aff728e8 (main)
and
46861041 (PR)
+146 -47
+2 -2
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (1R, ZK)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Single round proofs (1R) prove the validity of a state proposal, only requiring a single transaction to resolve. A fault proof eliminates a state proposal by proving that any intermediate state transition in the proposal results in a different state root. For either, a ZK proof is used.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 86400,
"challengeDelay": 259200,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.5"
},
"permissioned": false,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-assessed",
"secondLine": "3d challenge period\n+ 1d execution delay"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "The primary whitelisted proposer currently has no optimistic advantage (`vanguardAdvantage = 0`), so this privilege is disabled (not active). Anyone can leverage the source available zk prover to prove a fault or a conflicting valid proposal to win against the privileged proposer and/or supply a bond and make a counter proposal immediately.",
"description": "The primary whitelisted proposer has an optimistic advantage, letting them win by default if no conflicting proposals are made. This privilege is dropped after 1mo of inactivity, and anyone can leverage the source available zk prover to prove a fault or a conflicting valid proposal to win against the privileged proposer and/or supply a bond and make a counter proposal at any time.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
"orderHint": 2592000
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+7 -2
{
"architectureImage": "opstack-rollup-superchain-opfp-kailua",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "All data required for proofs is published on chain",
"description": "All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission"
},
{
"title": "BatchInbox - address",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x3A75346f81302aAc0333FB5DCDD407e12A6CfA83#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x3C877699263119022Cdaa251058c1BAc8Fc43287#code"
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular exits",
"description": "The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When a state root containing such transaction is settled, the funds become available for withdrawal on L1 after 1d. Withdrawal inclusion can be proven before state root settlement, but a 1d period has to pass before it becomes actionable. The process of state root settlement takes a challenge period of at least 3d to complete. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds. This transaction requires a merkle proof.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, proveWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x3C877699263119022Cdaa251058c1BAc8Fc43287#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - Etherscan source code, finalizeWithdrawalTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x3C877699263119022Cdaa251058c1BAc8Fc43287#code"
}
]
},
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain",
"url": "https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x3C877699263119022Cdaa251058c1BAc8Fc43287#code"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "The system has a centralized operator",
"description": "The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": []
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing EVM Equivalence",
"url": "https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306"
}
]
}
],
"stateDerivation": {
"nodeSoftware": "The rollup node is composed of two software components: [op-node](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/tree/develop/op-node), implementing consensus related logic, and [op-geth](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/op-geth), implementing execution logic. The configuration file can be found [here](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/superchain-registry/blob/main/superchain/configs/mainnet/bob.toml).",
"compressionScheme": "Data batches are compressed using the [zlib](https://github.com/madler/zlib) algorithm with best compression level.",
"genesisState": "The genesis file can be found [here](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/superchain-registry/blob/main/superchain/extra/genesis/mainnet/bob.json.zst).",
"dataFormat": "The format specification of Sequencer's data batches can be found [here](https://optimism.io/blog/here-s-how-you-can-reproduce-op-mainnet-s-migration-to-bedrock)."
},
"stateValidation": {
"categories": [
{
"title": "State root proposals",
"description": "Proposers submit state roots as children of any (possibly unresolved) previous state root proposal, by calling the `propose()` function in the KailuaTreasury. A parent state root can have multiple conflicting children, composing a tournament. Each proposer requires to lock a bond, currently set to 0.5 ETH, that can be slashed if any proposal made by them is proven incorrect via a fault proof or a conflicting validity proof. The bond can be withdrawn once the proposer has no more pending proposals that need to be resolved and was not eliminated.\n\nProposals consist of a state root and a reference to their parent and implicitly challenge any sibling proposals who have the same parent. A proposal asserts that the proposed state root constitutes a valid state transition from the parent's state root. To offer efficient zk fault proofs, each proposal must include 3600 intermediate state commitments, each spanning 6 L2 blocks. \n\nProposals target sequential tournament epochs of currently 3600 * 6 L2 blocks. A tournament with a resolved parent tournament, a single child- and no conflicting sibling proposals can be resolved after 3d. \n\nThe **Vanguard** is configured with `vanguardAdvantage = 0`, so this advantage is currently disabled (not active) and child proposals are permissionless immediately.",
"description": "Proposers submit state roots as children of any (possibly unresolved) previous state root proposal, by calling the `propose()` function in the KailuaTreasury. A parent state root can have multiple conflicting children, composing a tournament. Each proposer requires to lock a bond, currently set to 0.5 ETH, that can be slashed if any proposal made by them is proven incorrect via a fault proof or a conflicting validity proof. The bond can be withdrawn once the proposer has no more pending proposals that need to be resolved and was not eliminated.\n\nProposals consist of a state root and a reference to their parent and implicitly challenge any sibling proposals who have the same parent. A proposal asserts that the proposed state root constitutes a valid state transition from the parent's state root. To offer efficient zk fault proofs, each proposal must include 3600 intermediate state commitments, each spanning 6 L2 blocks. \n\nProposals target sequential tournament epochs of currently 3600 * 6 L2 blocks. A tournament with a resolved parent tournament, a single child- and no conflicting sibling proposals can be resolved after 3d. \n\nThe **Vanguard** is a privileged actor who can always make the first child proposal on a parent state root. They can, in the worst case, delay each tournament for up to 1mo by not making this first proposal. Sibling proposals made after the Vanguard's initial one or after the 1mo vanguardAdvantage in each tournament are permissionless.",
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing - Kailua Docs",
"url": "https://boundless-xyz.github.io/kailua/design.html#sequencing"
},
{
"title": "Vanguard - Kailua Docs",
"url": "https://boundless-xyz.github.io/kailua/parameters.html#vanguard-advantage"
}
],
"risks": []
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be frozen if",
"text": "the vanguard exploits their vanguard advantage (1mo), halting the chain until they propose."
}
]
},
{
"title": "Challenges",
"description": "Any conflicting sibling proposals within a tournament that are made within the 3d challenge period of a proposal they are challenging, delay resolving the tournament until sufficient ZK proofs are published to leave one single tournament survivor.\n\nIn the tree of proposed state roots, each parent node can have multiple children. These children are indirectly challenging each other in a tournament, which can only be resolved if but a single child survives. A state root can be resolved if it is **the only remaining proposal** due to any combination of the following elimination methods:\n1. the proposal's challenge period of 3d has ended before a conflicting proposal was made\n2. the proposal is proven correct with a full validity proof (invalidates all conflicting proposals)\n3. a conflicting sibling proposal is proven faulty\n\nProving any of the 3600 intermediate state commitments in a proposal faulty invalidates the entire proposal. Proving a proposal valid invalidates all conflicting siblings. Pruning of a tournament's children happens strictly chronologically, which guarantees that the first faulty proposal of a given proposer is always pruned first. When pruned, an invalid proposal leads to the elimination of its proposer, which invalidates all their subsequent proposals, slashes their bond, and disallows future proposals by the same address. A slashed bond is transferred to an address chosen by the prover who caused the slashing.\n\nA single remaining child in a tournament can be 'resolved' and will be finalized and usable for withdrawals after an execution delay of 1d (time for the Guardian to manually blacklist malicious state roots).",
"references": [
{
"url": "https://boundless-xyz.github.io/kailua/operate.html",
"title": "How to run a challenger - Boundless Docs"
},
{
"url": "https://boundless-xyz.github.io/kailua/dispute.html",
"title": "Disputes - Kailua Book"
}
]
},
{
"title": "Validity proofs",
"description": "Validity proofs and fault proofs both must be accompanied by a ZK proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. These proofs are then verified on Ethereum by a smart contract.\n\nThe Kailua state validation system is primarily optimistically resolved, so no validity proofs are required in the happy case. But two different zk proofs on unresolved state roots are possible and permissionless: The proveValidity() function proves a state root proposal's full validity, automatically invalidating all conflicting sibling proposals. proveOutputFault() allows any actor to eliminate a state root proposal for which they can prove that any of the 3600 intermediate state transitions in the proposal are not correct. Both are zk proofs of validity, although one is used as an efficient fault proof to invalidate a single conflicting state transition.",
"references": [
{
"url": "https://boundless-xyz.github.io/kailua/introduction.html",
"title": "Kailua Proof System - Boundless Docs"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/blob/main/contracts/version-management-design.md",
"title": "Verifier upgrade and deprecation - Kailua Docs"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "the validity proof cryptography is broken or implemented incorrectly."
},
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "no challenger checks the published state."
},
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "the proposer routes proof verification through a malicious or faulty verifier by specifying an unsafe route selector."
},
{
"category": "Funds can be frozen if",
"text": "a verifier needed for a given proof is paused by its permissioned owner."
