b32913ac (main)
and
cdbf1046 (PR)
+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"permissioned": true,
"executionDelay": 10800,
"secondLine": "3h execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain (SD)",
"description": "All of the data (SD = state diffs) needed for proof construction is published onchain.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0,
"regular": {
"value": "4d 3h",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades go through a 4d 3h delay, but the central operator can still censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades go through a 4d 3h delay, but the central operator can still censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Enqueue via L1",
"description": "Users can submit transactions to an L1 queue, but can't force them. The sequencers cannot selectively skip transactions but can stop processing the queue entirely. In other words, if the sequencers censor or are down, they are so for everyone.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Replace proposer",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen. There is a decentralized Governance system that can attempt changing Proposers with an upgrade.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"executionDelayMode": "if-challenged",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": {
"value": "3600.0"
},
"permissioned": false,
"defenderAdvantage": {
"multiplier": 6.486486486486486,
"shape": "linear"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period\n+ 2d execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 5/7 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.7142857142857143
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -259200
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 3d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 259200,
"secondLine": "3d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632,
"secondLine": "12d 17h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 5/7 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.7142857142857143
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -259200
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 4d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 345600
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"executionDelayMode": "if-challenged",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": {
"value": "3600.0"
},
"permissioned": false,
"defenderAdvantage": {
"multiplier": 6.486486486486486,
"shape": "linear"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period\n+ 2d execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"permissioned": true,
"executionDelay": 0,
"secondLine": "No execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 3/5 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.6
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since the Security Council can remove the delay on upgrades.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -1,
"regular": {
"value": "3d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Even though there is a 3d Timelock for non-emergency upgrades, there are no forced transactions and thus no way to exit during operator censorship or downtime.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Even though there is a 3d Timelock for non-emergency upgrades, there are no forced transactions and thus no way to exit during operator censorship or downtime."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring. Although the functionality exists in the code, it is currently disabled.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"executionDelayMode": "if-challenged",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": {
"value": "3600.0"
},
"permissioned": false,
"defenderAdvantage": {
"multiplier": 6.486486486486486,
"shape": "linear"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period\n+ 2d execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow 5 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. There are fewer than 5 Challengers external to the Operator among these. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 5,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 2/3 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.6666666666666666
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632,
"secondLine": "12d 17h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow 5 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. There are fewer than 5 Challengers external to the Operator among these. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 5,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 2/3 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.6666666666666666
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 2d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 172800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"permissioned": true,
"executionDelay": 10800,
"secondLine": "3h execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published onchain.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0,
"regular": {
"value": "4d 3h",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades go through a 4d 3h delay, but the central operator can still censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades go through a 4d 3h delay, but the central operator can still censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Enqueue via L1",
"description": "Users can submit transactions to an L1 queue, but can't force them. The sequencers cannot selectively skip transactions but can stop processing the queue entirely. In other words, if the sequencers censor or are down, they are so for everyone.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Replace proposer",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen. There is a decentralized Governance system that can attempt changing Proposers with an upgrade.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"executionDelayMode": "if-challenged",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": {
"value": "3600.0"
},
"permissioned": false,
"defenderAdvantage": {
"multiplier": 6.486486486486486,
"shape": "linear"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period\n+ 2d execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 1d challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 86400,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "1d challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on the base chain, which ultimately gets published on Ethereum.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 7d 8h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 636216,
"secondLine": "7d 8h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 1d challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 86400,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "1d challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 2d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 172800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 7d 8h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 636216
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"executionDelayMode": "if-challenged",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": {
"value": "3600.0"
},
"permissioned": false,
"defenderAdvantage": {
"multiplier": 6.486486486486486,
"shape": "linear"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period\n+ 2d execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 2/3 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.6666666666666666
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -345600
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 4d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 345600,
"secondLine": "4d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632,
"secondLine": "12d 17h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 2/3 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.6666666666666666
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -345600
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 5d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 432000
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"executionDelayMode": "if-challenged",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": {
"value": "3600.0"
},
"permissioned": false,
"defenderAdvantage": {
"multiplier": 6.486486486486486,
"shape": "linear"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period\n+ 2d execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs only allow 3 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 7d challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 3,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.0"
