80d9d445 (main)
and
6dfb84c0 (PR)
+74 -3
+1 -1
{
"badges": [],
"description": "ether.fi is a liquid staking and restaking protocol. Deposit ETH for eETH (rebasing) or its wrapper weETH, and the pool stakes it both through ether.fi's own permissioned operators and through third-party liquid staking tokens it accepts, with restaking in EigenLayer. A 3-of-3 committee sets the exchange rate under hard caps of at most 0.25% per report. To exit, holders burn eETH for a withdrawal NFT the oracle must finalize, or swap instantly through a buffer for a fee up to 5%, though only a small buffer is instantly liquid, so large exits wait for validators to unwind. Upgrades and roles sit behind a 10 days timelock, with multisigs for day-to-day pausing and parameters.",
"description": "ether.fi is a liquid staking and restaking protocol. Users deposit ETH for eETH (rebasing) or its wrapper weETH, staked through whitelisted operators and restaked in EigenLayer, with an oracle committee setting the exchange rate.",
"detailedDescription": "ether.fi is a liquid staking and restaking protocol for ETH. Deposit ETH for eETH (rebasing) or its wrapper weETH, and the pool stakes it both through its own permissioned operators and through third-party liquid staking tokens it accepts. Operators are whitelisted, a committee sets the exchange rate, and privileged functions are controlled by multisigs behind timelocks.\n\n\n\n### The exchange rate\n\nA 3-of-3 oracle committee reports staking rewards and EtherFiAdmin applies them. Hard caps bound every report: at most 0.25% up per report and 5% implied APR, with negative moves capped tighter. Each report executes only after a delay of 10 minutes past consensus, in which the operating multisig can cancel it.\n\n### Custody and exit\n\neETH is a staking aggregator rather than a single validator set. ETH deposits fund new compounding validators of 1901 ETH each, run by ether.fi's permissioned operators. Their withdrawal credentials are fixed in code to a protocol-controlled address, the EigenLayer pod of the ether.fi node they belong to or, for a node created without a pod, the node contract itself, so operators run the keys but cannot redirect the stake. The Liquifier accepts already-staked liquid staking tokens from other providers against a governance-set whitelist and mints eETH for them, and EtherFiRestaker can hold them, restake them in EigenLayer, or unwind them to ETH through the provider's own exit. To exit, burn eETH for a withdrawal NFT that the oracle must finalize before the pool pays, or swap instantly through a buffer for a fee up to 5%. On-chain finalization depends on the 3-of-3 committee, and the permissionless stale-oracle backstop only opens if the committee stops reporting entirely. Only a small buffer is instantly liquid, so large exits wait for validators to unwind.\n\n\n\n### Who holds the keys\n\nUpgrades and every role grant sit behind a 10 days timelock. A shorter 2 days timelock and a set of multisigs run day-to-day operations: pausing, blacklisting, approving operators, and tuning parameters within fixed ceilings.",
"links": {
"websites": [
"https://ether.fi/"
],
"documentation": [
"https://etherfi.gitbook.io/etherfi"
],
"repositories": [
"https://github.com/etherfi-protocol/smart-contracts"
],
"socialMedia": [
"https://x.com/ether_fi"
]
},
"references": [
{
"title": "Deployed Contracts — ether.fi docs",
"url": "https://etherfi.gitbook.io/etherfi/developers/contracts-and-integrations/deployed-contracts"
}
]
}+54 -1
{
"category": "Liquid Staking"
"category": "Liquid Staking",
"liquidStaking": {
"minting": {
"value": "Permissionless",
"secondLine": "gated by ether.fi ops",
"sentiment": "good",
"description": "Anyone can deposit ETH for eETH with no cap or fee; weETH wraps it. Only ether.fi's operations team can send that ETH to validators, which withdraw to protocol EigenPods."
