d098d668 (main)
and
e6e44ffb (PR)
+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"badges": [],
"description": "A selective-disclosure privacy system for Ethereum that adds compliance-aware association sets.",
"detailedDescription": "Privacy Pools is a non-custodial privacy protocol on Ethereum built around asset-specific pools and private withdrawals, adding compliance by whitelisting all legitimate deposits. A deposit creates a commitment, which is represented by secret and nullifier, and a later withdrawal uses a zero-knowledge proof to spend that commitment, either partially or in full, without revealing the matching deposit. Losing the secret and the nullifier would effectively mean losing deposited tokens.\n\nPrivacy Pools are controlled by a 2/4 multisig, which has authority to stop deposits and manage the deposit whitelist, but users always have an option to publicly withdraw deposited tokens, linking their withdrawal to their deposit.\n\n### Privacy considerations\n\nPrivacy Pools protocol supports [relayed withdrawals](https://etherscan.io/address/0x15e355024de1cdc74addea7ebdf98418ba5b1a2c#code#F1#L133), in which relayer processes withdrawals on user's behalf for a fee, which enables sending funds to fresh addresses.\n\nPractical privacy also depends on the timing and amounts of deposits and withdrawals, underlying network and browser used to interact with Privacy Pools frontend (if used), RPC providers used to send transactions and query public blockchain state. Users are advised to research [OPSEC best practices](/publications/privacy-best-practices).\n\n### Fees\n\nPrivacy Pools charges a mandatory onchain vetting fee on deposits and caps relayed-withdrawal fees per asset:\n- 0% vetting fee, 10% maximum relayer fee: frxUSD, fxUSD, sUSDS, USDe, USDS, USDT, WBTC, wOETH, wstETH.\n- 0% vetting fee, 5% maximum relayer fee: DAI, USD1.\n- 0.5% vetting fee, 10% maximum relayer fee: BOLD, ETH, USDC.\n\nThe vetting fees are accumulated in the Entrypoint and can be withdrawn by its owner. Relayer fees are paid on withdrawals to the selected relayer and cannot exceed the per-asset cap; relayers can still choose their own quote below that cap and users can self-relay to not pay the fee.\n\n### Compliance\n\nThe main feature of Privacy Pools is compliance, which is enforced through the ASP. Association set is a whitelist of deposits that are allowed to be withdrawn from the protocol. This set is managed in real time by the provider, which is currently a single entity. The full association set is published via IPFS, only its Merkle root is posted onchain. User's deposit could be excluded from the whitelist at any moment, in this case the user can still ragequit, i.e. publicly withdraw deposited funds and link them to their deposit.\n\nASP is designed to vouch that withdrawals from Privacy Pools are not related to any known illegal activity.\n\n### Anonymity set\n\nThe anonymity set consists of all whitelisted deposits of the same token with the value greater than the withdrawal amount. Note that only deposits approved by the ASP add to the anonymity set. To maximize the anonymity set, users are recommended to withdraw smaller amounts and deposit popular tokens.",
"detailedDescription": "Privacy Pools is a non-custodial privacy protocol on Ethereum built around asset-specific pools and private withdrawals, adding compliance by whitelisting all legitimate deposits. A deposit creates a commitment, which is represented by secret and nullifier, and a later withdrawal uses a zero-knowledge proof to spend that commitment, either partially or in full, without revealing the matching deposit. Losing the secret and the nullifier would effectively mean losing deposited tokens.\n\nPrivacy Pools are controlled by a 2/4 multisig, which has authority to stop deposits and manage the deposit whitelist, but users always have an option to publicly withdraw deposited tokens, linking their withdrawal to their deposit.\n\n### Privacy considerations\n\nPrivacy Pools protocol supports [relayed withdrawals](https://etherscan.io/address/0x15e355024de1cdc74addea7ebdf98418ba5b1a2c#code#F1#L133), in which relayer processes withdrawals on user's behalf for a fee, which enables sending funds to fresh addresses.\n\nPractical privacy also depends on the timing and amounts of deposits and withdrawals, underlying network and browser used to interact with Privacy Pools frontend (if used), RPC providers used to send transactions and query public blockchain state. Users are advised to research [OPSEC best practice](/publications/privacy-best-practices).\n\n### Fees\n\nPrivacy Pools charges a mandatory onchain vetting fee on deposits and caps relayed-withdrawal fees per asset:\n- 0% vetting fee, 10% maximum relayer fee: frxUSD, fxUSD, sUSDS, USDe, USDS, USDT, WBTC, wOETH, wstETH.\n- 0% vetting fee, 5% maximum relayer fee: DAI, USD1.\n- 0.5% vetting fee, 10% maximum relayer fee: BOLD, ETH, USDC.\n\nThe vetting fees are accumulated in the Entrypoint and can be withdrawn by its owner. Relayer fees are paid on withdrawals to the selected relayer and cannot exceed the per-asset cap; relayers can still choose their own quote below that cap and users can self-relay to not pay the fee.\n\n### Compliance\n\nThe main feature of Privacy Pools is compliance, which is enforced through the ASP. Association set is a whitelist of deposits that are allowed to be withdrawn from the protocol. This set is managed in real time by the provider, which is currently a single entity. The full association set is published via IPFS, only its Merkle root is posted onchain. User's deposit could be excluded from the whitelist at any moment, in this case the user can still ragequit, i.e. publicly withdraw deposited funds and link them to their deposit.\n\nASP is designed to vouch that withdrawals from Privacy Pools are not related to any known illegal activity.\n\n### Anonymity set\n\nThe anonymity set consists of all whitelisted deposits of the same token with the value greater than the withdrawal amount. Note that only deposits approved by the ASP add to the anonymity set. To maximize the anonymity set, users are recommended to withdraw smaller amounts and deposit popular tokens.",
