4af7e1d7 (main)
and
333bf8ca (PR)
+15 -15
+15 -15
{
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "All transaction results (state diffs) are published in Ethereum blobs",
"description": "Each checkpoint proposal includes EIP-4844 blob commitments that are checked against the blob hashes in the proposing transaction. The epoch proof revalidates the accumulated blob commitments before the epoch is finalized.",
"references": [
{
"title": "Rollup.sol - propose() on Etherscan",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xAe2001f7e21d5EcABf6234E9FDd1E76F50F74962#code"
},
{
"title": "Rollup.sol - validateBlobs() on Etherscan",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xAe2001f7e21d5EcABf6234E9FDd1E76F50F74962#code"
}
],
"risks": []
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular messaging",
"description": "The user initiates L2->L1 messages by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled, the message becomes available for processing on L1. ZK proofs are required to settle blocks. Once the epoch root proof has been verified, the rollup inserts the epoch root into the Outbox, from which withdrawals and other L2->L1 messages can be consumed on Ethereum. Withdrawals can be initiated privately on L2, revealing only the L1-facing portion of the transaction. There is no canonical bridge escrow: only the canonical messaging layer is immutable, while each token bridged through a locking escrow may introduce additional trust assumptions tied to that specific escrow.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Rollup.sol - submitEpochRootProof() on Etherscan",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xAe2001f7e21d5EcABf6234E9FDd1E76F50F74962#code"
},
{
"title": "Outbox.sol - consume() on Etherscan",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xc9698B7AdEf9ee63F3Bf5cFF38086e4E836579f0#code"
}
]
}
],
"operator": {
"name": "There is no central operator",
"description": "There is no privileged sequencer. Anyone can stake 200 K AZTEC to join the sequencer queue, and anyone can call flushEntryQueue() to activate queued sequencers once the queue rules allow it.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Rollup.sol - deposit() on Etherscan",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xAe2001f7e21d5EcABf6234E9FDd1E76F50F74962#code"
},
{
"title": "Rollup.sol - flushEntryQueue() on Etherscan",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xAe2001f7e21d5EcABf6234E9FDd1E76F50F74962#code"
}
]
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "Upgrades replace the canonical rollup",
"description": "The core contracts are immutable, but Governance owns the Registry and GSE and can register a new rollup version as canonical after the governance delay. Governance also owns critical config parameters that can freeze or compromise the Rollup system.",
"references": [
{
"title": "Registry.sol - addRollup() on Etherscan",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x35b22e09Ee0390539439E24f06Da43D83f90e298#code"
},
{
"title": "Governance.sol - execute() on Etherscan",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x1102471Eb3378FEE427121c9EfcEa452E4B6B75e#code"
}
],
"risks": []
},
{
"name": "No canonical bridge escrow",
"description": "There is no default canonical escrow. The rollup is deployed only with an immutable canonical messaging bridge, which can be used by any escrow. As a result, each token bridged to Aztec via Ethereum lock-mint must be assessed individually by examining its specific locking escrow. The trust assumptions of a given escrow may differ from those of the immutable rollup itself. Gas tokens are bridged through the FeeJuicePortal, an immutable one-way portal that only supports bridging to public L2 addresses. Although the rollup and its canonical messaging bridge are immutable, an upgradeable escrow could migrate its funds to a new rollup version without requiring users to migrate, effectively trading immutability for convenience.",
"references": [
{
"title": "FeeJuicePortal.sol - on Etherscan",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/eth:0x2891F8b941067F8B5a3F34545A30Cf71E3E23617#code"
},
{
"title": "Outbox.sol - on Etherscan",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xc9698B7AdEf9ee63F3Bf5cFF38086e4E836579f0#code"
}
],
"risks": []
},
{
"name": "Inclusion is probabilistic",
"description": "All censorship resistance tools that are part of the protocol rely on probabilistic inclusion. In contrast to \"forced transactions\", there is no simple deterministic inclusion after some maximum delay, but rather different inclusion probabilities after different time horizons. The \"time needed to exit\" of 20d for the exit window was simulated by using a simple model of the decentralized sequencer set at launch. The escape hatch and private transactions can give additional inclusion guarantees.",
"references": [
{
"title": "CRsim - Simulated inclusion probability on Aztec",
"url": "https://sekuba.github.io/crsim"
}
],
"risks": []
}
],
"sequencing": {
"name": "Transactions are ordered by a staked validator committee",
"description": "Joining the sequencer set is permissionless and requires staking 200 K AZTEC. For each epoch, the rollup samples a 48-member committee from the active sequencer set of 3453 and selects one proposer from the current committee per slot. More than 2/3 of the sequencers in the committee need to attest to each proposed block in an epoch for it to be valid.",
"sequencerSetSpec": {
"slotTime": {
"value": "1m 12s"
},
"epochTime": {
"value": "38m 24s",
"description": "A random committee is sampled from the sequencer set for each epoch, a random block producer is sampled from the committee for each slot in the epoch"
},
"sequencerCount": {
"value": "3453 sequencers"
},
"blockProductionAccess": {
"value": "Open",
"sentiment": "good"
},
"stakePerValidator": {
"value": "200 K AZTEC, constant"
},
"rateLimit": {
"value": "Up to 4 sequencers per epoch (current)",
"description": "Can be changed (or set to 0) by onchain Governance"
},