},
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 2/5 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.4
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -345600
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 4d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 345600,
"secondLine": "4d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 13d 8h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1154616,
"secondLine": "13d 8h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs only allow 3 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 7d challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 3,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.0"
},
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 2/5 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.4
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -345600
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 5d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 432000
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 13d 8h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1154616
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"executionDelayMode": "if-challenged",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": {
"value": "3600.0"
},
"permissioned": false,
"defenderAdvantage": {
"multiplier": 6.486486486486486,
"shape": "linear"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period\n+ 2d execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs only allow 2 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 2,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.01"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/2 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.5
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -345600
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 4d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 345600,
"secondLine": "4d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632,
"secondLine": "12d 17h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs only allow 2 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 2,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.01"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/2 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.5
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -345600
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 5d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 432000
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"executionDelayMode": "if-challenged",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": {
"value": "3600.0"
},
"permissioned": false,
"defenderAdvantage": {
"multiplier": 6.486486486486486,
"shape": "linear"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period\n+ 2d execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 5d 14h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"executionDelayMode": "if-challenged",
"challengeDelay": 483840,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "5d 14h challenge period\n+ 2d execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 5d 14h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"executionDelayMode": "if-challenged",
"challengeDelay": 483840,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "5d 14h challenge period\n+ 2d execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 2d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 172800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"executionDelayMode": "if-challenged",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": {
"value": "3600.0"
},
"permissioned": false,
"defenderAdvantage": {
"multiplier": 6.486486486486486,
"shape": "linear"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period\n+ 2d execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow 15 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. There are fewer than 5 Challengers external to the Operator among these. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. There is a 5d 14h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 483840,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 15,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "5d 14h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 11d 23h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1033656,
"secondLine": "11d 23h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow 15 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. There are fewer than 5 Challengers external to the Operator among these. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. There is a 5d 14h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 483840,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 15,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "5d 14h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 2d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 172800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 11d 23h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1033656
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"permissioned": true,
"executionDelay": 0,
"secondLine": "No execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/2 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.5
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since the Security Council can remove the delay on upgrades.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -1,
"regular": {
"value": "3d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Even though there is a 3d Timelock for non-emergency upgrades, there are no forced transactions and thus no way to exit during operator censorship or downtime.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Even though there is a 3d Timelock for non-emergency upgrades, there are no forced transactions and thus no way to exit during operator censorship or downtime."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring. Although the functionality exists in the code, it is currently disabled.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"permissioned": true,
"executionDelay": 10800,
"secondLine": "3h execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published onchain.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0,
"regular": {
"value": "4d 3h",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades go through a 4d 3h delay, but the central operator can still censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades go through a 4d 3h delay, but the central operator can still censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring. The Operator actively uses a TransactionFilterer contract, which requires accounts that enqueue or force transactions from L1 to be whitelisted.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Replace proposer",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen. There is a decentralized Governance system that can attempt changing Proposers with an upgrade.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"executionDelayMode": "if-challenged",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": {
"value": "3600.0"
},
"permissioned": false,
"defenderAdvantage": {
"multiplier": 6.486486486486486,
"shape": "linear"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period\n+ 2d execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published onchain.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -200
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is ultimately NOT published on Ethereum.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -200
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"executionDelayMode": "if-challenged",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": {
"value": "3600.0"
},
"permissioned": false,
"defenderAdvantage": {
"multiplier": 6.486486486486486,
"shape": "linear"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period\n+ 2d execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.8"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632,
"secondLine": "12d 17h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.8"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 2d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 172800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"executionDelayMode": "if-challenged",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": {
"value": "3600.0"
},
"permissioned": false,
"defenderAdvantage": {
"multiplier": 6.486486486486486,
"shape": "linear"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period\n+ 2d execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 1d challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 86400,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "1d challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 7d 8h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 636216,