}
]
}
]
},
"stateValidationImage": "kailua"
}+74 -3
{
"ethereum": {
"roles": [],
"actors": [
{
"id": "Bob Multisig 1",
"name": "Bob Multisig 1",
"description": "A Multisig with 4/6 threshold. \n* Can upgrade **with no delay**\n * DelayedWETH [via: ProxyAdmin]\n * L1StandardBridge [via: ProxyAdmin]\n * OptimismMintableERC20Factory [via: ProxyAdmin]\n * L1ERC721Bridge [via: ProxyAdmin]\n * OptimismPortal2 [via: ProxyAdmin]\n * DisputeGameFactory [via: ProxyAdmin]\n * SystemConfig [via: ProxyAdmin]\n * AnchorStateRegistry [via: ProxyAdmin]\n * L1CrossDomainMessenger [via: ProxyAdmin]\n * SuperchainConfig [via: ProxyAdmin]\n* Can interact with SystemConfig\n * it can update the preconfer address, the batch submitter (Sequencer) address and the gas configuration of the system \n* Can interact with SuperchainConfig\n * Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless) \n* Can interact with AddressManager\n * set and change address mappings [via: ProxyAdmin]",
"description": "A Multisig with 4/6 threshold. \n* Can upgrade **with no delay**\n * DelayedWETH [via: ProxyAdmin]\n * L1StandardBridge [via: ProxyAdmin]\n * OptimismMintableERC20Factory [via: ProxyAdmin]\n * L1ERC721Bridge [via: ProxyAdmin]\n * OptimismPortal2 [via: ProxyAdmin]\n * DisputeGameFactory [via: ProxyAdmin]\n * KailuaVerifier \n * SystemConfig [via: ProxyAdmin]\n * AnchorStateRegistry [via: ProxyAdmin]\n * L1CrossDomainMessenger [via: ProxyAdmin]\n * SuperchainConfig [via: ProxyAdmin]\n* Can interact with SystemConfig\n * it can update the preconfer address, the batch submitter (Sequencer) address and the gas configuration of the system \n* Can interact with SuperchainConfig\n * Allowed to pause withdrawals. In op stack systems with a proof system, the Guardian can also blacklist dispute games and set the respected game type (permissioned / permissionless) \n* Can interact with AddressManager\n * set and change address mappings [via: ProxyAdmin]",
"accounts": [
{
"address": "eth:0xC91482A96e9c2A104d9298D1980eCCf8C4dc764E",
"type": "Contract",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0xC914…764E",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xC91482A96e9c2A104d9298D1980eCCf8C4dc764E"
}
],
"chain": "ethereum",
"references": [],
"participants": [
{
"address": "eth:0x32B8325b7f12ADB06763D6D04c951AC94e36C3D7",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x32B8…C3D7",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x32B8325b7f12ADB06763D6D04c951AC94e36C3D7"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x3C30D693b23F77d55e14b8e0CFB6C00075ff93aB",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x3C30…93aB",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x3C30D693b23F77d55e14b8e0CFB6C00075ff93aB"
},
{
"address": "eth:0xFB771f2640Dfd37B18332a84817B2a6e994f5BF6",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0xFB77…5BF6",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xFB771f2640Dfd37B18332a84817B2a6e994f5BF6"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x81175155D85377C337d92f1FA52Da166C3A4E7Ac",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x8117…E7Ac",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x81175155D85377C337d92f1FA52Da166C3A4E7Ac"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x3840f487A17A41100DD1Bf0946c34f132a57Fd5f",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x3840…Fd5f",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x3840f487A17A41100DD1Bf0946c34f132a57Fd5f"
},
{
"address": "eth:0xA0737fea60F0601A192E3d2c98865A883ab0bda2",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0xA073…bda2",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xA0737fea60F0601A192E3d2c98865A883ab0bda2"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true
},
{
"id": "Safe",
"name": "Safe",
"description": "A Multisig with 3/5 threshold. \n* Can interact with TimelockController\n * cancel queued transactions \n * execute transactions that are ready \n * manage all access control roles **with 3d delay** [via: TimelockController with 3d delay]\n * propose transactions \n* Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop\n * pause the verifier \n* Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop\n * pause the verifier \n* Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop\n * pause the verifier \n* Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierRouter\n * add/remove verifiers and the selectors they are mapped to **with 3d delay** [via: TimelockController with 3d delay]\n* Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop\n * pause the verifier \n* Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop\n * pause the verifier ",
"accounts": [
{
"address": "eth:0x2E5bcc9959dB5F5016F830E47943b07242CB2609",
"type": "Contract",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x2E5b…2609",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x2E5bcc9959dB5F5016F830E47943b07242CB2609"
}
],
"chain": "ethereum",
"references": [],
"participants": [
{
"address": "eth:0x10B0589c16a8851450BD7FEE274cD349fB9d6A0E",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x10B0…6A0E",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x10B0589c16a8851450BD7FEE274cD349fB9d6A0E"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x751708D6341b36c0C258754fc2DbF96074f5BdC7",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x7517…BdC7",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x751708D6341b36c0C258754fc2DbF96074f5BdC7"
},
{
"address": "eth:0xbF58b6DE2B893e7ab707edc6cf99Bb6989C173a4",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0xbF58…73a4",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xbF58b6DE2B893e7ab707edc6cf99Bb6989C173a4"
},
{
"address": "eth:0xd5D43445d0227a47cA2eACCb9392352746eD9926",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0xd5D4…9926",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xd5D43445d0227a47cA2eACCb9392352746eD9926"
},
{
"address": "eth:0xDA8e7102681f9652FB8a10b70949CF7F260e0A01",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0xDA8e…0A01",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xDA8e7102681f9652FB8a10b70949CF7F260e0A01"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true
},
{
"id": "EOA-1",
"name": "EOA 1",
"accounts": [
{
"address": "eth:0x08F9F14fF43E112B18c96f0986F28Cb1878f1D11",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x08F9…1D11",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x08F9F14fF43E112B18c96f0986F28Cb1878f1D11",
"displayName": "EOA 1"
}
],
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "* Can interact with SystemConfig\n * Allowed to commit transactions from the current layer to the host chain ",
"discoveryDrivenData": true
},
{
"id": "EOA-2",
"name": "EOA 2",
"accounts": [
{
"address": "eth:0x7cB1022D30b9860C36b243E7B181A1d46f618C69",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0x7cB1…8C69",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7cB1022D30b9860C36b243E7B181A1d46f618C69",
"displayName": "EOA 2"
}
],
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "* Can interact with KailuaTreasury\n * propose new state roots before anyone else, giving a first-mover advantage on the optimistic clock ",
"discoveryDrivenData": true
},
{
"id": "EOA-3",
"name": "EOA 3",
"accounts": [
{
"address": "eth:0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412",
"type": "EOA",
"isVerified": true,
"name": "0xF616…d412",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xF616A4f81857CFEe54A4A049Ec187172574bd412",
"displayName": "EOA 2"
"displayName": "EOA 3"
}
],
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "* Can interact with TimelockController\n * cancel queued transactions \n * execute transactions that are ready \n * manage all access control roles **with 3d delay** [via: TimelockController with 3d delay]\n * propose transactions \n* Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop\n * pause the verifier \n* Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop\n * pause the verifier \n* Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop\n * pause the verifier \n* Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop\n * pause the verifier \n* Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierRouter\n * add/remove verifiers and the selectors they are mapped to **with 3d delay** [via: TimelockController with 3d delay]\n* Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop\n * pause the verifier \n* Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop\n * pause the verifier ",
"description": "* Can interact with RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop\n * pause the verifier ",
"discoveryDrivenData": true
}
]
}
}+62 -39
{
"addresses": {
"ethereum": [
{
"name": "RiscZeroGroth16Verifier",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x20ff7C2Cf391a5F096A2Cc181cb41916680f8E97",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Verifier contract for RISC Zero Groth16 proofs (version 2.0.0-rc.3).\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x20ff7C2Cf391a5F096A2Cc181cb41916680f8E97#code"
},
{
"name": "RiscZeroGroth16Verifier",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x2a098988600d87650Fb061FfAff08B97149Fa84D",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Verifier contract for RISC Zero Groth16 proofs (version 3.0.0).\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x2a098988600d87650Fb061FfAff08B97149Fa84D#code"
},
{
"name": "RiscZeroGroth16Verifier",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x54aCE3ED46529B4d4F3770C8Bad5dDC48717B9bF",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Verifier contract for RISC Zero Groth16 proofs (version 2.0.3).\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x54aCE3ED46529B4d4F3770C8Bad5dDC48717B9bF#code"
},
{
"name": "OptimismPortal2",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x8AdeE124447435fE03e3CD24dF3f4cAE32E65a3E",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x0d9f416260598313Be6FDf6B010f2FbC34957Cd0"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x3C877699263119022Cdaa251058c1BAc8Fc43287"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1712862419,
"transactionHash": "0x86a85eda6fa19f4bcfe42bfe648335d93dde76ba0c31e0582608eefe04dd29b5",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x994e3B01D130944a3E67BFd3B8Fc73069b959FEc"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1752758927,
"transactionHash": "0x1d93c182527e3c738f03ffb7baf66bbddfb29e1e60bbd9f5457c7de1a90eaaf1",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x6322C2f2D6a4305Fc033754d486A5A067Ee5F9b1"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1752758927,
"transactionHash": "0x1d93c182527e3c738f03ffb7baf66bbddfb29e1e60bbd9f5457c7de1a90eaaf1",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x2D778797049FE9259d947D1ED8e5442226dFB589"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1752761915,
"transactionHash": "0x5fc7da71db9e1541e3eeeedbc3dd3058bf01b5d03b10eee95eaa5668e9efd74e",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1752761915,
