{
"message": {
"type": "warning",
"text": "There is no available node software that can reconstruct the state from L1 data, hence there is no way to verify that this system is a rollup."
},
"missing": {
"nextStage": "Stage 1",
"requirements": [
"Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators.",
"Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring.",
"The Security Council is not properly set up."
],
"principle": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council should be the only way (other than bugs) for a rollup to indefinitely block an L2→L1 message (e.g. a withdrawal) or push an invalid L2→L1 message (e.g. an invalid withdrawal) with a <7d exit window."
},
"stage": "Stage 0",
"summary": [
{
"stage": "Stage 0",
"requirements": [
{
"satisfied": true,
"description": "A complete and functional proof system is deployed."
},
{
"satisfied": true,
"description": "The project calls itself a rollup."
},
{
"satisfied": true,
"description": "State roots are posted to Ethereum L1."
},
{
"satisfied": true,
"description": "Inputs for the state transition function are posted to Ethereum L1."
},
{
"satisfied": false,
"description": "No source-available node exists that can recreate the state from L1 data."
}
]
},
{
"stage": "Stage 1",
"requirements": [
{
"satisfied": false,
"description": "Users' withdrawals can be censored by the permissioned operators."
},
{
"satisfied": false,
"description": "Upgrades executed by actors with more centralized control than a Security Council provide less than 7d for users to exit if the permissioned operator is down or censoring."
},
{
"satisfied": false,
"description": "The Security Council is not properly set up."
},
{
"satisfied": true,
"description": "The proof system meets the minimum trusted setup requirements defined in the L2BEAT [trusted setup assessment framework](https://forum.l2beat.com/t/the-trusted-setups-framework-for-zk-catalog/381).",
"upcoming": true
},
{
"satisfied": false,
"description": "Prover source code is not published.",
"upcoming": true
},
{
"satisfied": false,
"description": "Not all onchain verifiers' smart contracts can be independently regenerated from the verifier source code.",
"upcoming": true
},
{
"satisfied": false,
"description": "Not all program sources are public or not all program hashes can be independently regenerated.",
"upcoming": true
}
],
"principle": {
"satisfied": false,
"description": "Compromising ≥75% of the Security Council should be the only way (other than bugs) for a rollup to indefinitely block an L2→L1 message (e.g. a withdrawal) or push an invalid L2→L1 message (e.g. an invalid withdrawal) with a <7d exit window."
}
},
{
"stage": "Stage 2",
"requirements": [
{
"satisfied": false,
"description": "Upgrades unrelated to onchain provable bugs provide less than 30d to exit."
},
{
"satisfied": false,
"description": "The Security Council's actions are not confined to onchain provable bugs."
}
]
}
]
}
scalingRisks+9-9
{
"host": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs only allow 2 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"executionDelayMode": "if-challenged",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 2,
"initialBond": {
"value": "1.0"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period\n+ 2d execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on Ethereum L1.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -345600
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no guaranteed mechanism to have transactions included if the sequencer is down or censoring. Although users can enqueue messages in the L1 delayed inbox and call forceInclusion on the SequencerInbox, the chain runs ArbOS 61 transaction filtering: an authorized filterer can register any transaction hash in the ArbFilteredTransactionsManager precompile (0x00…0074), after which the state transition function forcibly fails that transaction, including force-included ones, without delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Self propose",
"description": "Anyone can become a Proposer after 28d of inactivity from the currently whitelisted Proposers.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 2419200,
"secondLine": "28d delay"
}
},
"self": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Validity proofs (SN)",
"description": "SNARKs are succinct zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness, but require trusted setup.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null,
"permissioned": true,
"executionDelay": 0,
"secondLine": "No execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain (SD)",
"description": "All of the data (SD = state diffs) needed for proof construction is published onchain.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -1209600
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "Force via host chain",
"description": "Users can submit priority requests directly on Robinhood Chain. If a request remains unprocessed for more than 14d, desert mode can be activated. The deployed DesertVerifier does not validate withdrawal proofs, so this mechanism does not provide a safe escape hatch.",
"sentiment": "warning",
"value": "Force via L1",
"description": "Users can force the sequencer to include a transaction by submitting a request through L1. If the sequencer censors or is down for for more than 14d, users can use the exit hatch to withdraw their funds.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": 1209600
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Unsafe escape hatch",
"description": "If operators stop processing priority requests, desert mode can be activated. The deployed DesertVerifier does not validate withdrawal proofs, allowing users to claim balances that are not part of the last verified state.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"value": "Use escape hatch",