"secondLine": "7d 8h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 1d challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 86400,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "1d challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 2d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 172800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 7d 8h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 636216
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"permissioned": true,
"executionDelay": 10800,
"secondLine": "3h execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain (SD)",
"description": "All of the data (SD = state diffs) needed for proof construction is published onchain.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0,
"regular": {
"value": "4d 3h",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades go through a 4d 3h delay, but the central operator can still censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades go through a 4d 3h delay, but the central operator can still censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Enqueue via L1",
"description": "Users can submit transactions to an L1 queue, but can't force them. The sequencers cannot selectively skip transactions but can stop processing the queue entirely. In other words, if the sequencers censor or are down, they are so for everyone.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Replace proposer",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen. There is a decentralized Governance system that can attempt changing Proposers with an upgrade.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"permissioned": true,
"executionDelay": 10800,
"secondLine": "3h execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on Avail. Transaction data is checked against the Vector bridge data roots, signed off by Avail validators.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0,
"regular": {
"value": "4d 3h",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades go through a 4d 3h delay, but the central operator can still censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades go through a 4d 3h delay, but the central operator can still censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Enqueue via L1",
"description": "Users can submit transactions to an L1 queue, but can't force them. The sequencers cannot selectively skip transactions but can stop processing the queue entirely. In other words, if the sequencers censor or are down, they are so for everyone.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Replace proposer",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen. There is a decentralized Governance system that can attempt changing Proposers with an upgrade.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"executionDelayMode": "if-challenged",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": {
"value": "3600.0"
},
"permissioned": false,
"defenderAdvantage": {
"multiplier": 6.486486486486486,
"shape": "linear"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period\n+ 2d execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on the base chain, which ultimately gets published on Ethereum.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632,
"secondLine": "12d 17h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 2d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 172800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"executionDelayMode": "if-challenged",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": {
"value": "3600.0"
},
"permissioned": false,
"defenderAdvantage": {
"multiplier": 6.486486486486486,
"shape": "linear"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period\n+ 2d execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 30m challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"executionDelayMode": "if-challenged",
"challengeDelay": 1800,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "30m challenge period\n+ 2d execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 28d of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 2419200,
"secondLine": "28d delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 30m challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"executionDelayMode": "if-challenged",
"challengeDelay": 1800,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "30m challenge period\n+ 2d execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 2d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 172800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 28d of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 2419200
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow 10 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. At least 5 Challengers are external to the Operator. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"executionDelayMode": "if-challenged",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 10,
"initialBond": {
"value": "1.0"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period\n+ 2d execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 5/6 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 0.8333333333333334
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "7d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have only 7d to exit.\n\n If users post a tx after that time, they would only be able to self propose a state root 28d after the last state root was proposed and then wait for the 6d 8h challenge window, while the upgrade would be confirmed just after the 6d 8h challenge window and the 3d L1 timelock.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have only 7d to exit.\n\n If users post a tx after that time, they would only be able to self propose a state root 28d after the last state root was proposed and then wait for the 6d 8h challenge window, while the upgrade would be confirmed just after the 6d 8h challenge window and the 3d L1 timelock."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 28d of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 2419200,
"secondLine": "28d delay"
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow 10 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. At least 5 Challengers are external to the Operator. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"executionDelayMode": "if-challenged",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 10,
"initialBond": {
"value": "1.0"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period\n+ 2d execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 5/6 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": 0.8333333333333334
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "7d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have only 7d to exit.\n\n If users post a tx after that time, they would only be able to self propose a state root 28d after the last state root was proposed and then wait for the 6d 8h challenge window, while the upgrade would be confirmed just after the 6d 8h challenge window and the 3d L1 timelock.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have only 7d to exit.\n\n If users post a tx after that time, they would only be able to self propose a state root 28d after the last state root was proposed and then wait for the 6d 8h challenge window, while the upgrade would be confirmed just after the 6d 8h challenge window and the 3d L1 timelock."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 28d of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 2419200,
"secondLine": "28d delay"
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs only allow 2 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 30m challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 1800,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 2,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "30m challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -864000
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 10d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 864000,
"secondLine": "10d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 6d 9h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 551616,
"secondLine": "6d 9h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs only allow 2 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 30m challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 1800,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 2,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "30m challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -864000