"transactionHash": "0x5fc7da71db9e1541e3eeeedbc3dd3058bf01b5d03b10eee95eaa5668e9efd74e",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1752761915,
"transactionHash": "0x5fc7da71db9e1541e3eeeedbc3dd3058bf01b5d03b10eee95eaa5668e9efd74e",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x2D7e764a0D9919e16983a46595CfA81fc34fa7Cd"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1752761915,
"transactionHash": "0x5fc7da71db9e1541e3eeeedbc3dd3058bf01b5d03b10eee95eaa5668e9efd74e",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1753214303,
"transactionHash": "0xa7881069c54f1028d42b83406ac5a768154f8ff34ad37ec7641b4d45766e77c3",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xB250566074B3c0f1B109A531A83f3d9B1a579273"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1768920023,
"transactionHash": "0xd025dbac937aa7bd1c53511421d35cc97c18a848ebb123cc85e910ab517a8922",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x381E729FF983FA4BCEd820e7b922d79bF653B999"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1768920023,
"transactionHash": "0xd025dbac937aa7bd1c53511421d35cc97c18a848ebb123cc85e910ab517a8922",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1773311975,
"transactionHash": "0x0c0e889a96e766d168753f3e596af7d57a9c07f7d84fb0ba05e3d46adf61ddd8",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x3C877699263119022Cdaa251058c1BAc8Fc43287"
]
}
],
"description": "The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the KailuaGame.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "Bob Multisig 1",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x8AdeE124447435fE03e3CD24dF3f4cAE32E65a3E#code"
},
{
"name": "DisputeGameFactory",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x96123dbFC3253185B594c6a7472EE5A21E9B1079",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x0d9f416260598313Be6FDf6B010f2FbC34957Cd0"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x74Fac1D45B98bae058F8F566201c9A81B85C7D50"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1752686063,
"transactionHash": "0x3e95a733128abc9cdbd115a77debd0838071a349ac5312955eceda05f647cd6e",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xc641A33cab81C559F2bd4b21EA34C290E2440C2B"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1752761915,
"transactionHash": "0x5fc7da71db9e1541e3eeeedbc3dd3058bf01b5d03b10eee95eaa5668e9efd74e",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x4bbA758F006Ef09402eF31724203F316ab74e4a0"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1768920023,
"transactionHash": "0xd025dbac937aa7bd1c53511421d35cc97c18a848ebb123cc85e910ab517a8922",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x33D1e8571a85a538ed3D5A4d88f46C112383439D"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1768920023,
"transactionHash": "0xd025dbac937aa7bd1c53511421d35cc97c18a848ebb123cc85e910ab517a8922",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x74Fac1D45B98bae058F8F566201c9A81B85C7D50"
]
}
],
"description": "The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "Bob Multisig 1",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x96123dbFC3253185B594c6a7472EE5A21E9B1079#code"
},
{
"name": "SystemConfig",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0xACB886b75D76d1c8d9248cFdDfA09b70C71c5393",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x0d9f416260598313Be6FDf6B010f2FbC34957Cd0"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1712862287,
"transactionHash": "0x0acb268e79a76416f50ff0418ab696ada4497fc8ff33747d5edc352ef1d5d1db",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xaa0A1EfD35d6578ea6B5704dbc2c40B36A55B590"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1752758927,
"transactionHash": "0x1d93c182527e3c738f03ffb7baf66bbddfb29e1e60bbd9f5457c7de1a90eaaf1",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x6322C2f2D6a4305Fc033754d486A5A067Ee5F9b1"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1752758927,
"transactionHash": "0x1d93c182527e3c738f03ffb7baf66bbddfb29e1e60bbd9f5457c7de1a90eaaf1",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xba2492e52F45651B60B8B38d4Ea5E2390C64Ffb1"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1752759527,
"transactionHash": "0xfdd53dea057419dee4a1f773029c57925865a0db916df2eddf1dbc988e6f3d56",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xAB9d6cB7A427c0765163A7f45BB91cAfe5f2D375"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1752761915,
"transactionHash": "0x5fc7da71db9e1541e3eeeedbc3dd3058bf01b5d03b10eee95eaa5668e9efd74e",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1752761915,
"transactionHash": "0x5fc7da71db9e1541e3eeeedbc3dd3058bf01b5d03b10eee95eaa5668e9efd74e",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xAB9d6cB7A427c0765163A7f45BB91cAfe5f2D375"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1752761915,
"transactionHash": "0x5fc7da71db9e1541e3eeeedbc3dd3058bf01b5d03b10eee95eaa5668e9efd74e",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x760C48C62A85045A6B69f07F4a9f22868659CbCc"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1752761915,
"transactionHash": "0x5fc7da71db9e1541e3eeeedbc3dd3058bf01b5d03b10eee95eaa5668e9efd74e",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x340f923E5c7cbB2171146f64169EC9d5a9FfE647"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1768920023,
"transactionHash": "0xd025dbac937aa7bd1c53511421d35cc97c18a848ebb123cc85e910ab517a8922",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x2bFE4A5Bd5A41e9d848d843ebCDFa15954e9A557"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1768920023,
"transactionHash": "0xd025dbac937aa7bd1c53511421d35cc97c18a848ebb123cc85e910ab517a8922",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED"
]
}
],
"description": "Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1\n * **batcherHash**: EOA 1\n * **owner**: Bob Multisig 1",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "Bob Multisig 1",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xACB886b75D76d1c8d9248cFdDfA09b70C71c5393#code"
},
{
"name": "RiscZeroGroth16Verifier",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0xafB31f5b70623CDF4b20Ada3f7230916A5A79df9",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Verifier contract for RISC Zero Groth16 proofs (version 2.2.0).\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xafB31f5b70623CDF4b20Ada3f7230916A5A79df9#code"
},
{
"name": "RiscZeroGroth16Verifier",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0xf70aBAb028Eb6F4100A24B203E113D94E87DE93C",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Verifier contract for RISC Zero Groth16 proofs. This older implementation exposes control-root and selector constants but does not expose a VERSION getter.\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xf70aBAb028Eb6F4100A24B203E113D94E87DE93C#code"
},
{
"name": "SuperchainConfig",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0xE925205ad05D8d612Ac205C4941CCd61Fc965C46",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0xa70ddfb3e00fCFD083E64B200FE867104f703E1c"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1752682883,
"transactionHash": "0x4fa702e7eff31a313f049d76f06b704a40c7c520d09ccbf8f9373ca25a6ec37e",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x4da82a327773965b8d4D85Fa3dB8249b387458E7"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1768920023,
"transactionHash": "0xd025dbac937aa7bd1c53511421d35cc97c18a848ebb123cc85e910ab517a8922",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xCe28685EB204186b557133766eCA00334EB441E4"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1768920023,
"transactionHash": "0xd025dbac937aa7bd1c53511421d35cc97c18a848ebb123cc85e910ab517a8922",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xb08Cc720F511062537ca78BdB0AE691F04F5a957"
]
}
],
"description": "This is NOT the shared SuperchainConfig contract of the OP stack Superchain but rather a local fork. It manages pause states for each chain connected to it, as well as a global pause state for all chains. The guardian role can pause either separately, but each pause expires after 3mo 1d if left untouched.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1\n * **guardian**: Bob Multisig 1",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "Bob Multisig 1",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xE925205ad05D8d612Ac205C4941CCd61Fc965C46#code"
},
{
"name": "L1StandardBridge",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x3F6cE1b36e5120BBc59D0cFe8A5aC8b6464ac1f7",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x0d9f416260598313Be6FDf6B010f2FbC34957Cd0"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [],
"description": "The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "Bob Multisig 1",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x3F6cE1b36e5120BBc59D0cFe8A5aC8b6464ac1f7#code"
},
{
"name": "L1ERC721Bridge",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x5fF93263D5181b2A826f8c51d54BC0da2d20D50a",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x0d9f416260598313Be6FDf6B010f2FbC34957Cd0"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1712862323,
"transactionHash": "0x4fca0abc9070a610b427308a8db3834aa45a425d87a261c2331eb633974de603",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xA67fc05D295d2Be6bC4cBfad4f880c1c58734212"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1752758927,
"transactionHash": "0x1d93c182527e3c738f03ffb7baf66bbddfb29e1e60bbd9f5457c7de1a90eaaf1",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x6322C2f2D6a4305Fc033754d486A5A067Ee5F9b1"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1752758927,
"transactionHash": "0x1d93c182527e3c738f03ffb7baf66bbddfb29e1e60bbd9f5457c7de1a90eaaf1",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xAE2AF01232a6c4a4d3012C5eC5b1b35059caF10d"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1752759527,
"transactionHash": "0xfdd53dea057419dee4a1f773029c57925865a0db916df2eddf1dbc988e6f3d56",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1752759527,
"transactionHash": "0xfdd53dea057419dee4a1f773029c57925865a0db916df2eddf1dbc988e6f3d56",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xAE2AF01232a6c4a4d3012C5eC5b1b35059caF10d"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1752761915,
"transactionHash": "0x5fc7da71db9e1541e3eeeedbc3dd3058bf01b5d03b10eee95eaa5668e9efd74e",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x276d3730f219f7ec22274f7263180b8452B46d47"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1752761915,
"transactionHash": "0x5fc7da71db9e1541e3eeeedbc3dd3058bf01b5d03b10eee95eaa5668e9efd74e",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x7aE1d3BD877a4C5CA257404ce26BE93A02C98013"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1768920023,
"transactionHash": "0xd025dbac937aa7bd1c53511421d35cc97c18a848ebb123cc85e910ab517a8922",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x7f1d12fB2911EB095278085f721e644C1f675696"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1768920023,