},
"operators": {
"value": "Whitelisted",
"secondLine": "no bond",
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Operators are whitelisted by the 4/7 Safe and post no bond. Holders share slashing losses, up to 3 bps per report. Stake is also restaked in EigenLayer, where extra slashing can cut principal."
},
"backing": {
"value": "EigenPods, stETH",
"secondLine": "creds: EigenPod",
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Validators withdraw to EigenPods, so most ETH sits in EigenLayer, which its own governance can upgrade. 23.7% of backing is stETH and 1.64% is a liquid buffer."
},
"exchangeRate": {
"value": "3 of 3",
"secondLine": "~4h · ≤0.25%",
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "All 3 oracle members must agree on each report, every 4 hours 16 minutes. A report can raise the rate by at most 0.25%. After 14 days of silence, anyone can submit a report."
},
"exit": {
"value": "Oracle-gated",
"secondLine": "~1 day · pausable",
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Withdrawal requests are finalized from oracle reports, at most 80,000 ETH a day. Instant redemption from the buffer costs up to 5%. The 4/7 Safe can pause all exits."
},
"upgrades": {
"value": "6/10 Safe",
"secondLine": "10d · no veto",
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "A 6-of-10 Safe can change the code after a 10-day timelock. A separate 2-day timelock tunes parameters within fixed limits. Holders have no veto."
}
},
"tokens": [
{
"symbol": "eETH",
"name": "ether.fi ETH",
"description": "Rebasing receipt for pooled and restaked ETH: balances follow the oracle report."
},
{
"symbol": "weETH",
"name": "Wrapped eETH",
"description": "Non-rebasing wrapper of eETH: a fixed amount whose ETH value rises with rewards."
}
],
"tvl": {
"source": "l2beat"
}
}+19 -1
null
[
{
"mode": "custom",
"id": "etherfi-eETH",
"priceId": "ether-fi-staked-eth",
"symbol": "eETH",
"name": "ether.fi ETH",
"amount": {
"type": "totalSupply",
"chain": "ethereum",
"sinceTimestamp": 1689005015,
"address": "0x35fA164735182de50811E8e2E824cFb9B6118ac2",
"decimals": 18
},
"category": "ether",
"source": "canonical",
"isAssociated": false
}
]+51 -1
+1 -1
{
"badges": [],
"description": "Lido is Ethereum’s largest liquid staking protocol. Users deposit ETH and receive stETH, a rebasing token whose supply tracks the protocol’s total pooled ETH staked across four node-operator modules. Because staked ETH lives on the beacon chain, the core trust surface is the execution-layer↔consensus-layer boundary, bridged by a 5-of-9 oracle committee (bounded by on-chain sanity checks) and by trustless EIP-4788 beacon-root proofs. Withdrawal credentials are set by the protocol, so node operators cannot take user principal. Every protocol-critical change is controlled by the Lido DAO through Dual Governance, which gives stETH holders a veto and a rage-quit exit against DAO proposals over a 3-day-plus timelock.",
"description": "Lido is Ethereum’s largest liquid staking protocol. Users deposit ETH for stETH, a rebasing token backed by validators run by curated and bonded node-operator modules, priced by an oracle committee and governed by the Lido DAO under a stETH-holder veto.",
"detailedDescription": "Lido is Ethereum’s largest liquid staking protocol. Users deposit ETH and receive stETH, a rebasing ERC-20 whose balance equals `shares × shareRate`, so its total supply tracks the protocol’s total pooled ETH. wstETH is an immutable, adminless wrapper where 1 wstETH permanently equals one stETH share; its value changes only through the stETH contract it points to.\n\n### Staking and node operators\n\nDeposited ETH is buffered in the Lido contract, then routed by the StakingRouter across four staking modules — the curated Node Operators Registry, Simple DVT, the permissionless Community Staking Module, and the MaxEB Curated Module v2. Withdrawal credentials for pooled validators are set by the router to the protocol’s WithdrawalVault, not by operators, so operators can never redirect user principal. Their misbehavior can only degrade yield (socialized to stETH holders), they post a bond in the newer modules (CSM/CMv2), and their validators can be force-exited via EIP-7002.