism relies on reputational security alone; no staked assets are at risk for DA misbehavior or slashable < TVS."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• corn +84 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "layer": "layer2",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "BoLD",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "Bitcoin DApps"
      ],
      "raas": "Conduit",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Small DAC",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +83 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• cronoszkevm +79 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "None"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "infrastructure": "Elastic Chain",
      "layer": "layer2",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Validity",
        "zkCatalogId": "boojum"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal"
      ],
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "No DA bridge",
          "shortDescription": "There is no data availability bridge",
          "description": "Projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "ZK Stack"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +78 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.",
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code. [View code](https://github.com/matter-labs/zksync-era)"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The proof system meets the minimum trusted setup requirements defined in the L2BEAT [trusted setup assessment framework](https://forum.l2beat.com/t/the-trusted-setups-framework-for-zk-catalog/381).",
              "upcoming": true
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Prover source code is published.",
              "upcoming": true
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• cyber +80 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "Alt-DA"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "infrastructure": "Superchain",
      "layer": "layer2",
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "Social"
      ],
      "raas": "AltLayer",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "No proofs",
          "shortDescription": "The proof system isn't fully functional",
          "description": "Projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "No DA bridge",
          "shortDescription": "There is no data availability bridge",
          "description": "Projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "OP Stack"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +79 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.",
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Not all program sources are public or not all program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• degen +84 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "base",
        "slug": "base",
        "name": "Base Chain"
      },
      "layer": "layer3",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "Arbitrum Classic",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "Social"
      ],
      "raas": "Alchemy",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Small DAC",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +83 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• donatuz +59 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "EigenDA"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "base",
        "slug": "base",
        "name": "Base Chain"
      },
      "layer": "layer3",
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "Social"
      ],
      "raas": "Conduit",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "No proofs",
          "shortDescription": "The proof system isn't fully functional",
          "description": "Projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "No DA bridge",
          "shortDescription": "There is no data availability bridge",
          "description": "Projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "OP Stack"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +58 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.",
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The proof system is still under development."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code. [View code](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/tree/develop/op-node)"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• earnm +84 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "arbitrum",
        "slug": "arbitrum",
        "name": "Arbitrum One"
      },
      "layer": "layer3",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "Arbitrum Classic",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "Social"
      ],
      "raas": "Alchemy",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +83 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• ebichain +79 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "layer": "layer2",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "Arbitrum Classic",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "Exchange"
      ],
      "raas": "Conduit",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Small DAC",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +78 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• edgechain +84 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "arbitrum",
        "slug": "arbitrum",
        "name": "Arbitrum One"
      },
      "layer": "layer3",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "Arbitrum Classic",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Exchange"
      ],
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Small DAC",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +83 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• edgeless +84 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "layer": "layer2",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "Arbitrum Classic",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal"
      ],
      "raas": "Caldera",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Small DAC",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +83 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• educhain +84 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "arbitrum",
        "slug": "arbitrum",
        "name": "Arbitrum One"
      },
      "layer": "layer3",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "Arbitrum Classic",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "Social"
      ],
      "raas": "Gelato",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Small DAC",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +83 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• ethereal +84 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "arbitrum",
        "slug": "arbitrum",
        "name": "Arbitrum One"
      },
      "layer": "layer3",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "BoLD",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Exchange"
      ],
      "raas": "Conduit",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Small DAC",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +83 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• everclear +84 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "layer": "layer2",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "Arbitrum Classic",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "Interoperability"
      ],
      "raas": "Gelato",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Small DAC",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +83 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• fluence +84 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "layer": "layer2",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "Arbitrum Classic",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal"
      ],
      "raas": "Gelato",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Small DAC",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +83 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• fraxtal +59 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "FraxtalDA"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "layer": "layer2",
      "purposes": [
        "Universal"
      ],
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "No proofs",
          "shortDescription": "The proof system isn't fully functional",
          "description": "Projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "No DA bridge",
          "shortDescription": "There is no data availability bridge",
          "description": "Projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "OP Stack"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +58 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.",