"links": {
"websites": [
"https://privacypools.com"
]
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"badges": [],
"description": "An onchain privacy system for Ethereum based on encrypted UTXO-style private balances and zk-proven DeFi interactions.",
"detailedDescription": "Railgun is a non-custodial privacy protocol on Ethereum built around encrypted UTXO-style private balances rather than fixed-denomination pools. This design enables in-protocol transfers of shielded tokens and interactions with DeFi smart contracts on L1.\n\nA shield transaction moves assets from a public address on Ethereum into the Railgun contract and creates encrypted commitments in a Merkle-tree state. Later private transfers or unshields use zk-SNARK proofs to spend those commitments without revealing the sender, recipient, token type, or amount. Notes created by deposits and private transactions represents ownership of tokens in Railgun, users must keep them secret and make sure the notes are not lost.\n\nRailgun supports private transfers and cross-contract interactions without fragmenting liquidity across denominations. DeFi calls can be executed through the RelayAdapt contract, which temporarily unshields tokens to Ethereum L1, performs a sequence of contract calls, and shields the resulting assets back into Railgun in a single transaction (facilitated by a relayer).\n\nRailgun has a DAO governed by holders of the RAIL token. The DAO has the authority to arbitrarily change the logic of the protocol and its shielded tokens.\n\n### Privacy considerations\n\nRailgun protocol supports [relayed withdrawals](https://docs.railgun.org/developer-guide/wallet/transactions/unshielding), in which a relayer processes withdrawals on the user's behalf for a fee, which enables sending funds to fresh addresses. Transactions from private addresses can be sent through relayers over the [Waku network](https://blog.waku.org/2024-04-26-railgun-case-study/), which increases network-level privacy. Railgun allows interactions between shielded tokens and DeFi, which allows depositing and withdrawing different tokens.\n\nPractical privacy also depends on the timing and amounts of deposits and withdrawals, as well as RPC providers used to send transactions and query the public blockchain state. Syncing a railgun wallet requires a user to make heavy rpc queries because they need to scan all deposits to the protocol to track their own balance. Running a full node or trusted rpc is recommended. Users are advised to research the best OPSEC practices. Users are advised to research [OPSEC best practices](/publications/privacy-best-practices).\n\n### Fees\n\nThere are mandatory onchain protocol fees of 0.25% for shields and 0.25% for unshields. The NFT fee field is currently set to 0. Shield and unshield fees are sent to the Railgun Treasury.\n\nRelayers can charge additional offchain fees for submitting transactions on a user's behalf. These relayer fees are not set by the core protocol contracts.\n\n### Compliance\n\nRailgun protocol does not enforce any compliance measures. However it allows using [Private Proof of Innocence](https://docs.railgun.org/wiki/assurance/private-proofs-of-innocence)(PPoI), which can attest to the origin and history of shielded tokens. Relayers and some wallets require a valid PPoI for their services, but they are not generally enforced.\n\nAdditionally, Railgun users can share a read-only viewing key to expose all sent and received private transactions, if required by a regulator or enforcer. \n### Anonymity set\n\nBecause Railgun allows private transfers, optional PPoIs that can be enforced by relayers, and interactions with DeFi, its anonymity set depends on many details. A withdrawal from Railgun could be connected with a deposit of another token, or could not correspond to any deposit if a user received a private transfer from another user. The anonymity set, in the best case, corresponds to the set of all Railgun users.",
"detailedDescription": "Railgun is a non-custodial privacy protocol on Ethereum built around encrypted UTXO-style private balances rather than fixed-denomination pools. This design enables in-protocol transfers of shielded tokens and interactions with DeFi smart contracts on L1.\n\nA shield transaction moves assets from a public address on Ethereum into the Railgun contract and creates encrypted commitments in a Merkle-tree state. Later private transfers or unshields use zk-SNARK proofs to spend those commitments without revealing the sender, recipient, token type, or amount. Notes created by deposits and private transactions represents ownership of tokens in Railgun, users must keep them secret and make sure the notes are not lost.\n\nRailgun supports private transfers and cross-contract interactions without fragmenting liquidity across denominations. DeFi calls can be executed through the RelayAdapt contract, which temporarily unshields tokens to Ethereum L1, performs a sequence of contract calls, and shields the resulting assets back into Railgun in a single transaction (facilitated by a relayer).\n\nRailgun has a DAO governed by holders of the RAIL token. The DAO has the authority to arbitrarily change the logic of the protocol and its shielded tokens.