e58c8ced (main)
and
c776e8d8 (PR)
+2 -2
+2 -2
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (1R, ZK)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Single round proofs (1R) prove the validity of a state proposal, only requiring a single transaction to resolve. A fault proof eliminates a state proposal by proving that any intermediate state transition in the proposal results in a different state root. For either, a ZK proof is used.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"challengeDelay": 432000,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.05"
},
"permissioned": false,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-assessed",
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
"secondLine": "5d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on Celestia. Sequencer tx roots are not checked against the Blobstream bridge data roots onchain, but L2 nodes can verify data availability by running a Celestia light client.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on Celestia. Sequencer tx roots are not checked against the Blobstream bridge data roots onchain, but L2 nodes can verify data availability by running a Celestia light client.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+28 -28
+2 -2
{
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (1R, ZK)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Single round proofs (1R) prove the validity of a state proposal, only requiring a single transaction to resolve. A fault proof eliminates a state proposal by proving that any intermediate state transition in the proposal results in a different state root. For either, a ZK proof is used.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"challengeDelay": 432000,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.05"
},
"permissioned": false,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-assessed",
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
"secondLine": "5d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
}
}+1 -1
{
"architectureImage": "opstack-rollup-superchain-opfp-aggverifier",
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "All data required for proofs is published on chain",
"description": "All the data that is used to construct the system state is published on chain in the form of cheap blobs or calldata. This ensures that it will be available for enough time.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Derivation: Batch submission - OP Mainnet specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/specs/blob/main/specs/protocol/derivation.md#batch-submission"
},
{
"title": "BatchInbox - address",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xFf00000000000000000000000000000000008453#code"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x66d94eE8F529b683ED6013729784e8bb44697A64#code"
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Forced messaging",
"description": "If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular L2->L1 messaging they can submit their messages directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request or halt all messages, including forced withdrawals from L1 and regular messages initiated on L2. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular message.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Forced withdrawal from an OP Stack blockchain",
"url": "https://docs.optimism.io/stack/transactions/forced-transaction"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Users can force any transaction",
"description": "Because the state of the system is based on transactions submitted on the underlying host chain and anyone can submit their transactions there it allows the users to circumvent censorship by interacting with the smart contract on the host chain directly.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Sequencing Window - OP Mainnet Specs",
"url": "https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/51eeb76efeb32b3df3e978f311188aa29f5e3e94/specs/glossary.md#sequencing-window"
},
{
"title": "OptimismPortal2.sol - source code, depositTransaction function",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x66d94eE8F529b683ED6013729784e8bb44697A64#code"
}
]
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "EVM compatible smart contracts are supported",
"description": "OP stack chains are pursuing the EVM Equivalence model. No changes to smart contracts are required regardless of the language they are written in, i.e. anything deployed on L1 can be deployed on L2.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Introducing EVM Equivalence",
"url": "https://medium.com/ethereum-optimism/introducing-evm-equivalence-5c2021deb306"
}
]
}
],
"stateDerivation": {
"nodeSoftware": "The rollup node is composed of two software components: [op-node](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/tree/develop/op-node), implementing consensus related logic, and [op-geth](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/op-geth), implementing execution logic. The configuration file can be found [here](https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/superchain-registry/blob/main/superchain/configs/mainnet/base.toml).",
"compressionScheme": "Data batches are compressed using the [zlib](https://github.com/madler/zlib) algorithm with best compression level.",
"genesisState": "The genesis file can be found [here](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/base-org/node/refs/tags/v0.8.4/mainnet/genesis-l2.json).",
"dataFormat": "The format specification of Sequencer's data batches can be found [here](https://optimism.io/blog/here-s-how-you-can-reproduce-op-mainnet-s-migration-to-bedrock)."
},
"stateValidation": {
"categories": [
{
"title": "State root proposals",
"description": "State roots are proposed by calling `DisputeGameFactory.create` with the AggregateVerifier game type, posting a bond of 0.05 ETH. Each proposal must include an initial proof (TEE attestation or ZK proof) over the range of 600 L2 blocks split into sub-ranges of 30 blocks. With a single proof, the game resolves after 7d; if both proof arms commit, the window collapses to 1d.",
"description": "State roots are proposed by calling `DisputeGameFactory.create` with the AggregateVerifier game type, posting a bond of 0.05 ETH. Each proposal must include an initial proof (TEE attestation or ZK proof) over the range of 600 L2 blocks split into sub-ranges of 30 blocks. With a single proof, the game resolves after 5d; if both proof arms commit, the window collapses to 1d.",
"references": []
},
{
"title": "Challenges",
"description": "Any party that produces a valid ZK proof of an incorrect intermediate root can call `AggregateVerifier.challenge`, contradicting a TEE-only proposal. The challenger's proof is verified onchain via the SP1 verifier gateway. If the challenge stands until the resolution window closes, the original proposer's bond is awarded to the challenger and the game resolves CHALLENGER_WINS. Soundness contradictions within a single proof arm are caught by `AggregateVerifier.nullify`, which permanently disables that arm's verifier contract for all games.",
"references": []
}
]
},
"stateValidationImage": "aggverifier",
"upgradesAndGovernance": {
"content": "All contracts are upgradable by a `ProxyAdmin` contract controlled by a nested 2/2 `Base Governance Multisig` composed of the `Base Coordinator Multisig` and the `Base Security Council`. Upgrades require approval from both parties. There is no delay on upgrades. The Guardian role for the SuperchainConfig is assigned to the Base Governance Multisig, which can pause and unpause withdrawals. `Base Multisig 1` serves as Incident Responder and can pause withdrawals but cannot unpause or extend pauses. Each pause automatically expires after 3 months if not extended by the Guardian. The single Sequencer actor can be modified by `Base Multisig 1` via the SystemConfig contract. The Base Governance multisig can also recover dispute bonds in case of bugs that would distribute them incorrectly.\n\nState validation runs through the `AggregateVerifier` game type (621), which accepts either an AWS Nitro TEE attestation or an SP1 ZK proof. The TEE prover allowlist in the `TEEProverRegistry` is managed solely by the `Base Coordinator Multisig` (without Base Security Council approval), and a separate Manager EOA can register or deregister enclave signers. The ZK arm routes through a Base-owned SP1 verifier gateway; the Base Governance Multisig can add or freeze verifier routes. The Base Governance Multisig can swap the AggregateVerifier implementation, change the respected game type, blacklist individual games, or retire all in-flight games via the AnchorStateRegistry."
