a0ef70d0 (main)
and
dbdecd47 (PR)
+19 -1
+19 -1
null
{
"censorshipResistance": {
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Sequencing is permissionless with no single privileged actor, the protocol cannot be paused, and the exit window is infinite. It lacks determinism however - there is no L1 forced-transaction queue and no deterministic maximum inclusion delay, so inclusion is only probabilistic."
},
"openSource": {
"sentiment": "good",
"description": "Apache 2.0 licensed, the onchain verifier has been reproduced, and the rollup is even forkable onchain by design."
},
"privacy": {
"sentiment": "good",
"description": "Privacy is protocol-native: the AztecVM supports private and public smart contracts, balances and identities in private state are encrypted, and each private transaction is proven client-side."
},
"security": {
"sentiment": "warning",
"status": "partiallyReviewed",
"description": "State is validated with validity proofs and the v5 rollup is immutable, but quantum safety is unclear and the bridge was insecure until the very recent v5 upgrade (July 2026), leaving a migration risk and burden."
}
}+19 -1
+19 -1
null
{
"censorshipResistance": {
"sentiment": "good",
"description": "Ethscriptions is a based rollup with no sequencer: L2 state is derived deterministically from ethscription activity on Ethereum, so ordering is decided by L1 and any user can force a transaction there. The Rollup contract is not upgradeable and cannot be paused, so the exit window is infinite, and state proposing falls back to permissionless after a timeout."
},
"openSource": {
"sentiment": "good",
"description": "The node, the modified geth, the zk fault proof stack, and the onchain verifier are all published, and both the verifier contracts and the program hashes can be independently regenerated from source."
},
"privacy": {
"sentiment": "bad",
"description": "The chain derives its entire state from public Ethereum calldata, so every inscription and transfer is public by construction. There are no protocol-level privacy features."
},
"security": {
"sentiment": "good",
"status": "partiallyReviewed",
"description": "State is validated on L1 with SP1 validity proofs and the Rollup contract is immutable, putting it at Stage 2. It is an application-specific chain with no general-purpose contract deployment and no canonical bridge, which keeps the surface small but also means asset movement depends on third-party bridges assessed separately."
}
}+19 -1
+19 -1
null
{
"censorshipResistance": {
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Ragequit lives in the immutable pool contracts, so a depositor can always withdraw to their original address no matter what the Entrypoint or the ASP does - the assets are never custodial. Private withdrawals are a different story: the ASP postman can remove any deposit from the whitelist at any time, which forces the user to exit publicly and lose their privacy."
},
"openSource": {
"sentiment": "good",
"description": "The contracts, circuits, and supporting software needed to participate in Privacy Pools are publicly available and can be run locally."
},
"privacy": {
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Deposits and private withdrawals are unlinkable through zk proofs and the protocol cannot retroactively deanonymize past withdrawals, but compliance is gated by centralized association set providers that decide which deposits may ever be withdrawn privately. Privacy also depends on relayer availability - with no relayer, the withdrawal has to come from a linkable address."
},
"security": {
"sentiment": "warning",
"status": "partiallyReviewed",
"description": "Withdrawals are protected by a zk proof system that depends on a trusted setup, and the multisig can instantly swap the Entrypoint implementation and the ASP root with no delay, so a malicious upgrade could steal new deposits. Existing deposits stay recoverable through the immutable pool-level ragequit."
}
}+19 -1
+19 -1
null
{
"censorshipResistance": {
"sentiment": "good",
"description": "The protocol is permissionless: the immutable core has no admin, pause, or upgrade path and the exit window is infinite, so selective censorship, blanket censorship, and walkaway resistance are all solid. The relayer set (26 active relayers over the last month) is the weakest link, but users can always self-relay withdrawals."
},
"openSource": {
"sentiment": "good",
"description": "The core is GPL-3.0 licensed and reproducible: anyone can audit the published source code and run it locally to participate."
},
"privacy": {
"sentiment": "good",
"description": "Unstoppable user privacy with no protocol-level compliance mechanism or backdoor, and strong, clearly defined anonymity set numbers per fixed-denomination pool."
},
"security": {
"sentiment": "good",
"status": "partiallyReviewed",
"description": "A simple, well-ossified design that has been audited extensively - plausibly including by malicious actors. It is not quantum-resistant, which may expose user privacy to harvest-now-decrypt-later attacks, and immutability means bugs cannot be patched."