\n\n### Privacy considerations\n\nRailgun protocol supports [relayed withdrawals](https://docs.railgun.org/developer-guide/wallet/transactions/unshielding), in which a relayer processes withdrawals on the user's behalf for a fee, which enables sending funds to fresh addresses. Transactions from private addresses can be sent through relayers over the [Waku network](https://blog.waku.org/2024-04-26-railgun-case-study/), which increases network-level privacy. Railgun allows interactions between shielded tokens and DeFi, which allows depositing and withdrawing different tokens.\n\nPractical privacy also depends on the timing and amounts of deposits and withdrawals, as well as RPC providers used to send transactions and query the public blockchain state. Syncing a railgun wallet requires a user to make heavy rpc queries because they need to scan all deposits to the protocol to track their own balance. Running a full node or trusted rpc is recommended. Users are advised to research the best OPSEC practices. Users are advised to research [OPSEC best practice](/publications/privacy-best-practices).\n\n### Fees\n\nThere are mandatory onchain protocol fees of 0.25% for shields and 0.25% for unshields. The NFT fee field is currently set to 0. Shield and unshield fees are sent to the Railgun Treasury.\n\nRelayers can charge additional offchain fees for submitting transactions on a user's behalf. These relayer fees are not set by the core protocol contracts.\n\n### Compliance\n\nRailgun protocol does not enforce any compliance measures. However it allows using [Private Proof of Innocence](https://docs.railgun.org/wiki/assurance/private-proofs-of-innocence)(PPoI), which can attest to the origin and history of shielded tokens. Relayers and some wallets require a valid PPoI for their services, but they are not generally enforced.\n\nAdditionally, Railgun users can share a read-only viewing key to expose all sent and received private transactions, if required by a regulator or enforcer. \n### Anonymity set\n\nBecause Railgun allows private transfers, optional PPoIs that can be enforced by relayers, and interactions with DeFi, its anonymity set depends on many details. A withdrawal from Railgun could be connected with a deposit of another token, or could not correspond to any deposit if a user received a private transfer from another user. The anonymity set, in the best case, corresponds to the set of all Railgun users.",
"links": {
"websites": [
"https://railgun.org"
]
}
}+2 -2
+1 -1
{
"badges": [],
"description": "A classic Ethereum mixer design based on fixed-denomination pools and zk withdrawals.",
"detailedDescription": "Tornado Cash is a non-custodial mixer on Ethereum built around separate fixed-denomination pools, which prevents linking deposits and withdrawals via the amount. A deposit publishes a commitment into a Merkle tree producing a secret note, and a later withdrawal uses a zk-SNARK proof and the note to send the same denomination to a different address, breaking the deposit-withdrawal link. The note represents ownership of tokens in a Tornado cash pool, and losing it will effectively mean losing the tokens.\n\nThe core mixer contracts are immutable and have no admin, pause, or upgrade path, so funds can only move out with a valid proof. However Tornado cash features TORN token governance, which controls peripheral smart contracts: official pool registry, relayer registration requirement and TORN tokenomics.\n\n### Privacy considerations\n\nTornado cash introduces a permissionless relayer network, which is essential for practical privacy. Relayers process withdrawals from Tornado cash pools on user's behalf for a fee, which enables withdrawals to fresh addresses without funding them before the withdrawal. Without an active relayer network, practical privacy of Tornado cash deteriorates significantly.\n\nPractical privacy also depends on the timing of deposits and withdrawals, underlying network and browser used to interact with Tornado cash frontend (if used), RPC providers used to send transactions and query public blockchain state. Users are advised to research [OPSEC best practices](/publications/privacy-best-practices).\n\n### Fees\n\nThe immutable Tornado Cash pools do not charge a protocol-level deposit or withdrawal fee. Withdrawals can include a relayer fee chosen offchain between the user and the relayer and passed to the pool withdrawal call.\n\n### Compliance\n\nTornado cash does not have any protocol-level compliance features. However, it provides an optional [Compliance Tool](https://docs.tornado.cash/tornado-cash-classic/compliance-tool), which allows users to generate a proof linking a withdrawal to a specific deposit without revealing this information publicly onchain. This enables users to selectively disclose the origin of funds to third parties, such as exchanges or regulators.\n\nProtocol pools were [sanctioned by OFAC in August 2022](https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0916), flagging funds moved through these smart contracts as illicit and resulting in broad censorship (mainly by block builders) of transactions touching the contracts. Sanctions were lifted on March 21, 2025.\n\n### Anonymity set\n\nA user's anonymity set consists of all previous deposits into the same bucket (i.e. deposits of the same token and amount). Deposits can be mixed only with other deposits of the same token and denomination. To maximize the anonymity set, users are advised to deposit into the buckets with the most usage.