"transactionHash": "0xd025dbac937aa7bd1c53511421d35cc97c18a848ebb123cc85e910ab517a8922",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9"
]
}
],
"description": "Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "Bob Multisig 1",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x5fF93263D5181b2A826f8c51d54BC0da2d20D50a#code"
},
{
"name": "L1CrossDomainMessenger",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0xE3d981643b806FB8030CDB677D6E60892E547EdA",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "resolved delegate proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x0d9f416260598313Be6FDf6B010f2FbC34957Cd0"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0"
],
"immutable": false
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1712862131,
"transactionHash": "0x49ca0455d3479f3dec361e05c5b47ac8634c14ca765ad8770401421a038eb39d",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xE3d981643b806FB8030CDB677D6E60892E547EdA"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1712862371,
"transactionHash": "0x352fc46bb0f6c989aeb3dcb8490cd8d4a74bcfe919f9136b60dcfcbd9405a6a4",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x237853621998a33Fa5B9B820592F4c6f4c158c12"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1752758927,
"transactionHash": "0x1d93c182527e3c738f03ffb7baf66bbddfb29e1e60bbd9f5457c7de1a90eaaf1",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x6322C2f2D6a4305Fc033754d486A5A067Ee5F9b1"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1752758927,
"transactionHash": "0x1d93c182527e3c738f03ffb7baf66bbddfb29e1e60bbd9f5457c7de1a90eaaf1",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xD3494713A5cfaD3F5359379DfA074E2Ac8C6Fd65"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1752759527,
"transactionHash": "0xfdd53dea057419dee4a1f773029c57925865a0db916df2eddf1dbc988e6f3d56",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1752759527,
"transactionHash": "0xfdd53dea057419dee4a1f773029c57925865a0db916df2eddf1dbc988e6f3d56",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xD3494713A5cfaD3F5359379DfA074E2Ac8C6Fd65"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1752761915,
"transactionHash": "0x5fc7da71db9e1541e3eeeedbc3dd3058bf01b5d03b10eee95eaa5668e9efd74e",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x3eA6084748ED1b2A9B5D4426181F1ad8C93F6231"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1752761915,
"transactionHash": "0x5fc7da71db9e1541e3eeeedbc3dd3058bf01b5d03b10eee95eaa5668e9efd74e",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x5D5a095665886119693F0B41d8DFeE78da033e8B"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1768920023,
"transactionHash": "0xd025dbac937aa7bd1c53511421d35cc97c18a848ebb123cc85e910ab517a8922",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x22D12E0FAebD62d429514A65EBAe32dd316c12D6"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1768920023,
"transactionHash": "0xd025dbac937aa7bd1c53511421d35cc97c18a848ebb123cc85e910ab517a8922",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0"
]
}
],
"description": "Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "Bob Multisig 1",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xE3d981643b806FB8030CDB677D6E60892E547EdA#code"
},
{
"name": "L1ERC20TokenBridge",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x091dF5E1284E49fA682407096aD34cfD42B95B72",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x3e40D73EB977Dc6a537aF587D48316feE66E9C8c"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0xB531445401926029B1647669cFAc8b4e5d8C7777"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1713786239,
"transactionHash": "0x5c9f70728478f27141b59caee9f7e5e113aa710ae69566331419b511d6e4638b",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xB531445401926029B1647669cFAc8b4e5d8C7777"
]
}
],
"description": "Escrow for custom external tokens that use the canonical bridge for messaging but are governed externally.\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x091dF5E1284E49fA682407096aD34cfD42B95B72#code"
},
{
"name": "TimelockController",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 3d.\n* Roles:\n * **canceller**: EOA 2\n * **defaultAdmin**: TimelockController; ultimately EOA 2\n * **executor**: EOA 2\n * **proposer**: EOA 2",
"description": "A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 3d.\n* Roles:\n * **canceller**: Safe\n * **defaultAdmin**: TimelockController; ultimately Safe\n * **executor**: Safe\n * **proposer**: Safe",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711#code"
},
{
"name": "ProxyAdmin",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x0d9f416260598313Be6FDf6B010f2FbC34957Cd0",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "* Roles:\n * **owner**: Bob Multisig 1",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x0d9f416260598313Be6FDf6B010f2FbC34957Cd0#code"
},
{
"name": "PermissionedDisputeGame",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x15F80920C8Fec136e2A804E04f26203FF8dAd19A",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x15F80920C8Fec136e2A804E04f26203FF8dAd19A#code"
},
{
"name": "DelayedWETH",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x1A08BA77CB95184Ea0C31e56f199Db068eb6B35d",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x0d9f416260598313Be6FDf6B010f2FbC34957Cd0"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x33Dadc2d1aA9BB613A7AE6B28425eA00D44c6998"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1768920023,
"transactionHash": "0xd025dbac937aa7bd1c53511421d35cc97c18a848ebb123cc85e910ab517a8922",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x33Dadc2d1aA9BB613A7AE6B28425eA00D44c6998"
]
}
],
"description": "Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "Bob Multisig 1",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x1A08BA77CB95184Ea0C31e56f199Db068eb6B35d#code"
},
{
"name": "RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x1efDd13f831ceeEa14940806705A53D3211CD698",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "A verifier wrapper for the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.\n* Roles:\n * **owner**: EOA 2",
"description": "A verifier wrapper for the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.\n* Roles:\n * **owner**: Safe",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x1efDd13f831ceeEa14940806705A53D3211CD698#code"
},
{
"name": "PreimageOracle",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x1fb8cdFc6831fc866Ed9C51aF8817Da5c287aDD3",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "The PreimageOracle contract is used to load the required data from L1 for a dispute game.\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x1fb8cdFc6831fc866Ed9C51aF8817Da5c287aDD3#code"
},
{
"name": "RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x44c220f0598345195cE99AD6A57aDfFcb9Ea33e7",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "A verifier wrapper for the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.\n* Roles:\n * **owner**: EOA 2",
"description": "A verifier wrapper for the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.\n* Roles:\n * **owner**: EOA 3",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x44c220f0598345195cE99AD6A57aDfFcb9Ea33e7#code"
},
{
"name": "KailuaGame",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x4BE239c86364eD73fc244A5F50c8ccB101a492eF",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Implementation of the KailuaGame with type 1337. Based on this implementation, new KailuaGames are created with every new state root proposal.\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x4BE239c86364eD73fc244A5F50c8ccB101a492eF#code"
},
{
"name": "RiscZeroSetVerifier",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x5005aBa3DFf7C940fcc1e48DccCAD611a80eEB85",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Set verifier contract for RISC Zero proofs (version 0.9.0). It allows verifying a whole set of proofs identified with a Merkle root at once, afterwards each individual proof could be efficiently verified just by checking Merkle inclusion against the verified root.\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x5005aBa3DFf7C940fcc1e48DccCAD611a80eEB85#code"
},
{
"name": "OptimismMintableERC20Factory",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x5557408ab14013ce9Dbb300dE0D87D386BB09cb6",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x0d9f416260598313Be6FDf6B010f2FbC34957Cd0"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1712862335,
"transactionHash": "0xd74512bff91a91df00074f49532b5b49055c084c7adfece6155d7300013a0eac",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x0640c9377a4fAC00225097EACbB0295f4D5fbd76"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1752758927,
"transactionHash": "0x1d93c182527e3c738f03ffb7baf66bbddfb29e1e60bbd9f5457c7de1a90eaaf1",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x6322C2f2D6a4305Fc033754d486A5A067Ee5F9b1"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1752758927,
"transactionHash": "0x1d93c182527e3c738f03ffb7baf66bbddfb29e1e60bbd9f5457c7de1a90eaaf1",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xE01efbeb1089D1d1dB9c6c8b135C934C0734c846"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1752759527,
"transactionHash": "0xfdd53dea057419dee4a1f773029c57925865a0db916df2eddf1dbc988e6f3d56",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xE01efbeb1089D1d1dB9c6c8b135C934C0734c846"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1752761915,
"transactionHash": "0x5fc7da71db9e1541e3eeeedbc3dd3058bf01b5d03b10eee95eaa5668e9efd74e",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x5493f4677A186f64805fe7317D6993ba4863988F"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1768920023,
"transactionHash": "0xd025dbac937aa7bd1c53511421d35cc97c18a848ebb123cc85e910ab517a8922",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB"
]
}
],
"description": "A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "Bob Multisig 1",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x5557408ab14013ce9Dbb300dE0D87D386BB09cb6#code"
},
{
"name": "MIPS",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x6463dEE3828677F6270d83d45408044fc5eDB908",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "The MIPS contract is used to execute the final step of the dispute game which objectively determines the winner of the dispute.\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x6463dEE3828677F6270d83d45408044fc5eDB908#code"
},
{
"name": "RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x68dC2cB4e61774873971c499D9b239ec5Ac540E3",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "A verifier wrapper for the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.\n* Roles:\n * **owner**: EOA 2",
"description": "A verifier wrapper for the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.\n* Roles:\n * **owner**: Safe",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x68dC2cB4e61774873971c499D9b239ec5Ac540E3#code"
},
{