}
}+24 -24
{
"addresses": {
"ethereum": [
{
"name": "DisputeGameFactory",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x43edB88C4B80fDD2AdFF2412A7BebF9dF42cB40e",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x0475cBCAebd9CE8AfA5025828d5b98DFb67E059E"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x468C2345D1d409d5b0F2f8bE4aE2082150cC1a0c"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1728308027,
"transactionHash": "0x60eca85990bf426b85e3f3db9d9215e7fb229dce201a62401ad3d8a08ee5613c",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xc641A33cab81C559F2bd4b21EA34C290E2440C2B"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1744214879,
"transactionHash": "0x0351fede2eca409c36da1996944ef02aabaa989637ca1bfacd2f3f07547d1134",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x4bbA758F006Ef09402eF31724203F316ab74e4a0"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1759862579,
"transactionHash": "0x98ef4f3ecc10996b184385bd4ca5b877dce0a3b527d88f4ee0cfe296cf004a38",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x33D1e8571a85a538ed3D5A4d88f46C112383439D"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1764604703,
"transactionHash": "0x9b9aa2d8e857e1a28e55b124e931eac706b3ae04c1b33ba949f0366359860993",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x74Fac1D45B98bae058F8F566201c9A81B85C7D50"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1770742199,
"transactionHash": "0x7407256ae44170125b2d82c71f0d03cb6ade3c2268e8cd33dcb07fe259fbfd0b",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xc040F392E52Cb6970CA8E110c280fE24E07C5e2c"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1779825599,
"transactionHash": "0x75b1c9b2090ba2b311d6be08c319340b87dc1aabfae2505d126e7a0f1fc6b11c",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x468C2345D1d409d5b0F2f8bE4aE2082150cC1a0c"
]
}
],
"description": "The dispute game factory allows the creation of dispute games, used to propose state roots and eventually challenge them. This variant exposes per-type reads only; the legacy array views (gameImpls[], initBonds[]) were removed in the new implementation.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "Base Governance Multisig",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x43edB88C4B80fDD2AdFF2412A7BebF9dF42cB40e#code"
},
{
"name": "OptimismPortal2",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x49048044D57e1C92A77f79988d21Fa8fAF74E97e",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x0475cBCAebd9CE8AfA5025828d5b98DFb67E059E"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x66d94eE8F529b683ED6013729784e8bb44697A64"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1686793919,
"transactionHash": "0xad5179152fdbe7ca60a41fd5a490add905e567c59e6630a7856a379759939a8e",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x5FB30336A8d0841cf15d452afA297cB6D10877D7"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1719592367,
"transactionHash": "0xb690dad4829ca8b07b6944d7e937d7d36048ea29a9278cbae012ab4a66aac817",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1719592367,
"transactionHash": "0xb690dad4829ca8b07b6944d7e937d7d36048ea29a9278cbae012ab4a66aac817",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x2D778797049FE9259d947D1ED8e5442226dFB589"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1730302883,
"transactionHash": "0x2476bda1e2cc0f2a501876532cacf1d267fc9be8f07271b75e512e3b6c927639",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1730302883,
"transactionHash": "0x2476bda1e2cc0f2a501876532cacf1d267fc9be8f07271b75e512e3b6c927639",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1744214879,
"transactionHash": "0x0351fede2eca409c36da1996944ef02aabaa989637ca1bfacd2f3f07547d1134",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x2D7e764a0D9919e16983a46595CfA81fc34fa7Cd"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1745512871,
"transactionHash": "0xfd06079372fea0ef0c8907b71931fc6907cc88c39f0dc036d3ebf267686fb6da",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1759862579,
"transactionHash": "0x98ef4f3ecc10996b184385bd4ca5b877dce0a3b527d88f4ee0cfe296cf004a38",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x381E729FF983FA4BCEd820e7b922d79bF653B999"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1764604703,
"transactionHash": "0x9b9aa2d8e857e1a28e55b124e931eac706b3ae04c1b33ba949f0366359860993",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1770742199,
"transactionHash": "0x7407256ae44170125b2d82c71f0d03cb6ade3c2268e8cd33dcb07fe259fbfd0b",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x97cEbbf8959e2A5476fbe9B98A21806Ec234609B"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1779825599,
"transactionHash": "0x75b1c9b2090ba2b311d6be08c319340b87dc1aabfae2505d126e7a0f1fc6b11c",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x66d94eE8F529b683ED6013729784e8bb44697A64"
]
}
],
"description": "The OptimismPortal contract is the main entry point to deposit funds from L1 to L2. It also allows to prove and finalize withdrawals. It specifies which game type can be used for withdrawals, which currently is the AggregateVerifier.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "Base Governance Multisig",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x49048044D57e1C92A77f79988d21Fa8fAF74E97e#code"
},
{
"name": "SystemConfig",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x73a79Fab69143498Ed3712e519A88a918e1f4072",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x0475cBCAebd9CE8AfA5025828d5b98DFb67E059E"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x0507Aaa21c678976FCdC7e804836ACd6ebc17a44"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1686793907,
"transactionHash": "0x0a7442e325dac626d8c16a7a052e9a2ee8cd08a5b8c9796228b4d297e20ea3cc",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x6481ff79597Fe4F77E1063f615ec5BDaDDEFfd4B"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1719592367,
"transactionHash": "0xb690dad4829ca8b07b6944d7e937d7d36048ea29a9278cbae012ab4a66aac817",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1719592367,
"transactionHash": "0xb690dad4829ca8b07b6944d7e937d7d36048ea29a9278cbae012ab4a66aac817",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xba2492e52F45651B60B8B38d4Ea5E2390C64Ffb1"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1730302883,
"transactionHash": "0x2476bda1e2cc0f2a501876532cacf1d267fc9be8f07271b75e512e3b6c927639",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1730302883,
"transactionHash": "0x2476bda1e2cc0f2a501876532cacf1d267fc9be8f07271b75e512e3b6c927639",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xF56D96B2535B932656d3c04Ebf51baBff241D886"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1733958059,
"transactionHash": "0x1fdbb2443b479fedc7a6e43400a5f09c883aa00d3e7b40bc7238a08e43625294",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x45C4e267aE21E90f72C8AbF43ddB5941c953482F"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1738700927,
"transactionHash": "0x765a2eb3c7eecea5722b120037123eaec9e6ef4b6a53ba2bcfb88ef08fae074b",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1738700927,
"transactionHash": "0x765a2eb3c7eecea5722b120037123eaec9e6ef4b6a53ba2bcfb88ef08fae074b",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xAB9d6cB7A427c0765163A7f45BB91cAfe5f2D375"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1744214879,
"transactionHash": "0x0351fede2eca409c36da1996944ef02aabaa989637ca1bfacd2f3f07547d1134",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x760C48C62A85045A6B69f07F4a9f22868659CbCc"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1745512871,
"transactionHash": "0xfd06079372fea0ef0c8907b71931fc6907cc88c39f0dc036d3ebf267686fb6da",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x340f923E5c7cbB2171146f64169EC9d5a9FfE647"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1750797287,
"transactionHash": "0x289aeed24a156bbb3b03cbbe0ef4e5fc873436d41cf50c746cdd380ff26be89b",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x78FFE9209dFF6Fe1c9B6F3EFdF996BeE60346D0e"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1759862579,
"transactionHash": "0x98ef4f3ecc10996b184385bd4ca5b877dce0a3b527d88f4ee0cfe296cf004a38",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x2bFE4A5Bd5A41e9d848d843ebCDFa15954e9A557"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1764604703,
"transactionHash": "0x9b9aa2d8e857e1a28e55b124e931eac706b3ae04c1b33ba949f0366359860993",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x2fA28989fc559836E9d66dFf3010C7F7f41c65ED"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1770742199,
"transactionHash": "0x7407256ae44170125b2d82c71f0d03cb6ade3c2268e8cd33dcb07fe259fbfd0b",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xd392c27B84b1cA776528F2704BC67B82a62132d2"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1772559059,
"transactionHash": "0xa2dc938704977d2f3d0765832e79e1239d97aa6912efadc21a9705ef7dca42eb",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x0507Aaa21c678976FCdC7e804836ACd6ebc17a44"
]
}
],
"description": "Contains configuration parameters such as the Sequencer address, gas limit on this chain and the unsafe block signer address.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig\n * **batcherHash**: EOA 1\n * **owner**: Base Multisig 1",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "Base Governance Multisig",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x73a79Fab69143498Ed3712e519A88a918e1f4072#code"
},
{
"name": "SuperchainConfig",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0xb535ff7F118260a952CE65e7fF41B1743De8EE6c",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x0475cBCAebd9CE8AfA5025828d5b98DFb67E059E"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0xc4ceeB264Fa35a022e470aCc3C6A522308f3ec02"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1771973279,