\n\n### Secure frontend\n\nFor average users, the Tornado Cash frontend must be recognized as a critical part of the privacy protocol. If compromised, it can steal user assets and violate user privacy, which [was exploited in 2024](https://www.coindesk.com/business/2024/02/26/tornado-cash-reportedly-suffers-backend-exploit-user-deposits-at-risk).\n\nThe frontend's root of trust is the IPFS content hash registered for [tornadocash.eth](https://app.ens.domains/tornadocash.eth?tab=records) in the ENS smart contract on Ethereum. \nThe latest hash can be fetched from a trusted ethereum node (e.g. your own or trusted light node rpc). \nThere were incidents of malicious frontend hash updates passing onchain governance proposals before, so using a publicly audited or self-audited IPFS hash is advised. \nAn example of an audit process with useful links can be found [here](https://gist.github.com/pcaversaccio/ea7f62fd21b6e22f301980007f7c767e) or [here](https://notes.ethereum.org/@GW1ZUbNKR5iRjjKYx6_dJQ/Bk8zsJ9xj).\nThe frontend can then be accessed by running a local IPFS node that automatically fetches the verified frontend hash (e.g. in style of [dapp3.eth](https://github.com/apoorvlathey/dapp3) or [kubo](https://github.com/ipfs/kubo) + [ipfs-companion](https://github.com/ipfs/ipfs-companion) and serves it in the browser locally.\n",
"detailedDescription": "Tornado Cash is a non-custodial mixer on Ethereum built around separate fixed-denomination pools, which prevents linking deposits and withdrawals via the amount. A deposit publishes a commitment into a Merkle tree producing a secret note, and a later withdrawal uses a zk-SNARK proof and the note to send the same denomination to a different address, breaking the deposit-withdrawal link. The note represents ownership of tokens in a Tornado cash pool, and losing it will effectively mean losing the tokens.\n\nThe core mixer contracts are immutable and have no admin, pause, or upgrade path, so funds can only move out with a valid proof. However Tornado cash features TORN token governance, which controls peripheral smart contracts: official pool registry, relayer registration requirement and TORN tokenomics.\n\n### Privacy considerations\n\nTornado cash introduces a permissionless relayer network, which is essential for practical privacy. Relayers process withdrawals from Tornado cash pools on user's behalf for a fee, which enables withdrawals to fresh addresses without funding them before the withdrawal. Without an active relayer network, practical privacy of Tornado cash deteriorates significantly.\n\nPractical privacy also depends on the timing of deposits and withdrawals, underlying network and browser used to interact with Tornado cash frontend (if used), RPC providers used to send transactions and query public blockchain state. Users are advised to research [OPSEC best practice](/publications/privacy-best-practices).\n\n### Fees\n\nThe immutable Tornado Cash pools do not charge a protocol-level deposit or withdrawal fee. Withdrawals can include a relayer fee chosen offchain between the user and the relayer and passed to the pool withdrawal call.\n\n### Compliance\n\nTornado cash does not have any protocol-level compliance features. However, it provides an optional [Compliance Tool](https://docs.tornado.cash/tornado-cash-classic/compliance-tool), which allows users to generate a proof linking a withdrawal to a specific deposit without revealing this information publicly onchain. This enables users to selectively disclose the origin of funds to third parties, such as exchanges or regulators.\n\nProtocol pools were [sanctioned by OFAC in August 2022](https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0916), flagging funds moved through these smart contracts as illicit and resulting in broad censorship (mainly by block builders) of transactions touching the contracts. Sanctions were lifted on March 21, 2025.\n\n### Anonymity set\n\nA user's anonymity set consists of all previous deposits into the same bucket (i.e. deposits of the same token and amount). Deposits can be mixed only with other deposits of the same token and denomination. To maximize the anonymity set, users are advised to deposit into the buckets with the most usage.\n\n### Secure frontend\n\nFor average users, the Tornado Cash frontend must be recognized as a critical part of the privacy protocol. If compromised, it can steal user assets and violate user privacy, which [was exploited in 2024](https://www.coindesk.com/business/2024/02/26/tornado-cash-reportedly-suffers-backend-exploit-user-deposits-at-risk).\n\nThe frontend's root of trust is the IPFS content hash registered for [tornadocash.eth](https://app.ens.domains/tornadocash.eth?tab=records) in the ENS smart contract on Ethereum. \nThe latest hash can be fetched from a trusted ethereum node (e.g. your own or trusted light node rpc). \nThere were incidents of malicious frontend hash updates passing onchain governance proposals before, so using a publicly audited or self-audited IPFS hash is advised. \nAn example of an audit process with useful links can be found [here](https://gist.github.com/pcaversaccio/ea7f62fd21b6e22f301980007f7c767e) or [here](https://notes.ethereum.org/@GW1ZUbNKR5iRjjKYx6_dJQ/Bk8zsJ9xj).\nThe frontend can then be accessed by running a local IPFS node that automatically fetches the verified frontend hash (e.g. [dapp3.eth](https://github.com/apoorvlathey/dapp3) or [kubo](https://github.com/ipfs/kubo) + [ipfs-companion](https://github.com/ipfs/ipfs-companion) and serves it in the browser locally.\n",
"links": {
"websites": [
"https://app.ens.domains/tornadocash.eth?tab=records"
]
}
}+1 -1
{
"attributes": [
{
"id": "immutable",
"label": "Immutable",
"description": "Core smart contract code cannot be changed."