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 11d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 950400
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 1mo 4d of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 2970816
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"executionDelayMode": "if-challenged",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": {
"value": "3600.0"
},
"permissioned": false,
"defenderAdvantage": {
"multiplier": 6.486486486486486,
"shape": "linear"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period\n+ 2d execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow 14 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. There are fewer than 5 Challengers external to the Operator among these. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. There is a 5d 14h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 483840,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 14,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "5d 14h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400000
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 2y 9mo delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400000,
"secondLine": "2y 9mo delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 11d 23h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1033656,
"secondLine": "11d 23h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow 14 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. There are fewer than 5 Challengers external to the Operator among these. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. There is a 5d 14h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 483840,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 14,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "5d 14h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400000
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 2y 9mo delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86486400
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 11d 23h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1033656
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"executionDelayMode": "if-challenged",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": {
"value": "3600.0"
},
"permissioned": false,
"defenderAdvantage": {
"multiplier": 6.486486486486486,
"shape": "linear"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period\n+ 2d execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow 14 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. There are fewer than 5 Challengers external to the Operator among these. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. There is a 5d 14h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 483840,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 14,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "5d 14h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 11d 23h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1033656,
"secondLine": "11d 23h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow 14 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. There are fewer than 5 Challengers external to the Operator among these. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. There is a 5d 14h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 483840,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 14,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "5d 14h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 2d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 172800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 11d 23h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1033656
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"executionDelayMode": "if-challenged",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": {
"value": "3600.0"
},
"permissioned": false,
"defenderAdvantage": {
"multiplier": 6.486486486486486,
"shape": "linear"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period\n+ 2d execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632,
"secondLine": "12d 17h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 2d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 172800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"executionDelayMode": "if-challenged",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": {
"value": "3600.0"
},
"permissioned": false,
"defenderAdvantage": {
"multiplier": 6.486486486486486,
"shape": "linear"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period\n+ 2d execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs only allow 3 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 3,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.7"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 2/3 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.6666666666666666
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632,
"secondLine": "12d 17h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs only allow 3 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 3,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.7"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 2/3 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.6666666666666666
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 2d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 172800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"permissioned": true,
"executionDelay": 0,
"secondLine": "No execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 2/3 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.6666666666666666
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since the Security Council can remove the delay on upgrades.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -1,
"regular": {
"value": "3d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Even though there is a 3d Timelock for non-emergency upgrades, there are no forced transactions and thus no way to exit during operator censorship or downtime.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Even though there is a 3d Timelock for non-emergency upgrades, there are no forced transactions and thus no way to exit during operator censorship or downtime."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring. Although the functionality exists in the code, it is currently disabled.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"permissioned": true,
"executionDelay": 10800,
"secondLine": "3h execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on Avail. Transaction data is checked against the Vector bridge data roots, signed off by Avail validators.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0,
"regular": {
"value": "4d 3h",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades go through a 4d 3h delay, but the central operator can still censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades go through a 4d 3h delay, but the central operator can still censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring. The Operator actively uses a TransactionFilterer contract, which requires accounts that enqueue or force transactions from L1 OR their targets on L2, to be whitelisted.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Replace proposer",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen. There is a decentralized Governance system that can attempt changing Proposers with an upgrade.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST)",
"description": "STARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"permissioned": true,
"executionDelay": 0,
"secondLine": "No execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain (SD)",
"description": "All of the data (SD = state diffs) needed for proof construction is published onchain.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "7d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L1 and go through a 8d delay. In case users are censored, the Security Council minority can be alerted to enforce censorship resistance by submitting a new state root. This process is assumed to take 1d, leaving users 7d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L1 and go through a 8d delay. In case users are censored, the Security Council minority can be alerted to enforce censorship resistance by submitting a new state root. This process is assumed to take 1d, leaving users 7d to exit."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Log via L1",