"name": "RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x844D5f01161E3559d36f23d0Aa9E9620949aF782",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "A verifier wrapper for the RiscZeroSetVerifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.\n* Roles:\n * **owner**: EOA 2",
"description": "A verifier wrapper for the RiscZeroSetVerifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.\n* Roles:\n * **owner**: Safe",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x844D5f01161E3559d36f23d0Aa9E9620949aF782#code"
},
{
"name": "RiscZeroVerifierRouter",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x8EaB2D97Dfce405A1692a21b3ff3A172d593D319",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "A router proxy that routes to verifiers based on selectors. The mapping can be changed by a permissioned owner (TimelockController).\n* Roles:\n * **owner**: TimelockController; ultimately EOA 2",
"description": "A router proxy that routes to verifiers based on selectors. The mapping can be changed by a permissioned owner (TimelockController).\n* Roles:\n * **owner**: TimelockController; ultimately Safe",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x8EaB2D97Dfce405A1692a21b3ff3A172d593D319#code"
},
{
"name": "KailuaTreasury",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x9B3E1661bccAF907893B71e4016c01513ae9263C",
"address": "eth:0x9937033Cc967eED9d753e31c77D2F146d002ae53",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Entrypoint for state root proposals. Manages bonds (currently 0.5 ETH) and tournaments for the OP Kailua state validation system, wrapping the OP stack native DisputeGameFactory. The current vanguard advantage is defined here as 0s.\n",
"description": "Entrypoint for state root proposals. Manages bonds (currently 0.5 ETH) and tournaments for the OP Kailua state validation system, wrapping the OP stack native DisputeGameFactory. The current vanguard advantage is defined here as 1mo.\n* Roles:\n * **vanguard**: EOA 2",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x9B3E1661bccAF907893B71e4016c01513ae9263C#code"
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x9937033Cc967eED9d753e31c77D2F146d002ae53#code"
},
{
"name": "RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x9F9994Eb4Cb5200198FEfb470f8b50301662e696",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "A verifier wrapper for the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.\n* Roles:\n * **owner**: EOA 2",
"description": "A verifier wrapper for the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.\n* Roles:\n * **owner**: Safe",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x9F9994Eb4Cb5200198FEfb470f8b50301662e696#code"
},
{
"name": "KailuaVerifier",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0xa23bf38299bbCbAA01b9ea8a1d3412D9f405b97d",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0xC91482A96e9c2A104d9298D1980eCCf8C4dc764E"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0xF59DA245d3D69E5432Afd05008E8D332C1bfAb4e"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1777898303,
"transactionHash": "0x237eddbdb5201a747c74cb6964186fdb2dd8c7924d61b2d594a15fd8c286f3ad",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xF59DA245d3D69E5432Afd05008E8D332C1bfAb4e"
]
}
],
"description": "* Roles:\n * **admin**: Bob Multisig 1",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "Bob Multisig 1",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xa23bf38299bbCbAA01b9ea8a1d3412D9f405b97d#code"
},
{
"name": "ProxyAdmin",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0xa70ddfb3e00fCFD083E64B200FE867104f703E1c",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "* Roles:\n * **owner**: Bob Multisig 1",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xa70ddfb3e00fCFD083E64B200FE867104f703E1c#code"
},
{
"name": "AnchorStateRegistry",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0xC9AC21AcD8696B64270716528bF83630Ea7a293c",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x0d9f416260598313Be6FDf6B010f2FbC34957Cd0"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0xd0216bdcC195abDF77746B6a6347CE85e2535431"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1768920023,
"transactionHash": "0xd025dbac937aa7bd1c53511421d35cc97c18a848ebb123cc85e910ab517a8922",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xeb69cC681E8D4a557b30DFFBAd85aFfD47a2CF2E"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1773311975,
"transactionHash": "0x0c0e889a96e766d168753f3e596af7d57a9c07f7d84fb0ba05e3d46adf61ddd8",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xd0216bdcC195abDF77746B6a6347CE85e2535431"
]
}
],
"description": "Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the KailuaGame.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Bob Multisig 1",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "Bob Multisig 1",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xC9AC21AcD8696B64270716528bF83630Ea7a293c#code"
},
{
"name": "KailuaGame",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0xD37b0BEdD9094988a31dBbB6BF77dC97269E742b",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Implementation of the KailuaGame with type 1337. Based on this implementation, new KailuaGames are created with every new state root proposal.\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xD37b0BEdD9094988a31dBbB6BF77dC97269E742b#code"
},
{
"name": "RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0xDa8f3de6fBBdb261Ac771B813a578A7aBdA6B2b1",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "A verifier wrapper for the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.\n* Roles:\n * **owner**: EOA 2",
"description": "A verifier wrapper for the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.\n* Roles:\n * **owner**: Safe",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xDa8f3de6fBBdb261Ac771B813a578A7aBdA6B2b1#code"
}
]
},
"escrows": [
{
"address": "0x8AdeE124447435fE03e3CD24dF3f4cAE32E65a3E",
"sinceTimestamp": 1712862059,
"tokens": [
"ETH"
],
"contract": {
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x8AdeE124447435fE03e3CD24dF3f4cAE32E65a3E",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x0d9f416260598313Be6FDf6B010f2FbC34957Cd0"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x3C877699263119022Cdaa251058c1BAc8Fc43287"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1712862419,
"transactionHash": "0x86a85eda6fa19f4bcfe42bfe648335d93dde76ba0c31e0582608eefe04dd29b5",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x994e3B01D130944a3E67BFd3B8Fc73069b959FEc"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1752758927,
"transactionHash": "0x1d93c182527e3c738f03ffb7baf66bbddfb29e1e60bbd9f5457c7de1a90eaaf1",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x6322C2f2D6a4305Fc033754d486A5A067Ee5F9b1"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1752758927,
"transactionHash": "0x1d93c182527e3c738f03ffb7baf66bbddfb29e1e60bbd9f5457c7de1a90eaaf1",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x2D778797049FE9259d947D1ED8e5442226dFB589"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1752761915,
"transactionHash": "0x5fc7da71db9e1541e3eeeedbc3dd3058bf01b5d03b10eee95eaa5668e9efd74e",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1752761915,
"transactionHash": "0x5fc7da71db9e1541e3eeeedbc3dd3058bf01b5d03b10eee95eaa5668e9efd74e",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1752761915,
"transactionHash": "0x5fc7da71db9e1541e3eeeedbc3dd3058bf01b5d03b10eee95eaa5668e9efd74e",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x2D7e764a0D9919e16983a46595CfA81fc34fa7Cd"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1752761915,
"transactionHash": "0x5fc7da71db9e1541e3eeeedbc3dd3058bf01b5d03b10eee95eaa5668e9efd74e",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1753214303,
"transactionHash": "0xa7881069c54f1028d42b83406ac5a768154f8ff34ad37ec7641b4d45766e77c3",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xB250566074B3c0f1B109A531A83f3d9B1a579273"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1768920023,
"transactionHash": "0xd025dbac937aa7bd1c53511421d35cc97c18a848ebb123cc85e910ab517a8922",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x381E729FF983FA4BCEd820e7b922d79bF653B999"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1768920023,
"transactionHash": "0xd025dbac937aa7bd1c53511421d35cc97c18a848ebb123cc85e910ab517a8922",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1773311975,
"transactionHash": "0x0c0e889a96e766d168753f3e596af7d57a9c07f7d84fb0ba05e3d46adf61ddd8",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x3C877699263119022Cdaa251058c1BAc8Fc43287"
]
}
],
"description": "Main entry point for users depositing ETH.",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "ProxyAdmin",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x8AdeE124447435fE03e3CD24dF3f4cAE32E65a3E#code"
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"includeInTotal": true,
"chainId": 1
},
{
"address": "0x3F6cE1b36e5120BBc59D0cFe8A5aC8b6464ac1f7",
"sinceTimestamp": 1712862107,
"tokens": "*",
"excludedTokens": [
"SolvBTC",
"SolvBTC.BBN"
],
"contract": {
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x3F6cE1b36e5120BBc59D0cFe8A5aC8b6464ac1f7",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x0d9f416260598313Be6FDf6B010f2FbC34957Cd0"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [],
"description": "Main entry point for users depositing ERC20 token that do not require custom gateway.",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "ProxyAdmin",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x3F6cE1b36e5120BBc59D0cFe8A5aC8b6464ac1f7#code"
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"includeInTotal": true,
"chainId": 1
},
{
"address": "0x091dF5E1284E49fA682407096aD34cfD42B95B72",
"sinceTimestamp": 1713786239,
"tokens": [
"wstETH"
],
"contract": {
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x091dF5E1284E49fA682407096aD34cfD42B95B72",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x3e40D73EB977Dc6a537aF587D48316feE66E9C8c"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0xB531445401926029B1647669cFAc8b4e5d8C7777"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1713786239,
"transactionHash": "0x5c9f70728478f27141b59caee9f7e5e113aa710ae69566331419b511d6e4638b",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xB531445401926029B1647669cFAc8b4e5d8C7777"
]
}
],
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x091dF5E1284E49fA682407096aD34cfD42B95B72#code"
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"includeInTotal": true,
"chainId": 1
}
],
"programHashes": [
{
"title": "Kailua fault proof program BOB",
"description": "Program that executes OP Kona client to derive blocks and generate fault or validity proofs, is a part of ZK non-interactive kailua fault proof system. This version adds op-contracts v5 compatibility.",
"description": "Program that executes OP Kona client to derive blocks and generate fault or validity proofs, is a part of ZK non-interactive kailua fault proof system. ",