\n\n\n\n### The oracle and the EL↔CL boundary\n\nBecause validator balances, exits and slashings live on the consensus layer, Lido bridges that boundary two ways: a 9-member oracle committee (quorum 5 of 9, the same members across all consensus instances) that reports aggregate balances and drives the daily rebase and withdrawal finalization; and trustless EIP-4788 beacon-root proofs for facts about specific validators. Each committee seat is an Execution Delegation Framework DelegationContract rather than a key: its current delegate (a hot key) submits reports through it, while the seat’s immutable owner can revoke the delegate instantly and install a new one after a 2-day cooldown without a DAO vote. Only the DAO can add or remove seats. A malicious oracle quorum is bounded by the OracleReportSanityChecker, which clamps per-report rebase and consensus-layer balance change within on-chain limits — it can degrade or freeze, but principal theft is tightly bounded. If the oracle committee stops reporting, rebases and withdrawal finalization stop.\n\n### Deposits, DSM and withdrawals\n\nDeposits of pooled ETH into new validators flow only through the Deposit Security Module (stVaults deposit through the PredepositGuarantee instead): 6 guardians (quorum 4), whose seats are DelegationContracts with the same owner and delegate model as the oracle seats, sign off on the current deposit-contract root and key set before each deposit, guarding against the [deposit-frontrunning attack](https://hackmd.io/@lido/HJfjMgW56), in which a node operator pre-registers one of its validator keys with its own withdrawal credentials so that Lido’s deposit to that key would end up under the operator’s control; any single guardian can pause deposits or unvet a module’s signing keys, and only the DAO can unpause. Withdrawals are requested into the WithdrawalQueue (minting an unstETH NFT) and can only be finalized inside the oracle report, paying the lesser of the rate at request time and the report’s share rate.\n\n\n\n### stVaults (Lido V3)\n\nIsolated StakingVaults let operators mint stETH against 0x02-credential collateral, over-collateralized per tier, capped at 10% of stETH shares per vault and a global 30% external-ratio cap in the Lido contract. Bad debt can only be socialized to stETH holders through a role-gated committee process with an LDO objection window.\n\n### Governance and Dual Governance\n\nEvery protocol-critical action is controlled by the Lido DAO and must pass Dual Governance: Aragon Voting proposes, and execution flows through a timelock (3-day submit + 1-day schedule minimum) to the DAO Agent, which is proxy-admin of the entire protocol. stETH and wstETH holders can veto by locking ≥1% of supply in the signalling Escrow, and rage-quit at ≥10% to exit before a contested proposal executes. A time-boxed emergency committee set can freeze execution or, until 2027-06-20, reset governance to a no-veto fallback. Because the DAO can re-point the whole protocol by swapping the LidoLocator implementation, the ultimate trust assumption is the DAO acting through Dual Governance’s economic-veto timelock.",
"links": {
"websites": [
"https://lido.fi/"
],
"documentation": [
"https://docs.lido.fi/"
],
"repositories": [
"https://github.com/lidofinance/core"
],
"socialMedia": [
"https://x.com/LidoFinance"
]
}
}+50 -0
{
"category": "Liquid Staking",
"liquidStaking": {
"minting": {
"value": "Permissionless",
"secondLine": "gated by DSM 4/6",
"sentiment": "good",
"description": "Anyone can stake ETH for stETH, up to 150,000 ETH at a time. Sending it to new validators needs 4 of 6 guardian signatures, and any one guardian can pause that."
},
"operators": {
"value": "Hybrid",
"secondLine": "no bond; CSM bonded",
"sentiment": "neutral",
"description": "Most operators are curated and post no bond, so their slashing losses are shared by all holders. 626 permissionless operators (9% of stake) post a bond that covers their penalties."