"description": "Users can submit transactions to an L1 map, but can't force them. When users “complain” that their transaction is stuck on L1 and not picked up by the sequencer, the Security Council minority can bypass the sequencer by posting a state root that includes it.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Security Council minority",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposer can update state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen. The Security Council minority can be alerted to enforce censorship resistance because they are a permissioned Operator.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"executionDelayMode": "if-challenged",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": {
"value": "3600.0"
},
"permissioned": false,
"defenderAdvantage": {
"multiplier": 6.486486486486486,
"shape": "linear"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period\n+ 2d execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 5d 14h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"executionDelayMode": "if-challenged",
"challengeDelay": 483840,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "5d 14h challenge period\n+ 2d execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 5d 14h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"executionDelayMode": "if-challenged",
"challengeDelay": 483840,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "5d 14h challenge period\n+ 2d execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 2d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 172800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"permissioned": true,
"executionDelay": 10800,
"secondLine": "3h execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on Avail. Transaction data is checked against the Vector bridge data roots, signed off by Avail validators.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0,
"regular": {
"value": "4d 3h",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades go through a 4d 3h delay, but the central operator can still censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades go through a 4d 3h delay, but the central operator can still censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Enqueue via L1",
"description": "Users can submit transactions to an L1 queue, but can't force them. The sequencers cannot selectively skip transactions but can stop processing the queue entirely. In other words, if the sequencers censor or are down, they are so for everyone.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Replace proposer",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen. There is a decentralized Governance system that can attempt changing Proposers with an upgrade.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"permissioned": true,
"executionDelay": 0,
"secondLine": "No execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since the Security Council can remove the delay on upgrades.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -1,
"regular": {
"value": "3d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Even though there is a 3d Timelock for non-emergency upgrades, there are no forced transactions and thus no way to exit during operator censorship or downtime.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Even though there is a 3d Timelock for non-emergency upgrades, there are no forced transactions and thus no way to exit during operator censorship or downtime."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring. Although the functionality exists in the code, it is currently disabled.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"permissioned": true,
"executionDelay": 10800,
"secondLine": "3h execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published onchain.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0,
"regular": {
"value": "4d 3h",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades go through a 4d 3h delay, but the central operator can still censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades go through a 4d 3h delay, but the central operator can still censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Enqueue via L1",
"description": "Users can submit transactions to an L1 queue, but can't force them. The sequencers cannot selectively skip transactions but can stop processing the queue entirely. In other words, if the sequencers censor or are down, they are so for everyone.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Replace proposer",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen. There is a decentralized Governance system that can attempt changing Proposers with an upgrade.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"executionDelayMode": "if-challenged",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": {
"value": "3600.0"
},
"permissioned": false,
"defenderAdvantage": {
"multiplier": 6.486486486486486,
"shape": "linear"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period\n+ 2d execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow 15 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. There are fewer than 5 Challengers external to the Operator among these. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. There is a 1h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 3600,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 15,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "1h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 6d 9h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 553416,
"secondLine": "6d 9h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow 15 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. There are fewer than 5 Challengers external to the Operator among these. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. There is a 1h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 3600,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 15,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "1h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 2d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 172800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 6d 9h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 553416
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"permissioned": true,
"executionDelay": 0,
"secondLine": "No execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/2 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.5
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since the Security Council can remove the delay on upgrades.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -1,
"regular": {
"value": "3d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Even though there is a 3d Timelock for non-emergency upgrades, there are no forced transactions and thus no way to exit during operator censorship or downtime.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Even though there is a 3d Timelock for non-emergency upgrades, there are no forced transactions and thus no way to exit during operator censorship or downtime."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring. Although the functionality exists in the code, it is currently disabled.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"permissioned": true,
"executionDelay": 0,
"secondLine": "No execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/2 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.5
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since the Security Council can remove the delay on upgrades.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -1,
"regular": {
"value": "3d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Even though there is a 3d Timelock for non-emergency upgrades, there are no forced transactions and thus no way to exit during operator censorship or downtime.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Even though there is a 3d Timelock for non-emergency upgrades, there are no forced transactions and thus no way to exit during operator censorship or downtime."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring. Although the functionality exists in the code, it is currently disabled.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"permissioned": true,
"executionDelay": 10800,
"secondLine": "3h execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published onchain.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0,
"regular": {
"value": "4d 3h",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades go through a 4d 3h delay, but the central operator can still censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades go through a 4d 3h delay, but the central operator can still censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Enqueue via L1",