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The proof system is still under development."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code. [View code](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/tree/develop/op-node)"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• funki +80 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "Alt-DA"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "infrastructure": "Superchain",
      "layer": "layer2",
      "purposes": [
        "Universal"
      ],
      "raas": "AltLayer",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "No proofs",
          "shortDescription": "The proof system isn't fully functional",
          "description": "Projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "No DA bridge",
          "shortDescription": "There is no data availability bridge",
          "description": "Projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "OP Stack"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +79 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.",
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Not all program sources are public or not all program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• galxegravity +80 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "layer": "layer2",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "BoLD",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal"
      ],
      "raas": "Conduit",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Small DAC",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +79 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code. [View code](https://github.com/OffchainLabs/nitro)"
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• game7 +84 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "arbitrum",
        "slug": "arbitrum",
        "name": "Arbitrum One"
      },
      "layer": "layer3",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "Arbitrum Classic",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "Gaming"
      ],
      "raas": "Conduit",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Small DAC",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +83 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• geist +84 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "base",
        "slug": "base",
        "name": "Base Chain"
      },
      "layer": "layer3",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "Arbitrum Classic",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "Gaming",
        "NFT"
      ],
      "raas": "Alchemy",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Small DAC",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +83 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• grvt +79 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "None"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "infrastructure": "Elastic Chain",
      "layer": "layer2",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Validity",
        "zkCatalogId": "boojum"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Exchange"
      ],
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "No DA bridge",
          "shortDescription": "There is no data availability bridge",
          "description": "Projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "ZK Stack"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +78 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.",
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code. [View code](https://github.com/matter-labs/zksync-era)"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The proof system meets the minimum trusted setup requirements defined in the L2BEAT [trusted setup assessment framework](https://forum.l2beat.com/t/the-trusted-setups-framework-for-zk-catalog/381).",
              "upcoming": true
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Prover source code is published.",
              "upcoming": true
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• ham +59 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "Celestia"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "base",
        "slug": "base",
        "name": "Base Chain"
      },
      "layer": "layer3",
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "Social"
      ],
      "raas": "Caldera",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "No proofs",
          "shortDescription": "The proof system isn't fully functional",
          "description": "Projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "No DA bridge",
          "shortDescription": "There is no data availability bridge",
          "description": "Projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "OP Stack"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +58 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.",
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The proof system is still under development."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code. [View code](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/tree/develop/op-node)"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• hychain +84 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "layer": "layer2",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "Arbitrum Classic",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "Gaming"
      ],
      "raas": "Caldera",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Small DAC",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +83 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• hypr +63 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "Celestia"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "layer": "layer2",
      "purposes": [
        "Universal"
      ],
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "No proofs",
          "shortDescription": "The proof system isn't fully functional",
          "description": "Projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "No DA bridge",
          "shortDescription": "There is no data availability bridge",
          "description": "Projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "OP Stack"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +62 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.",
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The proof system is still under development."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• inevm +84 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "arbitrum",
        "slug": "arbitrum",
        "name": "Arbitrum One"
      },
      "layer": "layer3",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "Arbitrum Classic",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "Interoperability"
      ],
      "raas": "Caldera",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Small DAC",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +83 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• karak +59 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "Celestia"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "layer": "layer2",
      "purposes": [
        "Universal"
      ],
      "raas": "Caldera",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "No proofs",
          "shortDescription": "The proof system isn't fully functional",
          "description": "Projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "No DA bridge",
          "shortDescription": "There is no data availability bridge",
          "description": "Projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "OP Stack"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +58 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.",
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The proof system is still under development."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code. [View code](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/tree/develop/op-node)"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• l3x +79 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "arbitrum",
        "slug": "arbitrum",
        "name": "Arbitrum One"
      },
      "layer": "layer3",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "Arbitrum Classic",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal"
      ],
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Small DAC",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +78 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• lasernet +84 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "layer": "layer2",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "BoLD",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal"
      ],
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Small DAC",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +83 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• lens +4 -7 Viewed

