Diff between e53461eb (main) and 057aac84 (PR)

• aztecnetwork +47 -1 Viewed

  • crops +47 -1 Viewed

    null
    {
      "censorshipResistance": {
        "sentiment": "warning",
        "points": [
          "Sequencing is permissionless with no single privileged actor.",
          "Decentralised sequencing and private execution environment provide excellent realtime, probabilistic CR.",
          "Exit window is infinite due to immutable core contracts + Escape Hatch.",
          "Passes the walkaway test."
        ],
        "missing": [
          "No deterministic CR: Self-proposal is probabilistic through the escape hatch."
        ]
      },
      "openSource": {
        "sentiment": "good",
        "license": "Apache-2.0",
        "points": [
          "Onchain verifier has been reproduced.",
          "Rollup is forkable onchain by design."
        ]
      },
      "privacy": {
        "sentiment": "good",
        "points": [
          "Programmable privacy: private state, private and public smart contracts are protocol-native.",
          "Private transactions are proven client-side (private inputs do not leave the device)."
        ],
        "missing": [
          "The complicated execution environment might leak some metadata."
        ]
      },
      "security": {
        "sentiment": "bad",
        "points": [
          "All state is validated with validity proofs on Ethereum."
        ],
        "missing": [
          "The current proof system has known critical vulnerabilities",
          "No multiproof system.",
          "An exploit in the single proof system combined with private execution can be fatal for the protocol."
        ],
        "notReviewed": [
          "Quantum safety.",
          "Circuit breakers and rate limits."
        ]
      }
    }

• ethscriptions +47 -1 Viewed

  • crops +47 -1 Viewed

    null
    {
      "censorshipResistance": {
        "sentiment": "good",
        "points": [
          "A based rollup with no sequencer: L2 state is derived deterministically from ethscription activity on Ethereum, so ordering is decided by L1 and any user can force a transaction there.",
          "The Rollup contract is not upgradeable and cannot be paused, so the exit window is infinite.",
          "State proposing falls back to permissionless after a timeout."
        ],
        "notReviewed": [
          "Whether transaction filters could live in the node state transition function."
        ]
      },
      "openSource": {
        "sentiment": "good",
        "points": [
          "The node, the modified geth, the zk fault proof stack and the onchain verifier are all published.",
          "Both the verifier contracts and the program hashes can be independently regenerated from source."
        ],
        "notReviewed": [
          "License permissiveness across the stack, so fork rights are unconfirmed.",
          "Node build reproducibility, as distinct from the program hashes."
        ]
      },
      "privacy": {
        "status": "fullyTransparent",
        "points": [
          "The protocol does not make privacy claims, and is fully transparent.",
          "Ethscription activity and the L2 state derived from it are public on Ethereum."
        ]
      },
      "security": {
        "sentiment": "good",
        "points": [
          "State is validated on L1 with SP1 validity proofs and the Rollup contract is immutable, putting it at Stage 2.",
          "An application-specific chain with no general-purpose contract deployment, which keeps the surface small."
        ],
        "missing": [
          "No canonical bridge, so asset movement depends on third-party bridges assessed separately."
        ],
        "notReviewed": [
          "Audit coverage.",
          "Trusted setup requirements of the proof system.",
          "Prover decentralization and multiproof.",
          "Circuit breakers and rate limits."
        ]
      }
    }

• superposition +3 -2 Viewed

  • chainConfig +2 -1 Viewed

    {
      "apis": [
        {
          "type": "rpc",
          "url": "https://rpc.superposition.so",
          "callsPerMinute": 300
        },
        {
          "type": "blockscout",
          "url": "https://explorer.superposition.so/api"
        }
      ],
      "chainId": 55244,
      "explorerUrl": "https://explorer.superposition.so",
      "gasTokens": [
        "ETH"
      ],
      "multicallContracts": [
        {
          "address": "0xcA11bde05977b3631167028862bE2a173976CA11",
          "batchSize": 150,
          "sinceBlock": 39,
          "version": "3"
        }
      ],
      "name": "superposition",
      "sinceTimestamp": 1725644465
      "sinceTimestamp": 1725644465,
      "untilTimestamp": 1788868800
    }