"transactionHash": "0x29d51cf032651b7bedba5af1030eff2c43e40b676d4fe2cdf6c970a8a01e3a43",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xc4ceeB264Fa35a022e470aCc3C6A522308f3ec02"
]
}
],
"description": "Base's own SuperchainConfig, used to manage pause states for the Base chain. The guardian and incident responder roles are immutable and set at construction time. The guardian can pause, unpause, and extend pauses, while the incident responder can only pause. Each pause automatically expires after 3 months.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig\n * **guardian**: Base Governance Multisig\n * **incident_responder**: Base Multisig 1",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "Base Governance Multisig",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xb535ff7F118260a952CE65e7fF41B1743De8EE6c#code"
},
{
"name": "L1StandardBridge",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x3154Cf16ccdb4C6d922629664174b904d80F2C35",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x0475cBCAebd9CE8AfA5025828d5b98DFb67E059E"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [],
"description": "The main entry point to deposit ERC20 tokens from host chain to this chain.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "Base Governance Multisig",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x3154Cf16ccdb4C6d922629664174b904d80F2C35#code"
},
{
"name": "L1ERC721Bridge",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x608d94945A64503E642E6370Ec598e519a2C1E53",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x0475cBCAebd9CE8AfA5025828d5b98DFb67E059E"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1686793919,
"transactionHash": "0xad5179152fdbe7ca60a41fd5a490add905e567c59e6630a7856a379759939a8e",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x3311aC7F72bb4108d9f4D5d50E7623B1498A9eC0"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1719592367,
"transactionHash": "0xb690dad4829ca8b07b6944d7e937d7d36048ea29a9278cbae012ab4a66aac817",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1719592367,
"transactionHash": "0xb690dad4829ca8b07b6944d7e937d7d36048ea29a9278cbae012ab4a66aac817",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xAE2AF01232a6c4a4d3012C5eC5b1b35059caF10d"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1744214879,
"transactionHash": "0x0351fede2eca409c36da1996944ef02aabaa989637ca1bfacd2f3f07547d1134",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x276d3730f219f7ec22274f7263180b8452B46d47"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1745512871,
"transactionHash": "0xfd06079372fea0ef0c8907b71931fc6907cc88c39f0dc036d3ebf267686fb6da",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x7aE1d3BD877a4C5CA257404ce26BE93A02C98013"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1759862579,
"transactionHash": "0x98ef4f3ecc10996b184385bd4ca5b877dce0a3b527d88f4ee0cfe296cf004a38",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x7f1d12fB2911EB095278085f721e644C1f675696"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1764604703,
"transactionHash": "0x9b9aa2d8e857e1a28e55b124e931eac706b3ae04c1b33ba949f0366359860993",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1770742199,
"transactionHash": "0x7407256ae44170125b2d82c71f0d03cb6ade3c2268e8cd33dcb07fe259fbfd0b",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x74f1aC50EB0BE98853805D381C884f5f9abDEcf9"
]
}
],
"description": "Used to bridge ERC-721 tokens from host chain to this chain.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "Base Governance Multisig",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x608d94945A64503E642E6370Ec598e519a2C1E53#code"
},
{
"name": "L1CrossDomainMessenger",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x866E82a600A1414e583f7F13623F1aC5d58b0Afa",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "resolved delegate proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x0475cBCAebd9CE8AfA5025828d5b98DFb67E059E"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0"
],
"immutable": false
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1686793907,
"transactionHash": "0x8869b94ddd0ba84b41d937708db7b8aa64948e85b3a11e970f22887a56b0b1d7",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1686793919,
"transactionHash": "0xad5179152fdbe7ca60a41fd5a490add905e567c59e6630a7856a379759939a8e",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x81C4Bd600793EBd1C0323604E1F455fE50A951F8"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1719592367,
"transactionHash": "0xb690dad4829ca8b07b6944d7e937d7d36048ea29a9278cbae012ab4a66aac817",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1719592367,
"transactionHash": "0xb690dad4829ca8b07b6944d7e937d7d36048ea29a9278cbae012ab4a66aac817",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xD3494713A5cfaD3F5359379DfA074E2Ac8C6Fd65"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1744214879,
"transactionHash": "0x0351fede2eca409c36da1996944ef02aabaa989637ca1bfacd2f3f07547d1134",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x3eA6084748ED1b2A9B5D4426181F1ad8C93F6231"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1745512871,
"transactionHash": "0xfd06079372fea0ef0c8907b71931fc6907cc88c39f0dc036d3ebf267686fb6da",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x5D5a095665886119693F0B41d8DFeE78da033e8B"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1759862579,
"transactionHash": "0x98ef4f3ecc10996b184385bd4ca5b877dce0a3b527d88f4ee0cfe296cf004a38",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x22D12E0FAebD62d429514A65EBAe32dd316c12D6"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1764604703,
"transactionHash": "0x9b9aa2d8e857e1a28e55b124e931eac706b3ae04c1b33ba949f0366359860993",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1770742199,
"transactionHash": "0x7407256ae44170125b2d82c71f0d03cb6ade3c2268e8cd33dcb07fe259fbfd0b",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xb686F13AfF1e427a1f993F29ab0F2E7383729FE0"
]
}
],
"description": "Sends messages from host chain to this chain, and relays messages back onto host chain. In the event that a message sent from host chain to this chain is rejected for exceeding this chain's epoch gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract's replay function.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "Base Governance Multisig",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x866E82a600A1414e583f7F13623F1aC5d58b0Afa#code"
},
{
"name": "HistoryStorage",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x0000F90827F1C53a10cb7A02335B175320002935",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"references": [
{
"title": "Source Code",
"url": "https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-2935"
}
],
"description": "EIP-2935 system contract storing the last 8191 L1 blockhashes. Bytecode is canonical to the EIP, deployed at the same address across networks.\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x0000F90827F1C53a10cb7A02335B175320002935#code"
},
{
"name": "ProxyAdmin",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x0475cBCAebd9CE8AfA5025828d5b98DFb67E059E",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "* Roles:\n * **owner**: Base Governance Multisig",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x0475cBCAebd9CE8AfA5025828d5b98DFb67E059E#code"
},
{
"name": "OptimismMintableERC20Factory",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x05cc379EBD9B30BbA19C6fA282AB29218EC61D84",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x0475cBCAebd9CE8AfA5025828d5b98DFb67E059E"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1686793919,
"transactionHash": "0xad5179152fdbe7ca60a41fd5a490add905e567c59e6630a7856a379759939a8e",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x3d2c2f8f95CAba644eA25319c4c08594b8DC0359"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1719592367,
"transactionHash": "0xb690dad4829ca8b07b6944d7e937d7d36048ea29a9278cbae012ab4a66aac817",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1719592367,
"transactionHash": "0xb690dad4829ca8b07b6944d7e937d7d36048ea29a9278cbae012ab4a66aac817",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xE01efbeb1089D1d1dB9c6c8b135C934C0734c846"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1744214879,
"transactionHash": "0x0351fede2eca409c36da1996944ef02aabaa989637ca1bfacd2f3f07547d1134",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x5493f4677A186f64805fe7317D6993ba4863988F"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1764604703,
"transactionHash": "0x9b9aa2d8e857e1a28e55b124e931eac706b3ae04c1b33ba949f0366359860993",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1770742199,
"transactionHash": "0x7407256ae44170125b2d82c71f0d03cb6ade3c2268e8cd33dcb07fe259fbfd0b",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x8ee6fB13c6c9a7e401531168E196Fbf8b05cEabB"
]
}
],
"description": "A helper contract that generates OptimismMintableERC20 contracts on the network it's deployed to. OptimismMintableERC20 is a standard extension of the base ERC20 token contract designed to allow the L1StandardBridge contracts to mint and burn tokens. This makes it possible to use an OptimismMintableERC20 as this chain's representation of a token on the host chain, or vice-versa.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "Base Governance Multisig",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x05cc379EBD9B30BbA19C6fA282AB29218EC61D84#code"
},
{
"name": "TimelockController",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "A timelock with access control. The current minimum delay is 3d.\n* Roles:\n * **canceller**: Safe\n * **defaultAdmin**: TimelockController; ultimately Safe\n * **executor**: Safe\n * **proposer**: Safe",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x0b144E07A0826182B6b59788c34b32Bfa86Fb711#code"
},
{