"description": "Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a zero knowledge proof of funds.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
}
},
"stacked": {
"stateValidation": {
"value": "Fraud proofs (INT)",
"description": "Fraud proofs only allow 2 WHITELISTED actors watching the chain to prove that the state is incorrect. Interactive proofs (INT) require multiple transactions over time to resolve. The challenge protocol can be subject to delay attacks. There is a 6d 8h challenge period.",
"executionDelay": 172800,
"executionDelayMode": "if-challenged",
"challengeDelay": 549816,
"permissioned": true,
"defenderAdvantage": "not-applicable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": 2,
"initialBond": {
"value": "1.0"
},
"secondLine": "6d 8h challenge period\n+ 2d execution delay"
},
"dataAvailability": {
"value": "Onchain",
"description": "All of the data needed for proof construction is published on the base chain, which ultimately gets published on Ethereum.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
},
"exitWindow": {
"value": "None",
"description": "There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"orderHint": -345600
},
"sequencerFailure": {
"value": "No mechanism",
"description": "There is no guaranteed mechanism to have transactions included if the sequencer is down or censoring. Although users can enqueue messages in the L1 delayed inbox and call forceInclusion on the SequencerInbox, the chain runs ArbOS 61 transaction filtering: an authorized filterer can register any transaction hash in the ArbFilteredTransactionsManager precompile (0x00…0074), after which the state transition function forcibly fails that transaction, including force-included ones, without delay.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"proposerFailure": {
"value": "Unsafe escape hatch",
"description": "If operators stop processing priority requests, desert mode can be activated. The deployed DesertVerifier does not validate withdrawal proofs, allowing users to claim balances that are not part of the last verified state.",
"sentiment": "bad",
"value": "Use escape hatch",
"description": "Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a zero knowledge proof of funds.",
"sentiment": "good",
"orderHint": null
}
}
}
scalingTechnology+10-28
{
"dataAvailability": [
{
"name": "State differences posted on Robinhood Chain",
"description": "The state differences required to reconstruct and prove the Lighter state are included directly in commitBatch calldata on Robinhood Chain. Unlike the Ethereum deployment, the Lighter contract does not read EIP-4844 blob hashes. Robinhood Chain subsequently batches its own transaction data to Ethereum blobs.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Example commitBatch transaction on Robinhood Chain",
"url": "https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/tx/0x73360fb1c909946ab6eba200a1dfc8c70065c04784dadcbc0ca090c1788fd7a3"
},
{
"title": "Robinhood Chain architecture documentation",
"url": "https://docs.robinhood.com/chain/"
}
]
}
],
"exitMechanisms": [
{
"name": "Regular exit",
"description": "The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled the funds become available for withdrawal on L1. ZK proofs are required to settle blocks. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds.",
"risks": [],
"references": []
},
{
"name": "Unsafe desert-mode escape hatch",
"description": "After desert mode is activated, users are expected to exit by proving their balance against the last verified state root. The deployed DesertVerifier does not validate these proofs, so withdrawal balances are not constrained by the last verified state.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "desert mode is activated and users withdraw balances that are not part of the last verified state.",
"isCritical": true
}
],
"name": "Escape hatch through ZK proofs",
"description": "If the centralized operators fail to process forced transactions after the deadline, the system can be frozen (desert mode) and users are expected to exit by reconstructing the latest settled state and providing a ZK proof of balance.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Deployed DesertVerifier on Robinhood Chain",
"url": "https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/address/0x443cc0c7f773d0955e3bd8da393b708152cfa5bc"
"url": "https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/address/0x56aeED6920DBB9E198C2C0072147A45684A06E10"
}
]
}
],
"forceTransactions": {
"name": "Priority requests can be submitted on Robinhood Chain",
"description": "Users can submit priority requests directly to the Lighter contract on Robinhood Chain. If the operators leave the oldest request unprocessed for more than 14d, anyone can activate desert mode. The deployed DesertVerifier does not validate withdrawal proofs, so desert mode does not provide a safe escape hatch.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "desert mode is activated, because withdrawals are not constrained by a valid proof.",
"isCritical": true
}
],
"description": "Users can submit priority requests directly to the Lighter contract on Robinhood Chain. If the operators leave the oldest request unprocessed for more than 14d, anyone can activate desert mode.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Lighter contract on Robinhood Chain",
"url": "https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/address/0x94bAB9693Ba2f6358507eFfcbd372b0660AFfF9d"
}
]
},
"operator": {
"name": "Centralized operators",
"description": "Only the centralized operators can submit batches and verify them with a ZK proof, i.e. advance the state of the protocol. The network governor can add or remove validators.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "MEV can be extracted if",
"text": "the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions."