"proverSystemProject": "risc0",
"verificationStatus": "notVerified",
"hash": "0x4aca4abde3db9c42152b4d9eb359e6030111c34ba68f7c68160fce93ed5b7b25"
},
{
"title": "Set builder program",
"description": "Recursively verifies a Merkle tree of zk proofs at once, identified by a Merkle Mountain Range root.",
"programUrl": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/tree/v3.0.1/crates/aggregation/guest/set-builder",
"proverSystemProject": "risc0",
"verificationStatus": "successful",
"verificationSteps": "Even though the program is compiled in docker for reproducibility reasons, it gives the correct image ID only on linux OS. Steps below were done on Ubuntu 22.04 OS.\n\nPrepare:\n\n1. Install rust: `curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh`, then `. .cargo/env`.\n2. Install dependency libs `sudo apt-get install build-essential`.\n3. Install docker [https://docs.docker.com/get-started/get-docker/](https://docs.docker.com/get-started/get-docker/).\n4. Install the risc zero toolkit `curl -L https://risczero.com/install | bash`, then `rzup install`.\n\nVerify:\n\n1. Checkout the correct branch in [risc0-ethereum](https://github.com/risc0/risc0-ethereum/tree/main) repo: `git checkout v3.0.1` . Commit hash should be `365e7b2db4f620fa256580c27558d2623362b9ae `.\n2. Make sure docker is running by running `docker ps `.\n3. Set env var to use Risc Zero docker build: `export RISC0_USE_DOCKER=1`.\n4. From the repo root dir: `cargo risczero build --manifest-path crates/aggregation/guest/set-builder/Cargo.toml` to build elf binaries from sources. This command should output correct ImageID.",
"hash": "0x70909b25db0db00f1d4b4016aeb876f53568a3e5a8e6397cb562d79947a02cc9"
"hash": "0x3768ea4f0e0d940f69c4cc5bd39a9e2772bfe3cb57818ce526bbe68033ee5934"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades.",
"isCritical": true
}
],
"zkVerifiers": [
"eth:0xafB31f5b70623CDF4b20Ada3f7230916A5A79df9",
"eth:0x2a098988600d87650Fb061FfAff08B97149Fa84D"
"eth:0xa23bf38299bbCbAA01b9ea8a1d3412D9f405b97d"
]
}+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1773320760,
"baseTimestamp": 1783072732,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}+24 -0
+24 -0
{
"creator": "RISC Zero",
"projectsForTvs": [
{
"projectId": "taiko",
"sinceTimestamp": 1730452800
},
{
"projectId": "bob",
"sinceTimestamp": 1752703200
},
{
"projectId": "megaeth",
"sinceTimestamp": 1763954183
},
{
"projectId": "soon",
"sinceTimestamp": 1765180787
},
{
"projectId": "base",
"sinceTimestamp": 1779825599
},
{
"projectId": "roninnetwork",
"sinceTimestamp": 1780557929
}
],
"proofSystemInfo": "## Description\n\nRISC Zero is the first zkVM proving RISC-V ISA programs. Its STARK proving system is based on a rather standard theoretical construction of [Ben-Sasson et al paper](https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/046) and [DEEP-ALI version of FRI](https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/336). The proof of zkVM execution is wrapped in Groth16 SNARK for efficient onchain verification. RISC Zero onchain verifier targets [96 bits of security](https://dev.risczero.com/api/security-model#cryptographic-security).\n\n## Proof system\n\n### RISC-V circuit\n\nRISC Zero implements a [circuit that proves RISC-V RV32IM instruction set](https://github.com/risc0/risc0/tree/main/risc0/circuit/rv32im) (see [here](https://dev.risczero.com/api/zkvm/zkvm-specification#the-zkvm-execution-model) for more details). Arithmetization of this circuit has different types of columns: control, data and accumulator. Control columns contain public data that describes the RISC-V program being executed and proven. Data and accumulator columns contain private data (accessible only to prover), data represents the running state of the processor and memory and accumulator is auxiliary data for the PLOOKUP argument.\n\n### Recursion circuit\n\nRISC Zero prover supports recursive proving of RISC-V programs using [recursion circuit](https://github.com/risc0/risc0/tree/main/risc0/circuit/recursion). This is a separate STARK circuit that is designed to efficiently generate proofs for the verification of STARK proofs, it uses the same proving system as the RISC-V circuit.\n\nBig programs are split into several segments that are executed and proven in parallel. Segment receipts (i.e. proofs of correct execution) are verified with recursion circuits and succinct receipts are produced. These succinct receipts could be recursively joined in pairs of two until a single succinct proof of the whole execution is produced. \n\n### Final wrap\n\nRISC Zero [implements a SNARK wrapping](https://github.com/risc0/risc0/tree/main/risc0/groth16) of a recursive succinct receipt into a Groth16 proof over BN254 curve for onchain verification. This Groth16 R1CS circuit uses a circuit-specific trusted setup, the ceremony was run by RISC Zero, see [below](#trusted-setups) for more details. \n\nThe final wrap circuit has a [control root](https://dev.risczero.com/terminology#control-root) public input that depends on the RISC-V and recursion circuit versions. This design allows upgrading RISC Zero proving system without changing the final wrapper and thus without running a new trusted setup ceremony.",
"techStack": {
"zkVM": [
{
"id": "RISC0",
"type": "STARK",
"name": "Risc0",
"description": "zkVM STARK proving system developed by RISC ZERO for RISC-V programs."
},
{
"id": "RISCV32",
"type": "ISA",
"name": "RISC-V 32bit",
"description": "Free and open-source universal 32-bit ISA used across a variety of hardware and software."
},
{
"id": "BabyBear",
"type": "Field",
"name": "Baby Bear",
"description": "Prime field of order p = 15 * 2**27 + 1."
}
],
"finalWrap": [
{
"id": "Snarkjs",
"type": "Groth16",
"name": "Snarkjs",
"description": "Circom / iden3 implementation of Groth16 proving system written in JS."
},
{
"id": "BN254",
"type": "curve",
"name": "BN254",
"description": "BN254, aka BN256, aka alt_bn128 pairing-friendly 254-bit prime field Weierstrass elliptic curve."
}
]
},
"trustedSetups": [
{
"proofSystem": {
"id": "Snarkjs",
"type": "Groth16",
"name": "Snarkjs",
"description": "Circom / iden3 implementation of Groth16 proving system written in JS."
},
"id": "Risc0",
"name": "Risc0 Groth16",
"participantCount": 55,
"risk": "yellow",
"shortDescription": "Circuit-specific trusted setup for Risc0 final wrap Groth16 onchain verifier. It was built on top of 55 phase 1 contributions, and reached 238 phase 2 participants. Proving system could be broken if either phase 1 or 2 is compromised.",
"longDescription": "Ceremony for a circuit-specific trusted setup run by Risc0 for Groth16 circuits verifying Risc0 STARK proof.\n\nRisc0 Groth16 builds on top of Polygon zkEVM ceremony as phase 1. It contains 55 participants.\n\nPhase 2 of the trusted setup was publicly announced and run with 238 participants. Ceremony transcript, as well as instructions for participation and verification \nare publicly available.\n\n- Phase 1 ceremony: .\n- Ceremony instructions: [https://risczero.com/blog/ceremony-contribution-public-instructions](https://risczero.com/blog/ceremony-contribution-public-instructions)\n- Link to the verification: [https://dev.risczero.com/api/trusted-setup-ceremony#the-transcript-matches-the-circuit](https://dev.risczero.com/api/trusted-setup-ceremony#the-transcript-matches-the-circuit)\n- Post with a call to community to participate: [https://x.com/RiscZero/status/1781110200923275769](https://x.com/RiscZero/status/1781110200923275769)"
}
],
"verifierHashes": [
{
"hash": "0xa42b7a9c647b7bea4f92660bfd9cd3c5afc91b4c40773f9fb410eb55c8402e40",
"name": "RiscZero v2.2.0",
"sourceLink": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0/tree/v2.2.0",
"proofSystem": {
"id": "Snarkjs",
"type": "Groth16",
"name": "Snarkjs",
"description": "Circom / iden3 implementation of Groth16 proving system written in JS."
},
"knownDeployments": [
{
"address": "eth:0xafB31f5b70623CDF4b20Ada3f7230916A5A79df9",
"overrideUsedIn": [
"taiko",
"bob",
"megaeth",
"soon"
]
}
],
"verificationStatus": "successful",
"attesters": [
{
"id": "l2beat",
"name": "L2BEAT",
"link": "https://l2beat.com"
}
],
"verificationSteps": "Verification works on a linux machine, 36 GiB of memory is enough to regenerate the verifier. Approximately 14 GiB of trusted setup files need to be downloaded.\n\nTo regenerate the verifier, both Groth16 verifier keys and constructor parameters `control_root` and `bn254_control_id` need to be regenerated.\n\n1. Install npm, rust, git-lfs:\n```\ncurl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh\n. .cargo/env\n\nsudo apt install npm git-lfs\n```\n\n2. Install snarkjs and circom v2.1.0 (from sources):\n```\nnpm install -g snarkjs\n\ngit clone https://github.com/iden3/circom.git\ncd circom\ngit checkout v2.1.0\ncargo build --release\ncargo install --path circom\nexport PATH=\"$HOME/.cargo/bin:$PATH\"\n```\n\n3. Clone risc0 repo, lfs pull the circuit for verifying Risc Zero STARK proofs and compile it into R1CS:\n```\ngit clone https://github.com/risc0/risc0.git\ncd risc0\ngit checkout v2.0.0 # hash 3f26f9d4c2fb8a7e5eb830ae2433c8eae67f5a38\ngit lfs install\ngit lfs pull --include=groth16_proof/groth16/stark_verify.circom\ncd groth16_proof/groth16\ncircom stark_verify.circom --r1cs\n\n# check that the circuit is correct:\nshasum -a 256 stark_verify.r1cs # output should be 84d3c34b7c0eb55ad1b16b24f75e0b9de307f7b74089ea4a20a998390ee24178\n```\n\n4. Download phase 1 and phase 2 trusted setup files, verify their correctness:\n```\nwget https://storage.googleapis.com/zkevm/ptau/powersOfTau28_hez_final_23.ptau\nwget https://risc0-artifacts.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/tsc/2024-04-04/stark_verify_final.zkey\n\nexport NODE_OPTIONS=\"--max-old-space-size=32768\" # without this snarkjs runs out of mem\nsnarkjs zkey verify stark_verify.r1cs powersOfTau28_hez_final_23.ptau stark_verify_final.zkey\n```\n\n5. Export the solidity verifier. Check it manually against the deployed smart contract: `snarkjs zkey export solidityverifier stark_verify_final.zkey verifier.sol`.\n\n6. Check out to the `v2.2.0` tag of risc0 repo: `git checkout v2.2.0`, commit hash should be `eff3c74bf9992401c2c68bea95eb6c93b27999ec`. \nFrom the risc0 repo root dir, call `RUST_LOG=info cargo xtask bootstrap`. \nIt will output computed `allowed_control_root` and `bn254_identity_control_id` that could be compared with the contract constructor values: `0xce52bf56033842021af3cf6db8a50d1b7535c125a34f1a22c6fdcf002c5a1529` and `0x04446e66d300eb7fb45c9726bb53c793dda407a62e9601618bb43c5c14657ac0`. Note that the bytes of `bn254_identity_control_id` will be output in the reversed order.",
"description": "Custom verifier ID: SHA256 hash of the following values abi packed together: the bytes32 value of internal pure function verifier_key_digest() of the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier.sol, bytes32 value of `control_root` and bytes32 value of `bn254_control_id` of contract constructor values."