"name": "TEEProverRegistry",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x1af2A7E537DE2eE795DE5B8BfbB1Ad0DD513A5aA",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x0475cBCAebd9CE8AfA5025828d5b98DFb67E059E"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0xeaB9b34BDD26Ad451B381B0934a30fAa6ED5E316"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1779394811,
"transactionHash": "0xa94f74e29a92b8875b27a53a90195adba0f46b381f8c6bb5d6a51c98080da52b",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xeaB9b34BDD26Ad451B381B0934a30fAa6ED5E316"
]
}
],
"description": "Registry of authorized TEE enclave signers and proposer addresses used by the TEEVerifier. Owner can add or remove allowlisted proposers via setProposer (onlyOwner) and set the AggregateVerifier game type lookup. Owner and Manager can register or deregister enclave signers via registerSigner / deregisterSigner. Registration requires a Risc0 ZK proof of a valid AWS Nitro attestation document verified by the NITRO_VERIFIER.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "Base Governance Multisig",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x1af2A7E537DE2eE795DE5B8BfbB1Ad0DD513A5aA#code"
},
{
"name": "AggregateVerifier",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x1bd8db5139Ba7aC9277684650c15e6E341761919",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Game type implementation that combines a TEE attestation arm and a ZK proof arm. A single un-nullified proof of either type can resolve a game (PROOF_THRESHOLD = 1). When both arms commit, the finalization window collapses from SLOW_FINALIZATION_DELAY (5d) to FAST_FINALIZATION_DELAY (1d).\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x1bd8db5139Ba7aC9277684650c15e6E341761919#code"
},
{
"name": "RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x1efDd13f831ceeEa14940806705A53D3211CD698",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "A verifier wrapper for the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.\n* Roles:\n * **owner**: Safe",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x1efDd13f831ceeEa14940806705A53D3211CD698#code"
},
{
"name": "TEEVerifier",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x1FbA0C57b07Af804A9717e51dec9CC27FBC12228",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Stateless verifier that validates AggregateVerifier TEE proofs by recovering an ECDSA signature over the journal and checking the recovered signer against TEEProverRegistry. Enforces PCR0 match by comparing the signer's registered image hash to the AggregateVerifier's TEE_IMAGE_HASH. Can be permanently nullified by a successful AggregateVerifier.nullify call.\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x1FbA0C57b07Af804A9717e51dec9CC27FBC12228#code"
},
{
"name": "RiscZeroGroth16Verifier",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x20ff7C2Cf391a5F096A2Cc181cb41916680f8E97",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Verifier contract for RISC Zero Groth16 proofs (version 2.0.0-rc.3).\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x20ff7C2Cf391a5F096A2Cc181cb41916680f8E97#code"
},
{
"name": "RiscZeroGroth16Verifier",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x2a098988600d87650Fb061FfAff08B97149Fa84D",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Verifier contract for RISC Zero Groth16 proofs (version 3.0.0).\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x2a098988600d87650Fb061FfAff08B97149Fa84D#code"
},
{
"name": "RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x44c220f0598345195cE99AD6A57aDfFcb9Ea33e7",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "A verifier wrapper for the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.\n* Roles:\n * **owner**: EOA 3",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x44c220f0598345195cE99AD6A57aDfFcb9Ea33e7#code"
},
{
"name": "RiscZeroSetVerifier",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x5005aBa3DFf7C940fcc1e48DccCAD611a80eEB85",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Set verifier contract for RISC Zero proofs (version 0.9.0). It allows verifying a whole set of proofs identified with a Merkle root at once, afterwards each individual proof could be efficiently verified just by checking Merkle inclusion against the verified root.\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x5005aBa3DFf7C940fcc1e48DccCAD611a80eEB85#code"
},
{
"name": "RiscZeroGroth16Verifier",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x54aCE3ED46529B4d4F3770C8Bad5dDC48717B9bF",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x54aCE3ED46529B4d4F3770C8Bad5dDC48717B9bF#code"
},
{
"name": "PermissionedDisputeGame",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x58bf355C5d4EdFc723eF89d99582ECCfd143266A",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Same as FaultDisputeGame, but only two permissioned addresses are designated as proposer and challenger.\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x58bf355C5d4EdFc723eF89d99582ECCfd143266A#code"
},
{
"name": "DelayedWETH",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x64AE5250958CdeB83f6b61f913B5Ac6Ebe8EFd4D",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x0475cBCAebd9CE8AfA5025828d5b98DFb67E059E"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x33Dadc2d1aA9BB613A7AE6B28425eA00D44c6998"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1759862579,
"transactionHash": "0x98ef4f3ecc10996b184385bd4ca5b877dce0a3b527d88f4ee0cfe296cf004a38",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x33Dadc2d1aA9BB613A7AE6B28425eA00D44c6998"
]
}
],
"description": "Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "Base Governance Multisig",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x64AE5250958CdeB83f6b61f913B5Ac6Ebe8EFd4D#code"
},
{
"name": "RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x68dC2cB4e61774873971c499D9b239ec5Ac540E3",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "A verifier wrapper for the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.\n* Roles:\n * **owner**: Safe",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x68dC2cB4e61774873971c499D9b239ec5Ac540E3#code"
},
{
"name": "Escrow",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x7F311a4D48377030bD810395f4CCfC03bdbe9Ef3",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Simple escrow that accepts tokens and allows to configure permissioned addresses that can access the tokens.\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7F311a4D48377030bD810395f4CCfC03bdbe9Ef3#code"
},
{
"name": "NitroEnclaveVerifier",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x7F3a16E1fe6Fda64c5AC4296E13ECB9F7B44F6fb",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "ZK-based verifier of AWS Nitro Enclave attestation documents. Used by TEEProverRegistry to validate new enclave signer registrations against the AWS Nitro PKI.\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7F3a16E1fe6Fda64c5AC4296E13ECB9F7B44F6fb#code"
},
{
"name": "RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x844D5f01161E3559d36f23d0Aa9E9620949aF782",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "A verifier wrapper for the RiscZeroSetVerifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.\n* Roles:\n * **owner**: Safe",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x844D5f01161E3559d36f23d0Aa9E9620949aF782#code"
},
{
"name": "RiscZeroVerifierRouter",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x8EaB2D97Dfce405A1692a21b3ff3A172d593D319",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "A router proxy that routes to verifiers based on selectors. The mapping can be changed by a permissioned owner (TimelockController).\n* Roles:\n * **owner**: TimelockController; ultimately Safe",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x8EaB2D97Dfce405A1692a21b3ff3A172d593D319#code"
},
{
"name": "AnchorStateRegistry",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x909f6cf47ed12f010A796527f562bFc26C7F4E72",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x0475cBCAebd9CE8AfA5025828d5b98DFb67E059E"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x4483F964F6711Cb55f633820ED174E780369b99D"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1759862579,
"transactionHash": "0x98ef4f3ecc10996b184385bd4ca5b877dce0a3b527d88f4ee0cfe296cf004a38",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xeb69cC681E8D4a557b30DFFBAd85aFfD47a2CF2E"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1770742199,
"transactionHash": "0x7407256ae44170125b2d82c71f0d03cb6ade3c2268e8cd33dcb07fe259fbfd0b",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x36398155Cd17cfe804F69b233eDDA800DD4D5aA5"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1779825599,
"transactionHash": "0x75b1c9b2090ba2b311d6be08c319340b87dc1aabfae2505d126e7a0f1fc6b11c",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x4483F964F6711Cb55f633820ED174E780369b99D"
]
}
],
"description": "Contains the latest confirmed state root that can be used as a starting point in a dispute game. This variant stores respectedGameType, retirementTimestamp, and disputeGameFinalityDelaySeconds locally and drops the legacy *FromGame fields, since the AggregateVerifier model does not expose vm()/weth()/absolutePrestate() on its game implementation.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "Base Governance Multisig",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x909f6cf47ed12f010A796527f562bFc26C7F4E72#code"
},
{
"name": "wstETHEscrow",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x9de443AdC5A411E83F1878Ef24C3F52C61571e72",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x3e40D73EB977Dc6a537aF587D48316feE66E9C8c"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x313819736457910aC1Dd21a712a37f3d7595645A"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1695935315,
"transactionHash": "0xac8580fdfdbb35af667cf9c5c5fa9d10c793486d10fcbea538efd9386b04c106",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x313819736457910aC1Dd21a712a37f3d7595645A"
]
}
],