},
"backing": {
"value": "Protocol vault",
"secondLine": "creds: protocol",
"sentiment": "good",
"description": "Validators withdraw to a Lido contract set by the protocol, not by operators. Vaults can also mint stETH against their own collateral, capped at 30% of supply (0.04% today)."
},
"exchangeRate": {
"value": "5 of 9",
"secondLine": "daily · ≤0.075%",
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "A 5-of-9 oracle committee reports balances daily, and each report can raise the rate by at most 0.075%. If the committee stops, the rate and withdrawals freeze."
},
"exit": {
"value": "Oracle-gated",
"secondLine": "≤1 day · pausable",
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Withdrawal requests are finalized in a later oracle report, at the lower of the request and report rate. A 3/6 committee can pause the queue for 21 days, and another can extend that indefinitely."
},
"upgrades": {
"value": "Lido DAO",
"secondLine": "4d min · stETH veto",
"sentiment": "neutral",
"description": "Code changes go through Dual Governance and take at least 4 days. Holders locking 1% of stETH delay a change; at 10% they can exit before it applies. Until 2027-06-20, emergency committees can freeze execution."
}
},
"tokens": [
{
"symbol": "stETH",
"name": "Lido Staked Ether",
"description": "Rebasing receipt for pooled ETH: balances follow the daily oracle report."
},
{
"symbol": "wstETH",
"name": "Wrapped liquid staked Ether 2.0",
"description": "Non-rebasing wrapper of stETH: a fixed share count whose ETH value rises with rewards; immutable."
}
],
"tvl": {
"source": "l2beat"
}
}+73 -3
+1 -1
{
"badges": [],
"description": "Rocket Pool is an Ethereum liquid staking protocol. Users deposit ETH and receive rETH, a token whose value tracks the protocol's pooled ETH and staking rewards. Validators are run by registered node operators who combine their own ETH bond with ETH supplied by the pool. Withdrawal credentials point to protocol contracts, so operators cannot take user principal. The core trust surface is a 6-of-10 oracle set that reports the balances used to price rETH, with each report limited to a 2% price move and one report every 1 day. The same oracle set can upgrade protocol contracts after a delay of 7 days, subject to a veto by a 2 of 3 (67%) security council Safe. On-chain redemptions cannot be paused, but depend on available protocol liquidity.",
"description": "Rocket Pool is a permissionless liquid staking protocol. Users deposit ETH for rETH, a token whose value tracks validators run by bonded node operators and is priced by an oracle set that also governs upgrades.",
"detailedDescription": "Rocket Pool is an Ethereum staking pool. Anyone can deposit ETH and receive rETH, a token that appreciates against ETH as the pool's validators earn rewards. Node operators run the validators by putting up part of the stake, with the pool supplying the remainder, and never take custody of depositors' ETH. A permissioned oracle set of 10 node operators writes the number that rETH prices itself from, and the same set is the only actor that can change protocol code.\n\n### Depositing\n\nDepositing is open to anyone with a minimum of 0.01 ETH. The protocol keeps a fee of 0.05% and mints rETH with the rest. Incoming ETH first refills the redemption buffer up to 1% of the tracked backing, and the remainder waits in RocketVault until it is matched to a validator, under a cap of 6,000,000 ETH on unassigned ETH. Deposits can be switched off instantly by the security council and by RPL governance.\n\n\n\n### Redeeming\n\nRedeeming is open to any holder and has no pause switch, but it pays only from liquid ETH, the token contract's buffer plus the deposit pool's unassigned surplus. When that runs out, redemption reverts and holders use the secondary market or wait. The protocol does not implement EIP-7002, so no contract can force a validator exit. Staked ETH returns only when validators leave the beacon chain, at the operator's initiative or through slashing.