"deterministicCrGadget": {
"value": "No",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"additionalCrGadgets": {
"value": "Bonded escape hatch, private transactions",
"sentiment": "good"
}
},
"inclusionDelayChart": {
"type": "committeelike",
"validatorCount": 3453,
"committeeSize": 48,
"epochSlots": 32,
"slotSeconds": 72,
"blockingThreshold": 15,
"target": 0.99,
"maxCensorFraction": 0.5,
"stakeDistribution": {
"stakeToken": "AZTEC",
"totalStake": 629230000,
"totalStake": 609016000,
"entities": [
{
"name": "Nethermind",
"stake": 123200000
"stake": 113800000
},
{
"name": "Nansen | Stake to Stack Points",
"stake": 79800000
"stake": 77200000
},
{
"name": "Sigma Prime",
"stake": 54600000
"stake": 53200000
},
{
"name": "snoopfear|PON",
"stake": 47200000
"stake": 47400000
},
{
"name": "P2P.org",
"stake": 45196000
"stake": 42398000
},
{
"name": "Wonderland",
"stake": 35400000
"stake": 39000000
},
{
"name": "GabbexNodes",
"stake": 30800000
},
{
"name": "ZKV",
"stake": 30590000
"stake": 29416000
},
{
"name": "Aztec-Scan",
"stake": 21000000
"name": "GabbexNodes",
"stake": 28000000
},
{
"name": "01node",
"stake": 18000000
"stake": 21400000
},
{
"name": "Aztec-Scan",
"stake": 18600000
}
]
}
},
"inclusionDelayChartDescription": "The chart models live-chain selective censorship only. It does not model the escape hatch, validator-set changes, validator-set lag, and blanket-censorship resistance gadgets.",
"censorshipResistance": "The committee and regular sequencer set can be circumvented via the escape hatch, which designates a bonded proposer (via RANDAO) who can publish checkpoints without committee attestations. The bond is 332 M AZTEC, a high amount that is supposed to protect the single-proof system in case of bugs while still providing a last resort opportunity to circumvent the sequencer set. Aztec has developed a full private execution environment on the L2. This can benefit users because they cannot be censored based on their transaction content.\n### Selective censorship\nOn a live Aztec L2 with a given fraction of censoring sequencers, users can either send private transactions or wait for a non-censoring committee and proposing sequencer to include their public transaction.\n### Blanket censorship\nIf users are censored by the entire sequencer set, even if it stops block production just to censor, anyone can join the sequencer set permissionlessly at the churn rate or circumvent it completely by bonding and using the escape hatch. In both cases, expensive hardware is required to provide the required validity proof. Motivated censorers can try to saturate the entry queue and the escape hatch with their own new sequencers and thus lower the inclusion chances of the censored.\n### Walkaway\nIn the scenario of all sequencers stopping their service, the escape hatch provides an inclusion guarantee of 2d 23h in the worst case and the sequencer set can heal long-term by permissionless entry and churn.",
"references": [
{
"title": "Aztec docs - Privacy considerations",
"url": "https://github.com/AztecProtocol/aztec-packages/blob/next/docs/docs-developers/docs/resources/considerations/privacy_considerations.md#function-fingerprints-and-tx-fingerprints"
},
{
"title": "Rollup.sol - getProposerAt() on Etherscan",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xAe2001f7e21d5EcABf6234E9FDd1E76F50F74962#code"
},
{
"title": "EscapeHatch.sol - selectCandidates() on Etherscan",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x8c189ead28D5987A48e522162f9225124D50AD1B#code"
}
],
"risks": []
},
"stateValidation": {
"description": "Each epoch root proof is verified by the HonkVerifier smart contract on Ethereum before the proven checkpoint number is advanced and the epoch outbox state root is inserted into the Outbox. Proving is permissionless, and a single proof can cover one Checkpoint (1m 12s) to one epoch (38m 24s). Unproven checkpoints are pruned after the proof submission window of 1h 16m expires.",
"categories": [
{
"title": "State root proposals",
"description": "The rollup only advances the proven chain after submitEpochRootProof() succeeds. That call verifies the epoch proof and then inserts the epoch outbox state root for L2->L1 messaging.",
"references": [
{
"title": "Rollup.sol - submitEpochRootProof() on Etherscan",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xAe2001f7e21d5EcABf6234E9FDd1E76F50F74962#code"
}
],
"risks": []
},
{
"title": "Validity proofs",
"description": "Each update to the system state must be accompanied by a ZK proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. These proofs are then verified on Ethereum by a smart contract.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Rollup.sol - submitEpochRootProof() on Etherscan",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xAe2001f7e21d5EcABf6234E9FDd1E76F50F74962#code"
},
{
"title": "HonkVerifier.sol - verify() on Etherscan",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x70aEDda427f26480D240bc0f4308ceDec8d31348#code"
}
]
},
{
"title": "Slashing",
"description": "Each stake of 200 K AZTEC that is locked to join the sequencer set and vote in governance can be slashed under certain conditions. Slashing is voted on by sequencers each time they propose a checkpoint and is grouped in rounds that span 4 epochs (2h 33m) each.\n\nSlashing conditions are programmed into each sequencer node and can be changed by node operators by updating or editing their node software. Nodes usually submit votes to slash automatically on L1. The `TallySlashingProposer` contract only enforces the formalities of the slashing system:\n* A given slashing round's votes always target the checkpoint proposals from 2 rounds ago.\n* As soon as a round's votes have reached a quorum of 65/128, it enters an execution delay of 28 rounds (2d 23h)\n* An automatically generated slashing payload is executable by anyone on L1 after the execution delay, applying the slashing penalties defined by the sequencer votes.\n\nSlashing penalties are defined onchain in three levels: large (2.00 K AZTEC), medium (2.00 K AZTEC), and small (2.00 K AZTEC). Offenses that lead to slashing usually include:\n* Inactivity: A sequencer fails to attest or propose when selected.\n* Data Withholding: A sequencer proposes a checkpoint including state diff data availability on L1 but withholds the public transaction bodies and/or CHONK proofs required for permissionless proving.\n* Invalidity: A sequencer attests to invalid proposals, multiple conflicting proposals, with invalid signatures, or proposes a block that is not proven in time.\n\nThe above offense list is not exhaustive and not defined onchain but usually in the software the sequencers decide to run. This is also where the mapping of offenses to the slashing penalty levels can be defined.\n\nThe SlashVeto Council is a 5/9 Multisig that can veto specific proposals and/or all slashing for 3d at a time.",