"description": "Escrow for custom external tokens that use the canonical bridge for messaging but are governed externally.\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x9de443AdC5A411E83F1878Ef24C3F52C61571e72#code"
},
{
"name": "RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x9F9994Eb4Cb5200198FEfb470f8b50301662e696",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "A verifier wrapper for the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.\n* Roles:\n * **owner**: Safe",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x9F9994Eb4Cb5200198FEfb470f8b50301662e696#code"
},
{
"name": "SkyLink Bridge",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0xA5874756416Fa632257eEA380CAbd2E87cED352A",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0xaeFd31c2e593Dc971f9Cb42cBbD5d4AD7F1970b6"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1728571151,
"transactionHash": "0xde7d483c73060001a6d0ee88b5b9848bdb8a830a93a9579e956350b80296db83",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xaeFd31c2e593Dc971f9Cb42cBbD5d4AD7F1970b6"
]
}
],
"description": "Custom bridge for USDS and sUSDS managed by Sky governance.\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xA5874756416Fa632257eEA380CAbd2E87cED352A#code"
},
{
"name": "RiscZeroGroth16Verifier",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0xafB31f5b70623CDF4b20Ada3f7230916A5A79df9",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Verifier contract for RISC Zero Groth16 proofs (version 2.2.0).\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xafB31f5b70623CDF4b20Ada3f7230916A5A79df9#code"
},
{
"name": "SP1Verifier",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0xb69f2584CBcFf99a58C4e7002E8b89Af54a6f4e2",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Verifier contract for SP1 proofs (v6.1.0).\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xb69f2584CBcFf99a58C4e7002E8b89Af54a6f4e2#code"
},
{
"name": "ZkVerifier",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0xB88D95bDf6972508942d184866890c1834219B75",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Thin router that forwards SP1 ZK proof verification from the AggregateVerifier game to the SP1 verifier gateway. Can be permanently nullified by a successful AggregateVerifier.nullify call.\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xB88D95bDf6972508942d184866890c1834219B75#code"
},
{
"name": "DelayedWETH",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0xd0D07924AdD740a87e41Ca8A0d4CBBf6b074EF71",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x0475cBCAebd9CE8AfA5025828d5b98DFb67E059E"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x437c42d7927fe396E54da837d6aC57756cD868e3"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1779394835,
"transactionHash": "0xdd0a92f8c5c98e49332f4d4349b9cf72f9da59dbfb9154ce6c532083072a6403",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x437c42d7927fe396E54da837d6aC57756cD868e3"
]
}
],
"description": "Contract designed to hold the bonded ETH for each game. It is designed as a wrapper around WETH to allow an owner to function as a backstop if a game would incorrectly distribute funds.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "Base Governance Multisig",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xd0D07924AdD740a87e41Ca8A0d4CBBf6b074EF71#code"
},
{
"name": "RiscZeroVerifierEmergencyStop",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0xDa8f3de6fBBdb261Ac771B813a578A7aBdA6B2b1",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "A verifier wrapper for the RiscZeroGroth16Verifier that allows pausing (emergency stop) the verifier by its owner.\n* Roles:\n * **owner**: Safe",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xDa8f3de6fBBdb261Ac771B813a578A7aBdA6B2b1#code"
},
{
"name": "SP1VerifierGateway",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0xdc32E228636273285Befa5F001dBB5142517C106",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "This contract is the router for zk proof verification. It stores the mapping between identifiers and the address of onchain verifier contracts, routing each identifier to the corresponding verifier contract.\n* Roles:\n * **owner**: Base Governance Multisig",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xdc32E228636273285Befa5F001dBB5142517C106#code"
},
{
"name": "AggregateVerifier",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0xeEcb8A5944B217585817E802702b1262a049D259",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Game type implementation that combines a TEE attestation arm and a ZK proof arm. A single un-nullified proof of either type can resolve a game (PROOF_THRESHOLD = 1). When both arms commit, the finalization window collapses from SLOW_FINALIZATION_DELAY (7d) to FAST_FINALIZATION_DELAY (1d).\n",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xeEcb8A5944B217585817E802702b1262a049D259#code"
},
{
"name": "RiscZeroGroth16Verifier",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0xf70aBAb028Eb6F4100A24B203E113D94E87DE93C",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xf70aBAb028Eb6F4100A24B203E113D94E87DE93C#code"
}
],
"base": [
{
"name": "FeeDisburser",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "base:0x09C7bAD99688a55a2e83644BFAed09e62bDcCcBA",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"base:0xa966054731540a48b28990b63Dcf4f33d8aE57B2"
],
"implementations": [
"base:0x72984FeF9c2123eBB66912CeAB9e47C5E9B738e6"
]
},
"chain": "base",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1693609603,
"transactionHash": "0x49e50b94dd7c45505380b0015b912b001354b9103fc5549d05a2b4bb7e433278",
"implementations": [
"base:0x45969D00739d518f0Dde41920B67cE30395135A0"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1772559377,
"transactionHash": "0x055b31e8fb8689e5e72d9c41c1c38b5a165fd145aa76bf118194f86a066d0650",
"implementations": [
"base:0xDa70b4cd0Cd8193f665A7D49CeFD5f79F11FCc75"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1773435991,
"transactionHash": "0x68c2a1b66361dcb9ec2f8b1fe26ae275021b6d78751d0577fc0bd410dfd47518",
"implementations": [
"base:0x72984FeF9c2123eBB66912CeAB9e47C5E9B738e6"
]
}
],
"description": "Contract used to disburse funds from system FeeVault contracts, shares revenue with Optimism and bridges the rest of funds to L1.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: EOA 2",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"id": "EOA-2",
"name": "EOA 2",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://basescan.org/address/0x09C7bAD99688a55a2e83644BFAed09e62bDcCcBA#code"
},
{
"name": "L2CrossDomainMessenger",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "base:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000007",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"base:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
],
"implementations": [
"base:0xC0d3c0d3c0D3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D3c0d3c0d30007"
]
},
"chain": "base",
"pastUpgrades": [],
"description": "The L2CrossDomainMessenger (L2xDM) contract sends messages from L2 to L1, and relays messages from L1 onto L2 with a system tx. In the event that a message sent from L2 to L1 is rejected for exceeding the L1 gas limit, it can be resubmitted via this contract’s replay function.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"id": "Base-Governance-Multisig---L2-Alias",
"name": "Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://basescan.org/address/0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000007#code"
},
{
"name": "L2StandardBridge",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "base:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000010",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"base:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
],
"implementations": [
"base:0xC0d3c0d3c0D3c0d3C0D3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D30010"
]
},
"chain": "base",
"pastUpgrades": [],
"description": "The L2StandardBridge contract is the main entry point to deposit or withdraw ERC20 tokens from L2 to L1. This contract can store any token.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"id": "Base-Governance-Multisig---L2-Alias",
"name": "Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://basescan.org/address/0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000010#code"
},
{
"name": "SequencerFeeVault",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "base:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000011",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"base:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
],
"implementations": [
"base:0xd53210eE20948eCFF8B6B8180E29657e0ce8492d"
]
},
"chain": "base",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1693589723,
"transactionHash": "0xe56b939e6eed472f168be6942f7b08af959d3777eee8b8508f82ef5ade47d528",
"implementations": [
"base:0x54d194FaAe439fc3f8024801B0b9EBc91Ebd39f5"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1693589723,
"transactionHash": "0xe56b939e6eed472f168be6942f7b08af959d3777eee8b8508f82ef5ade47d528",
"implementations": [
"base:0xd53210eE20948eCFF8B6B8180E29657e0ce8492d"
]
}
],
"description": "Collects the sequencer fees, which are withdrawable to the FeesCollector on L1.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"id": "Base-Governance-Multisig---L2-Alias",
"name": "Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://basescan.org/address/0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000011#code"
},
{
"name": "OptimismMintableERC20Factory",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "base:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000012",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"base:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
],
"implementations": [
"base:0x6922ac4DbDfEdEa3a1E5535f12c3171f2b964C91"
]
},
"chain": "base",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1716225807,