\n\n\n\n### The exchange rate\n\nThe rETH price is a stored number, total backing ETH divided by rETH supply, written by the oracle set. A report needs 6 of 10 members to agree, can move the price at most 2% in either direction, and can land once per 1 day. Reports do not expire, so a silent oracle freezes the price and minting and redemption continue at the stale value. A lying oracle is capped at 2% per report, but nothing caps the cumulative drift. Reporting can be switched off instantly by the security council. The same set also reports the RPL price and the rewards tree, and a seat requires a bond of 1,750 RPL that the other members can burn by voting the member out.\n\n### Node operators\n\nOperators post part of each validator's 32 ETH as a bond and borrow the rest from the pool. Registration of new operators is a protocol switch, currently enabled. Staking RPL is optional, it adds governance voting power and a share of protocol revenue, and unstaking takes 28 days. Staked RPL is held by protocol contracts, so a contract upgrade by the oracle set can reach it. Operators cannot take depositors' ETH. Validator withdrawals land in a protocol contract that splits them on-chain between operator and pool, anyone can trigger the split, and exits are proven against beacon-chain state rather than reported. The oracle set can fine an operator in ETH at 51% agreement, capped at 612 ETH per penalty and over a rolling window.\n\n### Governance and upgrades\n\nOnly an executed oracle-set proposal can change protocol code. Voting cannot open until 7 days after a proposal is made, and a passed upgrade waits another 7 days before any member can execute it. The lane's reach is nearly total, everything including the deposit pool and the balance oracle is replaceable through it, and only a short fixed list of contracts, among them the vault and the tokens, keeps its code. RPL governance cannot upgrade anything.\n\n**The security council**\n\nMembership is held by a 2 of 3 (67%) Safe appointed by RPL governance. The council can veto a pending upgrade while it waits out its delay, and can instantly flip an allowlist of settings, today mostly on and off switches for deposits, registrations, and oracle reporting, plus a capped nudge to the node commission share. It cannot upgrade contracts, move funds, or stop redemption.\n\n**RPL governance**\n\nRegistered node operators vote with their staked RPL, counted up to 150% of their bonded ETH value. RPL held outside a node carries no vote. Voting power is proven optimistically, a proposer bonds 100 RPL, anyone can challenge a claimed tally with 10 RPL, and an unanswered challenge defeats the proposal after 30 minutes. What passes can set any protocol parameter, spend the treasury, and change the council's membership, but cannot change code.\n\n**The guardian**\n\nAn externally owned account left from deployment. Its original admin powers are permanently disabled, but it still sets the penalty ceiling for legacy validators, with no upper bound and no way for governance to reach or revoke that power.\n\n### What cannot be changed\n\nNo party can upgrade the vault or the token contracts, redirect a funded validator's payout, pause redemption, or move a holder's tokens. Withdrawal credentials are fixed to the validator contract when it is funded. The oracle set can misprice rETH by 2% per report and, after the delays above and absent a veto, replace the code that computes the price. The security council can stop deposits and freeze the price immediately. Neither can reach the pool's ETH without first changing code through the delayed lane.",
"links": {
"websites": [
"https://rocketpool.net/"
],
"documentation": [
"https://docs.rocketpool.net/"
],
"repositories": [
"https://github.com/rocket-pool/rocketpool"
],
"socialMedia": [
"https://x.com/Rocket_Pool"
]
},
"references": [
{
"title": "RPIP-61: rETH exchange rate update bounds",
"url": "https://rpips.rocketpool.net/RPIPs/RPIP-61"
},
{
"title": "RPIP-33: Protocol DAO governance",
"url": "https://rpips.rocketpool.net/RPIPs/RPIP-33"
}
]
}+53 -1
{
"category": "Liquid Staking"
"category": "Liquid Staking",
"liquidStaking": {
"minting": {
"value": "Permissionless",
"secondLine": "ungated FIFO queue",
"sentiment": "good",
"description": "Anyone can deposit ETH (minimum 0.01 ETH, 0.05% fee) for rETH. Deposits go to queued validators in order. The 2/3 security council or RPL governance can switch deposits off."