"references": [
{
"title": "Slashing - Aztec Docs",
"url": "https://docs.aztec.network/operate/operators/sequencer-management/slashing_and_offenses"
},
{
"title": "SlashVeto Council - Github",
"url": "https://github.com/aztec-slash-veto/council"
},
{
"title": "slashveto.me - Monitor Slashing",
"url": "https://slashveto.me"
}
],
"risks": []
}
]
},
"upgradesAndGovernance": {
"content": "# Standard Path (Signaling)\nBecause sequencers stake AZTEC tokens to secure the L2 network, they are also the primary governors of the system. Any governance proposal must be encoded and deployed as a smart contract payload on Ethereum. While core contracts are immutable, the onchain Governance system can designate a new 'canonical' rollup with a 1mo delay and has access to critical configuration permissions that can freeze or compromise the Rollup system. These permissions can only be accessed through the process described below.\n\n## 1. The Signaling Phase (`GovernanceProposer`)\nAztec uses an onchain \"Empire\" signaling system. Active sequencers operating on the 'canonical rollup' (as defined by the Registry) call `signal(payloadAddress)` on the L1 `GovernanceProposer` contract during their designated L2 slots to support a specific upgrade payload. A voting round consists of 1,000 slots. To win a round and become a formal proposal, a payload must receive signals from at least 600 slots. Once quorum is reached, the payload is submitted to the L1 `Governance` contract.\n\n## 2. The Voting Phase (`Governance`)\nOnce submitted, the proposal enters a delay and voting flow:\n* **Pending (3d):** At the end of this delay, voting power is snapshotted.\n* **Active (7d):** AZTEC token holders can vote. To pass, a proposal must reach a 20% Quorum of all staked power, and the `yea` votes must exceed a required margin of 33%.\n* **Queued (1mo):** If successful, the proposal enters an execution delay. This acts as an exit window, allowing dissenting sequencers to initiate a withdrawal of their staked tokens before the malicious/disagreed-upon code is executed.\n* Executable (7d): The proposal enters a grace period where anyone can call `execute()`. If not executed, it expires.\n\nTotal standard delay from proposal to execution: **1mo 10d**.\n\n### Emergency Path (Circumvent Signaling)\nIf the L2 sequencer set is offline, censoring, or acting maliciously, the `GovernanceProposer` cannot be used. To ensure liveness, anyone can bypass the Sequencer signaling phase using the `proposeWithLock()` function directly on the `Governance` contract.\n* An actor must lock **258 M AZTEC**, roughly 2.5% of total supply\n* These funds are locked for an extended 3mo.\n* Once proposed, the payload enters the exact same 1mo 10d Voting Phase (Pending -> Active -> Queued -> Executable) as the standard path.\n\n### Rollup Immutability\nThe smart contract code of `Rollup`, its verifier and its canonical messaging contracts cannot be changed. However, `Governance` owns critical permissions for configuration parameters that can freeze the L2 indefinitely. 'Upgrading' a Rollup contract involves a `Governance` action that designates a new `Rollup` contract address as canonical. The `GSE` (Governance Staking Escrow) automatically migrates the voting power and stake of all active sequencers to the new rollup version if they staked to the default magic address `0x9064Fb41156D300196d5Eb95E0B3c1f08eBc39a8` instead of a specific immutable rollup. Importantly, `Governance` retains ownership of the old rollup, with the permissions to freeze it in the same or any future governance proposal. In summary and practice, the current Aztec rollup system is not immutable and prone to governance changes with the configured 1mo delay.\n\n### Slashing and the SlashVeto Council\nAztec features onchain slashing for equivocation or missing attestations, managed by `Slasher` and `TallySlashingProposer`. \n\nThere is a protective **Vetoer** role held by the SlashVeto Council. The Council cannot upgrade the protocol, alter governance, or steal funds. Instead it is limited to two permissions:\n* call `vetoPayload()` to stop a specific slashing event.\n* call `setSlashingEnabled(false)`, which pauses all slashing in the protocol for a period of 3d.\n\n### Economics & Treasury\n* **Coin Issuer:** The `CoinIssuer` contract is owned by Governance and is authorized to mint new AZTEC tokens up to a cap of 20%.\n* **Protocol Treasury:** Funds owned by the DAO sit in the `ProtocolTreasury`. The Treasury has a hardcoded timestamp (approx. Nov 2026). Before this date, the DAO cannot spend Treasury funds. After this date, Treasury funds and token ownership can be moved with a Governance Proposal."
},
"warning": "Aztec v4 has [know security vulnerabilities](https://aztec.network/blog/critical-vulnerability-in-alpha-v4) that can only be fixed in a new deployment."
}+13 -13
+13 -13
{
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "Destination tokens are upgradeable",
"description": "Tokens transferred end up as wrapped ERC20 proxies, some of them are upgradable. The contract is named UChildERC20Proxy.",
"references": [],
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "destination token contract is maliciously upgraded."