}
],
"references": []
},
"otherConsiderations": [
{
"name": "USDG is the quote and margin asset",
"description": "Unlike the Ethereum deployment, this fork uses Global Dollar (USDG) instead of USDC as the quote and margin asset.",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Robinhood Chain token contracts",
"url": "https://docs.robinhood.com/chain/contracts/"
},
{
"title": "Robinhood Wallet perpetual futures documentation",
"url": "https://robinhood.com/us/en/support/articles/robinhood-wallet-perpetual-futures/"
}
]
},
{
"name": "External oracles used for index prices",
"description": "Lighter uses external oracles to determine index prices. External signatures are not verified by the settlement contract and the sequencer must be trusted to truthfully report data.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be lost if",
"text": "the oracle prices are manipulated."
}
],
"references": [
{
"title": "Lighter docs - Fair Price Marking",
"url": "https://docs.lighter.xyz/perpetual-futures/fair-price-marking"
}
]
}
],
"stateValidation": {
"description": "Each update to the system state must be accompanied by a ZK proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid transactions to the previous state. These proofs are verified on Robinhood Chain by a smart contract. In desert mode, users are expected to provide proofs of their balances to exit, but the deployed DesertVerifier does not validate them.",
"description": "Each update to the system state must be accompanied by a ZK proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid transactions to the previous state. These proofs are verified on Robinhood Chain by a smart contract. In desert mode, users can provide proofs of their balances to exit, which is validate by the DesertVerifier.",
"categories": [
{
"title": "Verification Keys Generation",
"description": "Lighter uses a Plonk-based proof system which requires a trusted setup. The verification keys are hardcoded in the verifier contract on-chain. The Lighter prover repository contains a [script](https://github.com/elliottech/lighter-prover/blob/main/build_circuits.sh) that regenerates circuits and verification keys, but it does not reproduce the verification keys used by this deployment.",
"references": [
{
"title": "ZK Lighter verifier verification keys",
"url": "https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/address/0xA3c70B197AcE329D9e09C753DA7874B78F1D00f4"
}
]
},
{
"title": "Validity proofs",
"description": "State updates are verified by the ZkLighterVerifier contract. In desert mode, the DesertVerifier does not validate withdrawal proofs, allowing users to withdraw balances that are not part of the last verified state.",
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "desert mode is activated and users withdraw balances that are not part of the last verified state.",
"isCritical": true
}
],
"description": "State updates are verified by the ZkLighterVerifier contract. Desert verifier consists of circuits proving valid L2 -> L1 withdrawals in the desert mode. More details in [ZK Catalog](https://l2beat.com/zk-catalog/lighterprover#proof-system).",
"risks": [],
"references": [
{
"title": "Deployed DesertVerifier implementation",
"url": "https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/address/0x443cc0c7f773d0955e3bd8da393b708152cfa5bc"
"url": "https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/address/0x56aeED6920DBB9E198C2C0072147A45684A06E10"
}
]
}
]
}
}
contracts+2-6
{
"addresses": {
"robinhood": [
{
"name": "UpgradeGatekeeper",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "robinhood:0x43CfF77CD060A155dCe5deb12B93b875f69F2716",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "robinhood",
"description": "Governance contract functioning like an upgrade timelock for downstream contracts. The current delay is 21d and can be entirely skipped by 0x4972E0CaCb2AC45644BA054838e96fF4f6f7eFDb.\n* Roles:\n * **getMaster**: Lighter Governor\n * **securityCouncilAddress**: Lighter Security Council",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/address/0x43CfF77CD060A155dCe5deb12B93b875f69F2716#code"
},
{
"name": "DesertVerifier",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "robinhood:0x56aeED6920DBB9E198C2C0072147A45684A06E10",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "immutable",