},
{
"hash": "0x10ab33bc472e3e9024d89e512d33781519ba9b1621e4fe0ffd80cd20523062a8",
"name": "RiscZero v3.0.0",
"sourceLink": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0/tree/v3.0.0",
"proofSystem": {
"id": "Snarkjs",
"type": "Groth16",
"name": "Snarkjs",
"description": "Circom / iden3 implementation of Groth16 proving system written in JS."
},
"knownDeployments": [
{
"address": "eth:0x2a098988600d87650Fb061FfAff08B97149Fa84D",
"overrideUsedIn": [
"bob",
"taiko"
]
},
{
"address": "eth:0x411e56a890c5fe0712f6F345977815Ba8E7785C3"
}
],
"verificationStatus": "successful",
"attesters": [
{
"id": "l2beat",
"name": "L2BEAT",
"link": "https://l2beat.com"
}
],
"verificationSteps": "Verification works on a linux machine, 36 GiB of memory is enough to regenerate the verifier. Approximately 14 GiB of trusted setup files need to be downloaded.\n\nTo regenerate the verifier, both Groth16 verifier keys and constructor parameters `control_root` and `bn254_control_id` need to be regenerated.\n\n1. Install npm, rust, git-lfs:\n```\ncurl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh\n. .cargo/env\n\nsudo apt install npm git-lfs\n```\n\n2. Install snarkjs and circom v2.1.0 (from sources):\n```\nnpm install -g snarkjs\n\ngit clone https://github.com/iden3/circom.git\ncd circom\ngit checkout v2.1.0\ncargo build --release\ncargo install --path circom\nexport PATH=\"$HOME/.cargo/bin:$PATH\"\n```\n\n3. Clone risc0 repo, lfs pull the circuit for verifying Risc Zero STARK proofs and compile it into R1CS:\n```\ngit clone https://github.com/risc0/risc0.git\ncd risc0\ngit checkout v2.0.0 # hash 3f26f9d4c2fb8a7e5eb830ae2433c8eae67f5a38\ngit lfs install\ngit lfs pull --include=groth16_proof/groth16/stark_verify.circom\ncd groth16_proof/groth16\ncircom stark_verify.circom --r1cs\n\n# check that the circuit is correct:\nshasum -a 256 stark_verify.r1cs # output should be 84d3c34b7c0eb55ad1b16b24f75e0b9de307f7b74089ea4a20a998390ee24178\n```\n\n4. Download phase 1 and phase 2 trusted setup files, verify their correctness:\n```\nwget https://storage.googleapis.com/zkevm/ptau/powersOfTau28_hez_final_23.ptau\nwget https://risc0-artifacts.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/tsc/2024-04-04/stark_verify_final.zkey\n\nexport NODE_OPTIONS=\"--max-old-space-size=32768\" # without this snarkjs runs out of mem\nsnarkjs zkey verify stark_verify.r1cs powersOfTau28_hez_final_23.ptau stark_verify_final.zkey\n```\n\n5. Export the solidity verifier. Check it manually against the deployed smart contract: `snarkjs zkey export solidityverifier stark_verify_final.zkey verifier.sol`.\n\n6. Check out to the `v3.0.0` tag of risc0 repo: `git checkout v3.0.0`, commit hash should be `96eef1c3c9c6dde65dcc2fc86791a4358fcc8e4d`. \nFrom the risc0 repo root dir, call `RUST_LOG=info cargo xtask bootstrap`. \nIt will output computed `allowed_control_root` and `bn254_identity_control_id` that could be compared with the contract constructor values: `0xa54dc85ac99f851c92d7c96d7318af41dbe7c0194edfcc37eb4d422a998c1f56` and `0x04446e66d300eb7fb45c9726bb53c793dda407a62e9601618bb43c5c14657ac0`. Note that the bytes of `bn254_identity_control_id` will be output in the reversed order.",
"description": "Custom verifier ID: SHA256 hash of the following values abi packed together: the bytes32 value of internal pure function verifier_key_digest() of the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier.sol, bytes32 value of `control_root` and bytes32 value of `bn254_control_id` of contract constructor values."
},
{
"hash": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
"name": "RiscZero Soon verifier",
"proofSystem": {
"id": "Snarkjs",
"type": "Groth16",
"name": "Snarkjs",
"description": "Circom / iden3 implementation of Groth16 proving system written in JS."
},
"knownDeployments": [
{
"address": "eth:0x455218fa82e96A6adCcf182EE8A90A93BE7a6Bc6"
}
],
"verificationStatus": "unsuccessful",
"attesters": [
{
"id": "l2beat",
"name": "L2BEAT",
"link": "https://l2beat.com"
}
],
"description": "Verifier smart contract sources are not available on Etherscan, hash value is set to 0x0 to indicate that it is not known."
},
{
"hash": "0x79325d9dc09af1afcea4dbf04db9fada7a71846045ad56daa1996bbebf9468d8",
"name": "RiscZero v1.0.0",
"sourceLink": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0/tree/v1.0.0",
"proofSystem": {
"id": "Snarkjs",
"type": "Groth16",
"name": "Snarkjs",
"description": "Circom / iden3 implementation of Groth16 proving system written in JS."
},
"knownDeployments": [
{
"address": "eth:0xf70aBAb028Eb6F4100A24B203E113D94E87DE93C"
}
],
"verificationStatus": "successful",
"attesters": [
{
"id": "l2beat",
"name": "L2BEAT",
"link": "https://l2beat.com"
}
],
"verificationSteps": "Verification works on a linux machine, 36 GiB of memory is enough to regenerate the verifier. Approximately 14 GiB of trusted setup files need to be downloaded.\n\nTo regenerate the verifier, both Groth16 verifier keys and constructor parameters `control_root` and `bn254_control_id` need to be regenerated.\n\n1. Install npm, rust, git-lfs:\n```\ncurl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh\n. .cargo/env\n\nsudo apt install npm git-lfs\n```\n\n2. Install snarkjs and circom v2.1.0 (from sources):\n```\nnpm install -g snarkjs\n\ngit clone https://github.com/iden3/circom.git\ncd circom\ngit checkout v2.1.0\ncargo build --release\ncargo install --path circom\nexport PATH=\"$HOME/.cargo/bin:$PATH\"\n```\n\n3. Clone risc0 repo, lfs pull the circuit for verifying Risc Zero STARK proofs and compile it into R1CS:\n```\ngit clone https://github.com/risc0/risc0.git\ncd risc0\ngit checkout v2.0.0 # hash 3f26f9d4c2fb8a7e5eb830ae2433c8eae67f5a38\ngit lfs install\ngit lfs pull --include=groth16_proof/groth16/stark_verify.circom\ncd groth16_proof/groth16\ncircom stark_verify.circom --r1cs\n\n# check that the circuit is correct:\nshasum -a 256 stark_verify.r1cs # output should be 84d3c34b7c0eb55ad1b16b24f75e0b9de307f7b74089ea4a20a998390ee24178\n```\n\n4. Download phase 1 and phase 2 trusted setup files, verify their correctness:\n```\nwget https://storage.googleapis.com/zkevm/ptau/powersOfTau28_hez_final_23.ptau\nwget https://risc0-artifacts.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/tsc/2024-04-04/stark_verify_final.zkey\n\nexport NODE_OPTIONS=\"--max-old-space-size=32768\" # without this snarkjs runs out of mem\nsnarkjs zkey verify stark_verify.r1cs powersOfTau28_hez_final_23.ptau stark_verify_final.zkey\n```\n\n5. Export the solidity verifier. Check it manually against the deployed smart contract: `snarkjs zkey export solidityverifier stark_verify_final.zkey verifier.sol`.\n\n6. Check out to the `v1.0.0` tag of risc0 repo: `git checkout v1.0.0`, commit hash should be `f2d27817a953ca4548739164afaf065de4d9a54a`.\nFrom the risc0 repo root dir, call `RUST_LOG=info cargo xtask bootstrap`. \nIt will output computed `allowed_control_root` and `bn254_identity_control_id` that could be compared with the contract constructor values: `0xa516a057c9fbf5629106300934d48e0e775d4230e41e503347cad96fcbde7e2e` and `0x0eb6febcf06c5df079111be116f79bd8c7e85dc9448776ef9a59aaf2624ab551`. Note that the bytes of `bn254_identity_control_id` will be output in the reversed order.",
"description": "Custom verifier ID: SHA256 hash of the following values abi packed together: the bytes32 value of internal pure function verifier_key_digest() of the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier.sol, bytes32 value of `control_root` and bytes32 value of `bn254_control_id` of contract constructor values."