}
],
"isIncomplete": true
}
],
"sequencing": {
"name": "Transactions are ordered by Polygon PoS validators",
"description": "Polygon PoS is operated by a closed proof-of-stake validator set with 102 active validators. Block production rights are given to validators randomly (stake-weighted) for the duration of a *span*. In practice, validators delegate the block production further to centralised validator-elected block producers (VeBloPs). Ethereum smart contracts accept checkpoints signed by more than two thirds of Polygon PoS validator stake.",
"sequencerSetSpec": {
"slotTime": {
"value": "2s"
},
"epochTime": {
"value": "3h 33m",
"description": "Randomly sampled validators delegate block production for the duration of a span: 6400 blocks"
},
"sequencerCount": {
"value": "102 validators"
},
"blockProductionAccess": {
"value": "Closed and capped",
"sentiment": "bad",
"description": "The current validator cap is 105. Joining the set is permissioned (Multisig)."
},
"stakePerValidator": {
"value": "100,000 POL minimum, variable",
"description": "stake-weighted block production rights, no maximum"
},
"rateLimit": {
"value": "No (permissioned)"
},
"deterministicCrGadget": {
"value": "No",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"additionalCrGadgets": {
"value": "No",
"sentiment": "bad"
}
},
"inclusionDelayChart": {
"type": "spanlike",
"validatorCount": 102,
"spanBlocks": 6400,
"blockSeconds": 2,
"target": 0.99,
"maxCensorFraction": 0.33,
"stakeDistribution": {
"stakeToken": "POL",
"totalStake": 3606070002,
"totalStake": 3584180072,
"entities": [
{
"name": "Upbit Staking",
"stake": 408044403
"stake": 413573181
},
{
"name": "Coinbase",
"stake": 351875004
"stake": 363170203
},
{
"name": "Luganodes",
"stake": 305004763
"stake": 283172194
},
{
"name": "Binance Node",
"stake": 251922326
"stake": 258927770
},
{
"name": "Figment",
"stake": 225231066
"stake": 225661576
},
{
"name": "Matic Power",
"stake": 207784342
"name": "Anonymous 194",
"stake": 208026879
},
{
"name": "Anonymous 194",
"stake": 183259002
"name": "Matic Power",
"stake": 207786172
},
{
"name": "Blockdaemon",
"stake": 176532472
"stake": 181572004
},
{
"name": "Kraken",
"stake": 152345919
"stake": 154483521
},
{
"name": "Kiln x Ownest 🔸 Pro Staking 🔸",
"stake": 130976081
"stake": 133742516
}
]
}
},
"inclusionDelayChartDescription": "The chart models live-chain selective censorship only. Since proposing is stake-weighted, the x-axis represents the censoring POL stake, and does not cover validator-set changes, or blanket-censorship resistance gadgets.",
"censorshipResistance": "The validator set (on Polygon PoS, validators are both proposers and sequencers) is closed and capped, but includes a diverse set of known entities who share block production rights. There are no specific censorship resistance gadgets built into the protocol.\n### Selective censorship\nAs long as the Polygon PoS blockchain is producing blocks, users can expect to include their transactions due to the rotating, diverse block producers, even if they are censored by some of them. Unfortunately, the rotation is very slow (see *span* time) and even just a few entities censoring can cause long inclusion delays.\n### Blanket censorship\nValidators holding more than 1/3 of Polygon PoS stake among them can censor users if they actively refuse to attest to blocks with their transactions. Polygon Multisig controls the core smart contracts on Ethereum and can administer the validator set (including malicious changes) as a consequence.\n### Walkaway\nIf validators holding more than 1/3 of the stake on Polygon PoS stop block production, the chain stops and there is no way for users to include any transactions. As the validator set is currently closed by a permissioned smart contract setting on ethereum, walkaway of the permissioned actor would require social coordination and a hard fork to progress the chain.",
"references": [
{
"title": "Polygon PoS architecture documentation",
"url": "https://docs.polygon.technology/pos/architecture/"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"category": "Users can be censored if",
"text": "the active span proposer censors them, or if at least one third of Polygon PoS stake refuses to attest blocks that include their transactions."
}
]
},
"stateValidation": {
"categories": [
{
"title": "No state validation",
"description": "State updates are settled on Ethereum if signed by at least 2/3+1 of the Polygon PoS validators stake. Contracts on Ethereum do not check whether the state transitions are valid.",
"references": [],
"risks": [
{
"category": "Users can be censored if",
"text": "validators on Polygon decide to not mint tokens after observing an event on Ethereum."
},
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "validators decide to mint more tokens than there are locked on Ethereum thus preventing some existing holders from being able to bring their funds back to Ethereum."
},
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "validators submit a fraudulent checkpoint allowing themselves to withdraw all locked funds."