},
{
"id": "uncensorable",
"label": "Uncensorable",
"description": "Deposits and withdrawals cannot be censored."
},
{
"id": "fixedAmounts",
"label": "Fixed amounts",
"description": "Pre-defined transfer amounts use distinct buckets (anonymity sets)."
},
{
"id": "sourceAvailable",
"label": "Source available",
"description": "There is at least one practical way to use exclusively auditable, source-available software to interact with this protocol."
}
],
"riskSummary": "## Funds can be stolen if\n1. the zk proof system is broken, allowing invalid withdrawals.\n2. the [trusted setup](#trusted-setups) is compromised or all ceremony participants collude, allowing invalid withdrawals.\n
\n## Funds can be lost if\n1. a user loses the note secrets required to withdraw. \n
\n## Privacy can be lost if\n1. no relayer is available and the withdrawal must be submitted from an address that can be linked to the user (see [best practices page](/publications/privacy-best-practices) for more info).",
"riskSummary": "## Funds can be stolen if\n1. the zk proof system is broken, allowing invalid withdrawals.\n2. the [trusted setup](#trusted-setups) is compromised or all ceremony participants collude, allowing invalid withdrawals.\n
\n## Funds can be lost if\n1. a user loses the note secrets required to withdraw. \n
\n## Privacy can be lost if\n1. no relayer is available and the withdrawal must be submitted from an address that can be linked to the user (see [best practice page](/publications/privacy-best-practices) for more info).",
"tokens": [
{
"token": {
"address": "0x5d3a536E4D6DbD6114cc1Ead35777bAB948E3643",
"iconUrl": "https://assets.coingecko.com/coins/images/9281/large/cDAI.png?1696509390",
"symbol": "cDAI",
"decimals": 8,
"priceId": "cdai",
"sinceTimestamp": 1577297782
},
"buckets": [
{
"id": "tornado-cDAI-5000",
"type": "denomination",
"label": "cDAI 5000",
"address": "eth:0x22aaA7720ddd5388A3c0A3333430953C68f1849b",
"sinceTimestamp": 1577297782,
"denomination": "5000",
"deposit": {
"event": "0xa945e51eec50ab98c161376f0db4cf2aeba3ec92755fe2fcd388bdbbb80ff196",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "500000000000"
}
},
"withdrawal": {
"event": "0xe9e508bad6d4c3227e881ca19068f099da81b5164dd6d62b2eaf1e8bc6c34931",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "500000000000"
}
}
},
{
"id": "tornado-cDAI-50000",
"type": "denomination",
"label": "cDAI 50000",
"address": "eth:0x03893a7c7463AE47D46bc7f091665f1893656003",
"sinceTimestamp": 1616155055,
"denomination": "50000",
"deposit": {
"event": "0xa945e51eec50ab98c161376f0db4cf2aeba3ec92755fe2fcd388bdbbb80ff196",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "5000000000000"
}
},
"withdrawal": {
"event": "0xe9e508bad6d4c3227e881ca19068f099da81b5164dd6d62b2eaf1e8bc6c34931",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "5000000000000"
}
}
},
{
"id": "tornado-cDAI-500000",
"type": "denomination",
"label": "cDAI 500000",
"address": "eth:0x2717c5e28cf931547B621a5dddb772Ab6A35B701",
"sinceTimestamp": 1616135923,
"denomination": "500000",
"deposit": {
"event": "0xa945e51eec50ab98c161376f0db4cf2aeba3ec92755fe2fcd388bdbbb80ff196",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "50000000000000"
}
},
"withdrawal": {
"event": "0xe9e508bad6d4c3227e881ca19068f099da81b5164dd6d62b2eaf1e8bc6c34931",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "50000000000000"
}
}
},
{
"id": "tornado-cDAI-5000000",
"type": "denomination",
"label": "cDAI 5000000",
"address": "eth:0xD21be7248e0197Ee08E0c20D4a96DEBdaC3D20Af",
"sinceTimestamp": 1616115450,
"denomination": "5000000",
"deposit": {
"event": "0xa945e51eec50ab98c161376f0db4cf2aeba3ec92755fe2fcd388bdbbb80ff196",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "500000000000000"
}
},
"withdrawal": {
"event": "0xe9e508bad6d4c3227e881ca19068f099da81b5164dd6d62b2eaf1e8bc6c34931",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "500000000000000"
}
}
}
]
},
{
"token": {
"address": "0x6B175474E89094C44Da98b954EedeAC495271d0F",
"iconUrl": "https://assets.coingecko.com/coins/images/9956/large/Badge_Dai.png?1696509996",