},
{
"hash": "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
"name": "Kailua v1.2.0 verifier",
"proofSystem": {
"id": "Snarkjs",
"type": "Groth16",
"name": "Snarkjs",
"description": "Circom / iden3 implementation of Groth16 proving system written in JS."
},
"knownDeployments": [
{
"address": "eth:0xa23bf38299bbCbAA01b9ea8a1d3412D9f405b97d"
}
],
"verificationStatus": "notVerified",
"attesters": [
{
"id": "l2beat",
"name": "L2BEAT",
"link": "https://l2beat.com"
}
],
"description": "Kailua v1.2.0 introduces a dedicated KailuaVerifier wrapper contract (deployed behind a proxy) that gates proof verification with optional fault-proof permits before delegating to the underlying RISC Zero verifier at `RISC_ZERO_VERIFIER`."
},
{
"hash": "0x55c1a9d623f4b589ad496bf8fde885abfafbcbf0129c67f1dbc78c8430b69eaf",
"name": "RiscZero v2.0.0-rc.3",
"sourceLink": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0/tree/v2.0.0-rc.3",
"proofSystem": {
"id": "Snarkjs",
"type": "Groth16",
"name": "Snarkjs",
"description": "Circom / iden3 implementation of Groth16 proving system written in JS."
},
"knownDeployments": [
{
"address": "eth:0x20ff7C2Cf391a5F096A2Cc181cb41916680f8E97"
}
],
"verificationStatus": "successful",
"attesters": [
{
"id": "l2beat",
"name": "L2BEAT",
"link": "https://l2beat.com"
}
],
"verificationSteps": "Verification works on a linux machine, 36 GiB of memory is enough to regenerate the verifier. Approximately 14 GiB of trusted setup files need to be downloaded.\n\nTo regenerate the verifier, both Groth16 verifier keys and constructor parameters `control_root` and `bn254_control_id` need to be regenerated.\n\n1. Install npm, rust, git-lfs:\n```\ncurl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh\n. .cargo/env\n\nsudo apt install npm git-lfs\n```\n\n2. Install snarkjs and circom v2.1.0 (from sources):\n```\nnpm install -g snarkjs\n\ngit clone https://github.com/iden3/circom.git\ncd circom\ngit checkout v2.1.0\ncargo build --release\ncargo install --path circom\nexport PATH=\"$HOME/.cargo/bin:$PATH\"\n```\n\n3. Clone risc0 repo, lfs pull the circuit for verifying Risc Zero STARK proofs and compile it into R1CS:\n```\ngit clone https://github.com/risc0/risc0.git\ncd risc0\ngit checkout v2.0.0 # hash 3f26f9d4c2fb8a7e5eb830ae2433c8eae67f5a38\ngit lfs install\ngit lfs pull --include=groth16_proof/groth16/stark_verify.circom\ncd groth16_proof/groth16\ncircom stark_verify.circom --r1cs\n\n# check that the circuit is correct:\nshasum -a 256 stark_verify.r1cs # output should be 84d3c34b7c0eb55ad1b16b24f75e0b9de307f7b74089ea4a20a998390ee24178\n```\n\n4. Download phase 1 and phase 2 trusted setup files, verify their correctness:\n```\nwget https://storage.googleapis.com/zkevm/ptau/powersOfTau28_hez_final_23.ptau\nwget https://risc0-artifacts.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/tsc/2024-04-04/stark_verify_final.zkey\n\nexport NODE_OPTIONS=\"--max-old-space-size=32768\" # without this snarkjs runs out of mem\nsnarkjs zkey verify stark_verify.r1cs powersOfTau28_hez_final_23.ptau stark_verify_final.zkey\n```\n\n5. Export the solidity verifier. Check it manually against the deployed smart contract: `snarkjs zkey export solidityverifier stark_verify_final.zkey verifier.sol`.\n\n6. Check out to the `v2.0.0-rc.3` tag of risc0 repo: `git checkout v2.0.0-rc.3`, commit hash should be `99e8616b4e74203a5aa361a485e0196516b4b308`. \nFrom the risc0 repo root dir, call `RUST_LOG=info cargo xtask bootstrap`. \nIt will output computed `allowed_control_root` and `bn254_identity_control_id` that could be compared with the contract constructor values: `0x539032186827b06719244873b17b2d4c122e2d02cfb1994fe958b2523b844576` and `0x04446e66d300eb7fb45c9726bb53c793dda407a62e9601618bb43c5c14657ac0`. Note that the bytes of `bn254_identity_control_id` will be output in the reversed order.",
"description": "Custom verifier ID: SHA256 hash of the following values abi packed together: the bytes32 value of internal pure function verifier_key_digest() of the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier.sol, bytes32 value of `control_root` and bytes32 value of `bn254_control_id` of contract constructor values."
},
{
"hash": "0x23aae7a460d8470faa11d2b75a9005eee1d3e0bce0e88ac2288f1ada4e4664df",
"name": "RiscZero v2.1.0",
"sourceLink": "https://github.com/risc0/risc0/tree/v2.1.0",
"proofSystem": {
"id": "Snarkjs",
"type": "Groth16",
"name": "Snarkjs",
"description": "Circom / iden3 implementation of Groth16 proving system written in JS."
},
"knownDeployments": [
{
"address": "eth:0x54aCE3ED46529B4d4F3770C8Bad5dDC48717B9bF"
}
],
"verificationStatus": "successful",
"attesters": [
{
"id": "l2beat",
"name": "L2BEAT",
"link": "https://l2beat.com"
}
],
"verificationSteps": "Verification works on a linux machine, 36 GiB of memory is enough to regenerate the verifier. Approximately 14 GiB of trusted setup files need to be downloaded.\n\nTo regenerate the verifier, both Groth16 verifier keys and constructor parameters `control_root` and `bn254_control_id` need to be regenerated.\n\n1. Install npm, rust, git-lfs:\n```\ncurl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh\n. .cargo/env\n\nsudo apt install npm git-lfs\n```\n\n2. Install snarkjs and circom v2.1.0 (from sources):\n```\nnpm install -g snarkjs\n\ngit clone https://github.com/iden3/circom.git\ncd circom\ngit checkout v2.1.0\ncargo build --release\ncargo install --path circom\nexport PATH=\"$HOME/.cargo/bin:$PATH\"\n```\n\n3. Clone risc0 repo, lfs pull the circuit for verifying Risc Zero STARK proofs and compile it into R1CS:\n```\ngit clone https://github.com/risc0/risc0.git\ncd risc0\ngit checkout v2.0.0 # hash 3f26f9d4c2fb8a7e5eb830ae2433c8eae67f5a38\ngit lfs install\ngit lfs pull --include=groth16_proof/groth16/stark_verify.circom\ncd groth16_proof/groth16\ncircom stark_verify.circom --r1cs\n\n# check that the circuit is correct:\nshasum -a 256 stark_verify.r1cs # output should be 84d3c34b7c0eb55ad1b16b24f75e0b9de307f7b74089ea4a20a998390ee24178\n```\n\n4. Download phase 1 and phase 2 trusted setup files, verify their correctness:\n```\nwget https://storage.googleapis.com/zkevm/ptau/powersOfTau28_hez_final_23.ptau\nwget https://risc0-artifacts.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/tsc/2024-04-04/stark_verify_final.zkey\n\nexport NODE_OPTIONS=\"--max-old-space-size=32768\" # without this snarkjs runs out of mem\nsnarkjs zkey verify stark_verify.r1cs powersOfTau28_hez_final_23.ptau stark_verify_final.zkey\n```\n\n5. Export the solidity verifier. Check it manually against the deployed smart contract: `snarkjs zkey export solidityverifier stark_verify_final.zkey verifier.sol`.\n\n6. Check out to the `v2.1.0` tag of risc0 repo: `git checkout v2.1.0`, commit hash should be `0f60032dce731863eba197c8494bdf455445c4af`. \nFrom the risc0 repo root dir, call `RUST_LOG=info cargo xtask bootstrap`. \nIt will output computed `allowed_control_root` and `bn254_identity_control_id` that could be compared with the contract constructor values: `0x884389273e128b32475b334dec75ee619b77cb33d41c332021fe7e44c746ee60` and `0x04446e66d300eb7fb45c9726bb53c793dda407a62e9601618bb43c5c14657ac0`. Note that the bytes of `bn254_identity_control_id` will be output in the reversed order.",
"description": "Custom verifier ID: SHA256 hash of the following values abi packed together: the bytes32 value of internal pure function verifier_key_digest() of the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier.sol, bytes32 value of `control_root` and bytes32 value of `bn254_control_id` of contract constructor values."
}
]
}