  • scalingStage +4 -7 Viewed

    {
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.",
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "DA is attested by a committee or external DA layer, not solely by the sequencer."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code. [View code](https://github.com/matter-labs/zksync-era)"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A secure DA verifier is integrated on L1 that checks DA attestations onchain, enabling challengers to retrieve data and construct proofs. [View code](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8f50d93B9955B285f787043B30B5F51D09bE0120#code)"
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The DA verifier is non-upgradeable, or upgrades to it provide at least a 7d independent exit window."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The DA layer meets minimum decentralization: a DAC with ≥5 external members under an honest-minority assumption, or an external DA chain with an attestation verifier."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The proof system meets the minimum trusted setup requirements defined in the L2BEAT [trusted setup assessment framework](https://forum.l2beat.com/t/the-trusted-setups-framework-for-zk-catalog/381).",
              "upcoming": true
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Prover source code is published.",
              "upcoming": true
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
              "description": "The DA verifier (and related contracts) is upgradeable with less than 30d independent exit window."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The DA verifier (and related contracts) is non-upgradeable, or upgrades to it provide at least a 30d independent exit window."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The DA mechanism relies on reputational security alone; no staked assets are at risk for DA misbehavior or slashable < TVS."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• lyra +80 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "Celestia"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "layer": "layer2",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "OPFP",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "Exchange"
      ],
      "raas": "Conduit",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "No DA bridge",
          "shortDescription": "There is no data availability bridge",
          "description": "Projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "OP Stack"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +79 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.",
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• mantapacific +63 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "Celestia"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "layer": "layer2",
      "purposes": [
        "Universal"
      ],
      "raas": "Caldera",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "No proofs",
          "shortDescription": "The proof system isn't fully functional",
          "description": "Projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "No DA bridge",
          "shortDescription": "There is no data availability bridge",
          "description": "Projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "OP Stack"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +62 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "warning",
        "text": "There is no available node software that can reconstruct L2 state transitions from available DA, so this system cannot be independently verified."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.",
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The proof system is still under development."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "No source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state from the DA layer."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• megaeth +84 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "EigenDA"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "layer": "layer2",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "Kailua",
        "zkCatalogId": "risc0",
        "challengeProtocol": "Single-step"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal"
      ],
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "No DA bridge",
          "shortDescription": "There is no data availability bridge",
          "description": "Projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "OP Stack"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +83 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "There are at least 5 external actors who can submit fraud proofs."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The proof system meets the minimum trusted setup requirements defined in the L2BEAT [trusted setup assessment framework](https://forum.l2beat.com/t/the-trusted-setups-framework-for-zk-catalog/381).",
              "upcoming": true
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Not all program sources are public or not all program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open to everyone."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• muster +84 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "arbitrum",
        "slug": "arbitrum",
        "name": "Arbitrum One"
      },
      "layer": "layer3",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "BoLD",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "Gaming"
      ],
      "raas": "AltLayer",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Small DAC",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +83 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• nillion +76 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "Celestia"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "layer": "layer2",
      "purposes": [
        "Universal"
      ],
      "raas": "Conduit",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "No proofs",
          "shortDescription": "The proof system isn't fully functional",
          "description": "Projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "No DA bridge",
          "shortDescription": "There is no data availability bridge",
          "description": "Projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "OP Stack"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +75 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.",
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code. [View code](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/tree/develop/op-node)"
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• nova +5 -0 Viewed