}
]
}
]
}
}+0 -32
+0 -32
{
"creator": "Succinct",
"projectsForTvs": [
{
"projectId": "fluent",
"sinceTimestamp": 1776599267
},
{
"projectId": "forknet",
"sinceTimestamp": 1781600877
},
{
"projectId": "katana",
"sinceTimestamp": 1781600877
},
{
"projectId": "lumia",
"sinceTimestamp": 1781600877
},
{
"projectId": "polygonzkevm",
"sinceTimestamp": 1781600877
},
{
"projectId": "xlayer",
"sinceTimestamp": 1781600877
},
{
"projectId": "silicon",
"sinceTimestamp": 1781600877
},
{
"projectId": "ternoa",
"sinceTimestamp": 1781600877
},
{
"projectId": "wirex",
"sinceTimestamp": 1781600877
},
{
"projectId": "penchain",
"sinceTimestamp": 1781600877
},
{
"projectId": "haust",
"sinceTimestamp": 1781600877
},
{
"projectId": "celo",
"sinceTimestamp": 1771445567
},
{
"projectId": "vector",
"sinceTimestamp": 1771445567
},
{
"projectId": "sophon",
"sinceTimestamp": 1771445567
},
{
"projectId": "lens",
"sinceTimestamp": 1771445567
},
{
"projectId": "galxegravity",
"sinceTimestamp": 1771445567,
"untilTimestamp": 1763420400
},
{
"projectId": "rari",
"sinceTimestamp": 1771445567
},
{
"projectId": "blobstream",
"sinceTimestamp": 1771445567
},
{
"projectId": "molten",
"sinceTimestamp": 1771445567
},
{
"projectId": "winr",
"sinceTimestamp": 1771445567
},
{
"projectId": "phala",
"sinceTimestamp": 1771445567
},
{
"projectId": "kroma",
"sinceTimestamp": 1771445567
},
{
"projectId": "taiko",
"sinceTimestamp": 1774964687
},
{
"projectId": "mantle",
"sinceTimestamp": 1778001356
},
{
"projectId": "morph",
"sinceTimestamp": 1779354407
},
{
"projectId": "base",
"sinceTimestamp": 1779825599
},
{
"projectId": "appchain",
"sinceTimestamp": 1780326419
},
{
"projectId": "apechain",
"sinceTimestamp": 1780346337
},
{
"projectId": "gpt",
"sinceTimestamp": 1781600877
},
{
"projectId": "astarzkevm",
"sinceTimestamp": 1781600877
},
{
"projectId": "witness",
"sinceTimestamp": 1781600877
}
],
"proofSystemInfo": "## Description\n\nSP1 Hypercube is the latest Succint's RISC-V zkVM using the [Plonky3](https://github.com/Plonky3/Plonky3) stack. The zkVM execution is proven recursively and is wrapped into a SNARK for final verification. It provides tools to generate onchain Groth16 or Plonk verifiers. SP1 Hypercube provides 98 bits of proven security, as per [Ethereum Foundation’s soundcalc evaluation](https://github.com/ethereum/soundcalc/blob/main/reports/sp1.md).\n\n## Proof system\n\nSP1 Hypercube is an iteration of the previous zkVM version, SP1 Turbo, introducing architectural changes that improve prover performance and memory efficiency.\n\nHypercube proves execution of a 64-bit RISC-V VM using several ZK circuits, or chips, connected by lookup arguments ([LogUp based on GKR protocol](https://docs.succinct.xyz/docs/sp1/hypercube/logupgkr)). VM execution trace is split into several shards of size approximately 2^22, that could be proven in parallel with a STARK proving system. Additional arguments prove memory consistency across shards. \n\nThe parallelized proofs are recursively checked by the next layer of STARK circuits. The correctness of the final STARK proof is verified with the final wrap SNARK program, the wrap SNARK proof is verified onchain.\n\n### Hypercube vs. Turbo\n\nProving time and memory optimizations of SP1 Hypercube are based on several design improvements compared to SP1 Turbo.\n\nHypercube implements a [multilinear polynomial](https://github.com/succinctlabs/sp1/tree/v6.0.0/slop/crates/multilinear) STARK compared to univariate polynomials in Turbo. Multilinear polynomial based proving systems are more efficient than univariate because manipulating them reduces usage of log-linear FFT algorithm.\n\nMultilinear polynomials also allow Hypercube to innovate on a polynomial commitment scheme, implementing [Jagged PCS](https://docs.succinct.xyz/docs/sp1/hypercube/jagged) (defined in [this preprint](https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/917)). Jagged PCS allows efficient packing of computation traces of zkVM chips with different lengths, optimizing the prover memory requirement. More efficient LogUp based on GKR is also made possible because of multilinear polynomials.\n\n### Recursion circuits\n\nSP1 Hypercube provides tools for recursive proof generation by [verifying proofs in a zkVM](https://docs.succinct.xyz/docs/sp1/writing-programs/proof-aggregation#verifying-proofs-inside-the-zkvm). This uses the same toolkit as top-level proof system, but proves the correct verification of all proofs generated on the previous step.\n\nFirst, proofs for correctness of separate shards are generated. These shards may have different trace shape, so in the next step they are normalized. Finally, normalized shard proofs are recursively compressed in batches of 3-4 to a single zkVM proof. For further details see [this page](https://docs.succinct.xyz/docs/sp1/hypercube/recursion).\n\n### Final wrap\n\nSP1 Hypercube supports Plonk (with KZG polynomial commitments) or Groth16 final SNARK wrap of the STARK proof for performant onchain proof verification ([link](https://docs.succinct.xyz/docs/sp1/generating-proofs/proof-types#compressed)). The implementation of these proof systems over BN254 curve is used. For Plonk, Aztec Ignition trusted setup ceremony is used, for Groth16 Succinct run internal circuit-dependent phase 2 trusted setup (todo: link to trusted setups section).",
"techStack": {
"zkVM": [
{
"id": "Plonky3",
"type": "STARK",
"name": "Plonky3",
"description": "Toolkit that implements a set of primitives for STARK-based zkVMs developed by Polygon Zero team."
},
{
"id": "RISCV64",
"type": "ISA",
"name": "RISC-V 64bit",
"description": "Free and open-source universal 64-bit ISA used across a variety of hardware and software."
},
{
"id": "BabyBear",
"type": "Field",
"name": "Baby Bear",
"description": "Prime field of order p = 15 * 2**27 + 1."
},
{
"id": "KoalaBear",
"type": "Field",
"name": "Koala Bear",
"description": "Prime field of order p = 2**31 - 2**24 + 1."
}
],
"finalWrap": [
{
"id": "Gnark",
"type": "Plonk",
"name": "Gnark",
"description": "Consensys implementation of Plonk proving system written in Go."