"admins": [],
"implementations": [],
"immutable": true
},
"chain": "robinhood",
"description": "",
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/address/0x56aeED6920DBB9E198C2C0072147A45684A06E10#code"
},
{
"name": "Lighter",
"isVerified": false,
"address": "robinhood:0x94bAB9693Ba2f6358507eFfcbd372b0660AFfF9d",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "zkLighter proxy",
"admins": [
"robinhood:0x43CfF77CD060A155dCe5deb12B93b875f69F2716"
],
"implementations": [
"robinhood:0xE470e41Cacc197EA07f879577765A8c81234ED7B",
"robinhood:0x1be72833f96e47366610CCFb9Bec081FE69EECf5"
]
},
"chain": "robinhood",
"description": "* Roles:\n * **admin**: UpgradeGatekeeper; ultimately Lighter Governor",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"id": "Lighter-Governor",
"name": "Lighter Governor",
"delay": "21d"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/address/0x94bAB9693Ba2f6358507eFfcbd372b0660AFfF9d#code"
},
{
"name": "ZkLighterVerifier",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "robinhood:0xe1aFBE2D670eFF0e7C8A41F080792C011916ac31",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"robinhood:0x43CfF77CD060A155dCe5deb12B93b875f69F2716"
],
"implementations": [
"robinhood:0xA3c70B197AcE329D9e09C753DA7874B78F1D00f4"
]
},
"chain": "robinhood",
"pastUpgrades": [],
"description": "The main ZK verifier of Lighter, settles the proofs of correct L2 state transition in the case of normal rollup operation.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: UpgradeGatekeeper; ultimately Lighter Governor",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"id": "Lighter-Governor",
"name": "Lighter Governor",
"delay": "21d"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/address/0xe1aFBE2D670eFF0e7C8A41F080792C011916ac31#code"
},
{
"name": "Governance",
"isVerified": true,
"address": "robinhood:0xf6F6Bd6eEA2b9A2041328732CcAe4c5e1DD278B7",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "EIP1967 proxy",
"admins": [
"robinhood:0x43CfF77CD060A155dCe5deb12B93b875f69F2716"
],
"implementations": [
"robinhood:0x3468Dcab5a2D81Af207B3e301DFA889321989a61"
]
},
"chain": "robinhood",
"pastUpgrades": [],
"description": "Manages the list of validators and the network governor.\n* Roles:\n * **admin**: UpgradeGatekeeper; ultimately Lighter Governor\n * **networkGovernor**: Lighter Governor\n * **validators**: Lighter Validator 1, Lighter Validator 2, Lighter Validator 3",
"upgradableBy": [
{
"id": "Lighter-Governor",
"name": "Lighter Governor",
"delay": "21d"
}
],
"discoveryDrivenData": true,
"url": "https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/address/0xf6F6Bd6eEA2b9A2041328732CcAe4c5e1DD278B7#code"
}
]
},
"escrows": [
{
"address": "0x94bAB9693Ba2f6358507eFfcbd372b0660AFfF9d",
"sinceTimestamp": 1782477747,
"tokens": [
"ETH",
"USDG",
"AAPL",
"AMZN",
"GOOGL",
"META",
"MSFT",
"NVDA",
"TSLA",
"ORCL",
"SPCX",
"BABA",
"USAR",
"USO",
"COIN",
"CRCL",
"QQQ",
"SPY",
"SGOV",
"SLV",
"AMD",
"INTC",
"MU",
"SNDK",
"CRWV",
"PLTR"
],
"contract": {
"isVerified": false,
"address": "robinhood:0x94bAB9693Ba2f6358507eFfcbd372b0660AFfF9d",
"upgradeability": {
"proxyType": "zkLighter proxy",
"admins": [
"robinhood:0x43CfF77CD060A155dCe5deb12B93b875f69F2716"
],
"implementations": [
"robinhood:0xE470e41Cacc197EA07f879577765A8c81234ED7B",
"robinhood:0x1be72833f96e47366610CCFb9Bec081FE69EECf5"
]
},
"chain": "robinhood",
"description": "Main Lighter contract on Robinhood Chain. It escrows USDG used as margin as well as ETH and Robinhood tokenized equities and ETFs used for spot trading, and credits the corresponding balances inside Lighter.",
"url": "https://robinhoodchain.blockscout.com/address/0x94bAB9693Ba2f6358507eFfcbd372b0660AFfF9d#code"
},
"chain": "robinhood",
"chainId": 4663
}
],
"risks": [
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "desert mode is activated, because withdrawals are not constrained by a valid proof.",
"isCritical": true
},
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades.",
"isCritical": true
},
{
"category": "Funds can be stolen if",
"text": "the source code of unverified contracts contains malicious code.",
"isCritical": true
}
],
"zkVerifiers": [
"robinhood:0xA3c70B197AcE329D9e09C753DA7874B78F1D00f4"
"robinhood:0xA3c70B197AcE329D9e09C753DA7874B78F1D00f4",
"robinhood:0x56aeED6920DBB9E198C2C0072147A45684A06E10"
]
}