  • scalingStage +5 -0 Viewed

    {
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "stage1PrincipleDescription": "The Security Council is properly set up (9/12), but BoLD fraud proof submission on Nova is restricted to a whitelist of 10 validators (validatorWhitelistDisabled = false on the RollupProxy). The whitelisted validators colluding to push a malicious assertion without external challenge is a residual attack path beyond Security Council compromise or sequencer+DAC collusion.",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "DA is attested by a committee or external DA layer, not solely by the sequencer."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code. [View code](https://github.com/OffchainLabs/nitro)"
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "There are at least 5 external actors who can submit fraud proofs."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "In case of an unwanted upgrade by actors more centralized than a Security Council, users have at least 7d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The Security Council is properly set up [(List of members)](https://docs.arbitrum.foundation/security-council-members)."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A secure DA verifier is integrated on L1 that checks DA attestations onchain, enabling challengers to retrieve data and construct proofs."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The DA verifier is non-upgradeable, or upgrades to it provide at least a 7d independent exit window."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The DA layer meets minimum decentralization: a DAC with ≥5 external members under an honest-minority assumption, or an external DA chain with an attestation verifier."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The DA verifier (and related contracts) is upgradeable with less than 30d independent exit window."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The DA mechanism relies on reputational security alone; no staked assets are at risk for DA misbehavior or slashable < TVS."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• oevnetwork +84 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "layer": "layer2",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "Arbitrum Classic",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "Oracles"
      ],
      "raas": "Caldera",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Small DAC",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +83 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• onyx +84 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "base",
        "slug": "base",
        "name": "Base Chain"
      },
      "layer": "layer3",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "BoLD",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal"
      ],
      "raas": "Conduit",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Small DAC",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +83 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• orderly +80 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "Celestia"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "layer": "layer2",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "OPFP",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "Exchange"
      ],
      "raas": "Conduit",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "No DA bridge",
          "shortDescription": "There is no data availability bridge",
          "description": "Projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "OP Stack"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +79 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "warning",
        "text": "There is no available node software that can reconstruct L2 state transitions from available DA, so this system cannot be independently verified."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.",
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "No source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state from the DA layer."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• pepeunchained +59 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "Celestia"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "layer": "layer2",
      "purposes": [
        "Universal"
      ],
      "raas": "Conduit",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "No proofs",
          "shortDescription": "The proof system isn't fully functional",
          "description": "Projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "No DA bridge",
          "shortDescription": "There is no data availability bridge",
          "description": "Projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "OP Stack"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +58 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.",
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The proof system is still under development."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code. [View code](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/tree/develop/op-node)"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• pepeunchained2 +84 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "layer": "layer2",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "BoLD",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal"
      ],
      "raas": "Conduit",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Small DAC",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +83 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• playblock +84 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "nova",
        "slug": "nova",
        "name": "Arbitrum Nova"
      },
      "layer": "layer3",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "Arbitrum Classic",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "Gaming"
      ],
      "raas": "Gelato",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Small DAC",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +83 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• plumenetwork +80 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "layer": "layer2",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "BoLD",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "RWA"
      ],
      "raas": "Conduit",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Small DAC",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +79 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code. [View code](https://github.com/OffchainLabs/nitro)"
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• popapex +84 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "arbitrum",
        "slug": "arbitrum",
        "name": "Arbitrum One"
      },
      "layer": "layer3",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "Arbitrum Classic",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "Gaming"
      ],
      "raas": "Conduit",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Small DAC",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +83 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• popboss +84 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "arbitrum",
        "slug": "arbitrum",
        "name": "Arbitrum One"
      },
      "layer": "layer3",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "Arbitrum Classic",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "Gaming"
      ],
      "raas": "Conduit",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Small DAC",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +83 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• powerloom +84 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "layer": "layer2",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "BoLD",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "Information"
      ],
      "raas": "Conduit",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Small DAC",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +83 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• publicgoodsnetwork +59 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "Celestia"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "infrastructure": "Superchain",
      "layer": "layer2",
      "purposes": [
        "Universal"
      ],
      "raas": "Conduit",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "No proofs",
          "shortDescription": "The proof system isn't fully functional",
          "description": "Projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "No DA bridge",
          "shortDescription": "There is no data availability bridge",
          "description": "Projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "OP Stack"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +58 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.",
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The proof system is still under development."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code. [View code](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/tree/develop/op-node)"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• rari +84 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "Celestia",
        "Espresso",
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "arbitrum",
        "slug": "arbitrum",
        "name": "Arbitrum One"
      },
      "layer": "layer3",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "Arbitrum Classic",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "NFT"
      ],
      "raas": "Caldera",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +83 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• real +84 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "layer": "layer2",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "Arbitrum Classic",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "RWA"
      ],
      "raas": "Gelato",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Small DAC",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +83 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• redstone +63 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "Alt-DA"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "layer": "layer2",
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "Gaming"
      ],
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "No proofs",
          "shortDescription": "The proof system isn't fully functional",
          "description": "Projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "No DA bridge",
          "shortDescription": "There is no data availability bridge",
          "description": "Projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "OP Stack"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +62 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.",
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The proof system is still under development."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• reya +84 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "layer": "layer2",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "Arbitrum Classic",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal"
      ],
      "raas": "Gelato",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Small DAC",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +83 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• river +59 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "Celestia"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "layer": "layer2",
      "purposes": [
        "Universal"
      ],
      "raas": "Caldera",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "No proofs",
          "shortDescription": "The proof system isn't fully functional",
          "description": "Projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "No DA bridge",
          "shortDescription": "There is no data availability bridge",
          "description": "Projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "OP Stack"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +58 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.",
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The proof system is still under development."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code. [View code](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/tree/develop/op-node)"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• rss3 +63 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "NearDA"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "layer": "layer2",
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "AI",
        "Information"
      ],
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "No proofs",
          "shortDescription": "The proof system isn't fully functional",
          "description": "Projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "No DA bridge",
          "shortDescription": "There is no data availability bridge",
          "description": "Projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "OP Stack"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +62 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "warning",
        "text": "There is no available node software that can reconstruct L2 state transitions from available DA, so this system cannot be independently verified."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.",
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The proof system is still under development."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "No source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state from the DA layer."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• sanko +84 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "arbitrum",
        "slug": "arbitrum",
        "name": "Arbitrum One"
      },
      "layer": "layer3",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "Arbitrum Classic",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "Gaming",
        "Social"
      ],
      "raas": "Caldera",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Small DAC",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +83 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• settlus +80 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "Celestia"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "infrastructure": "Superchain",
      "layer": "layer2",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "OPFP",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal"
      ],
      "raas": "Alchemy",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "No DA bridge",
          "shortDescription": "There is no data availability bridge",
          "description": "Projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "OP Stack"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +79 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.",
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• silentdata +80 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "None"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "infrastructure": "Superchain",
      "layer": "layer2",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "OPFP",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Enterprise"
      ],
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "No DA bridge",
          "shortDescription": "There is no data availability bridge",
          "description": "Projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "OP Stack"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +79 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.",
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• sophon +1 -9 Viewed