"transactionHash": "0xf433ab504bcdb633914551cb2410aa89683d05db0062dca76fbe7a48297745c0",
"implementations": [
"base:0x6922ac4DbDfEdEa3a1E5535f12c3171f2b964C91"
]
}
],
"description": "Factory contract to create bridge compliant ERC20 IOU token representations of bridged L1 ERC20 tokens.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"id": "Base-Governance-Multisig---L2-Alias",
"name": "Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://basescan.org/address/0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000012#code"
},
{
"name": "L1BlockNumber",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "base:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000013",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"base:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
],
"implementations": [
"base:0xC0D3C0d3C0D3c0D3C0d3c0D3C0d3c0d3C0d30013"
]
},
"chain": "base",
"pastUpgrades": [],
"description": "Simple contract that returns the latest L1 block number.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"id": "Base-Governance-Multisig---L2-Alias",
"name": "Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://basescan.org/address/0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000013#code"
},
{
"name": "L2ERC721Bridge",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "base:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000014",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"base:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
],
"implementations": [
"base:0xC0D3c0d3c0d3c0d3c0D3C0d3C0D3C0D3c0d30014"
]
},
"chain": "base",
"pastUpgrades": [],
"description": "The L2ERC721Bridge contract is the main entry point to deposit or withdraw ERC721 tokens from L2 to L1. This contract can store any token.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"id": "Base-Governance-Multisig---L2-Alias",
"name": "Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://basescan.org/address/0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000014#code"
},
{
"name": "L1Block",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "base:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000015",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"base:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
],
"implementations": [
"base:0x3Ba4007f5C922FBb33C454B41ea7a1f11E83df2C"
]
},
"chain": "base",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1710374401,
"transactionHash": "0x9f2b2d34dfa2cb55cceb9860cade0cb03cfbd7ff1dd07d48b4708b29a46b4a24",
"implementations": [
"base:0x07dbe8500fc591d1852B76feE44d5a05e13097Ff"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1746806401,
"transactionHash": "0xe992e00998b34075506d2726a274db07a62af6cdd9d527bfda9128114603cfbd",
"implementations": [
"base:0xFf256497D61dcd71a9e9Ff43967C13fdE1F72D12"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1764691201,
"transactionHash": "0xcd60191626fa3124e7031235c52f0adf6be545ebbd7cf55641bd9dabcbedaf6a",
"implementations": [
"base:0x3Ba4007f5C922FBb33C454B41ea7a1f11E83df2C"
]
}
],
"description": "Simple contract that returns information about the latest L1 block, which is derived permissionlessly from the L1 chain.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"id": "Base-Governance-Multisig---L2-Alias",
"name": "Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://basescan.org/address/0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000015#code"
},
{
"name": "L2ToL1MessagePasser",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "base:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000016",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"base:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
],
"implementations": [
"base:0xC0D3C0d3C0d3c0d3C0d3C0D3c0D3c0d3c0D30016"
]
},
"chain": "base",
"pastUpgrades": [],
"description": "Contract used internally by the L2CrossDomainMessenger to send messages to L1, including withdrawals. It can also be used directly as a low-level interface.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"id": "Base-Governance-Multisig---L2-Alias",
"name": "Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://basescan.org/address/0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000016#code"
},
{
"name": "OptimismMintableERC721Factory",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "base:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000017",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"base:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
],
"implementations": [
"base:0xc0d3C0d3C0d3C0d3C0d3c0d3C0D3C0d3C0D30017"
]
},
"chain": "base",
"pastUpgrades": [],
"description": "Factory contract to create bridge compliant ERC721 IOU token representations of bridged L1 ERC721 tokens.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"id": "Base-Governance-Multisig---L2-Alias",
"name": "Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://basescan.org/address/0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000017#code"
},
{
"name": "ProxyAdmin",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "base:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"base:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
],
"implementations": [
"base:0xC0d3C0D3c0d3C0d3c0d3c0D3C0D3C0d3C0D30018"
]
},
"chain": "base",
"pastUpgrades": [],
"description": "* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias\n * **owner**: Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"id": "Base-Governance-Multisig---L2-Alias",
"name": "Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://basescan.org/address/0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018#code"
},
{
"name": "BaseFeeVault",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "base:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000019",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"base:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
],
"implementations": [
"base:0x4E207bDF8aece56de86821f5370b2b993D08C9E9"
]
},
"chain": "base",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1693589723,
"transactionHash": "0xe56b939e6eed472f168be6942f7b08af959d3777eee8b8508f82ef5ade47d528",
"implementations": [
"base:0xB0B77878bBc76E29aBE7584Bda27ae3CE1A9059a"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1693589723,
"transactionHash": "0xe56b939e6eed472f168be6942f7b08af959d3777eee8b8508f82ef5ade47d528",
"implementations": [
"base:0x4E207bDF8aece56de86821f5370b2b993D08C9E9"
]
}
],
"description": "Collects EIP-1559 base fees, which are withdrawable to the FeesCollector on L1.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"id": "Base-Governance-Multisig---L2-Alias",
"name": "Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://basescan.org/address/0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000019#code"
},
{
"name": "L1FeeVault",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "base:0x420000000000000000000000000000000000001A",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"base:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
],
"implementations": [
"base:0x0c9034b92351cF8f067379a1fFA4fa35f5AF9dCC"
]
},
"chain": "base",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1693589723,
"transactionHash": "0xe56b939e6eed472f168be6942f7b08af959d3777eee8b8508f82ef5ade47d528",
"implementations": [
"base:0xD36F11023188134d0f4610fF0C6e01c1B11488f8"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1693589723,
"transactionHash": "0xe56b939e6eed472f168be6942f7b08af959d3777eee8b8508f82ef5ade47d528",
"implementations": [
"base:0x0c9034b92351cF8f067379a1fFA4fa35f5AF9dCC"
]
}
],
"description": "Collects the L1 portion of the L2 transaction fees, which are withdrawable to the FeesCollector on L1.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"id": "Base-Governance-Multisig---L2-Alias",
"name": "Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://basescan.org/address/0x420000000000000000000000000000000000001A#code"
},
{
"name": "SchemaRegistry",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "base:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000020",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"base:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
],
"implementations": [
"base:0x75505a97BD334E7BD3C476893285569C4136Fa0F"
]
},
"chain": "base",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1694184179,
"transactionHash": "0x582b0cae963bb1ae3f7ec048fbc359b6dbff0dbfdcc033f301ff58c097755a27",
"implementations": [
"base:0x75505a97BD334E7BD3C476893285569C4136Fa0F"
]
}
],
"description": "Contracts to register schemas for the Ethereum Attestation Service (EAS).\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"id": "Base-Governance-Multisig---L2-Alias",
"name": "Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://basescan.org/address/0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000020#code"
},
{
"name": "EAS",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "base:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000021",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"base:0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000018"
],
"implementations": [
"base:0xbEb5Fc579115071764c7423A4f12eDde41f106Ed"
]
},
"chain": "base",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1694184179,
"transactionHash": "0x582b0cae963bb1ae3f7ec048fbc359b6dbff0dbfdcc033f301ff58c097755a27",
"implementations": [
"base:0xbEb5Fc579115071764c7423A4f12eDde41f106Ed"
]
}
],
"description": "Contract containing the main logic for the Ethereum Attestation Service (EAS).\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: ProxyAdmin; ultimately Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"id": "Base-Governance-Multisig---L2-Alias",
"name": "Base Governance Multisig - L2 Alias",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://basescan.org/address/0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000021#code"