"symbol": "DAI",
"decimals": 18,
"priceId": "dai",
"sinceTimestamp": 1576534688
},
"buckets": [
{
"id": "tornado-DAI-100",
"type": "denomination",
"label": "DAI 100",
"address": "eth:0xD4B88Df4D29F5CedD6857912842cff3b20C8Cfa3",
"sinceTimestamp": 1576534688,
"denomination": "100",
"deposit": {
"event": "0xa945e51eec50ab98c161376f0db4cf2aeba3ec92755fe2fcd388bdbbb80ff196",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "100000000000000000000"
}
},
"withdrawal": {
"event": "0xe9e508bad6d4c3227e881ca19068f099da81b5164dd6d62b2eaf1e8bc6c34931",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "100000000000000000000"
}
}
},
{
"id": "tornado-DAI-1000",
"type": "denomination",
"label": "DAI 1000",
"address": "eth:0xFD8610d20aA15b7B2E3Be39B396a1bC3516c7144",
"sinceTimestamp": 1577297383,
"denomination": "1000",
"deposit": {
"event": "0xa945e51eec50ab98c161376f0db4cf2aeba3ec92755fe2fcd388bdbbb80ff196",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "1000000000000000000000"
}
},
"withdrawal": {
"event": "0xe9e508bad6d4c3227e881ca19068f099da81b5164dd6d62b2eaf1e8bc6c34931",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "1000000000000000000000"
}
}
},
{
"id": "tornado-DAI-10000",
"type": "denomination",
"label": "DAI 10000",
"address": "eth:0x07687e702b410Fa43f4cB4Af7FA097918ffD2730",
"sinceTimestamp": 1616114822,
"denomination": "10000",
"deposit": {
"event": "0xa945e51eec50ab98c161376f0db4cf2aeba3ec92755fe2fcd388bdbbb80ff196",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "10000000000000000000000"
}
},
"withdrawal": {
"event": "0xe9e508bad6d4c3227e881ca19068f099da81b5164dd6d62b2eaf1e8bc6c34931",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "10000000000000000000000"
}
}
},
{
"id": "tornado-DAI-100000",
"type": "denomination",
"label": "DAI 100000",
"address": "eth:0x23773E65ed146A459791799d01336DB287f25334",
"sinceTimestamp": 1616115387,
"denomination": "100000",
"deposit": {
"event": "0xa945e51eec50ab98c161376f0db4cf2aeba3ec92755fe2fcd388bdbbb80ff196",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "100000000000000000000000"
}
},
"withdrawal": {
"event": "0xe9e508bad6d4c3227e881ca19068f099da81b5164dd6d62b2eaf1e8bc6c34931",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "100000000000000000000000"
}
}
}
]
},
{
"token": {
"address": "0xEeeeeEeeeEeEeeEeEeEeeEEEeeeeEeeeeeeeEEeE",
"iconUrl": "https://assets.coingecko.com/coins/images/279/large/ethereum.png?1595348880",
"symbol": "ETH",
"decimals": 18,
"priceId": "ethereum",
"sinceTimestamp": 1576523323
},
"buckets": [
{
"id": "tornado-ETH-0.1",
"type": "denomination",
"label": "ETH 0.1",
"address": "eth:0x12D66f87A04A9E220743712cE6d9bB1B5616B8Fc",
"sinceTimestamp": 1576523323,
"denomination": "0.1",
"deposit": {
"event": "0xa945e51eec50ab98c161376f0db4cf2aeba3ec92755fe2fcd388bdbbb80ff196",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "100000000000000000"
}
},
"withdrawal": {
"event": "0xe9e508bad6d4c3227e881ca19068f099da81b5164dd6d62b2eaf1e8bc6c34931",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "100000000000000000"
}
}
},
{
"id": "tornado-ETH-1",
"type": "denomination",
"label": "ETH 1",
"address": "eth:0x47CE0C6eD5B0Ce3d3A51fdb1C52DC66a7c3c2936",
"sinceTimestamp": 1576534673,
"denomination": "1",
"deposit": {
"event": "0xa945e51eec50ab98c161376f0db4cf2aeba3ec92755fe2fcd388bdbbb80ff196",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "1000000000000000000"
}
},
"withdrawal": {
"event": "0xe9e508bad6d4c3227e881ca19068f099da81b5164dd6d62b2eaf1e8bc6c34931",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "1000000000000000000"
}
}
},
{
"id": "tornado-ETH-10",
"type": "denomination",
"label": "ETH 10",
"address": "eth:0x910Cbd523D972eb0a6f4cAe4618aD62622b39DbF",
"sinceTimestamp": 1576536415,
"denomination": "10",
"deposit": {
"event": "0xa945e51eec50ab98c161376f0db4cf2aeba3ec92755fe2fcd388bdbbb80ff196",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "10000000000000000000"
}
},
"withdrawal": {
"event": "0xe9e508bad6d4c3227e881ca19068f099da81b5164dd6d62b2eaf1e8bc6c34931",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "10000000000000000000"