  • scalingStage +1 -9 Viewed

    {
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.",
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "DA is attested by a committee or external DA layer, not solely by the sequencer."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code. [View code](https://github.com/matter-labs/zksync-era)"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A secure DA verifier is integrated on L1 that checks DA attestations onchain, enabling challengers to retrieve data and construct proofs. [View code](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8f50d93B9955B285f787043B30B5F51D09bE0120#code)"
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The DA verifier is non-upgradeable, or upgrades to it provide at least a 7d independent exit window."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The DA layer meets minimum decentralization: a DAC with ≥5 external members under an honest-minority assumption, or an external DA chain with an attestation verifier."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The proof system meets the minimum trusted setup requirements defined in the L2BEAT [trusted setup assessment framework](https://forum.l2beat.com/t/the-trusted-setups-framework-for-zk-catalog/381).",
              "upcoming": true
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Prover source code is published.",
              "upcoming": true
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
              "description": "The DA verifier (and related contracts) is upgradeable with less than 30d independent exit window."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The DA verifier (and related contracts) is non-upgradeable, or upgrades to it provide at least a 30d independent exit window."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The DA mechanism relies on reputational security alone; no staked assets are at risk for DA misbehavior or slashable < TVS."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• stack +63 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "Celestia"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "base",
        "slug": "base",
        "name": "Base Chain"
      },
      "layer": "layer3",
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "Social"
      ],
      "raas": "Conduit",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "No proofs",
          "shortDescription": "The proof system isn't fully functional",
          "description": "Projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "No DA bridge",
          "shortDescription": "There is no data availability bridge",
          "description": "Projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "OP Stack"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +62 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.",
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The proof system is still under development."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• superposition +84 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "arbitrum",
        "slug": "arbitrum",
        "name": "Arbitrum One"
      },
      "layer": "layer3",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "BoLD",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "Gaming",
        "Social"
      ],
      "raas": "Conduit",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Small DAC",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +83 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• sxt +4 -7 Viewed