},
{
"id": "SP1_v6_0_0",
"type": "Groth16",
"name": "SP1 v6.0.0",
"description": "Succinct's Groth16 final wrap circuit for SP1 zkVM v6.0.0"
},
{
"id": "SP1_v6_1_0",
"type": "Groth16",
"name": "SP1 v6.1.0",
"description": "Succinct's Groth16 final wrap circuit for SP1 zkVM v6.1.0"
},
{
"id": "BN254",
"type": "curve",
"name": "BN254",
"description": "BN254, aka BN256, aka alt_bn128 pairing-friendly 254-bit prime field Weierstrass elliptic curve."
}
]
},
"trustedSetups": [
{
"proofSystem": {
"id": "Gnark",
"type": "Plonk",
"name": "Gnark",
"description": "Consensys implementation of Plonk proving system written in Go."
},
"id": "AztecIgnition",
"name": "Aztec Ignition",
"participantCount": 176,
"risk": "green",
"shortDescription": "Aztec Ignition is a trusted setup ceremony that was run by Aztec for KZG commitment over BN254 curve in 2019. It included 176 participants and was publicly open for participation.",
"longDescription": "Aztec Ignition is a trusted setup ceremony for KZG commitments over BN254 curve that was run by Aztec for KZG commitment over BN254 curve in 2019. \nIt included 176 participants and was publicly open for participation.\n\n- Github repo to download and verify the ceremony artifacts: [https://github.com/AztecProtocol/ignition-verification](https://github.com/AztecProtocol/ignition-verification).\n- Github repo with instructions for ceremony participants: [https://github.com/AztecProtocol/Setup](https://github.com/AztecProtocol/Setup).\n- Ceremony announcement with a call to participate: [https://aztec.network/blog/announcing-ignition](https://aztec.network/blog/announcing-ignition)."
},
{
"proofSystem": {
"id": "SP1_v6_1_0",
"type": "Groth16",
"name": "SP1 v6.1.0",
"description": "Succinct's Groth16 final wrap circuit for SP1 zkVM v6.1.0"
},
"id": "SP1HypercubeGroth16_v6_1_0",
"name": "SP1 Hypercube v6.1.0 Groth16 circuit-specific setup",
"participantCount": 18,
"risk": "red",
"shortDescription": "Trusted setup ceremony for SP1 Hypercube (release v6.0.0) Groth16 final wrap circuits. Phase 2 of the ceremony was organized by Succinct and includes 18 participants from 8 different organizations, without public calls to participate.",
"longDescription": "SP1 Hypercube v6.1.0 Groth16 trusted setup builds on top of the first 54 contributions to the [Perpetual Powers of Tau](https://github.com/privacy-ethereum/perpetualpowersoftau) ceremony as its phase 1 setup.\n\nPhase 2 of the ceremony was run among 18 participants affiliated with Etherealize, Polygon, OP Labs, Alpen Labs, Offchain Labs, Succinct, Coinbase, Across Protocol. It generated circuit-specific setup parameters for Groth16 wrapper of SP1 Hypercube zkVM.\n\n- Phase 1 ceremony (first 54 contributions are used): .\n- Ceremony info on Succinct docs page: .\n- Ceremony instructions and verification instructions: [https://github.com/succinctlabs/semaphore-gnark-11/tree/main](https://github.com/succinctlabs/semaphore-gnark-11/tree/main).\n- Link to transcript and other artifacts (Note: will immediately start downloading .tar.gz file): ."
},
{
"proofSystem": {
"id": "SP1_v6_0_0",
"type": "Groth16",
"name": "SP1 v6.0.0",
"description": "Succinct's Groth16 final wrap circuit for SP1 zkVM v6.0.0"
},
"id": "SP1HypercubeGroth16",
"name": "SP1 Hypercube Groth16 circuit-specific setup",
"participantCount": 12,
"risk": "red",
"shortDescription": "Trusted setup ceremony for SP1 Hypercube (release v6.0.0) Groth16 final wrap circuits. Phase 2 of the ceremony was organized by Succinct and includes 12 participants from 7 different organizations, without public calls to participate.",
"longDescription": "SP1 Hypercube v6.0.0 Groth16 trusted setup builds on top of the first 54 contributions to the [Perpetual Powers of Tau](https://github.com/privacy-ethereum/perpetualpowersoftau) ceremony as its phase 1 setup.\n\nPhase 2 of the ceremony was run among 12 participants affiliated with Across Protocol, OP Labs, Offchain Labs, Succinct Labs, Conduit, Ethrealize and 1 independent participant. It generated circuit-specific setup parameters for Groth16 wrapper of SP1 Hypercube zkVM.\n\n- Phase 1 ceremony (first 54 contributions are used): .\n- Ceremony info on Succinct docs page: (link is updated and points to a different ceremony now).\n- Ceremony instructions and verification instructions: [https://github.com/succinctlabs/semaphore-gnark-11/tree/main](https://github.com/succinctlabs/semaphore-gnark-11/tree/main).\n- Link to transcript and other artifacts (Note: will immediately start downloading .tar.gz file): ."