  • archivedAt +1 -1 Viewed

    null
    1788868800

• tornado-cash +38 -1 Viewed

  • crops +38 -1 Viewed

    null
    {
      "censorshipResistance": {
        "sentiment": "good",
        "points": [
          "The core contracts are immutable, cannot be paused, and have no upgrade path, so the exit window is infinite.",
          "CR based on Ethereum L1 inclusion.",
          "Passes the walkaway test.",
          "Multiple active relayers; users can self-relay withdrawals."
        ]
      },
      "openSource": {
        "sentiment": "good",
        "license": "GPL-3.0",
        "points": [
          "Reproducible from source: anyone can audit it and run it locally to participate."
        ]
      },
      "privacy": {
        "sentiment": "good",
        "points": [
          "Unconditional privacy.",
          "Clearly defined anonymity set per fixed-denomination pool."
        ]
      },
      "security": {
        "sentiment": "good",
        "points": [
          "Simple, well-ossified design."
        ],
        "missing": [
          "Not quantum-resistant, which may expose user privacy to harvest-now-decrypt-later attacks.",
          "Brittle onchain governance (token voting) controls the official frontend (ENS+IPFS)."
        ],
        "notReviewed": [
          "Formal verification."
        ]
      }
    }

• umbra +40 -1 Viewed

  • crops +40 -1 Viewed

    null
    {
      "censorshipResistance": {
        "sentiment": "good",
        "points": [
          "The core contracts are immutable, cannot be paused, and have no upgrade path, so the exit window is infinite.",
          "Passes the walkaway test: nobody can stop a recipient from claiming a payment already sent to them, and withdrawals can always be self-relayed.",
          "Nobody can censor an individual user - the owner can only raise the ETH toll on contract-routed payments, which applies to everyone equally and cannot touch payment or withdrawal logic."
        ],
        "missing": [
          "ERC-20 stealth transfers are currently relayed only by Umbra Cash relayer, privacy guarantees are weakened if it censors withdrawals."
        ]
      },
      "openSource": {
        "sentiment": "good",
        "license": "MIT",
        "points": [
          "The immutable core contracts, the cryptographic library and the frontend are published and can be built and run locally."
        ]
      },
      "privacy": {
        "sentiment": "warning",
        "points": [
          "Recipient privacy with no protocol-level compliance mechanism, no privileged view key, and no way for anyone to retroactively deanonymize a payment."
        ],
        "missing": [
          "Only who controls the receiving address is hidden - the sender, the amount and the stealth address stay public.",
          "The number of registered stealth transfer recipients is not large enough to provide a high degree of anonymity."
        ]
      },
      "security": {
        "sentiment": "good",
        "points": [
          "A small, immutable, externally audited contract set with no proof system and no trusted setup.",
          "Umbra Cash main contract is well-ossified: it has been live for a long time without security incidents."
        ],
        "missing": [
          "Stealth addresses rely on elliptic-curve key derivation, so they are not quantum-resistant."
        ]
      }
    }

• uniswapv3 +45 -1 Viewed

  • crops +45 -1 Viewed

    null
    {
      "censorshipResistance": {
        "sentiment": "good",
        "points": [
          "Pools are immutable and adminless: nothing can be paused or upgraded.",
          "Anyone can deploy a pool for any token pair at an enabled fee tier, and swapping or withdrawing liquidity needs no permission and passes through no operator.",
          "UNI tokenholder governance, acting through a 2d timelock, holds only two bounded powers over v3 pools: enabling new fee tiers, and setting a protocol fee capped at 1/4 of LP fees per side.",
          "Governance cannot block a swap, freeze a position, or reach LP funds."
        ],
        "notReviewed": [
          "The routers and interfaces users actually reach the pools through, which sit outside them."
        ]
      },
      "openSource": {
        "sentiment": "good",
        "license": "GPL-2.0",
        "points": [
          "The GPL covers both the v3 core and the periphery - the business-source grant on the core expired in 2023.",
          "The contracts are verified onchain, and can be built and run locally alongside a self-hosted interface."
        ]
      },
      "privacy": {
        "status": "fullyTransparent",
        "points": [
          "The protocol does not make privacy claims, and is fully transparent.",
          "Swaps and positions are public onchain."
        ]
      },
      "security": {
        "sentiment": "good",
        "points": [
          "Every contract that holds or routes user funds is immutable, with no upgrade path.",
          "No external dependency - no oracle, no bridge.",
          "The core has been battle-tested at very high volume since 2021."
        ],
        "missing": [
          "A governance-set protocol fee remains: currently 1/4 of LP fees per side, 1/6 on the 0.3% tier, with proceeds burned as UNI through the Firepit.",
          "Per-pool token and liquidity risk stays with the user."
        ],
        "notReviewed": [
          "The router and approval contracts that sit outside the pools, which are assessed separately.",
          "Circuit breakers and rate limits."
        ]
      }
    }