},
"operators": {
"value": "Permissionless",
"secondLine": "ETH bond",
"sentiment": "good",
"description": "Anyone can register as an operator (currently enabled). Operators bond part of each validator's ETH, which absorbs losses before holders. The protocol cannot force an operator to exit."
},
"backing": {
"value": "Minipools",
"secondLine": "creds: minipool",
"sentiment": "good",
"description": "Each validator withdraws to its own Rocket Pool contract, fixed when it is funded. Returned ETH is split on-chain between the operator and the pool, and the vault and token contracts cannot be upgraded."
},
"exchangeRate": {
"value": "6 of 10",
"secondLine": "daily · ≤2%",
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "6 of 10 oracle DAO members report the rate daily, moving it at most 2% per report. If they stop, the last rate stays in force. The security council can switch reporting off."
},
"exit": {
"value": "Burn anytime",
"secondLine": "instant · no pause",
"sentiment": "good",
"warning": {
"value": "Pays only from the liquid buffer and reverts when it is empty; there is no forced validator exit.",
"sentiment": "warning"
},
"description": "Anyone can burn rETH for ETH instantly, with no queue or pause. ETH comes only from a liquid buffer (target 1% of backing); when it is empty, the burn fails."
},
"upgrades": {
"value": "Oracle DAO (6/10)",
"secondLine": "≥14d · council veto",
"sentiment": "warning",
"description": "Only the oracle DAO (6-of-10 majority) can change the code: 7 days before voting, then 7 days in which the 2/3 security council can veto. The vault and token contracts cannot be upgraded."
}
},
"tokens": [
{
"symbol": "rETH",
"name": "Rocket Pool ETH",
"description": "Appreciating token: its ETH rate, written by the oracle DAO, rises with rewards."
}
],
"tvl": {
"source": "l2beat"
}
}+19 -1
null
[
{
"mode": "custom",
"id": "rocketpool-rETH",
"priceId": "rocket-pool-eth",
"symbol": "rETH",
"name": "Rocket Pool ETH",
"amount": {
"type": "totalSupply",
"chain": "ethereum",
"sinceTimestamp": 1632980684,
"address": "0xae78736Cd615f374D3085123A210448E74Fc6393",
"decimals": 18
},
"category": "ether",
"source": "canonical",
"isAssociated": false
}
]+74 -4
+1 -1
"Binance Wrapped Beacon ETH"
"Binance"+1 -1
{
"badges": [],
"description": "Binance Wrapped Beacon ETH (wBETH) is a liquid staking token for ETH issued by Binance. Users can mint by depositing ETH onchain, while Binance also mints it against BETH balances held on its exchange. Binance controls the exchange rate and custody, must fund queued redemptions (currently delayed by 1 month 10 days), and can mint, pause, blacklist or upgrade without delay.",
"description": "Binance Wrapped Beacon ETH (wBETH) is Binance's liquid staking token. Binance mints it mostly against exchange balances, sets its exchange rate and funds redemptions at its own discretion.",
"detailedDescription": "wBETH is Binance's liquid staking token for ETH. It wraps BETH, Binance's offchain balance for staked ETH, into a token whose ETH value rises as staking rewards accrue.\n\n### Staking and minting\n\nAnyone can deposit ETH in the token contract to mint wBETH at the reported exchange rate. A Binance operator can move that ETH to Binance-controlled addresses or to the redemption queue. Validator balances and rewards are not tracked by the contracts.\n\nBinance can also mint wBETH through its `OperatorWallet` against BETH balances on the exchange. This issuance does not deposit ETH onchain, so users rely on Binance's accounting and custody.\n\n\n\n### Exchange rate\n\nA Binance bot reports the ETH-per-wBETH rate through a limiter currently allowing up to 15% of cumulative change over 1 year. The contracts do not derive this rate from validator balances. Binance can reconfigure or replace the oracle immediately, bypassing the limit.