}
]
},
"escrows": [
{
"address": "0x49048044D57e1C92A77f79988d21Fa8fAF74E97e",
"sinceTimestamp": 1686793895,
"tokens": [
"ETH"
],
"contract": {
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x49048044D57e1C92A77f79988d21Fa8fAF74E97e",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x0475cBCAebd9CE8AfA5025828d5b98DFb67E059E"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x66d94eE8F529b683ED6013729784e8bb44697A64"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1686793919,
"transactionHash": "0xad5179152fdbe7ca60a41fd5a490add905e567c59e6630a7856a379759939a8e",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x5FB30336A8d0841cf15d452afA297cB6D10877D7"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1719592367,
"transactionHash": "0xb690dad4829ca8b07b6944d7e937d7d36048ea29a9278cbae012ab4a66aac817",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1719592367,
"transactionHash": "0xb690dad4829ca8b07b6944d7e937d7d36048ea29a9278cbae012ab4a66aac817",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x2D778797049FE9259d947D1ED8e5442226dFB589"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1730302883,
"transactionHash": "0x2476bda1e2cc0f2a501876532cacf1d267fc9be8f07271b75e512e3b6c927639",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xd81f43eDBCAcb4c29a9bA38a13Ee5d79278270cC"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1730302883,
"transactionHash": "0x2476bda1e2cc0f2a501876532cacf1d267fc9be8f07271b75e512e3b6c927639",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xe2F826324b2faf99E513D16D266c3F80aE87832B"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1744214879,
"transactionHash": "0x0351fede2eca409c36da1996944ef02aabaa989637ca1bfacd2f3f07547d1134",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x2D7e764a0D9919e16983a46595CfA81fc34fa7Cd"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1745512871,
"transactionHash": "0xfd06079372fea0ef0c8907b71931fc6907cc88c39f0dc036d3ebf267686fb6da",
"implementations": [
"eth:0xB443Da3e07052204A02d630a8933dAc05a0d6fB4"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1759862579,
"transactionHash": "0x98ef4f3ecc10996b184385bd4ca5b877dce0a3b527d88f4ee0cfe296cf004a38",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x381E729FF983FA4BCEd820e7b922d79bF653B999"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1764604703,
"transactionHash": "0x9b9aa2d8e857e1a28e55b124e931eac706b3ae04c1b33ba949f0366359860993",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x7Cf803296662e8C72A6C1d6450572209aCF7f202"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1770742199,
"transactionHash": "0x7407256ae44170125b2d82c71f0d03cb6ade3c2268e8cd33dcb07fe259fbfd0b",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x97cEbbf8959e2A5476fbe9B98A21806Ec234609B"
]
},
{
"timestamp": 1779825599,
"transactionHash": "0x75b1c9b2090ba2b311d6be08c319340b87dc1aabfae2505d126e7a0f1fc6b11c",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x66d94eE8F529b683ED6013729784e8bb44697A64"
]
}
],
"description": "Main entry point for users depositing ETH.",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "ProxyAdmin",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x49048044D57e1C92A77f79988d21Fa8fAF74E97e#code"
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"includeInTotal": true,
"chainId": 1
},
{
"address": "0x3154Cf16ccdb4C6d922629664174b904d80F2C35",
"sinceTimestamp": 1686793895,
"tokens": "*",
"excludedTokens": [
"SolvBTC",
"SolvBTC.BBN",
"rsETH"
],
"contract": {
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x3154Cf16ccdb4C6d922629664174b904d80F2C35",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x0475cBCAebd9CE8AfA5025828d5b98DFb67E059E"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x61525EaaCDdB97D9184aFc205827E6A4fd0Bf62A"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [],
"description": "Main entry point for users depositing ERC20 token that do not require custom gateway.",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"name": "ProxyAdmin",
"delay": "no"
}
],
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x3154Cf16ccdb4C6d922629664174b904d80F2C35#code"
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"includeInTotal": true,
"chainId": 1
},
{
"address": "0x9de443AdC5A411E83F1878Ef24C3F52C61571e72",
"sinceTimestamp": 1695935315,
"tokens": [
"wstETH"
],
"contract": {
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x9de443AdC5A411E83F1878Ef24C3F52C61571e72",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"eth:0x3e40D73EB977Dc6a537aF587D48316feE66E9C8c"
],
"implementations": [
"eth:0x313819736457910aC1Dd21a712a37f3d7595645A"
]
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"pastUpgrades": [
{
"timestamp": 1695935315,
"transactionHash": "0xac8580fdfdbb35af667cf9c5c5fa9d10c793486d10fcbea538efd9386b04c106",
"implementations": [
"eth:0x313819736457910aC1Dd21a712a37f3d7595645A"
]
}
],
"description": "wstETH Vault for custom wstETH Gateway. Fully controlled by Lido governance.",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x9de443AdC5A411E83F1878Ef24C3F52C61571e72#code"
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"includeInTotal": true,
"chainId": 1
},
{
"address": "0x7F311a4D48377030bD810395f4CCfC03bdbe9Ef3",
"sinceTimestamp": 1728571115,
"tokens": [
"USDS",
"sUSDS"
],
"contract": {
"isVerified": true,
"address": "eth:0x7F311a4D48377030bD810395f4CCfC03bdbe9Ef3",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"description": "Maker/Sky-controlled vault for USDS and sUSDS bridged with canonical messaging.",
"url": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x7F311a4D48377030bD810395f4CCfC03bdbe9Ef3#code"
},
"chain": "ethereum",
"includeInTotal": true,
"chainId": 1
}
],
"programHashes": [
{
"title": "Aggregation program of Base AggregateVerifier",
"programUrl": "https://github.com/base/base/tree/v0.9.1/crates/proof/succinct/programs/aggregation",
"programUrl": "https://github.com/base/base/tree/v1.1.1/crates/proof/succinct/programs/aggregation",
"description": "Aggregates range proofs of correct execution for several consecutive sub-ranges of Base L2 blocks.",
"proverSystemProject": "sp1hypercube",
"verificationStatus": "successful",
"verificationSteps": "Prepare:\n\n1. Install cargo make: `cargo install --debug --locked cargo-make`\n2. Install sp1 toolchain v6.1.0: `curl -L https://sp1up.succinct.xyz/ | bash`, then `sp1up v6.1.0`\n3. Install docker https://docs.docker.com/get-started/get-docker/\n4. Install `lld` (required by the repo's `.cargo/config.toml`)\n\nVerify:\n\n1. Checkout the correct tag in [base/base](https://github.com/base/base) repo: `git checkout v0.9.1`. Commit hash should be `00e656223f5d2af1b2100351462272b26499f12f`.\n2. Make sure docker is running: `docker ps`.\n3. From the repo root: `just succinct build-elfs` to build the range and aggregation SP1 ELFs. Built elfs are placed in `crates/proof/succinct/elf/`.\n4. From the repo root: `just succinct vkeys` to print the range and aggregation verification key hashes.",
"hash": "0x003147cde8e7d519d3dbae6b76f1198a70d4ff477a3aaea73bee4153f250288a"
"verificationSteps": "Prepare:\n\n1. Install cargo make: `cargo install --debug --locked cargo-make`\n2. Install sp1 toolchain: `curl -L https://sp1up.succinct.xyz/ | bash`, then `sp1up`.\n3. Install docker \n\nVerify:\n\n1. Checkout the correct tag in [base/base](https://github.com/base/base) repo: `git checkout v0.9.2-rc.1`. Commit hash should be `f2579cd48d23163e11174049cdd10834f197e33f`.\n2. Make sure docker is running: `docker ps`.\n3. From the repo root: `just tee build-eif` to build the TEE image in a docker container.\n4. Extract `PCR0` from the build EIF: `just tee describe-eif`\n5. Compute image hash as keccak256 of the PCR0: `cast keccak \"0x\"`, where `PCR0_hex` is taken from the output of the previous step.",
"hash": "0xc9536fb5b1387f30d16f6b95a5a26de352f8056866482bca632f7219896ea74c"
"verificationSteps": "Regeneration steps below require Linux OS, they will produce a different hash on MacOS.\n\nPrepare:\n\n1. Install docker \n\nVerify:\n\n1. Checkout the correct tag in [base/base](https://github.com/base/base) repo: `git checkout v1.1.1`. Commit hash should be `01e732cdbae0c624d652da9e608d7d3fe0f9c74b`.\n2. Make sure docker is running: `docker ps`.\n3. From the repo root: `just tee build-eif` to build the TEE image in a docker container.\n4. Extract `PCR0` from the build EIF: `just tee describe-eif`\n5. Compute image hash as keccak256 of the PCR0: `cast keccak \"0x\"`, where `PCR0_hex` is taken from the output of the previous step.",
"hash": "0x58557c709e93357a135041297107aecc4bc6ba616509098a4aa8dbef774d212a"
},
{
"title": "AWS Nitro TEE attestation verifier for Base",
"programUrl": "https://github.com/base/base/tree/v0.9.0/crates/proof/tee/nitro-attestation-prover",
"description": "RISC Zero guest program that verifies an AWS Nitro TEE Enclave attestation document.",
"proverSystemProject": "risc0",
"verificationStatus": "successful",
"verificationSteps": "Prepare:\n\n1. Install docker https://docs.docker.com/get-started/get-docker/ and make sure it's running: `docker ps`.\n\nVerify:\n\n1. Checkout the correct tag in [base/base](https://github.com/base/base) repo: `git checkout v0.9.0`. Commit hash should be `0276bb4eb9b3ee37703bd818c8df71e3d31594fb`.\n2. From the repo root, build the builder image (once): `docker build --platform=linux/amd64 -t nitro-guest-builder crates/proof/tee/nitro-attestation-prover/guest`.\n3. From the repo root, build the guest and print the image ID: `docker run --rm --platform=linux/amd64 -v \"$(pwd)\":/build/base nitro-guest-builder verify`.\n4. Compare the printed `Image ID` against this hash.",
"hash": "0x20141665fe40bce01fbcfa0a95c8a1bd750eadbe3f24e06a75571e6fd7a9dc11"
}
],
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. Upgrades must be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council. There is no delay on upgrades."