"description": "Users can submit transactions to an L1 queue, but can't force them. The sequencers cannot selectively skip transactions but can stop processing the queue entirely. In other words, if the sequencers censor or are down, they are so for everyone.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Replace proposer",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen. There is a decentralized Governance system that can attempt changing Proposers with an upgrade.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"executionDelayMode": "if-challenged",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"initialBond": {
"value": "3600.0"
},
"permissioned": false,
"defenderAdvantage": {
"multiplier": 6.486486486486486,
"shape": "linear"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period\n+ 2d execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400,
"regular": {
"value": "10d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades are initiated on L2 and go through a 8d delay on L2 and a 3d delay on L1. Since there is a 1d delay to force a tx (forcing the inclusion in the following state update), users have 10d to exit."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs only allow 2 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 2,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 3/5 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.6
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632,
"secondLine": "12d 17h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs only allow 2 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 2,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 3/5 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.6
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 2d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 172800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 12d 17h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1099632
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"permissioned": true,
"executionDelay": 10800,
"secondLine": "3h execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain (SD)",
"description": "All of the data (SD = state diffs) needed for proof construction is published onchain.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0,
"regular": {
"value": "4d 3h",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades go through a 4d 3h delay, but the central operator can still censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades go through a 4d 3h delay, but the central operator can still censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Enqueue via L1",
"description": "Users can submit transactions to an L1 queue, but can't force them. The sequencers cannot selectively skip transactions but can stop processing the queue entirely. In other words, if the sequencers censor or are down, they are so for everyone.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Replace proposer",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen. There is a decentralized Governance system that can attempt changing Proposers with an upgrade.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"permissioned": true,
"executionDelay": 10800,
"secondLine": "3h execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation rely fully on data that is NOT published onchain.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0,
"regular": {
"value": "4d 3h",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades go through a 4d 3h delay, but the central operator can still censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades go through a 4d 3h delay, but the central operator can still censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Enqueue via L1",
"description": "Users can submit transactions to an L1 queue, but can't force them. The sequencers cannot selectively skip transactions but can stop processing the queue entirely. In other words, if the sequencers censor or are down, they are so for everyone.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Replace proposer",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen. There is a decentralized Governance system that can attempt changing Proposers with an upgrade.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (SN)",
"description": "SNARKs are succinct zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness, but require trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"permissioned": true
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 3/5 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.6
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -1296000,
"regular": {
"value": "1d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Even though there is a 1d Timelock for non-emergency upgrades, forced transactions are disabled. Even if they were to be enabled, user withdrawals can be censored up to 15d.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Even though there is a 1d Timelock for non-emergency upgrades, forced transactions are disabled. Even if they were to be enabled, user withdrawals can be censored up to 15d."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no mechanism to have transactions be included if the sequencer is down or censoring. Although the functionality exists in the code, it is currently disabled.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "If the Proposer fails, users can leverage the source available prover to submit proofs to the L1 bridge. There is a 5d delay for proving and a 5d delay for finalizing state proven in this way. These delays can only be lowered except during the emergency state.",
"sentiment": "good"
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (SN)",
"description": "SNARKs are succinct zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness, but require trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"permissioned": true,
"executionDelay": 0,
"secondLine": "No execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -1209600,
"regular": {
"value": "7d",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Users have 7d to exit funds in case of an unwanted non-emergency upgrade. There is a 21d delay before a non-emergency upgrade is applied, and withdrawals can take up to 14d to be processed.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Users have 7d to exit funds in case of an unwanted non-emergency upgrade. There is a 21d delay before a non-emergency upgrade is applied, and withdrawals can take up to 14d to be processed."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Force via L1",
"description": "Users can force the sequencer to include a transaction by submitting a request through L1. If the sequencer censors or is down for for more than 14d, users can use the exit hatch to withdraw their funds.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1209600
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Use escape hatch",
"description": "Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a zero knowledge proof of funds.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+2 -5
+2 -5
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (ST, SN)",
"description": "STARKs and SNARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness. STARKs proofs are wrapped in SNARKs proofs for efficiency. SNARKs require a trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"permissioned": true,
"executionDelay": 10800,
"secondLine": "3h execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain (SD)",
"description": "All of the data (SD = state diffs) needed for proof construction is published onchain.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0,
"regular": {
"value": "4d 3h",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"warning": {
"value": "Non-emergency upgrades go through a 4d 3h delay, but the central operator can still censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay.",
"sentiment": "warning"
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Non-emergency upgrades go through a 4d 3h delay, but the central operator can still censor withdrawal transactions by implementing a TransactionFilterer with no delay."
}
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Enqueue via L1",
"description": "Users can submit transactions to an L1 queue, but can't force them. The sequencers cannot selectively skip transactions but can stop processing the queue entirely. In other words, if the sequencers censor or are down, they are so for everyone.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Replace proposer",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen. There is a decentralized Governance system that can attempt changing Proposers with an upgrade.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}