}
}+19 -1
+19 -1
null
{
"censorshipResistance": {
"sentiment": "good",
"description": "The core contracts are immutable, cannot be paused, and have no upgrade path, so the exit window is infinite and the protocol passes the walkaway test: nobody can stop a recipient from claiming a payment already sent to them, and withdrawals can always be self-relayed instead of going through a relayer. Nobody can censor an individual user either - the owner can only raise the ETH toll on contract-routed payments, which applies to everyone equally and cannot touch payment or withdrawal logic."
},
"openSource": {
"sentiment": "good",
"description": "The immutable core contracts, the cryptographic library, and the frontend are published and can be built and run locally."
},
"privacy": {
"sentiment": "good",
"description": "Recipient privacy with no protocol-level compliance mechanism, no privileged view key, and no way for anyone to retroactively deanonymize a payment. Umbra hides who controls the receiving address; the sender, amount, and stealth address stay public, so privacy still depends on the recipient practising good withdrawal hygiene and avoiding recognizable timing or amount patterns."
},
"security": {
"sentiment": "good",
"status": "partiallyReviewed",
"description": "A small, immutable, externally audited contract set with no proof system and no trusted setup. Stealth addresses rely on elliptic-curve key agreement, so they are not quantum-resistant, and immutability means the unsupported-token accounting caveat cannot be patched."
}
}[ADDED]
uniswapv3
+92 -0
+1 -0
"uniswapv3"+1 -0
"uniswapv3"+1 -0
"Uniswap V3"+1 -0
null+1 -0
null+1 -0
0+3 -0
{
"unverifiedContracts": []
}+28 -0
{
"badges": [],
"description": "Uniswap v3 is a concentrated-liquidity AMM where anyone can deploy an immutable, adminless pool for any token pair at an enabled fee tier. User funds sit only in the pools, which no one can upgrade or pause. UNI tokenholder governance, acting through a 2-day timelock, holds two bounded control powers over v3 pools: enabling new fee tiers and setting a protocol fee capped at 1/4 of LP fees per side. Under the current UNIfication configuration, collected protocol fees are exchanged by the Firepit for UNI sent permanently to 0xdead; governance can change this disposal path after the timelock.",
"links": {
"websites": [
"https://app.uniswap.org/"
],
"documentation": [
"https://docs.uniswap.org/contracts/v3/overview"
],
"repositories": [
"https://github.com/Uniswap/v3-core"
],
"socialMedia": [
"https://x.com/Uniswap"
]
},
"references": [
{
"title": "Uniswap v3 Core Whitepaper",
"url": "https://app.uniswap.org/whitepaper-v3.pdf"
},
{
"title": "UNIfication proposal (protocol fees & UNI burn)",
"url": "https://vote.uniswapfoundation.org/proposals/93"
}
]
}+1 -0
null+1 -0
null+1 -0
null+1 -0
null+1 -0
null+1 -0
null+1 -0
null+1 -0
null+1 -0
null+1 -0
null+1 -0
null+1 -0
null+1 -0
null+1 -0
null+1 -0
null+1 -0
null+1 -0
null+1 -0
null+1 -0
null+3 -0
{
"category": "DEX"
}+1 -0
[]+17 -0
{
"censorshipResistance": {
"sentiment": "good",
"description": "Pools are immutable and adminless: anyone can deploy a pool for any token pair at an enabled fee tier, and swapping or withdrawing liquidity needs no permission and passes through no operator. Nothing can be paused or upgraded. UNI tokenholder governance, acting through a 2d timelock, holds only two bounded powers over v3 pools - enabling new fee tiers and setting a protocol fee capped at 1/4 of LP fees per side - so it cannot block a swap, freeze a position, or reach LP funds."
},
"openSource": {
"sentiment": "good",
"description": "The v3 core and periphery contracts are GPL licensed - the business-source grant on the core expired in 2023 - verified onchain, and can be built and run locally alongside a self-hosted interface."
},
"privacy": {
"status": "notReviewed"
},
"security": {
"sentiment": "good",
"description": "Every contract that holds or routes user funds is immutable, with no upgrade path and no external dependency - no oracle, no bridge - and the core has been battle-tested at very high volume since 2021. What remains is a governance-set protocol fee (currently 1/4 of LP fees per side, 1/6 on the 0.3% tier, with proceeds burned as UNI through the Firepit), per-pool token and liquidity risk, and the router and approval contracts that sit outside the pools."
}
}+1 -0
null+1 -0
null+1 -0
null+1 -0
null+1 -0
null+1 -0
null+1 -0
null+1 -0
null+1 -0
null+1 -0
null+1 -0
null+1 -0
null+1 -0
null+1 -0
null+1 -0
null