\n\n### Redeeming\n\nHolders burn wBETH at the reported rate to join an onchain ETH redemption queue. Claims are delayed by 1 month 10 days. The operator can change the delay but not below 2 days. A claim is paid only after Binance funds and allocates enough ETH. Pausing or blacklisting can prevent requests or claims.\n\n\n\n### Governance\n\nGovernance is centralized in Binance-controlled EOAs. They can move ETH, mint wBETH, change the rate and operational roles, pause or blacklist users, and upgrade all three upgradeable contracts without delay.",
"links": {
"websites": [
"https://www.binance.com/en/wbeth"
],
"documentation": [
"https://www.binance.com/en/support/faq/what-is-wbeth-e252366155174ba6887f6b32e3798273"
],
"repositories": [],
"socialMedia": [
"https://x.com/binance"
]
},
"references": [
{
"title": "PeckShield audit of wBETH v1 (March 2023)",
"url": "https://github.com/peckshield/publications/blob/master/audit_reports/PeckShield-Audit-Report-wBETH-v1.0.pdf"
},
{
"title": "PeckShield audit of wBETH v2 and the unwrap contract (September 2023)",
"url": "https://github.com/peckshield/publications/blob/master/audit_reports/PeckShield-Audit-Report-wBETHV2-v1.0.pdf"
}
]
}+53 -1
{
"category": "Liquid Staking"
"category": "Liquid Staking",
"liquidStaking": {
"minting": {
"value": "Permissionless",
"secondLine": "swept by Binance",
"sentiment": "bad",
"warning": {
"value": "About 99% of wBETH was minted by Binance against exchange balances, with no ETH deposited on-chain.",
"sentiment": "bad"
},
"description": "Anyone can deposit ETH for wBETH, but about 99% of supply was minted by Binance against exchange balances, with no ETH deposited on-chain. A Binance key can move deposited ETH to Binance at will."
},
"operators": {
"value": "Binance",
"secondLine": "no bond",
"sentiment": "bad",
"description": "No contract tracks validators, balances or slashing. Binance says its validators back wBETH; whether losses pass to holders is Binance's policy, not code."
},
"backing": {
"value": "Off-chain custody",
"secondLine": "creds: Binance",
"sentiment": "bad",
"description": "Deposited ETH moves to a Binance wallet. The token contract holds about 0.04% of the ETH its supply represents; the rest is an exchange balance that cannot be checked on-chain."
},
"exchangeRate": {
"value": "1 of 1",
"secondLine": "daily · ≤15%/yr",
"sentiment": "bad",
"description": "One Binance key writes the rate, with no cap per update and at most 15% over 1 year. The owner can switch the oracle and set any rate at once."
},
"exit": {
"value": "Binance-funded",
"secondLine": "40 days · pausable",
"sentiment": "bad",
"description": "Burned wBETH is paid after a 40-day lock, only once Binance funds the queue. Binance keys can pause withdrawals or blacklist holders."
},
"upgrades": {
"value": "Single EOA",
"secondLine": "no delay · no veto",
"sentiment": "bad",
"description": "A single key can replace the code of both contracts instantly. There is no multisig, timelock or governance."
}
},
"tokens": [
{
"symbol": "wBETH",
"name": "Wrapped Beacon ETH",
"description": "Appreciating wrapper of BETH, Binance's exchange balance for staked ETH; the rate is set by a Binance key."
}
],
"tvl": {
"source": "l2beat"
}
}+19 -1
null
[
{
"mode": "custom",
"id": "wbeth-wBETH",
"priceId": "wrapped-beacon-eth",
"symbol": "wBETH",
"name": "Wrapped Beacon ETH",
"amount": {
"type": "totalSupply",
"chain": "ethereum",
"sinceTimestamp": 1681902323,
"address": "0xa2E3356610840701BDf5611a53974510Ae27E2e1",
"decimals": 18
},
"category": "ether",
"source": "canonical",
"isAssociated": false
}
]