}
],
"zkVerifiers": [
"eth:0xb69f2584CBcFf99a58C4e7002E8b89Af54a6f4e2",
"eth:0xf70aBAb028Eb6F4100A24B203E113D94E87DE93C",
"eth:0x2a098988600d87650Fb061FfAff08B97149Fa84D",
"eth:0x20ff7C2Cf391a5F096A2Cc181cb41916680f8E97",
"eth:0xafB31f5b70623CDF4b20Ada3f7230916A5A79df9",
"eth:0x54aCE3ED46529B4d4F3770C8Bad5dDC48717B9bF"
]
}+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1782209652,
"baseTimestamp": 1782377394,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}+2 -2
+2 -2
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (1R, ZK)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Single round proofs (1R) prove the validity of a state proposal, only requiring a single transaction to resolve. A fault proof eliminates a state proposal by proving that any intermediate state transition in the proposal results in a different state root. For either, a ZK proof is used.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"challengeDelay": 432000,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.05"
},
"permissioned": false,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-assessed",
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
"secondLine": "5d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs only allow 2 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 5d 14h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 483840,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 2,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "5d 14h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 2/3 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.6666666666666666
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -345600
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 4d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 345600,
"secondLine": "4d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 6d 15h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 575476,
"secondLine": "6d 15h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs only allow 2 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 5d 14h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 483840,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 2,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "5d 14h challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 2/3 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.6666666666666666
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -345600
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 4d 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 388800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 6d 15h of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 575476
}
}
}+2 -2
+2 -2
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (1R, ZK)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Single round proofs (1R) prove the validity of a state proposal, only requiring a single transaction to resolve. A fault proof eliminates a state proposal by proving that any intermediate state transition in the proposal results in a different state root. For either, a ZK proof is used.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"challengeDelay": 432000,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.05"
},
"permissioned": false,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-assessed",
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
"secondLine": "5d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on EigenDA. Sequencer transaction data roots are not checked against the ServiceManager DA bridge data roots onchain.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on EigenDA. Sequencer transaction data roots are not checked against the ServiceManager DA bridge data roots onchain.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+1 -1
+1 -1
{
"baseTimestamp": 1780653849,
"baseTimestamp": 1782384456,
"contractsDiscoDriven": true,
"hasDiscoUi": true,
"isDiscoDriven": true,
"permissionsDiscoDriven": true
}+2 -2
+2 -2
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (1R, ZK)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Single round proofs (1R) prove the validity of a state proposal, only requiring a single transaction to resolve. A fault proof eliminates a state proposal by proving that any intermediate state transition in the proposal results in a different state root. For either, a ZK proof is used.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"challengeDelay": 432000,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.05"
},
"permissioned": false,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-assessed",
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
"secondLine": "5d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs only allow 2 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 1mo 8d challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 3298896,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 2,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "1mo 8d challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 2/3 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.6666666666666666
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -345600
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 4d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 345600,
"secondLine": "4d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 1mo 14d of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 3848712,
"secondLine": "1mo 14d delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs only allow 2 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 1mo 8d challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 3298896,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 2,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "1mo 8d challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 2/3 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0.6666666666666666
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -345600
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 4d 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 388800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 1mo 14d of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 3848712
}
}
}+2 -2
+2 -2
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (1R, ZK)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Single round proofs (1R) prove the validity of a state proposal, only requiring a single transaction to resolve. A fault proof eliminates a state proposal by proving that any intermediate state transition in the proposal results in a different state root. For either, a ZK proof is used.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"challengeDelay": 432000,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.05"
},
"permissioned": false,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-assessed",
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
"secondLine": "5d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on Celestia. Sequencer tx roots are not checked against the Blobstream bridge data roots onchain, but L2 nodes can verify data availability by running a Celestia light client.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on Celestia. Sequencer tx roots are not checked against the Blobstream bridge data roots onchain, but L2 nodes can verify data availability by running a Celestia light client.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+2 -2
+2 -2
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (1R, ZK)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Single round proofs (1R) prove the validity of a state proposal, only requiring a single transaction to resolve. A fault proof eliminates a state proposal by proving that any intermediate state transition in the proposal results in a different state root. For either, a ZK proof is used.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"challengeDelay": 432000,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.05"
},
"permissioned": false,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-assessed",
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
"secondLine": "5d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 1mo 3d challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 1036800,
"executionDelayMode": "if-challenged",
"challengeDelay": 2903040,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "1mo 3d challenge period\n+ 12d execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400,
"secondLine": "1d delay"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "No actor outside of the single Proposer can submit fraud proofs. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 1mo 3d challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 1036800,
"executionDelayMode": "if-challenged",
"challengeDelay": 2903040,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.1"
},
"secondLine": "1mo 3d challenge period\n+ 12d execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External (DAC)",
"description": "Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 1/1 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 1
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -86400
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 129600
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+2 -2
+2 -2
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (1R, ZK)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Single round proofs (1R) prove the validity of a state proposal, only requiring a single transaction to resolve. A fault proof eliminates a state proposal by proving that any intermediate state transition in the proposal results in a different state root. For either, a ZK proof is used.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"challengeDelay": 432000,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.05"
},
"permissioned": false,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-assessed",
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
"secondLine": "5d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on Celestia. Sequencer tx roots are not checked against the Blobstream bridge data roots onchain, but L2 nodes can verify data availability by running a Celestia light client.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "External",
"description": "Proof construction and state derivation fully rely on data that is posted on Celestia. Sequencer tx roots are not checked against the Blobstream bridge data roots onchain, but L2 nodes can verify data availability by running a Celestia light client.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}+2 -2
+2 -2
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (1R, ZK)",
"description": "Fraud proofs allow actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Single round proofs (1R) prove the validity of a state proposal, only requiring a single transaction to resolve. A fault proof eliminates a state proposal by proving that any intermediate state transition in the proposal results in a different state root. For either, a ZK proof is used.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"executionDelay": 0,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"challengeDelay": 432000,
"initialBond": {
"value": "0.05"
},
"permissioned": false,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-assessed",
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
"secondLine": "5d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable. Upgrades need to be approved by 2 parties: the Base Coordinator Multisig and the Base Security Council.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 0
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can be a Proposer and propose new roots to the L1 bridge.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 0
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on the base chain, which ultimately gets published on Ethereum.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 12h delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 43200,
"secondLine": "12h delay"
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "None",
"description": "Currently the system permits invalid state roots. More details in project overview.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null,
"challengeDelay": 604800,
"secondLine": "7d challenge period"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -604800
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Self sequence",
"description": "In the event of a sequencer failure, users can force transactions to be included in the project's chain by sending them to L1. There can be up to a 1d delay on this operation.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 86400
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Cannot withdraw",
"description": "Only the whitelisted proposers can publish state roots on L1, so in the event of failure the withdrawals are frozen.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}