}
}
},
{
"id": "tornado-ETH-100",
"type": "denomination",
"label": "ETH 100",
"address": "eth:0xA160cdAB225685dA1d56aa342Ad8841c3b53f291",
"sinceTimestamp": 1577296976,
"denomination": "100",
"deposit": {
"event": "0xa945e51eec50ab98c161376f0db4cf2aeba3ec92755fe2fcd388bdbbb80ff196",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "100000000000000000000"
}
},
"withdrawal": {
"event": "0xe9e508bad6d4c3227e881ca19068f099da81b5164dd6d62b2eaf1e8bc6c34931",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "100000000000000000000"
}
}
}
]
},
{
"token": {
"address": "0xA0b86991c6218b36c1d19D4a2e9Eb0cE3606eB48",
"iconUrl": "https://assets.coingecko.com/coins/images/6319/large/usdc.png?1696506694",
"symbol": "USDC",
"decimals": 6,
"priceId": "usd-coin",
"sinceTimestamp": 1577298068
},
"buckets": [
{
"id": "tornado-USDC-100",
"type": "denomination",
"label": "USDC 100",
"address": "eth:0xd96f2B1c14Db8458374d9Aca76E26c3D18364307",
"sinceTimestamp": 1577298068,
"denomination": "100",
"deposit": {
"event": "0xa945e51eec50ab98c161376f0db4cf2aeba3ec92755fe2fcd388bdbbb80ff196",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "100000000"
}
},
"withdrawal": {
"event": "0xe9e508bad6d4c3227e881ca19068f099da81b5164dd6d62b2eaf1e8bc6c34931",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "100000000"
}
}
},
{
"id": "tornado-USDC-1000",
"type": "denomination",
"label": "USDC 1000",
"address": "eth:0x4736dCf1b7A3d580672CcE6E7c65cd5cc9cFBa9D",
"sinceTimestamp": 1577298155,
"denomination": "1000",
"deposit": {
"event": "0xa945e51eec50ab98c161376f0db4cf2aeba3ec92755fe2fcd388bdbbb80ff196",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "1000000000"
}
},
"withdrawal": {
"event": "0xe9e508bad6d4c3227e881ca19068f099da81b5164dd6d62b2eaf1e8bc6c34931",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "1000000000"
}
}
}
]
},
{
"token": {
"address": "0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7",
"iconUrl": "https://assets.coingecko.com/coins/images/325/large/Tether.png?1696501661",
"symbol": "USDT",
"decimals": 6,
"priceId": "tether",
"sinceTimestamp": 1577298900
},
"buckets": [
{
"id": "tornado-USDT-100",
"type": "denomination",
"label": "USDT 100",
"address": "eth:0x169AD27A470D064DEDE56a2D3ff727986b15D52B",
"sinceTimestamp": 1577298900,
"denomination": "100",
"deposit": {
"event": "0xa945e51eec50ab98c161376f0db4cf2aeba3ec92755fe2fcd388bdbbb80ff196",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "100000000"
}
},
"withdrawal": {
"event": "0xe9e508bad6d4c3227e881ca19068f099da81b5164dd6d62b2eaf1e8bc6c34931",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "100000000"
}
}
},
{
"id": "tornado-USDT-1000",
"type": "denomination",
"label": "USDT 1000",
"address": "eth:0x0836222F2B2B24A3F36f98668Ed8F0B38D1a872f",
"sinceTimestamp": 1577298985,
"denomination": "1000",
"deposit": {
"event": "0xa945e51eec50ab98c161376f0db4cf2aeba3ec92755fe2fcd388bdbbb80ff196",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "1000000000"
}
},
"withdrawal": {
"event": "0xe9e508bad6d4c3227e881ca19068f099da81b5164dd6d62b2eaf1e8bc6c34931",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "1000000000"
}
}
}
]
},
{
"token": {
"address": "0x2260FAC5E5542a773Aa44fBCfeDf7C193bc2C599",
"iconUrl": "https://assets.coingecko.com/coins/images/7598/large/wrapped_bitcoin_wbtc.png?1696507857",
"symbol": "WBTC",
"decimals": 8,
"priceId": "wrapped-bitcoin",
"sinceTimestamp": 1616123193
},
"buckets": [
{
"id": "tornado-WBTC-0.1",
"type": "denomination",
"label": "WBTC 0.1",
"address": "eth:0x178169B423a011fff22B9e3F3abeA13414dDD0F1",
"sinceTimestamp": 1616134868,
"denomination": "0.1",
"deposit": {
"event": "0xa945e51eec50ab98c161376f0db4cf2aeba3ec92755fe2fcd388bdbbb80ff196",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "10000000"
}
},
"withdrawal": {
"event": "0xe9e508bad6d4c3227e881ca19068f099da81b5164dd6d62b2eaf1e8bc6c34931",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "10000000"
}
}
},
{
"id": "tornado-WBTC-1",
"type": "denomination",
"label": "WBTC 1",
"address": "eth:0x610B717796ad172B316836AC95a2ffad065CeaB4",