  • scalingStage +4 -7 Viewed

    {
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.",
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "DA is attested by a committee or external DA layer, not solely by the sequencer."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code. [View code](https://github.com/matter-labs/zksync-era)"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A secure DA verifier is integrated on L1 that checks DA attestations onchain, enabling challengers to retrieve data and construct proofs. [View code](https://etherscan.io/address/0x8f50d93B9955B285f787043B30B5F51D09bE0120#code)"
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The DA verifier is non-upgradeable, or upgrades to it provide at least a 7d independent exit window."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The DA layer meets minimum decentralization: a DAC with ≥5 external members under an honest-minority assumption, or an external DA chain with an attestation verifier."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The proof system meets the minimum trusted setup requirements defined in the L2BEAT [trusted setup assessment framework](https://forum.l2beat.com/t/the-trusted-setups-framework-for-zk-catalog/381).",
              "upcoming": true
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Prover source code is published.",
              "upcoming": true
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
              "description": "The DA verifier (and related contracts) is upgradeable with less than 30d independent exit window."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The DA verifier (and related contracts) is non-upgradeable, or upgrades to it provide at least a 30d independent exit window."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The DA mechanism relies on reputational security alone; no staked assets are at risk for DA misbehavior or slashable < TVS."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• treasure +79 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "None"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "infrastructure": "Elastic Chain",
      "layer": "layer2",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Validity",
        "zkCatalogId": "boojum"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "Gaming"
      ],
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "No DA bridge",
          "shortDescription": "There is no data availability bridge",
          "description": "Projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "ZK Stack"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +78 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.",
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code. [View code](https://github.com/matter-labs/zksync-era)"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The proof system meets the minimum trusted setup requirements defined in the L2BEAT [trusted setup assessment framework](https://forum.l2beat.com/t/the-trusted-setups-framework-for-zk-catalog/381).",
              "upcoming": true
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Prover source code is published.",
              "upcoming": true
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• winr +80 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "arbitrum",
        "slug": "arbitrum",
        "name": "Arbitrum One"
      },
      "layer": "layer3",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "Arbitrum Classic",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "Gaming"
      ],
      "raas": "Conduit",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Small DAC",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +79 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code. [View code](https://github.com/OffchainLabs/nitro)"
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• wonder +79 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "None"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "infrastructure": "Elastic Chain",
      "layer": "layer2",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Validity",
        "zkCatalogId": "boojum"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal"
      ],
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "No DA bridge",
          "shortDescription": "There is no data availability bridge",
          "description": "Projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "ZK Stack"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +78 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.",
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code. [View code](https://github.com/matter-labs/zksync-era)"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The proof system meets the minimum trusted setup requirements defined in the L2BEAT [trusted setup assessment framework](https://forum.l2beat.com/t/the-trusted-setups-framework-for-zk-catalog/381).",
              "upcoming": true
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Prover source code is published.",
              "upcoming": true
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• xai +84 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "arbitrum",
        "slug": "arbitrum",
        "name": "Arbitrum One"
      },
      "layer": "layer3",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "Arbitrum Classic",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "Gaming"
      ],
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Low DAC threshold",
          "shortDescription": "The data availability committee threshold is too low",
          "description": "Projects with a low DAC threshold rely on the honesty of few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. These entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +83 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• xchain +84 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "DAC"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "layer": "layer2",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Optimistic",
        "name": "Arbitrum Classic",
        "challengeProtocol": "Interactive"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal"
      ],
      "raas": "Conduit",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "Closed proofs",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can submit challenges",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized set of challengers rely on few entities to safely update the state. A small set of challengers can collude with the proposer to finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "Small DAC",
          "shortDescription": "There are less than 5 external actors that can attest data availability",
          "description": "Projects without a sufficiently decentralized data availability committee rely on few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. A small set of entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "Arbitrum"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +83 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is not sufficiently decentralized."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Users are able to exit without the help of the permissioned operators, provided DA is accessible."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Fraud proof submission is open only to whitelisted actors."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• xterio +63 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "Alt-DA"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "layer": "layer2",
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "Gaming"
      ],
      "raas": "AltLayer",
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "No proofs",
          "shortDescription": "The proof system isn't fully functional",
          "description": "Projects without a proper proof system fully rely on single entities to safely update the state. A malicious proposer can finalize an invalid state, which can cause loss of funds."
        },
        {
          "label": "No DA bridge",
          "shortDescription": "There is no data availability bridge",
          "description": "Projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "OP Stack"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +62 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "message": {
        "type": "underReview",
        "text": "The requirement for available node software is under review."
      },
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.",
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The proof system is still under development."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": "UnderReview",
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }

• zkcandy +79 -2 Viewed

  • scalingInfo +1 -1 Viewed

    {
      "capability": "universal",
      "daLayer": [
        "None"
      ],
      "hostChain": {
        "id": "ethereum",
        "slug": "ethereum",
        "name": "Ethereum"
      },
      "infrastructure": "Elastic Chain",
      "layer": "layer2",
      "proofSystem": {
        "type": "Validity",
        "zkCatalogId": "boojum"
      },
      "purposes": [
        "Universal",
        "Gaming"
      ],
      "reasonsForBeingOther": [
        {
          "label": "No DA bridge",
          "shortDescription": "There is no data availability bridge",
          "description": "Projects without a data availability bridge fully rely on single entities (the sequencer) to honestly rely available data roots on Ethereum. A malicious sequencer can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds."
        }
      ],
      "stacks": [
        "ZK Stack"
      ],
      "stage": "Not applicable",
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "type": "Other",
      "vm": [
        "EVM"
      ]
    }

  • scalingStage +78 -1 Viewed

    {
      "stage": "NotApplicable"
      "missing": {
        "nextStage": "Stage 1",
        "requirements": [
          "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.",
          "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
          "The Security Council is not properly set up."
        ],
        "principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
      },
      "stage": "Stage 0",
      "summary": [
        {
          "stage": "Stage 0",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The project self-identifies as a Validium or Optimium."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A complete and functional proof system (fraud or validity proofs) is deployed."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "A source-available node exists that can reconstruct the L2 state when DA is accessible. Please note that the L2BEAT team has not verified the validity of the node source code. [View code](https://github.com/matter-labs/zksync-era)"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 1",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The proof system meets the minimum trusted setup requirements defined in the L2BEAT [trusted setup assessment framework](https://forum.l2beat.com/t/the-trusted-setups-framework-for-zk-catalog/381).",
              "upcoming": true
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "Prover source code is published.",
              "upcoming": true
            },
            {
              "satisfied": true,
              "description": "The sources of all programs used are public and program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
              "upcoming": true
            }
          ],
          "principle": {
            "satisfied": false,
            "description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council to push a malicious upgrade, or sequencer+DA-committee collusion to withhold data and finalize invalid state roots, should be the only ways (other than bugs) to steal funds or block withdrawals indefinitely."
          }
        },
        {
          "stage": "Stage 2",
          "requirements": [
            {
              "satisfied": false,
              "description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs, including upgrades to the DA verifier, provide less than 30d to exit."
            }
          ]
        }
      ]
    }