}
],
"verifierHashes": [
{
"hash": "0x4388a21c687fdd5f218d7e3d13190cac4c5355818d3605fd5fb811df468ee696",
"name": "SP1 Hypercube Groth16 v6.1.0",
"sourceLink": "https://github.com/succinctlabs/sp1/tree/v6.1.0/crates/prover",
"proofSystem": {
"id": "SP1_v6_1_0",
"type": "Groth16",
"name": "SP1 v6.1.0",
"description": "Succinct's Groth16 final wrap circuit for SP1 zkVM v6.1.0"
},
"knownDeployments": [
{
"address": "eth:0xb69f2584CBcFf99a58C4e7002E8b89Af54a6f4e2"
},
{
"address": "eth:0xD9d5C8456a168Dd25561064F47bF116111131B1D"
},
{
"address": "arb1:0xD9d5C8456a168Dd25561064F47bF116111131B1D"
}
],
"verificationStatus": "successful",
"attesters": [
{
"id": "l2beat",
"name": "L2BEAT",
"link": "https://l2beat.com"
}
],
"verificationSteps": "The regeneration process consumed around 70 GiB of memory on the peak.\n\n1. Install necessary dependencies: rust, docker, sp1 toolkit, go.\n\n```\nsudo apt update\nsudo apt install build-essential golang-go protobuf-compiler\n\ncurl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh\n. .cargo/env\ncargo install --debug --locked cargo-make\n\ncurl -fsSL https://download.docker.com/linux/ubuntu/gpg | sudo apt-key add -\nsudo add-apt-repository \"deb [arch=amd64] https://download.docker.com/linux/ubuntu focal stable\"\nsudo apt install -y docker-ce\nsudo usermod -aG docker ${USER}\n\ncurl -L https://sp1up.succinct.xyz/ | bash\nsource ~/.bashrc\nsp1up\n```\n\n2. Clone [sp1 repo](https://github.com/succinctlabs/sp1), set `SP1_ALLOW_DEPRECATED_HOOKS` for correct compilation and run the script to build groth16 circuit file.\n\n```\ngit clone https://github.com/succinctlabs/sp1.git\ncd sp1/crates/prover\ngit checkout v6.1.0 # commit should be d454975ac7c1126097e36eceda9bce2cb9899da4\nexport SP1_ALLOW_DEPRECATED_HOOKS=true # fixes compilation errors\n\nmake build-circuits\n```\n\nThis script will generate `groth16_circuit.bin` file in the `prover/build/groth16` directory, however it will not generate correct prover and verifier keys.\n\n3. Generate correct pk and vk using the correct SP1 trusted setup. This will require [semaphore-gnark-11](https://github.com/succinctlabs/semaphore-gnark-11/tree/main) repo.\n\n```\ncd\ngit clone https://github.com/succinctlabs/semaphore-gnark-11.git # tested on commit hash 6d6ebc3608e609ec879e9ba99abee6b6b97d937d\ncd semaphore-gnark-11\n# Download the trusted setup transcript\ncurl \"https://sp1-circuits.s3-us-east-2.amazonaws.com/v6.1.0-trusted-setup.tar.gz\" -o trusted-setup.tar.gz\n\n# Extract trusted setup transcript.\ntar -xzf trusted-setup.tar.gz\n\n# Build the binary.\ngo build\n\n# Generate keys. They are outputted to the files pk and vk in the root directory.\n./semaphore-gnark-11 key trusted-setup/phase1 trusted-setup/phase2-17 trusted-setup/evals /path/to/sp1/crates/prover/build/groth16/groth16_circuit.bin\n```\nThe last step will take several hours to complete.\n\n4. Compute the hash of generated `vk` file: `shasum vk -a 256`."
},
{
"hash": "0x0e78f4db7a6771a3a6a7d9c3b0de6fe73d58781368967a7fe84d87aefffec896",
"name": "SP1 Hypercube Groth16 v6.0.0",
"sourceLink": "https://github.com/succinctlabs/sp1/tree/v6.0.0/crates/prover",
"proofSystem": {
"id": "SP1_v6_0_0",
"type": "Groth16",
"name": "SP1 v6.0.0",
"description": "Succinct's Groth16 final wrap circuit for SP1 zkVM v6.0.0"
},
"knownDeployments": [
{
"address": "eth:0x99A74A05a0FaBEB217C1A329b0dac59a1FA52508"
}
],
"verificationStatus": "successful",
"attesters": [
{
"id": "l2beat",
"name": "L2BEAT",
"link": "https://l2beat.com"
}
],
"verificationSteps": "The regeneration process consumed around 70 GiB of memory on the peak.\n\n1. Install necessary dependencies: rust, docker, sp1 toolkit, go.\n\n```\nsudo apt update\nsudo apt install build-essential golang-go protobuf-compiler\n\ncurl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh\n. .cargo/env\ncargo install --debug --locked cargo-make\n\ncurl -fsSL https://download.docker.com/linux/ubuntu/gpg | sudo apt-key add -\nsudo add-apt-repository \"deb [arch=amd64] https://download.docker.com/linux/ubuntu focal stable\"\nsudo apt install -y docker-ce\nsudo usermod -aG docker ${USER}\n\ncurl -L https://sp1up.succinct.xyz/ | bash\nsource ~/.bashrc\nsp1up\n```\n\n2. Clone [sp1 repo](https://github.com/succinctlabs/sp1), set `SP1_ALLOW_DEPRECATED_HOOKS` for correct compilation and run the script to build groth16 circuit file.\n\n```\ngit clone https://github.com/succinctlabs/sp1.git\ncd sp1/crates/prover\ngit checkout v6.0.0 # commit should be f87f8d6ff005d542db22e241928319f5e96a4609\nexport SP1_ALLOW_DEPRECATED_HOOKS=true # fixes compilation errors\n\nmake build-circuits\n```\n\nThis script will generate `groth16_circuit.bin` file in the `prover/build/groth16` directory, however it will not generate correct prover and verifier keys.\n\n3. Generate correct pk and vk using the correct SP1 trusted setup. This will require [semaphore-gnark-11](https://github.com/succinctlabs/semaphore-gnark-11/tree/main) repo.\n\n```\ncd\ngit clone https://github.com/succinctlabs/semaphore-gnark-11.git # tested on commit hash 6d6ebc3608e609ec879e9ba99abee6b6b97d937d\ncd semaphore-gnark-11\n# Download the trusted setup transcript\ncurl \"https://sp1-circuits.s3-us-east-2.amazonaws.com/v6.0.0-trusted-setup.tar.gz\" -o trusted-setup.tar.gz\n\n# Extract trusted setup transcript.\ntar -xzf trusted-setup.tar.gz\n\n# Build the binary.\ngo build\n\n# Generate keys. They are outputted to the files pk and vk in the root directory.\n./semaphore-gnark-11 key trusted-setup/phase1 trusted-setup/phase2-11 trusted-setup/evals /path/to/sp1/crates/prover/build/groth16/groth16_circuit.bin\n```\nThe last step will take several hours to complete.\n\n4. Compute the hash of generated `vk` file: `shasum vk -a 256`."