"sinceTimestamp": 1616123193,
"denomination": "1",
"deposit": {
"event": "0xa945e51eec50ab98c161376f0db4cf2aeba3ec92755fe2fcd388bdbbb80ff196",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "100000000"
}
},
"withdrawal": {
"event": "0xe9e508bad6d4c3227e881ca19068f099da81b5164dd6d62b2eaf1e8bc6c34931",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "100000000"
}
}
},
{
"id": "tornado-WBTC-10",
"type": "denomination",
"label": "WBTC 10",
"address": "eth:0xbB93e510BbCD0B7beb5A853875f9eC60275CF498",
"sinceTimestamp": 1616135758,
"denomination": "10",
"deposit": {
"event": "0xa945e51eec50ab98c161376f0db4cf2aeba3ec92755fe2fcd388bdbbb80ff196",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "1000000000"
}
},
"withdrawal": {
"event": "0xe9e508bad6d4c3227e881ca19068f099da81b5164dd6d62b2eaf1e8bc6c34931",
"extractor": "fixedAmount",
"params": {
"amount": "1000000000"
}
}
}
]
}
],
"trustedSetup": {
"id": "TornadoCash",
"name": "Tornado Cash",
"risk": "green",
"participantCount": 1114,
"shortDescription": "Circuit-specific trusted setup for Groth16 Tornado Cash circuits, contains 1114 contributions.",
"longDescription": "\n Circuit-specific trusted setup for Groth16 Tornado Cash circuits. It was publicly announced as a Phase 2 ceremony\n built on top of the 30th contribution to the Perpetual Powers of Tau ceremony, and completed in May 2020. It\n collected 1114 contributions over 10 days, with 450 identified contributors and 664 anonymous ones. Tornado Cash\n published the participant list, archive of contributions and artifacts, and the generated verifier contract.\n\n - Ceremony completion announcement: [https://tornado-cash.medium.com/the-biggest-trusted-setup-ceremony-in-the-world-3c6ab9c8fffa](https://tornado-cash.medium.com/the-biggest-trusted-setup-ceremony-in-the-world-3c6ab9c8fffa)\n - Ceremony page with participant list and archive download: [https://ceremony.tornado.cash/](https://ceremony.tornado.cash/)\n - Initial ceremony announcement: [https://tornado-cash.medium.com/tornado-cash-trusted-setup-ceremony-b846e1e00be1](https://tornado-cash.medium.com/tornado-cash-trusted-setup-ceremony-b846e1e00be1)\n - Ceremony code repository: [https://github.com/tornadocash/phase2-bn254](https://github.com/tornadocash/phase2-bn254)\n "
},
"upgradesAndGovernance": "\nTornado cash has a TORN DAO, which does not have the authority to upgrade or modify existing pools in any way. However it controls a significant portion of the Tornado cash protocol and periphery, including:\n\n1. **Default router for deposits and withdrawals and the official registry of supported pools**. Malicious upgrades of these components could lead to users losing deposited tokens. \n2. **Standard UI IPFS hash registered on ENS** ([link](https://app.ens.domains/tornadocash.eth)). Malicious upgrades of these components could lead to users losing deposited tokens. \n3. **TORN token itself**. Malicious upgrades of the token could lead to token transfers being frozen. \n4. **Registered relayers**. Malicious upgrades of these components could remove all registered relayers, disrupting user-relayer coordination and complicating private withdrawals.\n\n### **Governance flow**\n\n1. Users lock TORN token in the Governance contract ([0x5efda50f22d34F262c29268506C5Fa42cB56A1Ce](https://etherscan.io/address/0x5efda50f22d34F262c29268506C5Fa42cB56A1Ce)). After voting or proposing, staked tokens are locked for 5d 6h after proposal ends, preventing governance hopping. The stake can be delegated to another address. \n2. Anyone with at least 1.00 K TORN can create a proposal. The proposal spends 1m 15s in the Pending state, where voting is still disabled, followed by 5d of Active state, when votes are cast. If the vote outcome changes in the last 1h, the voting period is extended by another 6h. \n3. Proposal is accepted by the simple majority with a required quorum of 100 K TORN. Once accepted, 2d of Timelocked state allow exiting the protocol to everyone who disagrees with the proposal. Afterwards, the proposal can be permissionlessly executed within 3d. \n "
}