},
{
"hash": "0x5a093a2fcb46394f5cadfe55c44d4d572fad9cec7aeb38026b0278322ef07fac",
"name": "SP1 Hypercube Plonk v6.1.0",
"sourceLink": "https://github.com/succinctlabs/sp1/tree/v6.1.0/crates/prover",
"proofSystem": {
"id": "Gnark",
"type": "Plonk",
"name": "Gnark",
"description": "Consensys implementation of Plonk proving system written in Go."
},
"knownDeployments": [
{
"address": "eth:0xc3c6dDDAc8829b233Dc6536Ec024775a57b0AF2A"
},
{
"address": "arb1:0xc3c6dDDAc8829b233Dc6536Ec024775a57b0AF2A"
},
{
"address": "eth:0x9774CE99E8Ab3f13582bC6c2Bd2832e5A25C4624"
},
{
"address": "eth:0xD9F24400816c4CC1a3cBb9B851C9B0bAB63Ad692"
}
],
"verificationStatus": "successful",
"attesters": [
{
"id": "l2beat",
"name": "L2BEAT",
"link": "https://l2beat.com"
}
],
"verificationSteps": "The regeneration process consumed around 100 GiB of memory on the peak.\n\n1. Install necessary dependencies: rust, docker, sp1 toolkit, go.\n\n```\nsudo apt update\nsudo apt install build-essential golang-go protobuf-compiler\n\ncurl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh\n. .cargo/env\ncargo install --debug --locked cargo-make\n\ncurl -fsSL https://download.docker.com/linux/ubuntu/gpg | sudo apt-key add -\nsudo add-apt-repository \"deb [arch=amd64] https://download.docker.com/linux/ubuntu focal stable\"\nsudo apt install -y docker-ce\nsudo usermod -aG docker ${USER}\n\ncurl -L https://sp1up.succinct.xyz/ | bash\nsource ~/.bashrc\nsp1up\n```\n\n2. Clone [sp1 repo](https://github.com/succinctlabs/sp1), set `SP1_ALLOW_DEPRECATED_HOOKS` for correct compilation and run the script to regenerate verifiers.\n\n```\ngit clone https://github.com/succinctlabs/sp1.git\ncd sp1/crates/prover\ngit checkout v6.1.0 # commit should be d454975ac7c1126097e36eceda9bce2cb9899da4\nexport SP1_ALLOW_DEPRECATED_HOOKS=true # fixes compilation errors\n\nmake build-circuits\n```\n\nThe script will generate Plonk verifier smart contract with verification keys and the verifier hash in `build/plonk` dir."
},
{
"hash": "0xbb1a6f2930e94bfe8b35e794faf43133214534a17d2ad8e51358cad437b3c317",
"name": "SP1 Hypercube Plonk v6.0.0",
"sourceLink": "https://github.com/succinctlabs/sp1/tree/v6.0.0/crates/prover",
"proofSystem": {
"id": "Gnark",
"type": "Plonk",
"name": "Gnark",
"description": "Consensys implementation of Plonk proving system written in Go."
},
"knownDeployments": [
{
"address": "eth:0x8a0fd5e825D14368d90Fe68F31fceAe3E17AFc5C"
},
{
"address": "arb1:0x8a0fd5e825D14368d90Fe68F31fceAe3E17AFc5C"
}
],
"verificationStatus": "successful",
"attesters": [
{
"id": "l2beat",
"name": "L2BEAT",
"link": "https://l2beat.com"
}
],
"verificationSteps": "The regeneration process consumed around 70 GiB of memory on the peak.\n\n1. Install necessary dependencies: rust, docker, sp1 toolkit, go.\n\n```\nsudo apt update\nsudo apt install build-essential golang-go protobuf-compiler\n\ncurl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://sh.rustup.rs | sh\n. .cargo/env\ncargo install --debug --locked cargo-make\n\ncurl -fsSL https://download.docker.com/linux/ubuntu/gpg | sudo apt-key add -\nsudo add-apt-repository \"deb [arch=amd64] https://download.docker.com/linux/ubuntu focal stable\"\nsudo apt install -y docker-ce\nsudo usermod -aG docker ${USER}\n\ncurl -L https://sp1up.succinct.xyz/ | bash\nsource ~/.bashrc\nsp1up\n```\n\n2. Clone [sp1 repo](https://github.com/succinctlabs/sp1), set `SP1_ALLOW_DEPRECATED_HOOKS` for correct compilation and run the script to regenerate verifiers.\n\n```\ngit clone https://github.com/succinctlabs/sp1.git\ncd sp1/crates/prover\ngit checkout v6.0.0 # commit should be f87f8d6ff005d542db22e241928319f5e96a4609\nexport SP1_ALLOW_DEPRECATED_HOOKS=true # fixes compilation errors\n\nmake build-circuits\n```\n\nThe script will generate Plonk verifier smart contract with verification keys and the verifier hash in `build/plonk` dir."
}
]
}